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FOREWORD
The W.E. Upjohn Institute is pleased to publish a comprehensive review of
training and remediation strategies for unemployed and underemployed persons.
Although employability development programs that emphasize relatively longterm investments in training have been subordinate to programs that provide jobs,
this orientation was largely due to the short-term goals inherent in both the policy
orientation and management of the Comprehensive Employment and Training
Act.
The author clearly notes the need to reorient the ends and means of CETA.
Taggart advocates that improvements be made in CETA through gradual realign
ment and the development of new training activities and guidelines. In his view,
training should receive top priority in order that today's unemployed and
underemployed can be equipped to meet the future needs of business and industry
as the U.S. enters a potential labor shortage situation within the next decade or so.
This study is published with the expectation that the author's views on the role
and importance of training will contribute to a more informed discussion of
future employment policies and programs.
Facts and observations presented in this publication are the sole responsibility
of the author. His viewpoints do not necessarily represent positions of the W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
E. Earl Wright
Director
Kalamazoo, Michigan
October 1981
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PREFACE

It is human nature to neglect and squander resources which are
plentiful. It is also human nature to react with alarm and surprise when
these same resources later become scarce and valuable. For decades, our
nation has had a surfeit of unskilled and entry workers, the result, first,
of rising agricultural productivity and rural migration, and, subsequently,
of increased female labor force participation and the coming of age of the
post-war babies. Because these human resources were plentiful, they have
been wasted and disdained. As a nation, we have concentrated our in
vestments on higher education and advanced levels of preparation for those
best able to compete in and contribute to the labor market. Persons of
limited employability have been provided income maintenance, makework, and
remedial band-aids in order to assure minimum well-being and to buy social
peace.
Within a decade, barring world economic collapse or major changes in
our nation's immigration policies, we will face a shortage rather than a
surfeit of entry workers. Today's leftovers will become a scarce and
valuable resource. There will be much handwringing and breastbeating,
then, about why we have done so little to prepare persons of limited
employability to meet the critical needs of industry, and why we have
wasted so much money investing in advanced degrees that have a less than
expected payoff for society and the degree-holders.
The time to begin addressing the issue is now. Sagging productivity
during the 1970s and the decline of our relative economic growth taught us
the dangers of short-term perspectives, inadequate and erratic investments
in capital and equipment, and wasteful use of scarce natural resources.
The lessons are equally applicable to human resources. The future of the
economy and the social fabric depends in great measure on our willingness
to initiate and sustain policies which will develop the potential of those
who have traditionally been discarded and ignored, but who will be needed
more in the coming decades. At least on this one issue, the prescriptions
to achieve equity and efficiency are coincident. Those who preach the
supply-side Gospel, as well as those concerned with mitigating the
inequalities which have proved resistant to short-duration interventions,
should be able to find common ground in support of profitable human
resource investments.
And there is little doubt that training and remediation activities for
persons of limited employability are profitable. According to the best
available evidence, short-duration local classroom training raises earnings
by a tenth in the year after termination, while training on-the-job yields
increments almost twice as large. Comprehensive residential training for
the most disadvantaged youths pays off in earnings gains of a tenth as well
as large reductions in crime and dependency. Moreover, the impacts of
local classroom and residential training increase rather than decay, while
longer-duration training pays off more than proportionately. Every dollar
spent on residential training yields at least $1.45 in social benefits,
according to conservative estimates of the current values of benefits and
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costs and after accounting for alternative real returns on the same
resources. Local classroom training returns an estimated $1.38 for each
dollar invested, while the payoff of on-the-job training is substantially
greater. The investment in remediation and training is, thus, at least as
profitable as the investment in higher education, and it is profitable
despite labor market conditions which currently militate against training
and despite correctable shortcomings in programs and policies.
Most training and remediation for persons of limited employability is
provided under the aegis of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act.
CETA allocates federal funds to state and local governments for classroom
and on-the-job training, as well as for job creation and other activities.
Job Corps is a nationally-operated residential training program for young
adults also authorized by CETA.
Expenditures for Job Corps, local
classroom and on-the-job training totaled $2 billion in 1980.
Yet the primary emphasis of CETA has been to provide jobs rather than
training, and a helping hand rather than substantive remediation or career
ladders. Three-fourths of all local CETA allocations in 1980 were used for
subsidized employment rather than training or transition services. Local
training was primarily of limited duration and in a classroom rather than
job setting. Just a third of classroom trainees received more than half a
year of instruction, and less than one in fifty terminees from local
programs were graduates of more than a year's training. While Job Corps
invested more intensively, opportunities were available for only one in
twenty CETA youth participants. Less than one in ten local nonsummer CETA
participants was trained on the job in the private sector. In total,
training was available for just a small proportion of the universe of need.
Average enrollments in CETA training components in 1980 represented onetwentieth of the unemployed, less than a tenth of the low-income persons in
the work force full-year and predominantly full-time but with earnings
below the poverty level, and only half a percent of the labor force.
Retrenchment since then has substantially reduced training as well as work
experience opportunities.
CETA's planning, budgeting, record-keeping, decisionmaking and
management approaches for local programs evolved to accomplish short-term,
palliative missions; they discourage training investments and undermine
training quality. Resources are allocated according to local area need.
Localities with few jobs and many unemployed get disproportionate funds
despite limited opportunities for training and intense pressures for job
creation. The budgets for CETA categorical programs fluctuate erratically
from year to year, and the allocation of these resources to local areas
based on relative unemployment rates magnifies the variability and
uncertainty in local efforts, undermining systematic decisionmaking and
institution-building. The standardized management information system for
CETA does not record the intensity of services and is focused on short-term
outcomes, so that pressures for placement or cost-saving result in limited
services and quick fixes. There are no national standards for curricula or
for participant performance, no criteria for completion, and no CETA
credentials which document skill acquisition. The federal regulations
stack the cards against on-the-job training, while local decisionmaking
based on short-term results discourages long-duration classroom training.
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As the dramatic decline in labor force entrants in the next two
decades creates shortages of entry workers and increases the importance and
potential of training, the ends and means of the CETA system or its
successor must be reoriented. Training rather than job creation should
receive priority. Where jobs are provided, they should be combined with
and lead into training. The less employable who are willing and able to
make a "quantum leap" should be provided the opportunity. Placement must
be emphasized, particularly where substantial training investments are
involved. Mechanisms are needed to facilitate mobility from high unem
ployment and poverty areas.
To achieve these aims, some long-accepted tenets of employment and
training policy must be exorcised:
--Income maintenance should be deemphasized. Allowances and wages in
training and subsidized jobs are in some cases more than is justified by
need or productivity; they attract and hold some participants who have
limited interest in improving employability. Reduced allowances and wages
would encourage transition into unsubsidized employment and would leave
room for incentives to reward participant performance.
-Uniform, federally-mandated competency assessment systems should be
adopted to measure academic and vocational skill acquisition, to organize
individualized, self-paced instruction, to judge the efffectiveness of
training institutions, and to certify competencies attained.
-More intensive investments are needed. A second tier should be
built on the short-duration training and remediation efforts which now pre
dominate so that individuals with initial deficits but substantial po
tential are provided opportunities for upward mobility.
--Sorting the performers from nonperformers among participants should
be an objective rather than a taboo, as long as remediation and training is
focused on those who need it most. The "winners" among the disadvantaged
can be rewarded without punishing the "losers," if those who cannot advance
to second tier activities continue to receive the type of help now
provided.
--Training for the disadvantaged should utilize mainstream insti
tutions wherever possible, providing participants greater choice and
applying stricter standards of individual performance.
It is unnecessary and unwise to ravage the current CETA system, which
is providing useful short-term training as effectively as possible con
sidering the obstacles and the absence of clear guidance. Improvements can
be achieved through gradual realignment, the development of new components
and changes in the groundrules:
--Remedial education and training should be required supplements to
any CETA work experience, and the hours of subsidized work provided for any
individual should be further restricted.
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--The training required as part of work experience should be unstipended, reducing the hourly compensation and thereby encouraging tran
sition into unsubsidized employment. Allowances should cover the poverty
deficit, with supplemental rewards for performance, rather than being based
on hours of participation.
--On-the-job training regulations should be modified to provide for a
short "try-out" period during which the disadvantaged participants will be
stipended by the public sector while working in the private sector.
-Long-term training at the local level should be encouraged by
set-asides and incentive grants; the CETA Management Information System
must certainly be altered so that intensive investments are no longer
confused with inefficient investments.
--States should arrange to serve residents of those local areas unable
to provide long-term training by contracting with other areas, by es
tablishing statewide programs, and by providing for mobility and resi
dential support.
--Residential- "corporate career" training and internship programs
operated by private sector corporations and associations in their own
training facilities should be developed at the national level, with
opportunities available equally to all in need who prove their commitment
and capacity.
--Youth developmental activities should be separated from career
oriented efforts for adults. In the career system, placement should be
emphasized. No intensive training program should be recontracted or slots
refilled until a predetermined proportion of completers have secured
training-related jobs. "Try-out" OJT positions should not be refilled
unless one of every two participants who get a try-out is hired per
manently.
--Increased reliance must be placed on the voucher approach for
service delivery. Like the GI-bill, assistance might be provided as a
right for those who earn it, with individual choices about how and where to
best use these benefits.
It is not enough to reorient and restructure the remediation and
training system, focusing solely on the supply side of the equation. As
the surplus of entry workers turns to a shortage, there will be need and
potential to increase the incentives for private sector training. Payroll
taxes now used for unemployment insurance might be better applied for
training, with tax offsets where employers mount their own efforts or work
closely with public programs. Training requirements for career entry jobs
in our economy need to be formalized through an expanded and more flexible
apprenticeship system. Once job requirements are specified, we must assure
that the past victims of discrimination are helped to achieve the knowledge
and the skills required for career entry, but that once they attain these
competencies they are no longer victimized by prejudice.

It does not require hundreds of pages of exposition to make these
points. Even the most detailed analysis will not yield unequivocal proof
of what has worked and why. It is impossible to project with any certainty
what will occur in the future. Evidence alone cannot dictate what are in
herently political and normative judgments about what should be done. The
massive detail serves a different purpose. We have complicated social
policy almost beyond understanding.
Since employment and training
activities have been a major growth area, they have attracted legions of
social scientists using their most refined methods to measure every aspect
of manpower programs and their impacts. Their labors have been supported
on the supposition that the knowledge generated would help to rationalize
policymaking, program design, and management. But research, evaluation and
demonstration activities have pushed far beyond the point of diminishing
returns. There is so much information that it overwhelms policymakers and
managers, as well as undermining public understanding and support. Every
finding is equivocated or contradicted by an array of competing facts and
figures. Expertise has become so narrowly focused that it is difficult to
integrate the information so that it makes sense as a whole. Positive or
negative findings, although only pieces of a total puzzle, have at times
exerted disproportionate impact on policy and practice when they have
supported prevailing or emerging political consensus.
I have tried to wrestle this welter of information into submission,
not to discover new truths or to grind any axes, but rather to make sense
out of the confusion and to return to the zone of diminishing rather than
negative returns. It is a heroic undertaking to try to interpret and
integrate the vast array of information generated by two decades of
manpower program experience and hundreds of millions of dollars invested in
research, evaluation and demonstration activities. The interpretations and
the integrations are not sacrosanct. Much evidence has undoubtedly been
overlooked, many of the nuances ignored, and some of the arguments
truncated.
Yet few are likely to condemn the sins of omission. The hundreds of
pages of details and dissections provide a challenge to any reader. This
exegesis is intended for the knowledgeable policymaker, analyst, manager,
or observer who already understands the basics of labor market problems and
remedial interventions, who is struggling to make sense of the mountains of
information, and who is willing to invest time and energy recognizing that
the payoff of increased understanding is modest. "Ivory tower" scholars
will not want to be sullied by the nuts and bolts of management information
systems and performance standards; practitioners may have little interest
in--and some disdain for--the intricacies of benefit-cost analysis or
documented employability distributions; legislators and policymakers may
consider both analytical and operational insights to be inconsequential for
the political agenda. This volume is only worth the effort for those who
believe that theory, practice, and policy are interdependent, that under
standing the details of operations and evaluations is necessary to increase
knowledge, and that greater knowledge can and should guide policy and
practice. Naysayers who deny that labor market problems are real and
serious, that social interventions can make a difference, or that the
effectiveness of public programs can be improved, will find little to
support their preconceptions. By the same token, there is little ammunixi

tion for defenders of the status quo or the status quo ante. The short
comings of past efforts are undeniable, and the need for and directions of
change are documented. The arguments are directed to those who believe we
can and must do better.
This study was made possible by grants from the Charles Stewart Mott
and Edna McConnell Clark Foundations, but the content is my responsibility.
Thanks to Sar, Seymour, Cathy, Nancy, Babs, Flabs, and the few who keep the
faith and wait for tomorrow.

Robert Taggart
Labor Day 1981

xn

CONTENTS

Page
Chapter 1.

Teach Them To Fish

1

A Menu for the Labor Market's Leftovers
A Preview of Coming Attractions

1
8

Chapter 2.

Training the "Leftovers"

The Training System
A Profile of CETA Training
Chapter 3.

13
22

Effects and Effectiveness

Is Training Worthwhile?
An Anatomy of Impacts
Instrumental Factors
Work as Training
A Theoretical Perspective
Chapter 4.

54
54
76
96
126
143

Nuts and Bolts

194

Diversity in Local Training Efforts
The Delivery Perspective
Federal Oversight and Intervention
National Administration The Lessons From Job Corps
Chapter 5.

13

Visions and Revisions

194
217
242
258
278

The End of An Era
Training and Its Impacts A Summary and Interpretation
of Findings
Management, Decisionmaking and Delivery A Summary
and Interpretation of Findings
The Underlying Issues
Shaping the Future
Next Steps
Index

278
280
295
306
336
349
365

Xlll

CHAPTER 1
TEACH THEM TO FISH

"Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day.
Teach him to fish and you feed him for life. "

SECTION 1.
A MENU FOR
THE LABOR MARKET'S LEFTOVERS

In good times and bad, there are millions of individuals who fail in
or are failed by the labor market. As a result of low earnings, in
voluntarily part-time employment, and periods of nonemployment, 15.0 of the
82.5 million persons in the work force fifty weeks or more during 1979 had
annual earnings less than what would have been provided by minimum wage
employment during the hours they were willing and able to work (Table 1.1).
Some among this group were secondary earners or had other sources of
income, so that the welfare consequences of their labor market problems
were not overwhelming. But 4.6 million had earnings so low that, even when
combined with the wages and salaries of other family members, their
earnings were below the poverty level. Another million full-year work
force participants resided in large families whose total earnings were
below poverty even though their own earnings were above the minimum wage
equivalent. Though transfer payments frequently supplemented wages, 3.0
million full-year work force participants were counted among the poor,
along with their dependents.
Standards of need and concern may vary, but the seriousness of these
labor market problems and the severity of the resulting hardship cannot be
easily dismissed. These are not individuals with a marginal attachment to
work. Among the 15 million full-year labor force participants failing to
achieve minimum wage earnings during their hours of availability, 4.6
million were employed full-time for at least 49 weeks. Even when their
full-time, full-year earnings were augmented by the wages of other family
members, 1.4 million had below-poverty family earnings, and .9 million
remained in poverty after receipt of cash transfers.
The numbers counted as having labor market problems and the numbers
suffering hardship as a result are even larger if al 1 work force par
ticipants are considered, including those who entered or left the labor
force during the year. A staggering total of 28.9 million work force
participants in 1980, or one-fourth of the total, fell short of the minimum
full-employment standard--i.e., their earnings did not equal the equivalent
of the minimum wage for all hours and weeks each was willing and able to
work. There were 6.9 million work force participants counted among the
poor, and their combined earnings deficit relative to the minimum fullemployment standard equalled half of the total poverty deficit.

Table 1.1
The Leftovers 1n the Labor Market 1n 1979--Persons With Employment and Earnings Problems and Resulting Hardship
In Work Force
50 Weeks or More
During 1979
(OOOs)

In Work Force
26 Weeks or More
During 1979
(OOOs)

In Work Force at
Least One Week
During 1979
(OOOs)

15,013

19,984

28,893

4,577
4,796
5,301
339

5,260
6,497
7,805
422

6,948
7,855
12,175
1,915

5,546

7,818

12,914

1,386
1,815
2,161
183

1,705
2,528
3,351
235

2,857
3,151
6,005
902

Persons wanting to work, working or seeking
work who earned less than the minimum wage
multiplied by their hours of availability for work
Employed full-time during period in work force
Intermittently employed during period 1n work force
Employed part-time during entire period in work force
Could not find job during period in work force
Persons wanting to work, working or seeking work
whose annual earnings, combined with those of
other family members, were less than poverty
level for their households
Employed full-time during period 1n work force
Intermittently employed during period 1n work force
Employed part-time during entire period in work force
Could not find job during period in work force
Persons wanting to work, working or seeking work
whose annual earnings, combined with those of
other family members and supplemented by other
income sources, remained less than the poverty level
for their households
Employed full-time during period in work
Intermittently employed during period in
Employed part-time entire period in work
Could not find job during period in work
Source:

force
work force
force
force

3,026

4,172

6,853

897
1,051
952
126

1,082
1,487
1,440
164

1,704
1,913
2,630
606

Bureau of Census, unpublished tabulations from March 1981 Current Population Survey based on Sar A. Levitan and
Robert Taggart, Hardship: A System for Measurement and Analysis of the Welfare Consequences of Employment and
Earnings Problems (Washington, D.C.:Center for'Social Policy Studies, January 1981).

Economic growth and tight labor markets modestly alleviate but hardly
eliminate such problems.
In March 1968, during a period of what now is
remembered fondly as "full-employment," one in eight active or discouraged
labor force participants was officially unemployed, out of the labor force
due to discouragement over limited job prospects, working part-time in
voluntarily, or employed full-time but earning less than a poverty income
over the previous year. This incidence rate was only slightly below the
one-in-seven ratio which prevailed among work force participants in March
1980. I/ If the unemployment and discouragement rates in 1980 had been
reduced to the extremely low rates a decade previously, there would still
have been over four million persons in the labor force full-time, full-year
in 1980 with earnings below the poverty level because of unemployment or
low wages, and with family incomes no more than 50 percent above pov
erty. 2J In other words, the problems of the labor market's "leftovers"-those with limited skills, experience, and credentials, the victims of
stunted opportunities, discrimination, and bad luck, the residents of
poverty areas and declining labor markets, and those whose individual,
family, or cultural problems undermine successful performance in the
workplace will not be solved by an improved economy alone.
A basic dilemma of every society
least productive segment of its work
natives. The first is to do nothing,
ineffective or even counterproductive,

is how to deal
force. There
in the belief
that those who

with this excess and
are six basic alter
that any step will be
fail in a competitive

labor market have only themselves to blame, and that hardship is a great
motivator. This "let them eat cake" approach has proved more durable in
rhetoric than in application. Political expediency has usually favored
"bread and circuses" providing income or in-kind support for minimal needs
and diversion from the grim reality of poverty and inequality. However,
neither bread nor circuses come cheap, and an alternative has always been
job creation whether the waging of wars or the building of Pyramids to
put the idle to work and make them pay for their support. With the rise of
industrial societies and the increased complexity of the labor market, the
options have expanded. Existing jobs can be accessed by reducing the costs
of labor or certain types of labor, or by "jawboning" employers into hiring
more or different persons than dictated by market forces or market mores.
Reduced labor costs can stimulate employment growth, or at least a
redistribution of employment opportunities. Wage subsidies to encourage
the hiring of the less employable have been around since the introduction
of the Speenhamland system in England in 1795. Labor market inter
mediation, i.e., public support of exchanges to match up workers with jobs,
began in most industrial nations at the turn of the century in the belief
that some or all of joblessness resulted from either ignorance of available
opportunities or malingering which could be addressed by conditioning
income transfers on the use of labor market exchanges.
The final approach for dealing with the excess and least productive
segment of the work force is to increase their productivity through
education and training. On-the-job training as a public policy is nothing
new. Our nation was built on the labor of indentured servants most of
whom were debtors, the children of the poor or "undesirables" not absorbed
in the European labor market and, therefore, shipped over to the new
country to work and learn a trade. Institutional training and education
were viewed as the primary mechanisms for absorbing and "Americanizing"
immigrant populations in the early 1900s. In the last two decades,
however, human resource development has emerged as a basic tool of manpower
policies addressed to the problems of the "leftovers" in the economy.
Unlike the income maintenance, job creation, employer subsidy, or labor
market intermediation approaches, the goal of education and training
efforts is not just to mitigate the symptoms of the problems, but to get at
their causes, to alter not just the present but the future as well. As an
old proverb moralizes: "Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day.
Teach him to fish and you feed him for life."
While almost all developed countries have experienced a secular
increase in active efforts targeted to the labor market's leftovers, most
have also experienced cycles of activism then neglect. Nations vary over
time, as well as relatively, in their emphasis on providing fish, creating
jobs to work off the costs, guiding and coercing those in need to the best
fishing spots, stocking the lakes, teaching fishing skills, or simply
trying to ignore the reality that people are hungry. These fluctuations
follow some predictable patterns. Income maintenance tends to move forward
Social unrest or the discovery of previously "hidden"
in ratchets.
distress generates support for broad changes which frequently overshoot
available resources and lead to inclusion of some who are considered
"malingerers" and "cheaters." Exposure of these problems then offers an
excuse to stabilize or even reverse the progress, until a new salient of
distress is "discovered," or a new crisis generates consensus for another

action period. Job creation is tied to the business cycle. When economic
conditions deterioriate, pressure mounts for a policy response, and job
creation is usually the most expedient and visible remedy. When conditions
improve or stabilize, or the fisc runs dry, public opinion shifts and the
created jobs previously considered "vital" and "productive" become per
ceived as idle leaf-raking. Retrenchment usually follows. Job access
strategies fluctuate in a counter cycle. When tight labor markets absorb
the more employable workers, employers are ready to support subsidy schemes
which will help them cope with the costs of reaching further down the labor
queue. When conditions normalize, the entreaties and incentives have few
takers. Labor market intermediation, because of its low cost, tends to
continue in good times and bad, but it becomes more fashionable when the
"let them eat cake" approach is in ascendancy or when business conditions
are good. Evidence of unfilled jobs is then used to support the argument
that low cost placement and job search assistance activities can get
everyone employed, and that the high costs of job creation, hiring sub
sidies, and income maintenance can, therefore, be reduced. This approach
works until it is tried on more than a limited scale and the truth becomes
evident that frictional problems are small in relation to structural
problems that there really are not enough jobs for those who lack skills.
Business conditions also affect the emphasis on training, education, and
employability development. Investments in the future rest on the assump
tion and evidence that they will pay off that once taught to fish, an in
dividual will, indeed, be fed for a lifetime. When resources are scarce or
joblessness is prevalent, the investment costs become more burdensome and
the payoffs more questionable since already skilled resources are idle.
The cycles of activism and neglect, and the shifts in emphasis from
one approach to another, are demarcated by periods of friction and debate.
In democratic societies, such changes in public policy usually require
broad consensus and compelling arguments in order to overcome the vested
interests benefitting from the status quo. To build this consensus and
rationale, it is almost always necessary to inflate expectations and ignore
shortcomings, or, conversely, to minimize needs and to exaggerate flaws.
While the policies may represent reasonable responses to changing con
ditions, policymaking itself is rarely a rational process. Each change in
pace or emphasis is heralded as a new and permanent departure rather than a
needed correction. The mechanics of gear-shifting, accelerating and
braking are all consuming, leaving little time to focus on ultimate des
tinations.
Social policy in this country reflects these same patterns. The New
Deal and the War on Poverty were active periods, followed by retrenchment
and stabilization under the Eisenhower and Nixon/Ford administrations. We
are now, apparently, at a turning point in another cycle. During the late
1970s, there was a dramatic expansion of public efforts on behalf of the
excess and least employable segments of the work force. The Carter
administration's economic stimulus package including public service
employment, youth jobs, and public works, represented the largest con
centrated job creation effort in our nation's history, even though few
commentators have recognized its scale. This was accompanied by a massive
expansion in residential skill training for disadvantaged youth and the
initiation of special national programs for institutional and on-the-job
training. As the stimulus took hold and employment growth accelerated,

emphasis shifted to tax credit mechanisms to encourage private employers to
reach down to the disadvantaged. These incentives were complemented by
private sector initiatives providing employment and training resources
through business-dominated local organizations in order to better adapt
public interventions to employers' needs.
These recent job creation and training efforts were mounted under the
authorization of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) and
the oversight of the Department of Labor's Employment and Training Adminis
tration. Real expenditures under CETA more than doubled between 1976 and
1980, rising to a peak of over $10 billion. Problems were inherent in such
pell-mell expansion. They became visible just as overall employment growth
was undermining the consensus and need for such activities, while inflation
was eroding the nation's ability to pay. Not unexpectedly, criticism of
CETA reached a fever pitch, particularly concerning its countercyclical job
President Reagan campaigned on the promise of
creation components.
governmental retrenchment, and even though the Carter administration's
budget had already drastically reduced CETA work components, the new
administration followed through on its campaign promise by proposing and
achieving the immediate elimination of both countercyclical and structural
public service employment, as well as trimming youth job programs.
Throughout this turbulent period, the "T" in CETA was generally
obscured by the "E" and the "A". During the economic stimulus in the late
1970s, job creation received priority and the delivery system at the
federal, state, and local levels strained to reach hiring targets. Most of
the action revolved around public service employment, so that CETA became
synonymous with PSE, as it was called. When doubts mounted about the need
for and efficacy of job creation, this identification became costly. The
public's disdain for perceived "makework" was translated into a disdain for
all CETA activities and for the delivery system as well. In retrospect,
the administrative problems resulting from the massive CETA growth must
certainly be judged as minor by any reasonable standards, but "fraud and
abuse"--however isolated relative to total activities are the lightning
rods for changing public values. The administrative arrangements for the
delivery of employment and training services, thus, became the subject of
detailed legislative tinkering in 1978 to solve alleged shortcomings. In
many ways, these changes simply made things worse certainly more com
plicated. As the 1980s opened, there was widespread agreement that more
substantial changes were required perhaps even the elimination of CETA at
the end of its authorization in 1982.
Little of the criticism was focused on CETA's training components.
While the public may have limited enthusiasm for "makework," there is much
stronger support for training and education that increases the selfsufficiency of the disadvantaged and meets the skill needs of the economy.
Nevertheless, there is a good possibility that in the fervor of budget
cutting, public training investments for persons of limited employability
will also be judged expendable. It is to be hoped that such decisions
would consider the impacts and effectiveness of CETA training, the pros
pects for improved performance, and the future role of training in our
economy. The detailed analysis which follows seeks to provide the in
formation needed for this consideration. It focuses on the neglected
dimension of CETA--training for the disadvantaged.

There is, of course, no exact dichotomy between training, job crea
tion, labor market intermediation, job access and income maintenance.
Subsidized public sector jobs may serve as training sites. Tax credits and
other subsidy mechanisms may be a good way to "buy" jobs for those who are
trained. Placement and labor market intermediation are important adjuncts
to training, although they more often occur without it. Income maintenance
is a fundamental component where the disadvantaged lack the resources to
invest their time and energy in training. Yet if these elements are
interrelated, training is certainly different!'able in that its fundamental
aim is to improve the skills and competencies of individuals in order to
increase future employability, rather than to maintain well-being or
provide immediate employment.
The analysis concentrates on the training which occurs under the
auspices of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act simply because
CETA accounts for the bulk of training activities for persons of limited
employability and limited prospects. The substance of the training
activities, their impacts and impact patterns, are the primary concern.
CETA administrative or decisionmaking arrangements are considered only to
the extent they affect training outcomes. In fact, CETA consists of
several different administrative, decisionmaking, and delivery approaches
for training, which can be and are contrasted to suggest ways in which
training goals might best be acheived under whatever legislation replaces
or modifies the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act.
Although CETA is the primary mechanism for dealing with the labor
market's "leftovers," CETA training represents only a minor element of our
nation's overall human resource development system. More than most other
industrial countries, we rely on the education system to initially prepare
our work force, with limited formalized training beyond the career entry
point and with skills acquired, instead, through job mobility and cumula
tive work experiences. For those who do not make it in the educational
system or onto a job ladder in the labor market, the options are limited.
CETA training for the disadvantaged amounted to less than 2 percent of
public expenditures for human resources development in fiscal 1980: 3/
Public Expenditures
for Human
Resource Development
Fiscal 1980
(Billions)
Elementary and secondary education
Higher education
Secondary and post-secondary vocational
education
Military training
Veterans' training
Vocational rehabilitation
CETA expenditures for training

$94.5
40.3
10.9
10.0
2.2
1.2
2.0

The private sector does not provide many alternatives. Expenditures
for private vocational and technical school training in 1980 were an esti
mated $1.8 billion, with some of this subsidized by public funds, par
ticularly under the veterans' training programs, and much of it beyond the
means of persons with limited earnings and income. The estimates of formal
training and education financed by industry are not very dependable, but a
best guess is that between $5 billion and $8.5 billion were spent in 1980,
excluding the wage and salary costs for training during work hours. 4/
Finally, private expenditures for elementary and secondary education were
$11.9 billion and those for higher education were $19.0 billion. CETA
training, thus, represented less than 1 percent of combined public and
private human resource development expenditures. _5/
From any reasonable perspective, then, it is striking how little this
nation commits to improving the employability of those at the end of the
labor queue. Under CETA in 1980, there were 700,000 new participants in
institutional or on-the-job training, representing just 4 percent of all
those who experienced unemployment during the year, a miniscule .6 percent
of all persons in the labor force, and less than a tenth of all persons in
the labor force at least half the year whose earnings, when combined with
those of other family members, fell below the poverty level. The average
number in training at any point in time was less than half this level. In
other words, CETA--even before the Reagan administration retrenchments was
anything but "comprehensive" in addressing the human resource development
needs of persons with limited employability.
The evidence of unfilled needs is not, in itself, a proof that more
training for the disadvantaged is worthwhile, and this analysis is intended
as an objective assessment not as advocacy. It seeks to cut through the
confusion that surrounds CETA, and sort through the massive information
which has been gathered but largely unutilized, in order to determine the
amount and types of training which are being provided, the numbers and
characteristics of recipients, the aggregate impacts, the success deter
minants, the success rates for different trainee groups, the benefits and
costs of training, the theoretical models which best explain these
patterns, the institutional factors producing the aggregate outcomes, and
the best means to improve performance. Training as a tool for improving
limited employability is the concern, not CETA itself. There were other
funding, decisionmaking, and administrative mechanisms for training before
CETA, there are several variants under CETA, and new approaches may be
needed in the future. But evidence and analysis concerning the current
system's effectiveness should be the driving force of any reform, rather
than anecdote and ideology which have been the primary focus in discussions
of CETA to date.

SECTION 2.
A PREVIEW OF COMING ATTRACTIONS

The description and analysis which follow are extremely detailed and
range from abstract theory and recondite benefit-cost calculations to "nuts
and bolts" assessments of management information systems, performance
monitoring approaches and regulations. The second chapter describes CETA
and its training components, providing a roadmap for the complicated
legislative and programmatic structure, as well as an overview of activity
levels and trends, the allocation of training opportunities, and the sa
lient features of the various training approaches. The third chapter
provides the view from the "ivory tower," synthesizing the findings from a
wide range of evaluations concerning the effectiveness of training ac
tivities, the causal factors and the patterns of impact in order to
determine why, how, and for whom, not just whether, training works. The
fourth chapter focuses on delivery and decisionmaking. It seeks to
determine how policy decisions, management approaches and systems, and
institutional factors produce the results which have been analyzed in the
preceding chapters, and to determine how improvements can best be achieved.
The final chapter summarizes the findings on training and its impacts as
well as those concerning decisionmaking and delivery. It interprets both
sets of findings, discusses some of the controversial underlying issues and
long-term options, and provides detailed recommendations for immediate
action.
The analysis is not simple. The evidence is drawn from a diverse
array of sources. In almost all cases, data had to be manipulated and
adjusted to focus on specific issues or to achieve comparability across
sources. Particularly in the impact and benefit-cost sections, there was
reliance on studies and methodologies supported by a separate analytical
literature. The footnotes reference the sources of information, discuss
the major interpretative issues, explain data manipulations, and provide
detail to back up summary information in the text. While every effort is
made to simplify the presentation, the volume of information is more than
most readers would care to know, and the last chapter provides a compre
hensive summary of the findings so that it can be read alone.
Yet if the evidence is voluminous and the analysis complex, the con
clusions are quite simple. They may also be somewhat controversial, both
for supporters and critics of employment and training programs. The most
important finding is that training programs and the training system work
despite substantial room for improvement and despite labor market con
ditions that are far from propitious. The evidence overwhelmingly indi
cates that CETA training for the leftovers in the labor market increases
their post-program employment and earnings. Moreover, the dollars-andcents benefits from training outweigh the costs, so that the investment
pays off for society. The potential for and directions of improvement are
fairly clear. While there are shortcomings in the current system, there
are no villains. The system emerged to meet and did meet the needs of the
last two decades, when job creation was the most critical issue. Its
problems were mostly the result of unclear and changing signals, and the
lack of a coherent design. The drastic decline in the number of work force
entrants in the coming years will alter needs and potentials, but there is

every reason to believe that the existing delivery system s if properly
directed and realigned, can adjust to these changes and that it provides a
reasonable foundation for meeting the needs of the next two decades.
It is the basic precepts of employment and training policy rather
than the system itself which are challenged by the evidence:
First, a fundamental postulate of manpower policy over the last two
decades is that work experience increases employability. The evidence
suggests, on the contrary, that work per se does not improve post-program
labor market success, except when it is targeted to those entering or
reentering the labor force and needing a stepping-stone, when it is
designed as a training activity or is combined with classroom training, and
when it serves as a transition and on-the-job training mechanism into
unsubsidized employment in the public and nonprofit sectors. Job creation
may be justified because it alleviates structural and countercyclical
problems and is a preferable alternative to income maintenance, but not
because of its effects on employability. There is potential and need to
increase the training elements in work experence.
Second, CETA has been focused on short interventions intended to yield
immediate improvements in employment and earnings. Yet training pays off
most when it is long enough so that participants can achieve measurable and
certifiable competencies that are required in the labor market. For a
disadvantaged individual to attain a high school equivalency or postsecondary training degree, or to learn almost any occupational skill, takes
substantially more time than the average duration of CETA training. Only a
small minority of participants are assigned to training that is long enough
to provide credentials and competencies that will help to feed them for a
lifetime. Perhaps only a few in a hundred participants have the endurance
or capacity for the one-, two- or even four-year training, but it is
critical to begin providing opportunities for this minority to achieve
"quantum leaps" in employability.
Third, CETA is now essentially a "one-shot" intervention rather than
an employability development system. The participant enters the door, is
assessed, assigned to a limited duration component, and then (sometimes)
placed in a job on completion. What is needed is an opportunity ladder
which individuals will mount and scale at the level and pace dictated by
their ability and motivation. This, in turn, requires a system for
measuring competencies and competency acquisition. It requires standards
of completion as well as qualitative standards for inputs. Most of all, it
requires that these standards be maintained. Some of those who now linger
in CETA's training activities without performing or progressing should be
terminated. The better classroom training opportunities, and the limited
number of on-the-job training slots should go to those who have progressed
through the system rather than to those who are most qualified when they
enter and have the least need of help. Activities should be building
blocks, with increased use of combinations such as work experience leading
to classroom training followed by training on-the-job.
Fourth, more sorting must be done among those in need. The labor
market's leftovers include individuals of widely-ranging potential, and too
little is now done for those who have greater ability and motivation. If a
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second tier of advanced opportunities were added to what now exists in
CETA, no one who exerted an effort would get less than under the current
system, but those who exerted more effort and had more potential could
advance substantially. Alternatively, the second tier might be financed by
savings which could be achieved under current programs if they were focused
solely on training rather than functioning as stopgaps for persons with no
other options. Allowances in classroom training and wages in on-the-job
training should be used as a means to reward performance, to cover the
extra costs of participation, and to meet only the poverty deficits which
would hinder participation, rather than providing an incentive to par
ticipate even when there is no desire to be trained. There is room for
some savings in this regard, probably enough to finance longer training for
a reasonable proportion of current trainees. But a tradeoff is inherent:
Fewer individuals can be served when longer training is provided with any
given level of resources. While the net result of adding a second tier of
opportunities will be greater average and aggregate impacts for those in
need, the benefits will be less broadly shared. This is only equitable if
the opportunity structure is established so that all participants have an
equal shot at the longer and more promising training opportunities.
Some changes are needed in law, regulations, program design, and
management in light of these findings, but the bigger challenge is to alter
thought processes which have guided manpower programs and policies for
years. We must begin thinking about long-term impacts and "quantum leaps"
not just immediate outcomes and marginal gains. A stable training system
is needed rather than an ever changing array of separate training programs.
There must be long-term strategies, both locally and nationally, for
building a range of new opportunity tracks for disadvantaged individuals
with potential. Quality, not just quantity, needs to be emphasized in
curricula, in staff, and in outcomes. The employment and training system
must, in every way possible, utilize existing institutions rather than
maintaining segregated and frequently second-class delivery approaches for
the disadvantaged.
Even with such changes, the potential of training efforts for persons
of limited employability will be circumscribed unless the institutional
setting is altered. As long as there are disincentives for training by the
private sector, as long as the competencies and training needed to fill
available jobs in the economy are uncertain, and as long as help is offered
to persons of limited employability as an act of "noblesse oblige," public
programs will continue to have difficulty determining and meeting private
sector needs, private employers will stay at arm's length, discounting the
quality of training, and public resources will remain inequitably dis
tributed and overly concentrated on advanced education even though entrylevel investments would yield more payoff in the expected labor market of
the next two decades. Some of the long-term options which need to be
considered are, first, a GI-Bill approach to career training and education,
where all individuals would be guaranteed two years of post-secondary
training or retraining to be purchased from public and private institutions
by voucher; second, employer and employee taxes to cover part of the costs
of this career training, with credits where the private sector provides the
training itself, in order to encourage more entry training; and third,
expansion of the apprenticeship system to formalize the career entry tracks
and to identify the competencies and training necessary to perform career
entry jobs in our economy.
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While these changes in the precepts of employment and training
programs and in the setting in which they operate may be considered
revolutionary, they can and must be achieved through a steady evolutionary
process. The current array of CETA training programs and institutions can
serve as a foundation for building a more effective, equitable, and
comprehensive system. The changes which are necessary in the short term
are justified on their own merits, and do not require, nor do they commit
the nation to, a specific long-term path. Yet they certainly make sense in
terms of what can be expected in the labor market in the years ahead.
There is no question that we are entering a decade when the number of
excess and less desirable workers will decline as demographic trends play
out. There will, at the same time, be increasing demand for minimal com
petencies in even the lowest-level jobs. In contrast to the situation in
the 1970s, there will be abundant opportunities for successfully training
those at the end of the labor queue for career entry rather than just
short-term jobs. Training which is longer term and more ambitious in its
aims should become more feasible.
While the weight of the evidence is convincing in suggesting the
redirections for employment and training policy in the 1980s, it does not
rest on proof of the failure of policies in the 1970s or on promises of
massive improvements in the next decade. Training cannot help much in
areas or in periods where there are massive job deficits. It can help only
those who are willing and able to work to get ahead. Only a minority will
be "fed for a lifetime" by the skills and credentials they can reasonably
be expected to acquire. Yet with a changing economic scenario and
realizable improvements in design and management, training can be an even
more profitable public investment than it has proved in the past. The
evidence which follows suggests that priority in the policy mix for the
"leftovers" in the labor market should be placed on "teaching them to
fish."
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NOTES

1.

Sar A. Levitan and Robert Taggart, Employment and Earnings Inadequacy:
A New Social Indicator (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University
Press,1974);unpublished tabulations of Employment and Earnings
Inadequacy Index prepared from March 1969 Current Population Survey.

2.

Unpublished tabulations prepared as background for the National
Commission on Employment and Unemployment Statistics. Estimates for
1980 derived by reducing the 1980 unemployed and discouraged com
ponents of the NCEUS hardship measure to the incidence rates in 1970,
and adding these to the other 1980 components.

3.

Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1980 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, September 1980); and Budget of the United
States Government, Fiscal 1982 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, January 1981).Military training includes specialized skill
and flight training, professional development and supplemental
training but excludes recruit and officer training and salaries of
trainees. CETA training includes allowances plus estimated training
under the closely related Work Incentive Program for welfare
recipients.

4.

Harold Goldstein, Training and Education by Industry (Washington,
D.C.: National Institute for Work and Learning, 1980). The cited
figures subtract estimated wages and salaries of trainees from the $10
billion total training cost and 1 percent of wage bill suggested by
Goldstein as a best guess of private expenditures.

5.

Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1980 op. cit.

CHAPTER 2
TRAINING THE "LEFTOVERS"
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SECTION 1.
THE TRAINING SYSTEM

Background
Employment and training programs have been a major growth area of
social welfare policy over the last two decades--not only in resource and
activity levels, but in programmatic diversity as well as legislative and
regulatory complexity. The earliest initiatives were targeted to the
structural problems of lagging industries and areas which had been
exacerbated by a decade of slow economic growth. The Area Redevelopment
Act in 1959 and the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 initiated
institutional and on-the-job training efforts targeted for displaced
workers in depressed areas. Under the war on poverty, emphasis shifted to
the economically disadvantaged. Several new manpower programs were added
by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the most ambitious of which was
Job Corps. It aimed to interrupt the "vicious cycle of poverty" by
providing a structured residential environment for learning and development
where poor youths age 14 to 21 could escape from deprivation and realize
their full potential. Job Corps was and remains the most comprehensive and
intensive human resource investment program for the disadvantaged. The
Economic Opportunity Act also initiated job creation programs for the
hard-to-employ who were left behind despite accelerating economic growth in
the mid-1960s. The Neighborhood Youth Corps provided in-school, summer and
out-of-school work experience for teenagers to promote the development of
needed employability skills while keeping the streets quiet. The antipoverty act also created jobs programs for older workers and welfare
recipients on the assumption that work was preferable to dependency. In
1965 the New Careers program was introduced which sought to restructure
professional jobs in the public and nonprofit sectors, to train the disad
vantaged to perform as paraprofessionals and to subsidize their on-the-job
learning. New Careers evolved in the late 1960s into the Public Service
Careers (PSC) program, retaining the emphasis on providing career ladders
into unsubsidized public and nonprofit sector jobs.
As employment growth accelerated in the second half of the 1960s,
attention turned to the private sector. A Work Incentive (WIN) program was
adopted in 1967 as a substitute for the antipoverty workfare program. By
providing institutional and on-the-job training, plus financial incentives
for work by relief recipients, it aimed to facilitate private sector rather
than public sector employment. Later, the training components were reduced
so that WIN became essentially a placement and job search assistance
mechanism. The Job Opportunities in the Business Sector (or JOBS) program
was launched with much fanfare in 1968 to increase private sector in
volvement in manpower programs through contract and voluntary on-the-job
training of the disadvantaged.
The Concentrated Employment Program
provided extra resources to poverty areas to be used primarily for preemployment services such as counseling, motivation activities, job
development, and placement assistance.
By the time these private sector-oriented programs were geared up,
unemployment began to rise rapidly and the pendulum shifted in the opposite
direction. After some heated debate, the Emergency Employment Act was
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passed in 1971, initiating the first countercyclical job creation program
since the New Deal the Public Employment Program. This filled out the
tool kit of manpower programs. The components (although not the labels or
funding mechanisms) have remained essentially unchanged ever since. The
tool kit included basically preventative measures, primarily summer and
in-school jobs to help disadvantaged youth get off on the right foot,
remedial activities such as Job Corps and institutional training under
MDTA,ameliorative interventions including temporary jobs for older
workers, welfare recipients, and dropout youth, job access efforts such as
job restructuring under PSC, placement and job development under CEP and
WIN, plus on-the-job training under MDTA and JOBS, and countercyclical
measures, as typified by the Public Employment Program.
To better organize the tool kit, Congress passed the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act in 1973 with the aim of consolidating federal
employment and training resources into block grants to local units of
government representing populations of more than 100,000, and to states
representing the remaining smaller areas. Although the initial intent was
to let these state and local "prime sponsors" decide how to spend their
block grants after a mandated planning process and subject to local
advisory council review, and to leave them free to administer local
programs, the law as well as the regulations and administrative procedures
which subsequently interpreted and applied it, fell far short of the
decentralization and decategorization originally promised. The summer
employment program the progeny of the summer Neighborhood Youth Corps and
a public service employment component a combination of PSC and PEP were
retained by the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act as separate
categorical activities with their own eligibility rules and allocation
formulae. Job Corps was continued as a distinct, nationally-directed
program, although its authorization was included under the CETA umbrella
and its management shifted from the Office of Economic Opportunity to the
Department of Labor. A smorgasborg of small, nationally-run programs for
special needs groups such as older workers, migrants, Indians, offenders,
and displaced homemakers were added incrementally. The WIN program was not
included under the CETA umbrella. Even in the "block grant" titles of
CETA, there were a variety of federal set-asides and specifications
dictating the use of resources.
The CETA system was hardly operational before there were major changes
and then dramatic expansion. The 1976 amendments separated public service
employment into countercyclical and structural components, the first
directed to the victims of recession and funded by a "trigger formula"
which would automatically expand resources when unemployment rose, and the
second aimed at providing career entry opportunities, training, and
short-term work for persons of limited employability. Under the economic
stimulus package of the Carter administration in 1977, these two public
service employment components were increased from the 300,000 to 750,000
combined enrollment level in response to high and rising unemployment. A
national Skills Training Improvement Program (STIP) was initiated providing
grants to competitively-selected prime sponsors to provide long-term
training linked to the private sector. The HIRE program was also launched
with an aim of fostering on-the-job training, particularly for Vietnam
veterans. Funds under this program were administered both by prime spon
sors and from the federal level. The Youth Employment and Demonstration
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Projects Act in 1977 created two new categorical programs targeted
specifically to youth which were to be operated by all prime sponsors, a
large-scale experimental program testing a job guarantee, saturation
approach in selected prime sponsor areas, and a conservation program
operated jointly by the Departments of Labor, Agriculture and Interior on
public lands. To round out the economic stimulus measures, the long
standing summer program was expanded by a fourth, while the Job Corps
program was doubled in size.
The changes continued without pause. A Private Sector Initiative
Program was authorized in the 1978 CETA amendments. PSIP established
Private Industry Councils or PICs in each prime sponsor area to plan and
administer CETA-authorized activities linked to the private sector and
funded by a separate CETA title. The 1978 amendments increased the
targeting as well as the training emphasis under the structural public
service employment program. The "comprehensive" block grant was modified
by additional set-asides for upgrading and retraining, as well as for
education-linked activities.
Just as the new youth programs were implemented and the public service
employment expansion digested, the gears were shifted into neutral and then
slammed into reverse. The Carter administration announced the con
solidation of the separate CETA youth programs, but its proposed Youth Act
of 1980 fell short of enactment. However, the conservation and experi
mental job guarantee programs just enacted in 1977 were ended. The public
service employment components of CETA were also substantially retrenched.
The incoming Reagan administration went further, completely eliminating
funding for public service employment activities and drastically cutting
local nonsummer youth programs.
As a result of all these changes, the CETA system today is unques
tionably more complicated than the "categorical nightmare" it was designed
to replace. With reauthorization pending in 1982, with uncertainty about
budget levels for 1983 and beyond, and with drastic retrenchment already
underway, the situation is even more confusing. The latest dependable data
cover fiscal year 1980, which ended in October 1980. Yet several programs
authorized by the existing legislation and fully operational in 1980 were
phased out in fiscal 1981. The nomenclature, titles, funding levels, and
priorities may undergo some dramatic changes in anticipation or as a result
of the 1982 legislation. Nevertheless, the program mix existing in fiscal
1980 and authorized by the 1978 CETA amendments provides the only available
baseline for understanding of the system.
Legislative Framework
In the CETA system of fiscal 1980, nine-tenths of the service years of
employment and training activity were provided under the seven major titles
and subparts of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act which allo
cate funds based on relative unemployment and poverty to the nearly five
hundred state and local "prime sponsors" which serve as managing and
decisionmaking agents. For each of the separate categorical allocations,
the prime sponsors must submit annual plans outlining activities for the
coming year, projecting enrollment and spending levels and participant
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characteristics, as well as detailing procedures and guarantees to satisfy
the differing requirements of each title as interpreted in federal
regulations. The plans must be approved by the Department of Labor, and
prime sponsors must subsequently submit quarterly reports indicating
performance relative to plan. They are subject to a once-a-year assessment
by the Department of Labor, as well as periodic monitoring visits to assure
compliance with the law and regulations in their exercise of delegated
decisionmaking, management, and operational responsibilities. The seven
categorical programs are as follows:
Title IIBC, Comprehensive Employment and Training Services, pro
vides for a full range of activities for the unemployed and economically
disadvantaged (i.e., persons living in welfare recipient families or those
with a family income in the last six months which is below the higher of
the poverty level 'or 70 percent of the Bureau of Labor Statistics 1 lower
living standard). The prime sponsor decides on the mix of services to be
offered and the subgroups to be served among the eligible population. Up
to 6.5 percent of funds may be used for upgrading and retraining of
laid-off or currently underemployed workers who are not necessarily
economically disadvantaged.
Title IIP, Transitional Employment Opportunities for the Economi
t
cally Disadvantaged, or structural public service employment, fully sub
sidizes the employment of economically disadvantaged, long-term (15 weeks
or more) unemployed individuals in regular jobs in the public and nonprofit
sectors as well as in specially created projects providing needed public
services. In order to assure employability development and not just
employment, the law requires that 15 percent of funds in 1980, 20 percent
of funds in 1981, and 22 percent of funds in 1982 be used for training of
participants. Prime sponsors are, in concept, free to use all of Title I ID
allocations for training or any other allowable CETA service. In 1982,
there is no funding for Title I ID.
Title IV, Youth Employment and Training Programs (YETP), is the
comprehensive local program for youths. The prime sponsor may provide any
of the services allowable under Title I IB, but only for persons age 14 to
21. The income eligibility restrictions are somewhat more lenient than
under Title I IB. Up to 10 percent of funds may be used for nondisadvantaged youth and the income standard for eligibility is 85 percent rather
than 70 percent of the BLS lower living standard. Since nearly half of
participants in Title I IB are under the age of 22, there is substantial
overlap between YETP and Title IIB activities.
Title IV, Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects
(YCCIP), supports year-round neighborhood-based work projects of tangible
benefit to the community. These jobs are targeted for unemployed 16-19
year-olds. Eligibility is not restricted by family income. Supportive
services may be offered but training and remediation are discouraged
because YCCIP was intended to emphasize structured, supervised work rather
than human resource development.
Title IV, Summer Youth Employment Program, provides summer jobs
t
for 14 to 21 year-old economically disadvantaged youth. The funds may also
be used for all other services authorized under Title IIB as well as for
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Job Corps. Funds for all the other titles of CETA may also be, and fre
quently are, used by prime sponsors to create summer jobs.
t
Title VI, Countercyclical Public Service Employment,, is targeted
for the victims of recession who have been unemployed during 10 of the
prior 12 weeks and have a family income in the last 3 months less than 100
percent of the BLS lower living standard. The funds under this title may
be used for any of the activities allowable under other titles. The CETA
legislation contains a "trigger formula" for funding so that Title VI is to
expand automatically to absorb 20 percent of the unemployed in excess of 4
percent or 25 percent if unemployment rises above 7 percent. In practice,
appropriations have not reflected this groundrule. Countercyclical public
service employment was phased out in fiscal 1981 despite an unemployment
rate in excess of 7 percent.
t
Title VII, Private Sector Initiative Program, authorizes local
Private Industry Councils with predominant business membership to decide on
the use of funds provided under this title. The eligibility provision and
allowable activities are the same as for IIBC, but there is an emphasis on
the involvement of and placement in the private sector.
There are further complications. Six percent of Title IIBC funds are
set-aside for vocational education activities and distributed to the states
by a needs formula. The states then suballocate to prime sponsors for the
support of training activities. Another 4 percent of funds under Title IV
YETP and under Title IIBC are distributed to Governors for special
statewide activities, plus an additional 1 percent of Title IIBC funds for
educational linkage activities. In many cases these are distributed on an
application basis to the sub-state prime sponsors.
In addition to these state- and locally-operated programs supported by
legislatively-specified allocations based on the relative unemployment and
poverty rates of states and localities, there are a range of activities
funded under the Secretary's discretionary authority, out of set-asides
under each of the CETA titles. These resources are used for innovative
demonstration programs, to meet special needs of areas and population
groups, to reward performance by prime sponsors, and to mount special
purpose initiatives. The Secretary decides on the use and distribution of
these funds consistent with the requirements of each title.
There are also several national programs. Title III of CETA au
thorizes and funds national programs targeted to displaced homemakers,
seasonal farmworkers, veterans, older workers, offenders, youth and persons
of limited English speaking ability. Job Corps is authorized as a subpart
of CETA Title IV, with legislative language largely unchanged since the
Economic Opportunity Act. The residential Job Corps centers located
throughout the country are operated by private for-profit and nonprofit
contractors, and by the Departments of Agriculture and Interior on federal
lands. A Young Adult Conservation Corps is authorized under CETA Title
VIII, and an experimental Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects under
Title IV which guarantees jobs for all poor 16- to 19-year-old students in
selected areas. Both of these programs were phased out during fiscal 1981.
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State and local prime sponsors are sometimes used as delivery agents
for these various national programs. For instance, two prime sponsors are
the contractors for the operation of residential Job Corps centers and
several others use funds provided to them by formula under Title IIBC or IV
to purchase training slots in Job Corps. The Entitlement projects were
managed by 17 prime sponsors. The HIRE program was operated under Title
III authority and was funded in part through prime sponsors while the STIP
program was carried out under the Secretary's discretionary authority and
provided resources on a competitive basis to 45 percent of prime sponsors.
States administer portions of the funds for Title III older worker
programs. They also received a set-aside under the Young Adult Con
servation Corps while it existed.
The Building Blocks
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act specifies the activities
that are allowable under these various funding categories, with further
specification provided by the federal regulations and the management
information system. There are three major classifications of training
under state and local programs:
Classroom occupational skills training is normally conducted in
t
an institutional setting and i"s designed to provide individuals with
technical skills and information required to perform a specific job or
group of jobs. The training must be in occupations where there is a
reasonable chance of employment. It is not allowed for high turnover, low
wage jobs. Training may last up to two and a half years. Trainees are
entitled to an hourly allowance equal to the minimum wage plus supplements
for dependents and for extraordinary participation costs, although
allowances are reduced for public assistance and unemployment compensation
recipients. Stipends may be received for only two years of training.
Classroom training provided to workers already employed but in low level
jobs is labeled upgrading. If it is provided to displaced workers, it is
labeled retraining.
Other classroom training is also usually conducted in an in
t
stitutional setting and provides basic skills needed to perform generally
in the labor market, rather than in a specific job. It includes remedial
education, preparation for a high school equivalency degree, training in
English as a second language, and, in some cases, school-to-work transition
activities.
On-the-job training is a combination of work, orientation, and
t
skill training conducted primarily in a private sector workplace after the
participant has been hired by the employer. It aims to provide the skills
specifically needed to adequately perform in this job. In matching
participants and jobs, the aim is to assure that the trainee lacks the
education, training, or work experience normally required by the employer.
The employer is, then, reimbursed for the extra supervision needed by, and
lower productivity of, disadvantaged participants, as well as for any
outside training costs. The reimbursement ordinarily equals 50 percent of
the participant's wage during the period of training, at the end of which
time successful trainees continue in unsubsidized jobs with the employer.
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CETA also authorizes a range of pre-employment activities for par
ticipants with little or no labor market experience, primarily youth.
These activities, which are usually more limited in intensity than
classroom and on-the-job training, are included in a separate category
labeled employment and training services, but are very closely related to
training, as well as being difficult to distinguish from each other:
Vocational exploration activities expose participants to jobs
available in the private sector through observation of workplaces, class
room instruction, and, if appropriate, limited practical work experience as
long as it does not contribute to additional sales or profits of private
for-profit employers.
Transition services provide labor market information, job search
0
assistance, needs assessment, counseling and placement for in-school youth.
Job search assistance seeks to teach
pected by employers at the hiring door, as well
jobs. Job search activities are a component of
school-to-work transition efforts, but they may
as a short-duration intervention.

participants what is ex
as where and how to find
vocational exploration and
also be offered separately

Last, but hardly least, there are two employment-oriented components:
Work experience is a subsidized short-term or part-time work
t
assignment with a public or nonprofit employer which is designed to enhance
employability through the development of good work habits and basic work
skills. Whether offered as a summer or part-time in-school activity for
youth, an aging vat for dropouts, or a labor market reentry vehicle, the
primary aim of work experience is to provide a stepping-stone for persons
who have never worked or who have not been working for an extended time.
The progress of the participant in work experience positions is to be
reviewed every two months in order to assess the appropriateness of a
transfer to another activity. The amount of work experience for an in
dividual is limited to 1,000 hours during any one-year period and 2,000
hours during a five-year period, although the limitations do not apply to
in-school youth.
Public service employment is fully-subsidized work in regular
governmentancinonprofit sectorjobs in such fields as environmental
quality, child care, health care, education, crime prevention and treat
ment, recreation, transportation, park and public facility maintenance,
conservation, housing, and neighborhood improvement. PSE is an option for
workers with previous experience and skills who are suffering from tem
porary setbacks, in which case it is distinguished from work experience by
the types of individuals served as well as the levels of supervision and
performance required on the job assignments. PSE jobs may in many cases be
quite similar to work experience assignments, but work experience is more
restrictive than PSE.
Each of the titles and subtitles of CETA specifies which of these
activities is allowable and for whom. Under formula-funded programs, the
prime sponsor chooses among these allowable activities, specifying the
service mix in the annual plan submitted and approved by the Department of
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Labor.
Occupational skills training, other classroom training, and
on-the-job training are allowable activities under all the separate
subparts of CETA. It is possible for prime sponsors to allocate all funds
received by formula (except the limited amount under YCCIP) for these
training activities. History and convention would militate against such a
decision in the case of PSE (IID and VI) and in summer programs, but there
is no doubt that a decision to expend all of IIBC, YETP and PSIP resources
on training of one sort or another would be acceptable. Public service
employment is permissible only under Titles IID and VI, and is, therefore,
essentially proscribed for fiscal 1982 as a result of the elimination of
funding for these titles. Employment and training services and work
experience are allowable under all titles.
These broad primary activity classifications encompass treatments
which may vary significantly in intensity, duration, and focus. For
instance, classroom training in occupational skills may last anywhere from
a few weeks of part-time training up to two and a half years of full-time
instruction. OJT may be a way of placing a student in a part-time
school-year job or an arrangement for a year or more training in a worksite
combined with supplemental classroom instruction. Work experience may be
five hours weekly employment for an in-school youth or full-time work for
an adult. Job search assistance may be as short as a few days, while
school-to-work transition may be a set of activities stretching over a
junior and senior year and the intervening summer, or placement assistance
and occupational exploration activities concentrated in the last semester
before school-learning.
There is also substantial overlap between these categories. A par
ticipant is identified with a particular primary activity according to the
predominant focus of treatment during the period of participation. If
occupational skills training accounts for 51 percent of time and remedial
education 49 percent, the individual is counted as a skills training
participant. An on-the-job trainee may also be receiving outside classroom
instruction. A participant in work experience may be receiving three hours
of classroom training daily along with five hours of work. Most par
ticipants in CETA receive either employment and training services or
supportive services as part of another primary activity. Under YETP, for
instance, all in-school work experience must be combined with counseling,
occupationalinformation and efforts to overcome sex stereotyping a
combination labeled "career employment experience." Some CETA participants
may move from one primary activity to another; for instance, from work
experience to classroom training or from classroom training to on-the-job
training. There is no special classification for persons who receive these
sequential combinations; instead, they are assigned according to the major
treatment during their period of participation.
Job Corps is a fourth category of training provided under CETA. Its
legislatively-specified treatment combines occupational training, remedial
education, work experience, OJT in some cases, as well as employment and
training services in order "to assist young persons who need and can
benefit from an unusually intensive program, operated in a group setting,
to become more responsible, employable and productive citizens ...." The
services which must be provided to each corpsmember at either residential
or nonresidential centers include "an intensive, well-organized, and fully
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supervised program of education, vocational training, work experience,
planned vocational and recreational activities, physical rehabilitation and
development, and counseling." Job Corps is also required to provide
subsistence, transportation, clothing and equipment, recreational services,
assistance in career planning, as well as monthly allowances during
participation and readjustment allowances upon termination. Prime sponsors
may use the resources allocated to them by formula under each of the seven
CETA subparts to purchase training opportunities in Job Corps. For
example, when Job Corps was doubled in size in the 1978-1980 period,
several states offset the costs of establishing Job Corps centers in order
to have a continuing residential treatment option located within the state.
Participants in local programs may also be referred to Job Corps and are
eligible for available opportunities equally with other applicants.
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SECTION 2.
A PROFILE OF CETA TRAINING

Dollars and Bodies
Given the multiple titles and subparts under CETA, each with its own
allocation formula, target group, administrative rules, and activity com
binations, it is difficult to precisely identify or simply describe CETA
training. There are several alternate measures of activity levels which
all must be considered in order to provide a full picture. Annual par
ticipants in a program or activity include those entering in the previous
year and still receiving treatment, plus the new entrants; in other words,
this measure includes some who received most of their services in the prior
year and some who will receive them in the following year. The number of
new participants, which includes only those entering during the year, is a
better indicator of annual activity if the program has remained relatively
stable in scale; however, the number of new participants exaggerates
service levels during the phase-up of a program when participants are being
brought on board throughout the year, and understates activities during a
phase-down when few new participants are enrolled. Service years are
calculated by averaging the end-of-quarter enrollments during the year.
This figure roughly indicates the on-board strength maintained during the
year, except when applied to summer and in-school programs which operate
for only part of the year. A short-duration activity will have more total
and new participants per service year than a long-duration treatment.
There were over 2 million enrol lees in CETA programs in fiscal
1980. I/ Over two-thirds of these new participants were assigned to work
components as a primary activity, or nearly half if the summer program
enrollments are excluded.

CETA Local Programs

New Participants
(OOOs)

Distribution
by Component

2,006.4

94.8%

349.3
93.9
83.9
696.4
287.0
62.5
378.2
29.4
25.8

16.5
4.4
4.0
32.9
13.6
3.0
17.9
1.4
1.2

Job Corps

70.4

3.3

National Programs

39.4

1.9

2,116.2

100.0

Classroom training
OJT
Youth transition services
Summer youth work experience
Nonsummer youth work experience
Adult work experience
Public service employment
Direct referral
Assignment unknown

Total
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Service years were only half of new enrollments, basically reflecting
an average length of stay in CETA of around half a year. Work components
accounted for two-thirds of the one million service years of employment and
training activities estimated for fiscal 1980. 2/
Service Years
(OOOs)

Distribution

1,041.8

95.0%

219.9
54.3
41.3
126.2

20.0
4.9
3.7
11.6

252.3
347.8

23.0
31.7

Job Corps

35.7

3.2

National Programs

20.0

1.8

1,097.5

100.0

CETA Local Programs
Classroom training
OJT
Youth transition services
Summer youth work experience
Nonsummer work experience
for adults and youth
Public service employment

Total

Costs may also be measured in several ways. The costs by program
component, such a classroom training, OJT, or work experience, include all
expenditures incurred in providing services to participants who are pri
marily in these components; for instance, the classroom training program
component includes allowances, supportive services and employment and
training services along with the costs of purchasing or providing
Expenditures by functional activity
vocational or remedial training.
administration,
such as
into categories
expenditures
disaggregate
allowances, wages and fringes, worksite supervision, training, and
services. The "training" functional activity category includes the costs
of purchasing or providing vocational or remedial training for participants
in classroom training as a primary activity and the employer reimbursement
costs for on-the-job trainees, but also includes the training expenditures
for participants in work experience and other primary activities, while
excluding the costs of allowances or supportive services received by
classroom trainees. Costs can be calculated on a per participant, per new
participant, or per service year basis.
In fiscal 1980, the expenditures for training as a functional
activity for materials, training staff, and training facilities totalled
$757 million under CETA programs other than Job Corps and an estimated $59
million under Job Corps (if only the educational and vocational supplies
and teachers in Job Corps are counted) (Table 2.1). The expenditures on
classroom training as a primary activity (i.e., including allowances and
services received by participants) amounted to over a billion dollars;
those for OJT totalled one-fifth this amount and the total pricetag for Job
Supplemental
Corps was a little less than one-half a billion dollars.

Table 2.1
Fiscal 1980 CETA Training Activity

Participants:
Classroom training
Occupational skills
Other
OJT
Job Corps
Total primary training
activities
Transition services
PSE in training
Supplementary training

Title IIBC

Supplemental
vocational
education

Title IV
excluding
Job Corps

493,683
(352,342)
(141,341)
132,237
--

__**
_.**
-»**
__**
..**

109,556
(41,044)
(68,512)
11,775
--

96,000

625,920

__**

121,331

96,000

695
1,209
1,904

..**
_.**
__**

115,094
4,945
120,039

164,866
(128,665)
(36,201)
40,042
--

_.**
_,**
__**
_.**
__**

24,558
(12,048)
(12,510)
2,416

204,908

..**

..
302
~30?

**
__**

329,559

Job Corps

PSIP

40,734 11,634
(29,358) (11,143)
(491)
(11,376)
16,571
1,303
-57,305
147

--

STIP

12,937
__

147

Title III

Title IID

Title VI

17,258
(11,728)
(5,530)
16,273
_.

19,298
(12,139)
(7,159)
2,253
--

5,101
(3,738)
(1,363)
834
__

697,264
(461,492)
(235,772)
181,246
96,000

33,531

21,551

5,935

974,510

._
42
~J?

306
142.252
142,558

__
108.290
108,290

116,242
256.738
3757980"

Total

Person Years of Training:
Classroom training
Occupational
Remedial
OJT
Job Corps
Total primary training
activities
Transition services
PSE training
Supplementary training
Expenditures specifically for
vocational and remedial
training materials and
instruction (SOOOs)

35,700

15,112 5,725
(6,990) (5,394)
(8,122)
(331)
638
3,857
--

26,974

35,700

18,969

6,363

3,044
(1,969)
(1,075)
6,437
__

5,080
(3,722)
(1,358)
646
--

1,483
(1,187)
(2%)
263
--

219,868
(159,975)
(59,893)
54,299
35,700

9,481

5,726

1,746

309,867

-.
77

._
44.444
44,444

_.
37.747
377747

41,272
82,493
123,765

41,272

--

41,272

rr

76,276

91,141

59,300

51,861 20,391

17,468

117,269

53.159

816,424

696,041
145,345
--

77,601
1,832
_.

100,830
8,659
--

471,000

60,205 42,499
18,458 1,692
..

7.171
18,354
..

20,940
2,691
._

9,194
1,922

1,014,481
198,953
471.000

841,386

79,433

109,489

471,000

78,663 44,191

25,525

23,631

._
-..

95
9,630
31,128

122
168
134

68

138,907
181

90,426
8,572

236.454
18,968
31,272
"

40,853

424

68

139,088

98,998

286,694

TT

55-

Expenditures by program
component* (SOOOs)
Classroom training
OJT
Job Corps
Total primary training
activities
PSE training
Vocational exploration
Transition services
Total all supplementary
training activities

6,836
417
8
7,261

__

11,116 1,684,434

2
2

*0oes not include prime sponsor administrative costs or Department of Labor administrative costs in case of Job Corps.
"Participants counted in prime sponsor tallies.
Source:

Fisca1 198

"<

ro
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training transition services and vocational
exploration as primary
activities, and PSE training as an adjunct to subsidized work added nearly
three hundred million dollars to the training pricetag, raising it to
almost two billion dollars.
The lion's share of CETA training was supported under Title IIBC
(Table 2.2). Job Corps training represented a small share of person years
of training, but a significant share of training program expenditures
because of its intensity and duration.
Conversely, PSE and transition
services accounted for a substantial portion of participants receiving some
training but a lesser share of person years and expenditures because of the
limited duration and intensity of these supplemental training activities.
Nevertheless, the phase-out of the public service employment titles in 1981
will substantially reduce the training levels under CETA, since PSE funded
over a fifth of expenditures for actual training activities in 1980.
Program component costs vary markedly, reflecting differences in
intensity and duration, as well as wages and allowances to participants.
The total service year and per participant costs for classroom and onthe-job training under Title IIBC, including estimated administrative
expenditures and supplemental vocational education grants, were over $8,000
annually in fiscal 1980, compared to a full cost of over $13,000 for Job
Corps but under $1,000 for transition services. 3/
Fiscal 1980 Program Component Cost Levels

Classroom training
(Title IIBC including
supplementary voca
tional education)

OJT (Title IIBC)
Job Corps
Transition services (YETP)
Work experience (Title
IIBC)
Public service employment
(Title IID and VI
combined)

Cost Per
Slot

Cost Per
Participant

$3,420
2,182
6,597
455

$2,481
1,638
6,706
324

$ 8,046
6,088
13,193
905

2,036

1,641

5,311

8,503

3,702

9,030

Cost Per
Service Year

The Substance of Training
Job Corps is the most intensive and comprehensive of the training
interventions. Enrollees are normally allowed to stay two years or longer
under exceptional circumstances such as participation in advanced train
ing and average tenure for Corpsmembers completing a vocational program in
1980 was 1.1 years.
The 6.0 month average duration of stay for par
ticipants was due to the large proportion of early leavers. Two-fifths of
participants remained less than 90 days, while another three in ten left
before completing their full vocational program. 4/

Table 2.2
Training Activity by CETA Subpart, Fiscal 1980

IIBC
Supplemental vocational education
Youth employment
110
VI
111
STIP
PSIP
Job Corps
Total

Share of total
expenditures on
training as a
program component
(I.e.. DOT. class
room training
and Job Corps)

Share of total
expenditures
specifically
for vocational
and remedial
Instruction and
materials

49.91
4.7
6.5
1.4
0.7
1.5
2.6
4.7
Z8.0

40.4X
9.4
11.2
14.4
6.6
2.1
2.5
6.2
7.3

10 0

100.0

Share of total
participants In
training as a
program component
64.21
*
12.5
2.2
0.6
3.4
1.3
5.9
9.9

100.0

Share of total
participants In
training as a
program component,
plus participants
In PSE training
and transition
services
44.91
17.3
11.7
8.2
2.4
0.9
7.8
6.7

100.0

Share of total
person years
In training
as a program
component
66.11
*
8.7
1.8
0.6
3.1
2.1
6.1
11.5

100.0

Participants counted under Title IIBC totals In CETA MIS system
Source.

Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor, calculations from Management Information System Fiscal 1980 Summary
Reports and Job Corps Financial Reports, Fiscal 1980, unpublished.

Share of total
person years In
training as a
program component,
plus person
years of PSE
training and

47.31
*

15.7
11.6
9.1
2.2
1.5
4.4
8.2

Share of full-time
equivalent person
years of training
counting transition
services and PSE

55. 21
*

12.8
7.5
5.5
2.6
1.7
5.1
9.6

100.0

27

During the period of participation, Job Corps training, work and
education activities are provided 40 hours weekly, usually split evenly
between education and vocational training (plus work) during the first six
months, with a greater concentration on vocational training beyond this
point. Remedial education programs in Job Corps provide individualized,
self-paced instruction which spans the pre-reading through high school
equivalency level. There are provisions for advanced students to attend
college and post-secondary institutions with Job Corps support. Vocational
training in Job Corps centers is primarily in the clerical and service
occupations for females, and construction or automotive repair for
males. 5/
Occupations of Training
1978 Job Corps Terminees
Total
Professional
Clerical and sales
Health cccupations
Food services
Other services
Construction trades
Forestry, fanning and conservation
Electrical appliance repair
Automotive and machine repair
Transportation
Industrial production

1.0%
13.7
8.8
9.6
6.7
25.0
1.3
1.3
13.5
8.9
10.2

Males
.6%
3.8
I.0
II.2
9.3
36.7
1.7
1.9
20.0
1.0
12.9

Females
42.7
30.5
8.4
2.3
3.2
.6
1.3
1.3
.8
6.5

Corpsmembers at most residential centers play a major role in
maintenance, food service, health care, and clerical work, as well as
undertaking capital improvements on and construction of facilities as part
of vocational skill training. Work experience is provided in conservation
activities in those centers located on federal lands. There are also
provisions for on-the-job training in the private sector as a transition
mechanism for some terminating Corpsmembers.
All participants must complete an initial world-of-work program,
which, in part, is used to determine the appropriate vocational training
assignment. Counseling, guidance, and orientation are available on an
as-needed basis. Allowances are $40 monthly at entry, rising to as high as
$100 per month for participants remaining over six months. There is a
readjustment allowance paid upon termination and based upon duration of
stay. Job Corps also provides room and board, clothing, recreation and en
tertainment. All participants who stay more than 30 days receive com
prehensive health care; those staying over 90 days receive full dental
treatment.
The breakdown of 1980 Job Corps costs reflected these comprehensive
services: 6/
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Center operations:
Residential living and food
Education and vocational materials
and staff (including union
programs
Maintenance and utilities
Work project expenses
Administrative and other staff
Pay and allowances
Travel

(12.6)
(9.6
(8.8
(25.7)
8.8
1.3
3.2

Recruitment and placement

14.8

Capital

7.0

Other

According to Job Corps records, two-thirds of terminees are "placed"
in employment, and more than nine of ten are positive terminations. 7/
For
However, follow-up surveys indicate a much lower employment rate.
instance, 1977 Corpsmembers were employed two-fifths of the weeks in the
Just half were employed 18 months after
first post-termination year.
termination and only a fourth were employed full-time. Less than a fifth
claimed that placement assistance had been provided which helped in getting
at least one post-program job. 8/ Because less than a third of entrants
completed training, while only a proportion of these found employment and a
smaller proportion found training-related jobs, a best estimate is that
just one in seven entrants completed a full vocational program and was
subsequently employed in a training-related job. 9/
Classroom training under CETA is shorter duration, with an average
Among 1977 classroom trainees who
stay in fiscal 1980 of 5.1 months.
considered themselves to be "completers," a third stayed less than three
months and just one in twenty received more than a year of training. 10/
Length of Stay
1977 Classroom Trainees

Percent Among
All Trainees

Percent Among
Trainees
Considering
Themselves
Completers

Less than 30 days
30-59

10.3%
13.1

6.7%
12.0

60-89
90-119
120-149
150-179
180-239
240-359
360+

14.7
13.0
9.3
8.9
9.8
12.4
5.1

15.0
13.4
10.4
9.6
12.7
14.7
5.2

Time Enrolled in CETA

Local classroom training averaged between 22 and 26 hours per week in
fiscal 1976. ll/ A typical completer with a little over 22 weeks of par
ticipation thus received between 500 and 600 hours of treatment, or roughly
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one-fourth the treatment hours (excluding recreation and center life
activities) of the average Job Corps completer.
Among 1977 trainees, a fifth reported that they were in education
activities, a little less than a fifth were in a combination of vocational
and educational activities, and the remaining three-fifths were in skills
training alone. 12/ For classroom training across all CETA titles in 1980,
66 percent of classroom training participants were involved primarily in
occupational skills training and 34 percent primarily in "other" training.
Excluding classroom training funded under Title IV youth programs, the
rates were 72 percent and 28 percent, respectively. 13/
The preponderance of vocational training is in the clerical and con
struction-related occupations: 14/
Percent of
Fiscal 1976
Classroom
Occupational
Trainees
Occupations
of Training

Percent of
Fiscal 1975
Classroom
Occupational
Trainees
Males

Females

8%
8
31

8%
46
3

3

10

1

4

25

11

3
16

6
12

31

Total

Professional and
managerial
Clerical
Crafts
Construction crafts
Welding
Other crafts
Assemblers/laborers
farm workers/
garage workers
Nontransportation
operatives
Transportation
operatives
Service workers

7%
36
5
11
19

Consistent with the regulations, local classroom trainees usually
receive the minimum wage for hours of participation unless they are welfare
recipients, in which case they receive a training stipend. Between a fifth
and fourth of 1976 participants either received no allowance or less than a
minimum wage equivalent. 15/
Hourly Allowance Reported by Fiscal 1976 Participants
(Minimum wage changed from $2.10 to $2.30 mid-year)
$

0-.99
1.00-1.99
2.00-2.49
2.50-2.99
3.00+

11
66
3
12

30

Among fiscal 1976 classroom trainees, half received manpower services
and one in five received other supportive services according to prime
sponsor records (which probably understate the extent of services re
ceived): 16/
Services Received by 1976
Classroom Trainees
Manpower Services

50%

Counseling
Testing
Orientation
Coaching
Job Referral
Follow-up
Other

24%
11
10
5
11
14
13

Supportive Services

18%

Health Care
Child Care
Transportation
Residential Support

13%
7
7
1

The full costs of fiscal 1978 classroom training under the compre
hensive CETA Title IIBC were distributed as follows, according to the best
estimate from management information system data: 17/
Administration
Allowances
Training
Services

18.1%
42.2
21.4
16.1

A review by the General Accounting Office of fiscal 1977 Title IIBC
(then Title I) occupational training activities in a stratified sample of
prime sponsors found that half of trainees were placed in unsubsidized
employment at termination; 36 percent were placed in training-related jobs;
and 32 percent were placed in training-related jobs which they retained
half a year or more. 18/ For a larger and more representative sample of
fiscal 1977 enrollees in both occupational and "other" classroom training,
44 percent entered unsubsidized employment; 40 percent were in some other
status; and 16 percent were not tracked. Thus, half those with status
recorded were placed. 197 There is no exact record of training completion
because there are no graduation standards. Half of 1977 classroom trainees
did not know whether they had completed or not, but among those who had a
view, three-fourths considered themselves to be completers. 20/
On-the-job training is usually short-term. Although there is sig
nificant variability in the scheduled length, the average duration of stay
in 1980 was 4.3 months. Among 1977 completers, over a third were in OJT
less than 90 days, while a fifth participated half a year or more. 21/
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Length of Stay
1977 On-the-Job Trainees

Percent Among
All Trainees

Percent Among
Trainees
Considering
Themselves
Completers

Less than 30 days
30-59

9.2%
15.7

3.6%
12.1

60-89
90-119
120-149
150-179
180-239
240-359
360+

18.3
20.1
12.1
8.9
9.8
4.3
1.6

20.3
21.1
12.9
8.1
13.2
7.6
1.4

Time Enrolled in CETA

The primary occupations of assignment are in the clerical, service,
nontransportation operative and craft occupations. 22/
Percent of
Fiscal 1976
On-The-Job
Trainees
Occupations of
Job/Training Assignment
Professional and
managerial
Clerical
Crafts
Construction crafts
Welding
Other crafts
Assemblers/laborers
farm workers/
garage workers
Nontransportati on
operatives
Transportation
operatives
Service workers
Private household workers

Percent of
Fiscal 1975
On-The-Job
Trainees

Total

Males

Females

8%
19

11%
11
29

8%
48
3

10

14

4

21

25

22

6
12
--

4
8
--

15
2

6
3
16

OJT participants receive the usual entry wage of the jobs to which
they are assigned. For fiscal 1976 participants, the average wage was
$3.21, or more than half again the $2.10 minimum at the start of the year
and two-fifths above the $2.30 rate in effect at the end of the year. 23/
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Hourly Wage Reported

$2.00-2.99
3.00-3.99
4.00-4.99
5.00+

Percent of Fiscal 1976
OJT Participants

49%
33
12
6

A little over two-fifths of OJT participants receive manpower services
in addition to training on the job, and less than a fifth receive sup
portive services. 24/
Percent of Fiscal 1976
On-The-Job Trainees
Receiving Services
Manpower Services

43%

Counseling
Testing
Orientation
Coaching
Job Referral
Follow-up
Other

19%
9
13
5
18
11
6

Supportive Services

17%

Health Care
Child Care
Transportation
Residential Support

16%
8
7
2

The OJT reimbursement to employers is intended to cover the costs of
extra supervision, diminished productivity, and onsite training. There are
rarely any additional reimbursements for services because these are usually
provided directly by the prime sponsor. The full costs of fiscal 1978
on-the-job training under the comprehensive Title IIBC were distributed as
follows according to the best estimates from the management information
system: 25/
Administration
Employer reimbursement

17.6%
67.0

Services

15.4

A study of on-the-job training as operated by a stratified sample of
prime sponsors in fiscal 1977 found a placement rate of 58 percent at
termination, with 38 percent retained in training-related jobs six months
later. 26/ The findings from a larger sample of prime sponsors in 1977
found that among OJT participants, 69 percent entered employment upon
termination, 24 percent had another termination status and 8 percent had no
termination status recorded. The employment rate among those with a status
noted was, thus, 74 percent. Among the 45 percent of participants cogni-
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zant of completion or noncompletion of training,
considered themselves to have been completers. 27/

over three-fourths

Who Gets Trained
All CETA programs are targeted to individuals of limited employability. Yet within the eligible population (which varies with the
differing eligibility standards from title to title), there is enormous
diversity in background and potential, and presumably a wide variance in
the need for and ability to benefit from different employment and training
activities. A major task of local decisionmakers is to decide on the mix
of activities to be supported under each allocation and all allocations
taken together. A second task is to decide how to divide up the different
service opportunities among enrollees.
During fiscal 1980, classroom training opportunities were available
for less than a fifth of the two million new participants in local CETA
programs, or for three in ten of the entrants into nonsummer programs. OJT
opportunities were available for less than one in twenty enrollees, or 8
Job Corps opportunities
percent excluding the summer participants.
represented only 5 percent of the youth enrollments in CETA local programs.
The chances of assignment to classroom training were substantially
higher for those 1980 enrollees who were female, Hispanic, Indian and
Asian, persons with limited English speaking ability and single parents
(Figure 2.1). Using as a benchmark the white male high school graduate's
probability of assignment to classroom training (29 percent), the relative
probabilities were as follows:
Percent Subgroup Assigned to Classroom
Training Divided by Percent for
White Male High School Graduates
Female

H7X

Black
Hispanic
Other

102
118
145

14-19
20-21
22-44
45+

72
123
129
87

Dropout
Student

113
7

Single parent

131

Limited English

132

Received unemployment

compensation

113

The "plums" are the on-the-job training opportunities which provide
immediate earnings as well as a high probability of future employment.
These are allocated to the most employable CETA entrants. The relative
chances of OJT assignment are almost the inverse of those for classroom
training. Only one in seven white male high school graduates entering CETA

Fiqure 2.1
Assignment Under CETA Local Programs
Training
Initial
Probability of
ants (Excluding Summer Enrollees)
Particip
1980
For All Fiscal
OJT

——•—————————-————————134.0
|34.0

___I 5.5
I 1 Q

H9.0

White
Black

| 24.7

19.3

Male
Female

TOTAL TRAINING

CLASSROOM TRAINING

f

——————————————————————]37.6

I2q.fi

~—15.3
18 8

Hispanic

-——————————.————————134.9
142.1

135.6

110.4

137.3

22-44

32.1

1.3

f 33.4

lOQ Q

'( 38.1

;

|7.9

Limited English

Prior CETA Participant

Source:

——————————1 17.9

14.3

-——————————————-—————132.7

2fi.4

]18.2

Ife.S
...

. 112.5
_J2.5

,

.Ms, 5
122.0

Hb.7

143.9

llA.A

_____19.4

Received Unemployment Compensation
Received Public Assistance
Eligible But Not Receiving Public Assistance

-—————————————————————135.5

127.1

Unrelated Individual
Z33.5
———lfi,4

———•——————————————————-———144.0
————————————————————————J42.8

130.7

Jl2.t
31.4

R

- — ———————————.—————————J42.5

J22.3

————17.5

Parent In Two-Parent Family

2 or More Dependents

7TlO

U2. 4

Single Parent

1 Dependent

hi i

132.8

H.S. Graduate

0 Dependent a

——————————————-———————_______147.5

, ,, .

Dropout

Other Family Member

]?4 n

——-———•—————————————______(46.0

125.2

45+

Post-Secondary Education

——————————.—-——————___________{48.5
————

121.0

H13.8

20-21

Student

——-————————————————————143.0

1 34.2

Other
14-19

-——————————————————————139.5

————————1,40

132.8

—————————————-______________144.7
-————————————————————————__J45.4
| ia. n
-

- ——l'7.*

———————————I"' 1

During October
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,
1979- September 1980. (Employment and Training Administration
tion and Research, 1981).
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in 1980 was assigned to OJT, but this rate was more than double that for
other CETA enrol lees.
Percent Subgroup Assigned to On-The-Job
Training Divided by Percent
for White Male High School Graduates
Female

38*

Black
Hispanic
Other

36
60
44

14-19
20-21
22-44
45+

26
71
70
42

Dropout
Student

49
2

Single parent

42

Limited English

44

Family received public
assistance

17

As a result of these varying assignment probabilities, males accounted
for 63 percent of the new participants in OJT in fiscal 1980 but only 43
percent of classroom trainees and 45 percent of adult work experience
enrollees. Three-fifths of OJT participants were whites, compared to less
than two-fifths of youth program participants. School dropouts accounted
for nearly two-fifths of classroom trainees but only a third of total
enrollees (Table 2.3).
The relative employability of participants assigned to different
components can be estimated by weighting entry characteristics according to
their marginal relationship to post-program earnings (as derived from
regression equations of the two-year post-program earnings of 1975 par
ticipants, controlling for component and duration of stay). The projected
earnings of 1977 classroom trainees were 89 percent those of all non-summer
CETA participants, while the projected earnings of on-the-job trainees 122
percent of the average. 28/ In other words, the "employability" of the OJT
participants was nearly two-fifths above that of the classroom trainees as
measured by likely earnings in the absence of participation by this method.
Another estimate of relative earnings potential is provided by the 1977 and
1978 earnings of control groups selected from the 1976 Current Population
Survey sample and matched to fiscal 1976 CETA entrants on the basis of a
number of variables. 29/ This approach suggests a one-fourth differential
in earnings potential between participants assigned to OJT and those
assigned to classroom training.

1977
Social Security
Covered Earnings

1977
Social Security
Covered Earnings
as Percent
Average for All
CETA Controls

1977-1978
Social Security
Covered Earnings

1977-1978
Social Security
Covered Earnings
as Percent
Average for All
CETA Controls

99*

$7413

98X

Classroom training
control group

$3513

OJT control group

4430

125

9394

124

PSE control group

4589

129

9771

129

Work experience control group

3061

86

6739

89

All nonsummer CETA control group

3548

100

7577

100

Table 2.3
Characteristics of New Enrol lees Assigned to Different Local CETA Components, Fiscal 1980

Classroom
Training

OJT

Private Sector
Initiative
Program
(mostly
classroom and
on-the-job
training)

Public
Service
Employment

Adult
Work
Experience

Youth
Programs
Other Than
Classroom
Training
and OJT

Direct
Referral

Male
Female

43
57

63
37

59
41

55
45

45
55

50
50

56
44

White
Black
Hispanic
All other

48
36
11
5

60
26
11
3

47
33
17
4

53
37
7
2

59
38
8
5

38
48
11
3

44
38
14
4

Less than 16
16-19
20-21
22-44
45-54
55+

1
26
15
53
4
1

0
17
16
66
4
2

1
24
16
55
4
1

0
12
14
63
7
4

__
83
9
8

29
63
7
1

__
12
14
57
6
11

Single parent

25

16

17

19

24

5

17

School dropout
Student

39
5

33
2

29
6

31
1

36
2

12
74

35
2

Family received
public assistance

34

21

25

30

33

45

25

Prior participant
in CETA

17

17

19

18

17

24

18

7

5

6

2

2

3

6

Limited English
Source:

CETA Supplemental MIS Tables by Initial Program Assignment

New Enrol lees During October 1979-September 1980.

(Employment and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, 1981).
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Assignment patterns must respond to the interests of individual
participants as well as to their relative employability. Most CETA
entrants want a job not training. Three-fourths of fiscal 1977 npnsummer
local participants entered CETA primarily because they wanted a job or a
better job, while only 21 percent claimed that they wanted job training and
3 percent wanted to improve basic skills (Table 2.4). Of those seeking
training or basic skills improvements, 56 percent were assigned to class
room training, and 8 percent to OJT. Among this group who wanted and were
assigned to training, 87 percent entered CETA with a specific type of
training in mind and two-thirds of these received it. Looking at the
half-empty cup, half of participants who wanted job training either did not
get assigned to training or did not get the type of training they sought
(unless provided through work experience or public service employment).
White male entrants were least likely to want job training or basic skills,
which was fortuitous since white and black males were much less likely than
females to get training if they wanted it. On the other hand, among those
who wanted jobs rather than training, females were more likely than males
to receive training instead. Most summer youth program enrol lees simply
wanted a job, but among the minority seeking training, many did not get it.
The percentage of participants who wanted and got training was 64 percent
excluding the summer program but only 53 percent including it.
Job Corps is a major source of training for disadvantaged and dropout
youth. The 70.4 thousand new Job Corps enrol lees during fiscal 1980
equaled nearly half the total youth enrollments in classroom training under
local CETA programs. The five in six Corpsmembers who were dropouts repre
sented one-third the number of dropout youth enrolled in all local CETA
programs and half again the number of dropout youth who participated in
local classroom or on-the-job training. 30/ Job Corps entrants have been
characterized as the "hardest of the hard-core." The typical Corpsmember
faces almost overwhelming barriers to employment. Only half of 1977 Job
Corps participants came from two-parent families compared to four-fifths of
all youth; the average size of their families was 6.4 persons, compared to
3.4 for the total youth population (Table 2.5). Income per family member
was less than a third that for the total population. The average reading
and math performance at entry was below the sixth grade level. In
addition, a fourth of Job Corps enrollees had applied for but been rejected
by the military. Over a third had never held a job of 20 hours or more per
week which lasted a month. Two-fifths had previous arrests and three in
ten previous convictions. 31/ The annual earnings of youth comparable to
those who entered Job Corps in 1977 averaged only $2700 over the next two
years, or less than three-fourths of the 1977 Social Security covered
earnings of controls for 1976 CETA classroom trainees, three-fifths of the
earnings of OJT controls, and three-fourths of the earnings of controls for
all nonsummer participants. 32/
Trends in Training
Employment and training activities experienced phenomenal growth in
the 1960s and 1970s. In constant 1980' dollars, total expenditures rose
from next to nothing in 1961 to the billion dollar level in 1965, doubled
again in 1966, and then, after leveling off between 1967 and 1970, doubled
once more to a level of over $6 billion by 1972. After another plateau,
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Table 2.4
Primary Motivation for Entering CETA and Assignment Within CETA for Fiscal 1977 Local Enrol lees
Summer and Nonsummer Participants
Total

White
Males

White
Females

Black
Males

Black
Females

Hispanic
Males

Hispanic
Females

14. 2%

12.02

16.0%

11.2*

14.9%

18.3%

15.3%

1.9

1.4

2.1

.7

2.3

2.9

3.4

Percent who wanted job
or basic skil Is
training

16.1

13.4

18.1

11.9

17.2

21.2

18.7

Percent who wanted
job or basic skills
training who were
assigned to class
room training

46.1

42.5

57.2

38.2

43.8

39.6

46.9

Percent who wanted j'ob
or basic skills
training who were
assigned to classroom
or on-the-job
training

52.6

54.2

62.8

42.6

46.3

52.6

48.8

Percent who wanted job
or income who
were assigned to
classroom training

4.8

3.9

5.8

3.6

4.9

7.1

6.5

Percent who wanted
job training
Percent who wanted
basic skills training

Nonsummer Participants
Total

White
Males

White
Females

Black
Males

Black
Females

Hispanic
Males

Hispanic
Females

21.2%

16.5%

22. 9%

21. 6%

24. 7%

27.0%

20. 8%

Percent who wanted
basic skills training

3.2

2.3

2.9

1.6

4.9

4.8

7.0

Percent who wanted job
or basic skills
training

24.4

18.8

25.8

23.2

29.6

31.8

27.8

Percent who wanted
job or basic skills
training who were
assigned to class
room training

56.0

47.9

63.8

46.7

61.5

44.4

66.8

Percent who wanted job
or basic skills
training who were
assigned to classroom
or on-the-job
training

63.9

61.1

70.0

52.0

65.1

58.9

69.5

Percent who wanted job
or income who
were assigned to
classroom training

9.9

6.5

10.2

9.1

13.9

13.8

15.7

Percent who wanted
job training

Source:

Continuous Longitudinal Mapower Survey, Fiscal 1977 New Enrol lees, Westat, Inc., unpublished tabulations.
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Table 2.5
Family Background at Age 15:
1977 Job Corps Participants and U.S. Population
U.S.
Population
Percentage living with two parents
Percentage living with one parent
Percentage living with other
relatives
Percentage living alone
Percentage institutionalized
Family size
Percentage living outside U.S.
Percentage in non-English-speaking
households
Education of father or other male
head (highest grade completed)
Percentage of fathers completed high
school
Education of mother or other female
head (highest grade completed)
Percentage of mothers completed high
school
Family earnings
Family income
Percentage of families below
poverty level
Percentage of families below
poverty level or
receive welfare assistance
Percentage of families receiving
public transfers
Percentage of families receiving
cash welfare
Percentage of families receiving
food stamps
Percentage of families living
in public housing
Percentage of families receiving
unemployment benefits
Source:

78%
18
less than 1
3
1
3.4
less than 1

Job Corps
Participants

52%
34
9
1
2
6.4
5
15

12.5 grades

9.2 grades

70

36

12.4 grades

10.0 grades

70
$12,400
$14,500

40
$7,900
$8,800
44

13

59

21

55

8

30

5

29

2

17

14

19

Stuart Kerachsky, et al., "An Examination of Job Corps Partici
pation," in Assessments of Job Corps Performance and Impacts,
Volume I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
May 1980), pp. 363-364.
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real expenditures increased to over $7 billion in 1976 and a peak of more
than $12 billion in fiscal 1978 before declining by a third to less than $9
billion in 1980. 33/ Real expenditures will decline by half in fiscal 1981
and to a third the 1980 level in fiscal 1982.
Training components increased in real and absolute terms, but at a
much more modest pace (Figure 2.2). Outlays for classroom and on-the-job
training and Job Corps rose to $650 million (1980 dollars) in 1968, then
leveled off and were still less than $700 million in 1974. They, then,
began rising steadily to the $1.9 billion level in 1980. Where training
expenditures predominated in the policy mix for the first decade of
manpower programs, representing 63 percent of constant dollar outlays in
1969, they fell to only 15 percent in 1978 before rebounding to 21 percent
in 1980 as a result of cutbacks in the CETA jobs components.
The pace of expansion, and the relative emphasis on work versus
training, has fluctuated significantly from year to year. While the annual
increments in real expenditures display a cyclical pattern, large increases
in job creation have absorbed the extra resources that might otherwise have
gone for training during the growth cycles (Figure 2.3).
The relative emphasis on the different training approaches has also
shifted over time. On-the-job training represented less than a tenth of
training expenditures from 1963 through 1968. It increased to 22 percent
from 1969 through 1973, but declined to an average of 16 percent of train
ing expenditures over the remainder of the decade. The intensive remedia
tion approach of Job Corps accounted for nearly half of training expendi
tures in the program's heyday from 1966 through 1968, then declined to less
than a fourth over the next ten years until an expansion was initiated
which doubled real expenditures and nearly doubled enrollment. Finally,
locally-delivered classroom training increased from half of outlays during
the 1960s to 55 percent in the first half of the 1970s and 63 percent in
the second half.
As a result of these increased training investments, the number of
annual new participants in Job Corps, classroom and on-the-job training
rose to 336,000 in fiscal 1967, increased more slowly to 481,000 by 1972,
then declined until 1977, before accelerating to 701,000 new participants
in 1979 (Figure 2.4). Classroom enrollments accounted for almost all of
this growth. In fact, there were only half as many new OJT participants in
1980 as in 1972. Annual enrollments in OJT in the five years before the
implementation of CETA averaged half again the level attained between 1975
and 1980.
The growth of CETA training enrollments is much less impressive when
measured relative to the expanding labor force. Despite a two-fifths
increase in annual enrollments over the 1970s, the number of annual new
training participants rose only from .56 percent to .66 percent of the
labor force and will decline to the earlier level in fiscal 1981.
The same trends are evident when training is measured in service years
(Figure 2.5). The service years of OJT during the 1975-1980 period of
"decentralization and decategorization" under CETA were less than twothirds the levels achieved from 1969 through 1974 under federally-directed
categorical programs. Job Corps represented three-tenths of service years
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Figure 2.2
CETA and Antecedent Program Outlays
For Training ($ Billions)*
$2B .
Local
Classroom
$1B .
Training
63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
Ceta and Antecedent Program Outlays
For Training (Constant 1980 $ Billions)
$2B .

Total

$1B .

^^ Local Classroom Training

Corps .......... "'
.. . .
.
. .
r63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
Training Component Expenditures
as Percent of Total Expenditures
Under CETA and Antecedent Programs

Local
Classroom
Training

..-•

.••""""•-.

•••••"'

n IT

•••—•••... •—.....

***-—— - — «*

--— •"*"

63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
*The pre-CETA programs are those incorporated under the Comprehensive Em
ployment and Training Act. Only primary training activities are included,
i.e., excluding training which may be a supplement to work experience.
Special national programs such as STIP and HIRE are included in the local
classroom training and OJT figures.
Estimates for 1963-1975 are derived from Office of Management and
Source:
Budget unpublished tabulations; data for 1976-1980 were provided
by Employment and Training Administration, Office of Administration
and Management and Office of Job Corps and \oung Adult Conservation
Corps.

Figure 2.3
Year-to-Year Changes in Employment and Training Components
(Constant 1980 Dollars)
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2295
LJ I II

TRAINING

1394

629

121
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Source: Estimates for 1963-1975 derived from Office of Management and Budget unpublished tabulations; data
for 1976-1980 provided by Employment and Training Administration, Office of Administration and Manage
ment and Office of Job Corps and Young Adult Conservation Corps.
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Figure 2.4

HtH tHKOLLCES IN TRAINING ACTIVITIES
(thousands)
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Manpower Reports of the President, 1964-1975; Employment and
Training Reports of the President, 1975-1980; Employment and
Training Administration, Annual CETA Management Information
System Reports and Job Corps Manaqement Information System
Reports, unpublished.
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Figure 2.5

Service Years of Training
(Thousands)
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Source:

Manpower Reports of the President, 1964-1975; Employment and
Training Reports of the President, 1975-1980; Employment and
Training Administration, Annual CETA Management Information
System Reports and Job Corps Management Information System
Reports, unpublished.
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in 1968 but fell to a tenth in 1976 and remained only a ninth in fiscal
1980 despite the doubling of the program. Local classroom training
expanded in both absolute and relative terms. Again, the growth is less
impressive when measured relative to the universe of need. Rapid expansion
during the tight labor markets of the 1960s raised average on-board
strength to 5.3 percent of average unemployment in fiscal 1969. Training
enrollments then fell to 1.4 percent of average unemployment in fiscal 1975
before rising to 4.8 percent at the end of the decade. Thus, there was no
increase over the 1970s in training relative to need as measured by the
unemployment rate. On-the-job trainees equaled 2.1 percent of the unem
ployed in 1969, but only .7 percent in 1980.
Since most CETA training is provided under Title IIBC (formerly Title
I), which also leaves the most flexibility for local decisionmakers and
represents both the initial intent of CETA and the likely model of any
future consolidated block grant, changes over time in the mix and content
of "comprehensive" activities funded under this title are significant.
Whether as a result of local preference for classroom training or as a
reflection of the rapidly increasing resources for job creation available
under other titles of CETA, classroom training outlays rose from a third of
Title I expenditures in fiscal 1975 to nearly three-fifths of Title IIBC
expenditures in fiscal 1980 (Table 2.6). On the other hand, OJT efforts
received limited emphasis throughout the CETA regime. There was a sub
stantial rise in the cost of classroom training in 1979 and 1980 due to
legislated minimum wage rises which increased allowance components, and due
to greater administrative costs resulting from the 1978 CETA amendments.
In real terms, the cost of OJT slots has been relatively stable. The
duration of classroom training increased from 4.3 months in 1976 to 5.1
months in 1980. This occurred despite increasing emphasis on shorter
duration "other" classroom training which accounted for three in ten
classroom trainees in fiscal 1980. The duration of stay for occupational
skills components was estimated to be 5.9 months in fiscal 1980 compared to
3.5 months in "other" training components. 34/
There have been some changes over time in the enrollee mix under local
CETA training programs. From 1976 to 1979, the female share of new
participants in classroom training rose from 50 percent to 60 percent
(Table 2.7). Under the MDTA institutional program which, was the primary
classroom training vehicle before CETA, women represented only two-fifths
of enrollees. 35/ The tightening of eligibility requirements in the 1978
CETA amendments was reflected in an increased percentage of economically
disadvantaged trainees. The veteran's share among training participants
declined substantially over the post-Vietnam period, so that veterans
represented just 9 percent of classroom trainees in 1980 compared to 25
percent of the MDTA institutional training enrollment. There has been
little shift under CETA in the racial composition of participants, but a
major shift from pre-CETA. Whites accounted for three-fifths of classroom
training enrollments under MDTA compared to less than half under CETA. 36/
There has been a much smaller increase in the female share under OJT,
although it should be noted that women accounted for 37 percent of trainees
under CETA in 1980 compared to 22 percent under MDTA-OJT through 1974.
There was also a declining enrollment of veterans and an increasing
enrollment of low-income participants. 37/

Table 2.6
Training Activities Under CETA Title IIBC (formerly Title I)
1979

1980

1976

1977

1978

290,600
73,700
122,000
25.9%
6.6%

514,800
147,700
1,731,500
29.7%
8.5%

536,800
169,900
1,415,600
37.9%
12.0%

580,300
193,400
1,331,500
43.6%
14.5%

569,206
156,684
,193,727
47.7%
13.1%

493,682
132,237
,113,844
44.4%
11.9%

68,953
16,692
283,803
24.3%
5.9%

146,363
38,987
510,662
28.7%
7.6%

173,380
44,490
444,751
39.0%
10.0%

188,046
54,463
443,891
42.4%
12.3%

163,329
40,230
350,507
46.6%
11.8%

152,212
35,589
360,576
42.2%
9.9%

941.5
224.0
1,800.0
52.3%
12.4%

$1,224.6
216.1
2,145.0
57.1%
10.1*

1975

Individuals Served:
Classroom training
OJT
Total participants
Percent classroom training
Percent OJT
Service Years:
Classroom training
OJT
Total service years
Percent classroom training
Percent OJT
Outlays (millions of dollars):
Classroom training
OJT
Total outlays
Percent classroom training
Percent OJT

:

309.6
77.9
900.0
34.4%
8.7%

$

606.2
168.4
1,698.0
35.7%
9.9%

$

739.8
207.5
1,759.0
42.1%
11.8%

$

872.6
257.8
1,875.0
46.5%
13.8%

t

Cost Per Service Year:
Classroom training
OJT

$4,465
4,666

$4,017
4,209

$4,268
4,665

$4,641
4,733

$5,764
5,568

$8,046
6,088

$6,837
7,144

$5,817
6,095

$5,804
6,344

$5,862
5,978

$6,542
6,320

$8,046
6,088

N.A.
N.A.

4.3
4.2

4.8
4.4

5.2
4.3

5.2
4.4

5,1
4,3

Cost Per Service Year (1980
dollars):
Classroom training
OJT
Length of Stay (months):
Classroom training
OJT

Source: Richard Wagner, "Historical CETA Data for Titles II-ABC (formerly Title I), II-D (formerly
Title II), and Title VI Fiscal Years 1975 Through 1979," Mimeo. Employment and Training
Administration, Office of Community Employment Programs, March 1980; and unpublished tabu
lations for fiscal 1980 from same source.
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Table 2.7
Trends in Participant Mix Under CETA Local Programs :
Classroom Training

Hale
Fenale
Age it entry
Less than 18
18-21
22-29
30-44
4S-54
55+
White
Black
Hispanic
Other
Veteran
Deceiving cash welfare or
below poverty
Family receiving cash or in-kind benefits
Ho earnings
Less than high school
In-scho 1
Out-of- chool
High school r more
In-scho 1
Out-of- chool
Predominantly employed
Predominantly unemployed
Substantially unemployed
Not in labor force
Conbi nation
Employed
Unemployed
School training
Out of labor force
Estimated .radian family income
Estimated median earnings

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

50
50

48
52

44
56

40
60

43
57

4
32
39
19
5
1
44
36
14
6
16

4
34
37
19
4
2
48
32
12
7
14

5
35
36
19
4
2
50
31
12
6
11

4
33
38
21
4
1
48
34
13
5
11

4
31
39
21
4
2
49
34
11
6
9

68
35
42

72
35
39

74
35
37

80
38
38

99
INA
INA

5
36

5
35

5
34

4
34

4
37

8
51
11
38
13
28
10

8
52
9
37
15
28
12

9
53
10
31
16
30
13

8
54
9
30
15
33
13

32
38
14
17
4470
550

33
38
11
18
4700
747

35
34
12
19
5260
980

33
32
12
22
4950
1030

59

-"

OJT

Hale
Female
Age at entry
Less than 18
18-21
22-29
30-44
45-54
55*
White
Black
Hispanic
Other
Veteran
Receiving cash welfare or
below poverty
Family receiving cash or In-kind benefits
No earntnos
Less than high school
In-school
Out-of-school
High school or more
In-school
Out-of-school
Predominantly employed
Predominantly unemployed
Substantially unemployed
Not In labor force
Combination
Average percent time
Employed
Unemployed
School training
Out of labor force
Estimated median family Income
Estimated median earnings

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

66
34

68
32

64
36

63
37

63
37

3
32
39
20
5
2
63
20
12

4
31
40
18
5
2
67
20
11

3
32
39
21
4
2
62
23
12

3
31
40
21
4
2
60
26
11
3

22

3
33
38
20
4
2
68
19
10
4
21

51
19
25

62
18
24

62
18
23

73
23
25

98

3
27

4
26

2
29

2
30

2
33

7
62
17
30
14
25
14

9
fil
17
29
16
24
13

8
61
17
24
16
25
18

7
61
14
29
16
26
16

42
32
13
12
5750
1690

46
32
12
10
5880
1940

49
28
10
13
6630
2430

42
31
13
14
5990
2240

5
24

3

4
18

IS

65

--

..
--

*Includes primary training components under all formula-allocated CETA
programs.
Source: CETA Supplemental MIS Tables by Initial Program Assignment. New
Enrol lees During October 1979-September 1980. Employment and Train
ing Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, un
published; Westat, Inc. Characteristics of Enrol lees Who Entered
Adult-Oriented CETA Programs During Fiscal Year 1979 (October 1979
Through September 1979)7(Washington, D.C.:Employment and Training
Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, February
1981).
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Mirroring the increased number of female trainees, there have been
some shifts in training occupations. 38/ The clerical and service occupa
tions have increased in importance since MDTA, while traditionally male
construction and craft jobs have declined:
1972
MDTAInstitutional

1977
CETA
Classroom
Training

1972
MDTAOJT

1977
CETAOJT

13.0
22.2
12.2

7.1
36.1
15.8

5.1
10.1
8.0

8.3
18.9
10.9

8.7
8.3
23.3
12.4

4.8
10.5
19.0
6.7

16.7
5.8
28.3
25.8

6.1
2.6
16.0
37.2

Professional
and managerial
Clerical
Service
Construction
crafts
Welding
Other crafts
Other occupations

Although the basic Job Corps service mix and targeting have remained
relatively constant over the years, some changes have occurred. During the
1970s, there was a slight increase in female representation and a slight
upward trend in the age of entrants, although educational status and family
background did not change noticeably. 39/
Characteristics of Job Corps Enrol lees

1969

1979

Sex
Male
Female

11%
23

71%
29

16 and under
17
18-21

30
26
42

25
25
50

Less than high school completed
Average reading score at entry
(norm-referenced SAT-tests)

83

83

Public assistance recipient
Broken home

30
50

Age

5.5
grades

5.6
grades
30
48

The average duration of stay rose from 5.5 months in 1968 to 6.0
months in 1980. 40/ This resulted both from a decline in the 90 day
dropout rate and an increased average duration of stay for those remaining
more than 90 days. One factor was the implementation of longer-duration
training components including an advanced career training program in
post-secondary institutions and colleges (4 percent of 1980 enrollment), an
industry work experience program to ease the transition into the labor
market after training (1 percent of enrollment), advanced programs operated
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in centers by unions and employer associations (12 percent of training
enrollment), and several special needs groups programs (1 percent of en
rollment).
The real cost of Job Corps declined from $20,700 in 1966 and $15,400
in 1968 to $10,300 a decade later. 4JY This reflected declining start-up
costs, restrictions in some services, particularly health care, erosion in
the real value of allowances, and deferral of capital improvements, as well
as increased efficiency. Real expenditures increased to $13,200 in fiscal
1980, or $11,300 excluding capital costs, as a result of new center
shart-up, a doubling of Corpsmember allowances, and needed capital
improvements in existing centers.
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CHAPTER 3
EFFECTS AND EFFECTIVENESS
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SECTION 1.
IS TRAINING WORTHWHILE?

Earnings Impacts
Training is an investment in the future. The purpose of CETA is "to
assure that training and other services lead to maximum employment oppor
tunities and enhance self-sufficiency ...." Thus, the basic issue in
assessing CETA training activities is whether participants are able to
secure and retain better jobs than similar individuals who do not par
ticipate. The "bottom line" is increased post-program earnings.
The weight of evidence from studies of the categorical training
programs which preceded CETA was positive. Almost all studies found that
classroom training increased the earnings of participants in the first
post-program year, with estimates of the earnings impacts ranging from up
to $800 and a consensus ranging between $250 and $300 (Table 3.1).
Previous studies concluded that OJT paid off even more, with participants
experiencing post-program earnings increases of up to $2,200 and with most
estimates ranging between $400 and $900 in annual earnings improvements.
Past assessments of Job Corps reached very mixed conclusions, some finding
earnings gains and others earnings losses. Adult basic education increased
earnings according to available studies.
The impacts of CETA training are much more difficult to assess because
under its comprehensive approach, training is intermixed with other
activities. The intensity and types of training which occur within any
single prime sponsor are diverse, and there is great variability among
prime sponsors. In contrast, federally-directed categorical programs such
as MDTA were relatively standardized and focused primarily on occupational
training, with remedial education and training combinations largely occur
ring in skills centers so that the relative effects of this variant could
be isolated.
To try to separate the effects of the diverse components in CETA, a
Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey (CLMS) was implemented to track the
pre-program, in-program, and post-program experiences of participants in
each major CETA program activity funded under grants to prime sponsors.
Each year's entrants for a stratified sample of prime sponsors are inter
viewed at entry and 9, 18, and 36 months later. The participants are
classified according to primary assignment while in CETA, so that the
relationship between activities and outcomes can be determined. _!/
The CLMS has tracked CETA entrants since fiscal 1975. There are,
however, inherent time lags in gathering follow-up information at 18 and 36
months after entry, and subsequently in the analysis of these findings.
Only the 36-month follow-up results for 1975 entrants, and the 18-month
follow-up results for this group and for fiscal 1976 entrants, were
available for this analysis (i.e., through August 1981).
The CLMS does not include a control group of nonparticipants.
Instead, the information gathered in interviews with participants at entry
is compared with the information collected in the Current Population Survey
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Table 3.1
A Summary of the Annual Estimated Earnings Increases
for Participants In Remedial Education and Training Programs
Classroom Training
Ashenfelter
Black males
White males
Black females
White females
?
Borus
Males
Borus and Prescott
Males
Females

On-the-Job Training
$318
139
441
354

Hardln and Borus
Ketron6
Minority females
White females
Kiefer7
Black
White
Black
White

males
males
females
females

MainB

$417
322
552
572

305

_

Cooley, McGuIre and Prescott
Males
Females

to
to
to
to

516
38
4
71 to
168 to

234
291

251

Page ; Gooding

in

Prescott and Cooley
Males
Sewell 12

Kiefer7
Black
White
Black
White

$-38 to $ 59
30 to 226
1,984
2,181
884
926
-160
-61
386
926

males
males
females
females

Prescott and Cooley
Males

796

Males
Females

184
701
-742 to -355
-644 to -375
591
639

446

375
754

Job Corps
Kiefer
Black
White
Black
White
Mallar114*

-179
-74
-188
-780

males
males
females
females

Males
Females without children
Females with children

652
432

Cain and Stromsdorfer
White males
White females

Ketron6
Minority males
White males
Minority females
White females

4

Sewell 12

409

O

Cooley, McGuIre and Prescott
Males
Females

187
565
-206

Adult Basic Education
Brazzie 15
•Males

828
336

2.368

Roomkln 16
Males
Females

318
12
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for a representative sample of the national population. Based on a number
of questions on age, race, sex, education, income, earnings, and employment
status which are asked of both CETA participants in the CLMS and the
general population in the CPS, a comparison group is selected from the CPS
sample which matches the CLMS CETA sample in most regards. Earnings
recorded in Social Security records are, then, compared for these like
groups for the years after participants have left CETA. These comparisons
are the basis of estimates of earnings impacts of CETA and its com
ponents. 2J
The CPS-CLMS matching process is as rigorous as the interview
questions will permit, but there is no way to assure comparability in all
regards between the participant and control groups. The possibilities of
mismatch are greatest for certain subgroups of participants and controls.
The questions on education, income, employment and earnings which are used
to compare individuals in the CPS with participants in the CLMS are
probably better for matching adult male workers than for matching persons
outside the labor force, or youth with limited prior work experience. For
instance, many teenagers, but few adults, experience unemployment, so that
two teenagers matched because they were both out of work for some weeks may
be quite different in their likely future success while older individuals
suffering from long-term unemployment are likely to have more comparable
future experiences. Members of the comparison group drawn from the CPS may
also currently or subsequently participate in CETA. If participation
increases earnings, the gains estimated by comparing the earnings of
controls and participants will underestimate the impacts to the extent some
of the controls participated and shared in the earnings gains. Finally,
Social Security records do not provide comprehensive coverage of earnings,
particularly for youth in irregular jobs and for some local public sector
employment. Undercoverage of public sector earnings particularly affects
estimates of the gains realized by participants in public service em
ployment and work experience, where a major effect is to increase the rates
of unsubsidized post-CETA employment in the public sector. The technical
reports of the CLMS present estimates of the magnitude of possible dis
tortions and detail the techniques to minimize these biases. In general,
the assumptions adopted in estimating impacts are consciously conservative
so as not to exaggerate the benefits of participation.
Recognizing these caveats, the CLMS provides a massive volume of
information about the employment and participation patterns of CETA en
rol lees, as well as reasonable estimates of the minimum impacts of CETA as
it operated in its early years.
According to this evidence, participation in training programs
increased the post-program earnings of 1975 and 1976 CETA entrants. Among
classroom trainees who entered in fiscal 1976 and had terminated prior to
the end of calendar 1976, Social Security-covered earnings in 1977 were
$347 or 10 percent above those of the comparison group. Participants in
multiple activities, usually work and training combinations, experienced
similar gains. On-the-job trainees gained even more, with earnings $839
above controls, representing an 18 percent increment.

The impacts of classroom training increased over time. The estimated
earnings gains for 1976 classroom trainees were $442 in 1978, representing
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a rise in real terms of almost a fifth over the participant-control
For all 1976 participants, including those who
differential in 1977.
stayed longer and had not completed by the end of calendar 1976, who also
apparently gained more from training, the 1978 earnings were $468 above
those of controls. 3/ Less dependable estimates for fiscal 1975 partici
pants suggest a similar pattern of increased returns from the first to
second post-program year. 4/ This suggests that those "taught to fish"
continue to use their skilTs. In contrast, the estimated benefits of OJT
eroded over time. The second post-program year impacts for 1976 trainees
were over a third less in real terms than the first-year impacts. _5/ Less
dependable estimates for second-half 1975 participants evidenced the same
fall-off. 6/ Apparently, some of the initial jobs secured through OJT were
lost, and the skills were not transferable, or else the comparison group
found employment and caught up.
Annual Earnings Relative to Controls of Fiscal 1976 Entrants Terminating in Calendar 1976

Classroom training
On-the-job training
Combination of
activities
Public service
employment
Work experience

Change in
Magnitude
of Estimated
Impact From
1978 to 1979
Adjusted
for Inflation

Estimated
Net Impact
1977 SSA
Earnings

Gain as
Percent
1977 Earnings
of Controls

Estimated
Net Impact
1978 SSA
Earnings

+$347
+839

+10%
+18

+$442
+574

+10%
+15

+18%
-36

+356

+10

+164

+8

-57

+261
-149

+6
-5

+326
-187

+8
-6

+16
-17

Gain as
Percent
1978 Earnings
of Controls

These benefits might be contrasted with the estimated earnings impacts
of the primary alternatives to training adult work experience and public
service employment. Work experience participants had slightly lower 1977
Social Security earnings than averaged by their control group, while the
PSE participants had earnings $261 above controls. The rates of employment
in the public sector increased substantially from the pre-entry to posttermination periods for PSE participants and somewhat less for work ex
perience participants. Adjustments for the undercount of post-program
public sector earnings increase the estimated 1977 gains for PSE partici
pants to between $350 and $750. The maximum adjusted gain for work ex
perience participants was $100, with a best guess that there was no net
gain or loss from work experience alone. While participants in these
various components differed significantly, the estimates compared each set
of participants to matched controls.
Confirmation of these findings on the relative impacts of different
components is provided by analysis of the employment and earnings changes
between the pre-entry year and the second ppst-termination years for second
half fiscal 1975 entrants. This analytical approach does not involve
matching with a control group and uses interview data on earnings rather
than Social Security records, thus avoiding the possible undercoverage and
matching problems of the previous estimations. Comparing the second year
earnings, as well as the increase in earnings from the pre-entry year for
participants in different components, after adjusting through the use of
regression equations for the differences between participants in sex, race,
age, education, marital and family status, prior earnings patterns,
barriers to employment, family income, and time in program, the estimated
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relative impacts of the components were of the same order of magnitude as
the differentials calculated using the CPS-CLMS matching and Social
Security records. If the absolute earnings increases for work experience
participants are assumed to yield no net earnings gain relative to
controls, then the relatively greater gains of participants in other
components should have, and did, roughly parallel the net impact estimates
for each component calculated from the CPS-CLMS match. TJ
Public
Service
Employment

Classroom
Training

Earnings change of
participants in PSE,
classroom training,
OJT and combination
activities minus the
earnings change for
participants in adult
work experience after
adjusting for differences
in characteristics

+$483

+$638

+$1134

$+725

Second year earnings
of participants in
PSE, classroom training,
OJT and combination
activities minus the
earnings of adult work
experience participants
after adjusting for
differences in
characteristics

$+810

$+588

$+965

$+472

On-The-Job
Training

Combination
of Activities

Estimates of the earnings impacts of Job Corps were provided by a
follow-up of the two-year post-termination experiences of a stratified
sample of 1977 entrants and a comparison group of eligible youth drawn from
areas of limited Job Corps recruitment and matched through regression
analysis to the enrol lee group. Over the two-year post-program period,
civilian earnings were raised by $695, of which $487 was realized in the
second-post termination year. This represented an 8 percent earnings
increment in the first year and a 13 percent increment in the second. 8/
Earnings Per Week
by Length of Time
Out of Job Corps
(Months)

0-6

6-12

12-18

18-24

Expected weekly earnings of
Job Corps enrol lees 1f
had not participated
based on experience
of controls

$43.82

$58.38

$72.48

$73.73

Weekly earnings of
Job Corps termlnees

$45.84

$64.J8

$82.17

$82.76

Absolute gain in
weekly earnings

$2.02

$6.00

$9.69

$9.03

Percentage gain In
weekly earnings

4.6%

10.3%

13.4%

12.3%
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Benefits and Costs of Job Corps An Analytic Framework
One way to assess the magnitude of training program impacts is to
compare the present dollar value of estimated benefits with the costs
incurred to produce these results. The ratio of benefits to costs is an
indicator of the rate of return on the investment in human resources.
Benefit-cost analysis necessarily rests on a range of assumptions.
Benefits must be valued in dollar and cents terms. Gains measured in the
immediate post-program period must be projected into the future. Any
number of discount rates might be adopted in calculating the present value
of projected future benefits.
Thus, different and quite plausible
assumptions can yield a range of estimates concerning the rate of return on
the social investment. Recent analytic work has refined the procedures for
valuing benefits and has helped to standardize alternative assumptions, yet
estimates of absolute payoff of social programs remains as much art as
science. Yet the same can be said of the business projections used in
investment decisions. Rate of return calculations are no substitute for
judgment, but they can help to organize and provide a better sense of the
reasonableness of outomes in light of the resources needed to produce
them. 9/
Job Corps is one of the programs which has been subjected to careful
benefit-cost analysis utilizing the most refined techniques currently
available. 10/ This analysis provides a framework for the assessment of
other CETA training activities:
To begin with, benefits and costs can be estimated from a social
perspective which includes the gains and losses for participants as well
as nonparticipants--as well as from a taxpayer's perspective which focuses
on the payoffs and costs for nonparticipants. From the social perspective,
costs include all operating expenses, excluding allowances and other
transfers, plus the output which is foregone during the period the enrollee
is in training rather than available for work. The benefits include
in-program and increased post-program output, any administrative cost
savings from reduced transfer and drug treatment during and after par
ticipation, and reductions in criminal justice, corrections, and victimiza
tion costs to the extent crime is reduced as a result of participation.
In the two years following Job Corps, increased Corpsmembers 1 earnings
(including estimates of military salaries) plus fringes (valued at 15
percent of civilian earnings) were roughly $1000 more than those of
controls. Discounted at a 5 percent real rate to the period of par
ticipation when costs were incurred, the present value of these earnings
and fringes was $925. As an estimate of the earnings gains beyond the
two-year post-program period, the "benchmark" assumptions projected that
the annualized earnings differential between participants and controls
measured in the 18- to 24-month post-program period would decline 14
percent a year in real terms over the future 43 years of worklife. ll/
Discounting at a 5 percent real rate, the earnings gains projected under
these assumptions, added to the discounted gain in the immediate postprogram period, sum to the estimated current value of post-program output,
or $3896 for 1977 Job Corps enrol lees (Table 3.2).
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Table 3.2
Estimated Net Present Values Per Corpsmember
Under the Benchmark Assumptions
(1977 Dollars)

Benefits
Output Produced by Corpsmembers
In-program output
Increased post-program output
Increased tax payments on
post-program income
Increased utility due to
preferences for work over welfare
Reduced Dependence on Transfer Programs
Reduced transfer payments
Reduced administrative costs
Reduced Criminal Activity
Reduced criminal justice system
costs
Reduced personal injury and
property damage
Reduced stolen property
Reduced psychological costs
Reduced Drug/Alcohol Use
Reduced treatment costs
Increased utility from reduced
drug/alcohol dependence
Utilization of Alternative Services
Reduced costs of training, educa
tional, and PSE programs
Reduced training allowances

Social
$

757
3,896

$

673
0
582

0
158

1,357
158

1,152

1,152

645
315

645
484

30

30

+

+

390
0

390
49

Other Benefits
Increased utility from redistribution
+
Increased utility from improved
well-being of Corpsmembers
__+
Total Benefits
$7,343
Costs

Program Operating Expenditure
Center operating expenditures,
excluding transfers to
Corpsmembers
Transfers to Corpsmembers
Central administrative costs
Opportunity Cost of Corpsmember Labor
Foregone output
Foregone tax payments

$2,796
0

1,347

$2,796
1,208
1,347

881
0

0
153

Unbudgeted Expenditures Other Than
Corpsmember Labor
Resource costs
Transfers to Corpsmembers
Total Costs
Present Value
Benefit-Cost Ratio

Source:

(Benefits less Costs)

1.45

0.96

Charles Mallar, £t aJL » Evaluation of the Economic Impact of the
Job Corps Program Second Follow-Up Report (Washington, D.C.:
Employment and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Eval
uation and Research, April 1980), p. 153.
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Since Job Corps is a residential program dealing with high risk youth,
the in-program and post-program reductions in crime and drug use are
substantial. For the 1977 enrol lees, there were 11 per hundred fewer
arrests for burglary and larceny during the period of participation, and
nearly 3 per hundred fewer in the first post-program year. The costs of
crime and its treatment are large--for instance, an estimated $4300 per
arrest for larceny and $8500 per arrest for burglary--so that the savings
from reduced crime amounted to $2260 in current value on the assumption
that post-program effects measured in the second post-program year eroded
completely after five years. Lesser reliance on transfers and alternative
employment programs produced administrative cost savings with current
values of $158 and $390, respectively, also under the assumption of a decay
to zero after five years. Finally, the work components of the Job Corps
program yielded output valued at $757 per Corpsmember during the period of
participation.
The annual per participant cost of Job Corps was $4189 in fiscal 1977,
excluding $1208 per Corpsmember for food and shelter. These were not
considered a social cost because the losses of the nonparticipants who paid
for these transfers were balanced by the welfare gains of participants.
Society and Corpsmembers lost the output and earnings that would have been
produced if the Corpsmembers had not entered the program. Based on the
experience of the control group, this output would have been worth $881.
Total costs per Corpsmember were, thus, $5070, or $2271 less than the
estimated $7343 current value of benefits. The ratio of benefits to costs
was, thus, 1.45.
Other assumptions yield different ratios. In light of the increase
rather than decrease in estimated earnings impacts over the two years after
termination, the benchmark assumption of a 14 percent annual deterioration
in future earnings impacts may well understate longer-term payoffs.
If no
fade-out were assumed for the gains measured at the 18-24 month postprogram point, the benefit-cost ratio would be 2.91. On the other hand, if
there were no effects past those measured in the first two post-program
years, the ratio would be only .81. Under a 10 percent, rather than 5
percent, real discount rate applied to future benefits, the ratio would
fall to 1.24; while a 3 percent rate would increase it to 1.56. 12/
Taxpayers may be more concerned with the effects on their own wellbeing rather than the benefits to participants. From the taxpayer's
perspective, costs include all program operating and administrative
expenses plus allowances and other transfers. The Treasury loses the taxes
which would have been paid on earnings outside of Job Corps. On the
benefit side of the ledger, the taxpayer gains from in-program output and
the increased taxes paid in the post-program period by the participant.
Reduced transfers, not just the administrative costs of transfer programs,
are a savings to taxpayers. All savings from crime reduction and utiliza
tion of alternative services (including allowances and transfer payments in
these alternative services), are benefits to taxpayers.
From the taxpayer's perspective, the benefit-cost ratio for Job Corps
under the benchmark assumptions comes close to, but is somewhat below, the
break-even point relative to alternate uses of the resources, with a ratio
of .96. If the earnings gains experienced in the immediate post-program
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period did not erode in dollar terms, the increased taxes would push the
present value of benefits above costs, to a ratio of 1.54. If, on the
other hand, the benefits lasted only the two-years post-program, the ratio
would be .69. A 3 percent, rather than 5 percent, real discount rate of
future benefits would yield a 1.01 taxpayer benefit-cost rate, while a 10
percent rate would reduce the ratio to .87.
Benefits and Costs of Classroom Training
The earnings gains for CETA classroom trainees, as estimated from the
Social Security earnings recorded for the CLMS and CPS matched groups, were
$347 in fiscal 1977 and $442 in fiscal 1978 for fiscal 1976 participants
terminating during calendar 1976. Alternatively, the estimated gains were
$291 and $486 in 1977 and 1978, respectively, for all fiscal 1976 en
trants a lower value in the first year because some were still in
training, but a higher value in the second because training paid off more
for long stayers. Following the assumptions of the Job Corps study, i.e.,
assuming that fringe benefits add 15 percent to the differential, the real
discount rate is 5 percent, and the 1977 and 1978 gains are calculated in
1976 dollars, the present value of the two-year post-program gains were
$759 for participants terminating in 1976, and $742 for all 1976 par
ticipants. Assuming an average age at termination of 26 and work until 65,
there are 39 years of worklife. Under the benchmark assumptions, the
current value of the projected earnings beyond the second year was $2040
for participants terminating during calendar 1976, or $2244 for all par
ticipants. Alternatively, if it is assumed that dollar earnings gains will
not fade which is probably a more realistic assumption for classroom
training than for Job Corps the current values of projected earnings were
$4985 and $5485, respectively. 13/ If it is assumed that real earnings
gains fade out by 14 percent annually, that they only last 10 post-program
years, and using real a real discount rate of 10 percent, the current value
of projected earnings were $1325 and $1458, respectively. Adding the
current values of these alternative projected earnings to the current
values of the estimated gains in 1977 and 1978 yields the following total
earnings benefit estimates under varying assumptions:
Current Value of
Post-Program Earnings Gains
Projecting from
1978 estimate
for terminees in 1976

Projecting from
1978 estimate
for all terminees

High Assume no fade-out of
real do!lar gains, 5
percent discount rate

$5744

$6227

Intermediate Assume 14 per
cent fade-out of real
dollar gains, 5 percent
real discount rate
(benchmark assumptions
in Job Corps evaluation)

$2799

$2986

Benefit projection and
discounting assumptions
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Low—Assume 14 percent fadeout of real dollar gains,
10 percent real discount
rate and no benefits
beyond 10 years postprogram

$2084

$2200

In estimating the taxpayer benefit-cost ratio, the Job Corps study
assumed that tax payments would be 23 percent of earnings plus transfer
income. If participation in classroom training had no effect on transfer
receipt, the gains for the taxpayer under the various projection and
discounting assumptions would have been as follows:
Current Value of
Increased Post-Program Taxes
Benefit projection and
discounting assumptions
High
Intermediate
Low

Projecting from
1978 estimate
for terminees in 1976
$1129
540
397

Projecting from
1978 estimate
for al1 terminees
$1226
578
421

The magnitude of other benefits from classroom training is speculative
since there are no control group studies to make the necessarily careful
estimates of impacts on criminal activity, reduced drug and alcohol use,
and reliance on other transfer and training programs. The limited evidence
suggests, however, that classroom training resulted in modest reductions in
transfer incidence. For fiscal 1976 enrollees, the CLMS documented a
slight drop in transfer receipt from entry to exit; while the follow-up of
second half fiscal 1975 participants indicated a decline between the first
and second post-program years. 14/
Type of Benefit

AFDC
Supplemental Security Income
Other public assistance
Food stamps
Housing assistance
One or more

Proportions of Fiscal 1976
Trainees Receiving Benefits
At Entry

At Exit

18.8
2.9
7.3

17.9
2.2
5.5
23.2
6.7
31.9

26.0
7.3
36.2
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Type of Benefit

AFDC
Supplemental Security Income
Other public assistance
Food stamps
Housing assistance
Unemployment insurance
One or more

Proportions of Second Half
Fiscal 1975 Classroom Trainees
Receiving Benefits Sometime
Over Course of Year
First
Year
After
Termination

Second
Year
After
Termination

24
9
10
38
12
18
46

19
4
6
26
10
12
36

Based on the experiences of the Job Corps study control group and the
control groups for the supported work experiment, it appears that benefit
receipt declines over time for adult groups who have the highest proba
bility of receipt, such as AFDC recipients, ex-addicts, and ex-offenders,
but that receipt increases slightly over time for disadvantaged youth. 15/
If a! 1 of the in-program and post-program decline in usage for 1976
enrol lees were attributed to CETA participation, and if this were valued in
the same way as in the Job Corps study (which assumed that the savings
fade-out would be 14 percent a year and discounting the savings at 5
percent), the current value of reduced transfers was an estimated $635
using the average transfer values in the Job Corps benefit-cost study, and
the administrative costs savings were $78. Alternatively, if the average
monthly dollar amount received by classroom trainees in the year prior to
entry were used as a baseline, the current value of benefits was $925. 16/
This provides an upper bound "guestimate" of savings from reduced de
pendency. It is equally plausible to assume no in-program savings but
post-program savings in the same relation to those of Job Corpsmember as
the ratio of earnings of classroom trainees compared to Corpsmembers. This
produces a lower estimated $470 in transfer savings.
There is little evidence that community-based interventions (other
than summer employment for young teenagers) reduce crime probabilities.
The supported work demonstration found that during full-time work activity
there was no reduction in arrest rates for long-term AFDC recipients,
offenders, or dropout youth. Only drug addicts experienced reduced
arrests, but drug addicts represented an insignificant portion of classroom
trainees. 17/
Reduced participation in other programs may occur because of increased
earnings, but increased participation might also result from continuance of
schooling or greater likelihood of transition into other programs. The
effect in either direction is sheer conjecture, but even in the case of Job
Corps, this benefit was not a significant factor in overall social or
taxpayer benefit-cost estimates.
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The cost of classroom training in fiscal 1976 was $1438 per partici
pant, of which the allowance was $691 as estimated from the CLMS allowance
receipt data or $607 per participant as estimated from national management
information system totals. 18/ There was an estimated federal overhead
cost of $66 per participant in fiscal 1976. The foregone earnings may be
variously estimated. Prorating earnings in the year before entry over 146
mean days of participation and adjusting for inflation, the foregone
earnings were $573. Based on the experience of the CLMS controls, an
estimated $1165 in Socal Security-covered earnings were foregone by
participants. Another approach is to subtract the estimated gain from
participation from the 1977 earnings of training participants; reducing
this to 1976 terms by an inflation adjustment, the foregone earnings were
$1307. Using these three alternative foregone earnings estimates, and
adding 15 percent for fringes, the costs were:
Social Costs

Taypayer Costs

Foregone
Earnings
Assumptions

(Foregone Earnings Plus
Project Costs Net of
Allowances Plus
Federal Overhead)

(Total Project Costs
Including Allowances
Plus Federal
Overhead Plus Taxes
on Foregone Earnings)

High
Intermediate
Low

$2175
2013
1416

$1805
1772
1636

Under the "benchmark" assumptions considered most reasonable in the
Job Corps evaluation, and under most of the range of further assumptions
necessitated by the less refined information available for CETA classroom
training, the social benefits from fiscal 1976 classroom training exceeded
the social costs, even without inclusion of the transfer administrative
costs savings:
Social Benefit-Cost
Ratio

Benefit and Cost
Assumptions
High benefit

Intermediate
benefit
Low benefit

(1976 Terminees)

(All Terminees)

Low cost
Intermediate cost
High cost

4.02
2.84
2.64

4.48
3.14
2.93

Low cost
Intermediate cost
High cost

1.95
1.38
1.33

2.14
1.50
1.40

Low cost
Intermediate cost
High cost

1.45
1.02
.95

1.57
1.10
1.03
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From the taxpayer's perspective, the benefit-cost ratios were less
favorable, since the increased earnings did not result in tax payments or
transfer payment reductions adequate to fully amortize allowances and
training costs except under the high benefit assumptions. 19/
Taxpayer Benefit-Cost Ratios
All Terminees

Benefit and Cost
Assumptions
High benefit

Intermediate
benefit

Low benefit

Low cost
Intermediate
cost
High cost
o
o

Low cost
Intermediate
cost
High cost
Low cost
Intermediate
cost
High cost

Including
Minimum
Estimated
Transfer
Savings

Including
Intermediate
Estimated
Transfer
Savings

Including
Maximum
Estimated
Transfer
Savings

1.08

1.19

1.36

1.00
.98

1.09
1.07

1.26
1.23

.69

.79

.97

.64
.62

.73
.72

.89
.88

.59

.69

.87

.55
.54

.64
.63

.80
.79

Benefits and Costs of OJT
Benefit-cost analysis of on-the-job training is even more equivocal
because of uncertainties about the relative amount of output produced by
trainees, the real training costs, and the degree of difference between
CETA-referred clients and similar individuals who would have been hired
without employer reimbursement.
There are also some thorny and unresolved methodological issues. The
benefit-cost calculations for classroom training counted post-program
earnings gains as the primary benefit to society and the training outlays
and foregone earnings as the costs. Transfers were excluded on the
supposition that the welfare benefits from added consumption of par
ticipants were balanced by the welfare losses in reduced consumption by
nonparticipants. For OJT, this methodology would count as costs the actual
training outlays by employers plus services and administrative costs of the
prime sponsors, and the differential between the output of OJT trainees and
their foregone earnings. The OJT trainees are paid the same as regular
entrants despite lower productivity, and the difference between their pay
and the value of their output would be considered a transfer and excluded
from social costs.
A different methodological approach is to assume that the cost of OJT
equals training outlays by employers, services, and administrative costs of
the prime sponsor, foregone earnings, plus the differential between trainee
pay and output. If the job were filled in the normal way during the train-

67

ing period, output would be higher by the amount of this differential, so
that it might be reasonably counted as a social cost. This second approach
is most often adopted, because under the assumption that the employer
reimbursement just covers training costs and the deficient productivity of
trainees, prime sponsors' costs can be equated with social costs. This
methodology presumes that the individual who would normally be hired is
subsequently not employed for the training period; if he or she gets
another job, society may not be losing the increment in output during
training. Presumably, also this displaced individual does not lose ground
over the long run as a result. There is a further assumption that the
employment and output foregone by the participant during training is not
simply taken up by another unemployed worker. Finally, equating the
employer reimbursement with the training cost plus the productivity deficit
of trainees assumes that there is no windfall to the employer.
It is possible, however, particularly when OJT referrals are similar
to regular hires that the normal reimbursement of one-half of wages more
than covers the extra hiring and training costs. Some employers may be
making a social contribution, but most are presumably profit maximizers,
who will not contract for OJT unless the reimbursement leaves them as well
or better off than regular hiring procedures. Unless there is a great deal
of jawboning and public recognition for participating employers, windfall
is more likely on balance than employer social contribution. Even under
the assumption that the employer reimbursement just covers extra costs, the
allocation between actual training expenditures and deficient productivity
during training is still uncertain. Presumably, training costs are higher
the more that output of the trainees falls short of the output of regular
employees, but there is no way to know how the pie is split. An assumption
is necessary because foregone output is the difference between what the
trainee would have produced if he or she were not participating and the
value of output in the OJT assignment. If substantial learning is required
to do the new job effectively, the alternate output may be greater than the
output during training; if there is no substantial training, or if the
chances of unemployment are high in the absence of participation, the
reverse could be true. The assumption is critical if transfer payments are
further subtracted from costs (the first methodological approach) because
they can offset much of the employer reimbursement, making the only cost
the difference between OJT output and alternative output. Since the
participants are usually drawn from the unemployed, OJT output, even at low
hourly productivity, will usually exceed the alternative where hourly
productivity may be greater in less skilled work, but there are fewer hours
of likely employment. In other words, this first methodology usually
implies that OJT has little real cost, just as job creation is assumed to
have limited cost if otherwise idle resources produce output valued near
the cost of wages, supervision, services, and administration.
An even more basic issue is how to count the post-program benefits.
If there is a great deal of windfall for the employer, i.e., little
training and little difference between the output of OJT trainees and
regular hires, little net skill improvement could possibly result. The
post-program earnings of the participant would be higher because he or she
had the scarce job rather than another like individual who could have and
would have performed equally, but society is not necessarily better off
since the other individual's losses are the participant's gain. The post-
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program earnings increment is more likely to be a net benefit for society
where there is a large difference between foregone earnings and OJT
earnings, or more specifically, between the marginal productivity or
earnings rate in the OJT job once hired compared to that in the most likely
alternate employment. In plain English, if a trainee is very much like
normal hires, but would have a high chance of unemployment because there
are not enough jobs to go around, then the earnings gains post-program
cannot be equated with social benefits. Only if increased earnings reflect
skill enhancement for the individual will they represent net benefits.
Conventional benefit-cost procedures which count all increased
post-program earnings relative to controls as a social benefit clearly
stack the cards in favor of OJT, which provides immediate employment even
if it offers no training. Job Corps graduates or classroom training
completers may also get their jobs as a result of placement leverage rather
than skill enhancement, in which case the earnings gains may not represent
social benefits. However, the training activities and costs can still be
documented, and there are no financial incentives for the employers to hire
participants. In OJT, it is difficult to determine what training really
occurs and whether the subsidies are basically for hiring rather than
training.
The simplest benefit-cost calculations assume away these complications
by equating the reimbursement to employers with extra training costs plus
the output differential resulting from hiring less skilled trainees, and by
counting all post-program earnings gains relative to controls as social
benefits. The foregone output is estimated as the value of output in the
OJT assignment minus the earnings foregone as a result of participation.
Using the same projection and discounting assumptions as in the classroom
training calculations, the intermediate estimate of the current value of
increased post-program earnings for 1976 on-the-job trainees completing
during calendar 1976 was $4085 or more than a third above the same estimate
for classroom training.
Present Value
of Post-Program
Earnings Increment
Based on
1977-1978
Gains for
Fiscal 1976
Participants
Terminated

Present Value
of Post-Program

Tax Increment

Based on
1977-1978
Gains for
All 1976

Based on
1977-1978
Gains for
Fiscal 1976
Participants
Terminated

Based on
1977-1978
Gains for
All 1976

in 1976

Participants

in 1976

Participants

High—Assume no fadeout of real gains
gains, 5 percent
discount rate

$7862

$7739

$1572

$1548

Intermediate—Assume
14 percent fade-out
of real gains,
5 percent dis
count rate

$4035

$3971

$807

$794

Low—Assume 14 percent
fade-out of real
gains, 5 percent
real discount rate
and no benefits
beyond 10 years
post-program

$3107

$3057

$621

$611

Benefit Projection and
Discounting Assumptions
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The OJT cost per participant, including federal overhead, was an
estimated $1556 in fiscal 1976. According to estimates from the national
management information system, $428 of this represented services and
administration provided by CETA. 20/ The estimated $1028 average employer
reimbursement presumably equaled the extra training costs and reduced
output. The CLMS reported annualized earnings of $5500 for participants
while in OJT slots, which would translate into an estimated $2565 per
participant in wages, salaries, and fringes. 21/
The foregone social product was the difference between likely earnings
elsewhere and the output in the trainee position. The 1976 Social Security
earnings of a simulated control group for the OJT sample were $1396, while
the 1975 earnings of OJT participants, adjusted to 1976 prices, were $1113,
providing two estimates of alternate output after adjusting for fringes,
i.e., $1605 and $1280, respectively. 22/ Foregone social product under
varying assumptions was as follows:
Foregone Output/
Social Product
Assumption (1) OJT output valued at one-fourth
wages and fringes; high
alternative earnings assumption

$964

Assumption (2) OJT output valued at one-fourth
wages; low alternative earnings
assumption

639

Assumption (3) OJT output valued at one-half
wages; high alternative earnings
assumption

322

Assumption (4) OJT output valued at one-half
wages; low alternative earnings
assumption

-3

Assumption (5) OJT output valued at three-fourths
wages; high alternative earnings
assumption

-319

Assumption (6) OJT output valued at three-fourths
wages; low alternative earnings
assumption

-644

Benefits other than earnings gains were less for OJT than for class
room training because the participants were less disadvantaged. Savings
from reduced criminal activity, drug treatment, and alternate program usage
were probably minimal. The maximum transfer savings, calculated as for
classroom training, were $36 in administrative costs and $294 in current
value of reduced benefits as estimated using the Job Corps study benefit
levels and $425 using the CLMS-reported levels. 23/
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From a social perspective, benefits substantially exceeded costs.
Under the varying assumptions, the social benefit-cost ratio for OJT in
fiscal 1976 ranged from a high of 8.48 to a low of 1.21, excluding any
transfer administrative savings and based on the gains for all 1976
participants:
Social BenefitCost Ratio

High benefit;
Foregone output assumption

(1)
2
3
(4)
(5)

3.08
3.51
4.12
4.98
6.24
8.48

(1)

1.57
1.80
2.11
2.55
3.20
4.35

(6)

Intermediate benefit;
Foregone output assumption:

(2)

(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)

Low benefits;
Foregone output assumption:

(1)

1.21
1.40
1.63
1.96
2.47
3.35

(2)

(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)

These estimates did not subtract the transfer payments components of
enrollee wages from social costs, which would be required for consistency
with the classroom training estimates. The magnitude of transfers depends
on estimates of the extra costs of training on the job, which presumably
are related to the productivity of the trainees when they enter the door.
The following are three sets of arbitrary cost assumptions:
Training
Cost
Medium

Training
Cost
High

$300

$1000

$1923

200

500

1283

100

250

641

Training
Cost
Low
Output equal one-fourth of
wages and fringes
Output equals one-half of
wages and fringes
Output equal three-fourths
of wages and fringes
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Using these training cost assumptions combined with the six sets of
OJT output and foregone earnings assumptions, the benefit-cost ratios were
higher than the estimates which did not subtract transfers. It is im
portant to note that these assumptions permit the sum of training costs and
the output differential between trainees and regular hires to exceed the
employer reimbursement in some cases, while being less in others. Ob
viously, there could be any number of assumptions which would dramatically
affect the benefit-cost ratios.
Social Benefit/Cost Ratio
Under Intermediate
Benefit Projection
and Discounting Assumptions

Total Social Cost
Employer
Training
Cost
Low

Employer
Training
Cost

Medium

Employer
Training
Cost
High

Employer
Training
Cost
Low

Employer
Training
Cost
Medium

Employer
Training
Cost
High

1.77

1.18

Assumption (1) OJT output valued at
one-fourth wages and
fringes; high alternate
earnings assumption

2392

2.50

Assumption (2) OJT output valued at
one-fourth wages; low
alternate earnings
assumption

2067

3.10

Assumption (3) OJT output valued at
one-half wages; high
alternate earnings
assumption

3.39

Assumption (4) OJT output valued at
one-half wages; low
alternate earnings
assumption
Assumption (5) OJT output valued at
three-fourths wages;
high alternate earnings
assumption
Assumption (6) OJT output valued at
three-fourths wages;
low alternate earnings
assumption

1.41

925

1708

6.77

4.57

209

359

750

20.22

11.78

-116

34

425

No social costs

106.4

2.48

9.97

The taxpayer benefit-cost ratio includes taxes on post-program
earnings and reductions in transfers and transfer administration. The
costs include the OJT per participant costs plus foregone taxes (which are
a negative on the cost side if OJT participants pay more taxes than they
would under either of the alternate earnings assumptions).
No transfer
cost savings;
lower
alternate
earnings
assumptions

No transfer
cost savings;
higher
alternate
earnings
assumptions

Maximum transfer
cost savings;
lower
alternate
earnings
assumptions

Maximum transfer
cost savings;
higher
alternate
earnings
assumptions

1.19

1.12

1.75

1.66

Intermediate benefit

.60

.59

1.06

1.02

Low benefit

.47

.45

.84

.80

Benefit projection and
discounting projections
High benefit

All these estimates rest on the supposition that the earnings gains
measured in the post-program period reflect increased social output and
taxes. Presumably, this is valid if training does occur and the gap
between OJT output and normal productivity of entry employees is great. If
trainees are just as productive as regular hires and there is no real
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training on the job, it is tenuous to ascribe any of the gain relative to
controls as a net social benefit. A reasonable assumption is that the net
social benefit is directly proportional to the gap between value of output
and the wages received in the OJT assignment. For instance, if OJT is
valued at one-fourth of fringes, the post-program gain might represent
total social benefits. Where OJT output is equal to one-half wages, the
net social benefit might be only one-half of the gain. Where OJT output is
equal to three-fourths of wages, the net social benefit might be only
one-fourth of gain. These assumptions would reduce the social benefit-cost
estimates (which do not subtract in-program wage transfers and under the
intermediate benefit assumptions) to the following:
OJT Output and
Alternative Earnings
Assumptions
Assumption
Assumption
Assumption
Assumption
Assumption
Assumption

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Social Benefit-Cost
Ratio if No Discount
of Gains

Social Benefit-Cost
Ratio if Discount
of Gains

1.57
80
11

1.57
1.80
1.05
1.27
.78
1.09

55
20
4.35

All these manipulations suggest that the standard benefit-cost
assumptions probably overstate the size of the positive payoff of onthe-job training, and that the range of uncertainty is much greater than
for classroom training or Job Corps, since the training outlays on the job
are difficult to identify and there is the possibility that subsidies are
merely buying jobs. The benefit-cost ratios are relatively robust, i.e.,
restrictive assumptions can be made and positive ratios will still usually
prevail given the magnitude of post-program earnings gains for 1976
Nevertheless, the calculations are largely simulative
participants.
exercises. It is critically important in judging the payoff of OJT to
isolate its training effects--!'.e., whether occupational change or earnings
rate gains are achieved by participants, whether the OJT participants are
different from usual hires, and whether the training actually occurring at
the worksite is in excess of what is ordinarily provided to entry em
ployees.
The Relative Payoffs

It is evident from the wide range of benefit-cost ratios resulting
from plausible alternative assumptions that the rate of return on human
resource investments cannot be calculated with any precision. There is
less uncertainty when comparable activities are assessed using the same
assumptions or when the rates of return are estimated over time for similar
activities. 24/
There are, for instance, some interesting comparisons between the
benefit-cost estimates for Job Corps and local CETA classroom training.
Under the "benchmark" assumptions that produced a social benefit-cost ratio
of 1.45 for 1977 Job Corps, the intermediate estimate for 1976 CETA local
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classroom training was 1.38 for all terminees. The costs of CETA training
(net of allowances) were only one-fifth as great per trainee, and even
though the foregone earnings were a third higher (reflecting the greater
employability of the local CETA trainee population), the social costs per
participant were two-fifths those of Job Corps. On the benefit side, the
discounted post-program earnings gains for CETA participants were threefourths those for Job Corps. In other words, the earnings payoff per
dollar of expenditure was substantially higher for the local CETA programs
than for Job Corps, reflecting the fact that classroom trainees were less
disadvantaged on average than Corpsmembers. The big difference was in
crime impacts. Job Corps had a very substantial immediate effect because
it moved a high risk group from the streets into a structured environment.
The socialization which occurred in centers lead to a substantial redt/ction
in crime during the immediate post-program period. The estimated value of
the crime savings produced by Job Corps almost equalled the present value
of the earnings gains of CETA classroom trainees. By the same token, the
estimated transfer effects were somewhat less in the case of classroom
training than Job Corps, since the young people who entered Job Corps were
more likely to rely on welfare because of their greater needs. Addi
tionally, work activities which were part of the Job Corps treatment offset
a seventh of Job Corps costs. In other words, both programs were worth
while social investments. CETA training resulted in greater earnings gains
per dollar but slightly less overall payoff because of lesser transfer and
crime reduction effects.
From a taxpayer's perspective, the Job Corps yielded a greater payoff
because of these reductions in crime and dependency. For CETA training,
because of the less disadvantaged nature of the entering population and the
less comprehensive treatment, the maximum estimated transfer savings were
only two-thirds as large as the measured net savings produced by Job Corps,
and a best guess is that there were little or no crime savings resulting
from local programs. Thus, while both CETA training and Job Corps were
worthwhile social investments, and while CETA produced more earnings
increase per dollar of social or taxpayer expenditure, Job Corps came
closer to paying back taxpayer outlays in visible ways reduced dependency
and crime. It is understandable, then, why Job Corps has become more
politically popular than CETA.
The taxpayer benefit-cost ratio of OJT was also substantially greater
than for classroom training under the assumption that the post-program
earnings gains represented the payoff of training rather than the simple
purchase of a job for participants. Taxpayers are unlikely to give much
thought to displacement effects and the esoteric arguments involved. They
see more placements resulting from OJT, significant earnings gains for
participants, and increased taxes paid. It is no wonder the public favors
private sector approaches. In this case, however, the taxpayers' judgment
may be faulty. The relative payoff of institutional training vs. onthe-job training depends critically upon the degree of real training
involved at the OJT worksite and the productivity differential between
trainees and regular hires. To the degree OJT participants are like
regular hires and to the degree that OJT offers jobs more than training,
the relative payoffs to the taxpayer are more apparent than real. If OJT
usage is increased by being more generous with reimbursements or less
restrictive about who is hired, it is entirely possible that the windfall
element would increase and the real payoff would decline.
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The benefit-cost estimates for CETA training can also be contrasted
with the results for the categorical training programs which preceded CETA.
Two dozen studies of institutional training, on-the-job training, and work
experience programs operating during the 1960s and early 1970s have been
summarized using standardized benefit-cost analysis assumptions. 25/
Standard benefit estimates were based upon the increase in before-tax
earned income from the year before training to the year after training.
Studies which measured gains relative to controls were distinguished from
studies which measured the gains in absolute terms for participants.
Foregone earnings were not considered. Enrollee stipends were excluded as
costs for institutional training but included for on-the-job training. The
gains in the year following training were projected for a 10-year period
with no fade-out and the present value was calculated using a 10 percent
discount rate. Under these assumptions, the CLMS measured gains relative
to controls were $347 for CETA classroom trainees, and $839 for OJT
participants in the first post-program year. The absolute pre/post
earnings gains were $1104 and $1882, respectively, after adjusting for
minimum wage changes over the period. Using the measurements of gains
relative to controls, the benefit-cost ratio for 1976 classroom training
was 2.9, while based on the pre/post gains for participants alone, it was
9.2. For OJT, the benefit-cost ratios were 1.7 and 3.9, respectively. For
Job Corps, the first year earnings gain relative to controls was $209,
yielding a current value of $1413 which did go far to amortize the $4189
cost of the program. The pre/post gain of participants was $831, yielding
a current value of $5618. The benefit-cost ratios were, thus, .34 using
the control group estimation methodology and 1.34 based on the absolute
gains of participants alone. The standardized methodology ignored the fact
that earnings gains increased from the first to second post-program year,
and that crime and transfer reductions offset much of the cost, thus
understating the rate of return on the Job Corps investment in 1977 and
probably in earlier years as well. Without arguing for the realism of the
standardized estimation assumptions, it appears that classroom training
under CETA in 1976 compared favorably with preceding institutional training
efforts, while CETA OJT fell in the mid-range of earlier cost effectiveness
estimates all of which showed positive benefit-cost results for OJT
(Figure 3.1). Job Corps was not substantially more effective than previous
studies had estimated.

Pre-1971 Studies

Estimate Based on
1976 and 1977 Performance
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SECTION 2.
AN ANATOMY OF IMPACTS

While Job Corps, local classroom training and OJT result in earnings
increases for participants as a whole, the average includes some in
dividuals who make major gains, many who gain incrementally, some who are
not affected one way or the other, and a few who would have done better if
they had stayed in the labor market looking for work. The distribution of
impacts is as important as the average. If gains are concentrated so that
one subgroup of participants gains a lot while most gain very little,
training might be considered less favorably than if most groups gained at
least modestly. There may also be variability in the duration of gains.
For some groups the effects may be only short term, while for others the
payoffs might increase dramatically over time.
Likewise, the sources of the gains are important. Earnings increases
may result from movement into higher paying jobs in the same occupation and
industry, from occupational mobility, from greater stability of employment
or from increased labor force participation. Gains produced by stabilizing
the work patterns of the disadvantaged have far different consequences than
gains which reflect access to new career tracks. Training may serve
different purposes for those who have worked steadily, but lost their jobs,
those who have had unstable work patterns and need to get linked into the
primary labor market or to become more dependable, and those who are
entering or reentering the labor force after a long absence.
Who Benefits From Training? 26/
Almost everyone benefits substantially from on-the-job training, both
in comparison to like participants in other CETA activities and relative to
control groups. Among significant segments of the participant population
identified by race, sex, age, and prior earnings patterns, the CLMS-CPS
impact estimates suggest that only one subgroup of 1976 participants white
females in PSE--benefited more from subsidized work than from OJT (Table
3.3). Training on-the-job rather than in the classroom yielded greater
gains for all subgroups except white females, participants with previously
higher earnings patterns, and persons age 30 to 44; even in these cases,
the OJT impacts were still substantial. The only negative aspect of OJT
was that for all subgroups except participants with relatively higher
earnings before entry, the net impacts declined from the first to second
post-program years. While the second year impacts remained positive and
substantial, the fade-out was significant for those groups who achieved the
largest first-year gains and for subgroups with more severe problems such
as low earners, black males and females, and persons less than age 20, for
whom sustained impacts would have been most desirable.
All subgroups of 1976 classroom trainees gained relative to their
controls. The gains are greatest for females, for persons with low or high
but not intermediate earnings in the two years prior to entry, and for
persons age 30 and over. Classroom training had more post-program impact
than work experience for all groups except participants age 45 and over.
Compared to PSE, classroom training was more effective for males but not
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Table 3.3
Estimated Earnings Impacts of CETA Activities

GOT Enrollees 1n Fiscal 1976 Terminating 1n Calendar 1976

Race/Sex
White male
Minority male
White female
Minority female
Prior Earnings
Pattern*
Low earners
Intermediate
and mixed
earners
High earners

Age
17-18
19-21
22-25
26-29
30-44
45+

1977 and 1978
Earnings Relative
to Controls for
OJT Participants
Minus
Earnings Relative
to Controls
for PSE
Participants

1977 and 1978
Earnings Relative
to Controls for
OJT Participants
Minus

Earnings Relative
to Controls for
Work Experience
Participants

1977
SSA Earnings
Relative to
Controls

1978
SSA Earnings
Relative to
Controls

1977 and 1978
SSA Earnings
Relative to
Controls

$+775
+1132
+758
+1197

$+588
+543
+524
+727

$+1363
+1675
+1102
+1924

$-187
-589
-254
-470

$+953
+2374
-1060
+288

$+2288
+1776
+1103
+1188

+1310

+811

+2121

-499

+494

+2314

+494
+298

+342
+400

+836
+698

-152
+102

+688
+855

+1266
+1689

+1235
+718
+780
+820
+814
+931

+697
+617
+414
+339
+727
+749

+1932
+1335
+1194
+1159
+1541
+1680

-538
-101
-366
-481
-87
-182

+749
+446
+1252
+164
+1394
+87

+1703
+2127
+1699
+2391
+2175
+3045

Dollar
Change 1n
Net Impact,
1977-1978

Classroom Trainees Enrolling In Fiscal 1976 and Terminating 1n Calendar 1976

Race/Sex
White male
Minority male
White female
Minority female
Prior Earnings
Pattern*
Low earners
Intermediate
and mixed
earners
High earners

Age
17-18
19-21
22-25
26-29
30-44
45+

1977
SSA Earnings
Relative to
Controls

1978
SSA Earnings
Relative to
Controls

1977 and 1978
SSA Earnings
Relative to
Controls

Dollar
Change 1n
Net Impact,
1977-1978

$+411
+219
+573
+480

$+421
+130
+747
+698

$+832
+349
+1220
+1178

$+10
-89
+174
+218

$+421
+1048
-942
-458

$+1757
+450
+1221
+442

+595

+420

+1015

-175

-612

+1208

+30
+294

+266
+1061

+296
+1355

+236
+767

+128
+1512

+726
+2346

+230
+242
+49
+8
+1032
+566

+183
-17
+277
+445
+1278
+477

+413
+225
+326
+453
+2310
+1043

-47
-259
+128
+437
+246
-89

-770
-664
+384
-542
+2163
-550

+184
+1017
+831
+1685
+2944
-322

*Low earners are defined as those with earnings below $2,000 in each of the two pre-entry years.
All others are intermediate and mixed earners.
earnings above $4,000.

Source:

1977 and 1978
Earnings Relative
to Controls for
Classroom Trainees
Minus
Earnings Relative
to Controls for
Work Experience
Participants

1977 and 1978
Earnings Relative
to Controls for
Classroom Trainees
Minus
Earnings Relative
to Controls
for PSE
Participants

High earners are those with

Westat, Inc. Impact of 1978 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in Selected Program Activities (Washington, D.C.
Employment and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, February 1981).
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females, for high earners but not for low earners, and for prime working
age (30-44) participants but not for those younger. The gains for the
30-to 44-year-old participants accounted for three-fifths of the 1977-1978
aggregated earnings increases for all trainees even though they represented
only one-fifth of classroom trainees. The gains of trainees age 30 and
over accounted for nearly two-thirds of the aggregated gains though these
mature participants accounted for less than a fourth of all trainees.
The earnings impacts of classroom training increased substantially
from the first to second post-program years for female participants and for
trainees age 22 to 29. However, the gains of previous low earners faded
out, as did the limited initial impacts for black males. Females accounted
for 78 percent of the aggregated first-year gains, but 85 percent of the
second year gains. In contrast, previous low earners, representing half of
classroom trainees, accounted for nine-tenths of the aggregated first year
gains, but only half of the second year total.
Few surprises emerge from further disaggregation among classroom
trainees, and the estimates become more speculative because of the small
sample sizes and the sensitivity of the estimates to the matching pro
cedures (Table 3.4). The big gainers were trainees age 30-44, whatever
their race/sex category and previous earnings patterns. Minority youth
tended to lose ground, as did participants in their twenties who had
substantial prior earnings but interrupted employment. Individuals with
intermediate or mixed earnings in the two years before entry had limited
but positive improvements. For previously low earners, the gains were
substantial.
Regression analysis of the annual earnings gains from the year before
entry to the second year after termination provides confirmation of these
net impact estimates. 27/ The relative gains of race/sex groups in the
different program components estimated from follow-up interview data are
similar to those estimated from the CLMS-CPS match. The differential
between classroom training and work experience impacts was greater for
whites than for blacks. Minority females benefited most from work
experience relative to other components. Males gained more than females
from classroom training rather than work experience assignments. The
relative gains from PSE were larger than estimates from Social Security
earnings of the the CLMS-CPS match groups which undercounted the earnings
of PSE participants moving into unsubsidized public sector jobs.
Earnings Gains From Pre-Entry Year to Second Post-Termination
Year for Enrollees in Classroom Training, OJT and PSE
as Measured Relative to Gains for Work Experience Participants
Classroom
Training
White males
Minority males
White females
Minority females

$1859
431
820
-21

OJT

PSE

$1477
1469
1947
1308

$1136
514
345
-270
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Table 3.4
Estimates of 1977 Gains for Age/Earnings and
Age/Race/Sex Subgroups of 1976 Classroom Trainees*
Gains $1000+

30-44 low earners
30-44 high earners
30-44 minority males
30-44 white females
30-44 minority females

Gains $500-$1000

Gains $250-$500

Gains $0-$250

45+ low earners
19-21
26-29
17-18
26-29
22-25

white males
white males
white males
white females
minority females

17-18
19-21
22-25
26-29

low
low
low
low

17-18
22-25
19-21
26-29

white males
white males
minority females
minority females

19-21
22-25
26-29
30-44

mixed
mixed
mixed
mixed

earners
earners
earners
earners

earners
earners
earners
earners

30-44 white males
22-25 white females
Losers

22-25 high earners
26-29 high earners
19-21
22-25
26-29
17-18

minority
minority
minority
minority

males
males
males
females

*Includes only subgroups with more than 50 cases in the CLMS.
Source:

Westat, Inc. Impact on 1977 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA
Enrollees in Selected Program Activities (Washington, D.C.
Employment and Training Administration, Office of Policy,
Evaluation and Research, December 1980).
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Underlying these net impact estimates are quite different employment
and earnings changes from the pre-entry year to the second post-termination
year for different subgroups of participants in different program ac
tivities. The employment status of whites in classroom training improved
much more than that of whites in work experience; conversely, for blacks
and other Hispanics, training did not yield as great relative improvements
(Table 3.5). Employment rates of classroom trainees with 12 or more years
of education increased substantially compared to the modest increases for
similar work experience participants. In contrast, participants with less
than a high school education gained more in earnings from classroom
training but more in employment from work experience. PSE had very little
impact for persons with less than a high school diploma on entry.
Table 3.5
Employment and Earnings Changes From Year Before Entry to Second Post-Termination
Year for Subgroups of Participants In Different Activities
(Second Half Fiscal 1975 Entrants)
Change In Percent Time Employed

Change 1n Annual Earnings
On-The-Job
Trainees

Work
Experience
Participants

Public
Service
Employment
Participants

$2710
2200

$3150
3260

$1800
1970

$2980
2250

2690
2080
2530

3270
3060
2990

1700
2020
2420

2950
2060
2910

Less than
age 22
22+

2520
2380

3340
3120

1890

2770
2730

Less than 12
years
education
12 years or
more

2180

2400

1610

1380

2590

3550

1980

3200

Work

Public
Service
Employment
Participants

Classroom
Trainees

On-The-Job
Trainees

Male
Female

201
23

23X
32

241
22

White
Black
Other

22
21
22

25
25
31

25
17
26

Source:

Experience
Participants

Classroom
Trainees

Westat, Inc. CLMS Follow-Up Report No. 3 (36 Months After Entry), Experiences In the First Two Postprogram Years
With Pre/Post "Comparisons For Termlnees Who Entered CETA During January/June 1975(Washington, D.C.: Employment
and Training Administration, Oflce of Policy, Evaluation and Research, December 1980), Tables 58 and 60.

The Job Corps results suggest that even the most disadvantaged youth
can benefit from training. Yet there are differences in the impacts for
subgroups of the Corpsmember population. Females without children bene
fited substantially in both employment and earnings rates, while males
increased mostly in their employment rates. Females with children bene
fited less along both dimensions. 28/
Job Corps Net Impacts Relative to Controls During
Two-Year Post-Program Period

Increase in percent
of weeks employed
Increase in percent
of weeks in labor force
Increase in earnings

Males

Females
Without
Children

Females
With
Children

+ .064

+ .057

+ .003

+ .015
$580

+ .138
$1282

N.A.
$269
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Controlling for type of center, age, educational attainment, and race,
Hispanic male Corpsmembers gained most in employment from pre-entry to
post-termination, while white males gained most in earnings. High school
graduates improved more in earnings. Younger participants did not gain as
much in earnings. 29/ This does not mean that blacks, dropouts, and
younger teenagers benefited less from Job Corps, since lesser improvement
would have been expected net of treatment. No data are available to
estimate net impacts for these subgroups.
Change in
Percent Employed
Between Pre-Enrollment
Period and Week Prior
to First Follow-up

Change in Average
Weekly Earnings
Between Pre-Enrollment
Period and Week Prior
to Follow-up

Females

Males

Children

Males

Females
Without
Children

Black
White
Hispanic

+.119
+.175
+.252

+.079
+.169
+.111

+$26.08
+44.84
+37.61

+$19.90
+28.46
+14.91

16-17
18-22

+ .087
+ .170

+.109
+.091

+22.95
+35.91

+10.40
+24.20

High school
diploma at entry
Yes
No

+ .142
+ .132

+.053
+ .197

+30.82
+35.12

+16.75
+29.06

Without

The Underlying Changes in Employment and Earnings

The aggregate patterns of employment and earnings change are quite
different for participants in local classroom training, Job Corps, onthe-job training, and work experience. OJT results in a dramatic and
immediate increases in employment rates. In the fourth quarter before
entering CETA, fiscal 1975 on-the-job trainees were working 57 percent of
the time. The employment rate rose to 73 percent in the first post-program
quarter, increasing only gradually thereafter to 78 percent by the eighth
post-program quarter (Figure 3.2). In contrast, classroom trainees and
work experience participants just equalled their year earlier employment
rates when they left the program. However, employment rates among the
classroom trainees rose rapidly thereafter, from 44 percent in the first
quarter after exit to 58 percent by the fifth quarter. Compared to this 14
percentage point rise for classroom trainees, the employment rate of work
experience participants increased only 10 percentage points over the
post-termination year.
Employment also declined in the second posttermination year for work experience participants compared to a slight rise
for classroom trainees. For fiscal 1976 CETA participants, the patterns
were similar in the first post-termination year. 30/
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figure 3 2
AVERAGE PERCENT TIME EMPLOYED PRE-ENTRY
AND POST-TERMINATION BY PROGRAM ACTIVITY
SECOND HALF FISCAL 1975 PARTICIPANTS
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Westat, Inc. CLMS Follow-up Report No. 3 (36 Months After Entry)
Experiences In the First Two Postprogram Years, with Pre/Post
Comparisons, For Terminees Who Entered CETA During January-June
1975 (Washington, D.C.:Employment and Training Administration,
Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, December 1980), Table 40
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Classroom trainees must search for and find jobs to use their new
skills, while on-the-job trainees, if successful in their training assign
ments, already have jobs. For instance, immediately at exit, only 30
percent of fiscal 1975 classroom trainees were employed, rising within a
month to 41 percent and in two more months to 48 percent (Figure 3.3).
Most of this gain was matched by a decline in the percentage not in the
labor force. The subsequent employment gains beyond the first posttermination quarter were the result of a declining incidence of un
employment. For OJT, in contrast, there was no period of post-program
transition, and little post-program change in labor force participation.
The average annualized quarterly earnings of participants reflected
these employment patterns. The second half fiscal 1975 OJT participants
had average earnings in the first post-program quarter of $6,620, which
then rose by a fourth to $8,370 at the end of the eighth post-program
quarter (Figure 3.4). Classroom trainees had substantially lower earnings
during the post-termination transition period, but they rose more sub
sequently, i.e., from $3,660 to $5,880, or by three-fifths. Work ex
perience participants were better off than classroom trainees during their
first post-termination quarter, but earnings increased less, i.e., from
$3,850 to $5,360, or by just two-fifths.
Another perspective on post-program changes is provided by estimates
employment earnings—real earnings divided by percent time em
full
of
ployed. The classroom trainees experienced a gain of 18 percent in full
employment earnings from the first to the eighth post-termination quarters,
work experience participants gained 19 percent, and OJT participants gained
18 percent. This suggests that average earnings per week of employment for
participants in OJT, work experience, and classroom training rose at
roughly the same rates over the post-program period, so that the differen
tials in annualized earnings gains were the result of differing trends in
employment.
For Job Corps participants, the post-program transition is complicated
by the readjustment in returning home or moving to a new labor market. It
took several months for the weekly earnings of 1977 Corpsmembers to catch
up to those of controls, and in the first quarter after exit their earnings
were lower (Figure 3.5).
The earnings impacts of training programs are produced primarily by
increased employment rather than increased earnings rates. For second half
fiscal 1975 classroom trainees, the annual earnings (adjusted for in
flation) rose 45 percent from the pre-entry year to the first post-termi
nation year. The percent of weeks employed rose by 38 percent. Increased
employment, thus, accounted for 84 percent of the gain in annual earn
ings. 31/ From the first to second post-termination years, the annual
earnings of classroom trainees rose by 25 percent in real terms and the
weeks employed by 16 percent, so that employment increases accounted for 63
percent of the earnings gain between the first and second year. Comparing
the second year to the pre-entry year, the employment increases accounted
for three-fourths of the real gain in annual earnings.
For 1976 classroom trainees, earnings rose by 91 percent from the
fourth quarter prior to entry to the fourth quarter after exit. Adjusting
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Figure 3.3
Pre-Entry and Post-Termination Employment Status of Terminees
__________ Second Half Fiscal 1975 Participants
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Westat, Inc. CLMS Follow-up Report No. 3 (36 Months After Entry),
Experiences With the First Two Postprogram Years With Pre/Post
Comparisons, For Terminees Who Entered CETA During January-June
1975 (Washington, D.C.:Employment and Training Administration,
Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, December 1980), Table
38; Westat, Inc. Postprogram Experiences and Pre/Post Comparisons
For Terminees WhoTntered CETA During Fiscal Year 1976 (July 1975"June 1976) (Washington, D.C.:Employment and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, March 1979),
Tables 51-53.
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Figure 3.4
Earnings Gains Patterns for Second Half Fiscal 1975 CETA Participants
AVERAGE ANNUALIZED QUARTERLY EARNINGS
IN CONSTANT DOLLARS BY PROGRAM ACTIVITY
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Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, December 1980), Table
42.
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Figure 3.5
Estimates of Time Path of Net Increases in
Percent Time Employed and Earnings Per Week
1977 Male Corpsmembers Compared to Controls
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cipation (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1980)
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for minimum wage increases over this period, the gain was 65 percent.
Adjusting for the increase in average wages in nonagricultural employment,
the gain was 60 percent. The percent of time employed rose by 46 percent
(from an employment rate of 37 percent a year prior to entry to 54 percent
a year after exit), which thus accounted for between 71 and 74 percent of
the real gain in annual earnings depending on the cost adjustment used.
Additional evidence is provided by hourly wage change patterns. Among
1976 classroom trainees, those who were working the fourth quarter after
termination averaged $3.70 per hour. The average for those working in the
fourth quarter prior to entry was $3.05. The minimum wage increased by 12
percent over this period (weighted by the varying entry dates into CETA),
the hourly wage in private employment rose by 16 percent, and the cost of
living 13 percent. If the average wage of participants had risen by these
same percentages, the fourth quarter post-termination quarter wages would
have averaged $3.42, $3.54, and $3.45, respectively, suggesting real wage
gains of only 7 percent, 5 percent, and 7 percent, respectively, compared
to the over three-fifths increase in real annualized earnings. 32/
For OJT the situation is even more dramatic. For 1975 participants,
the increase in employment from the pre-entry year to the first posttermination year was 45 percent while the increase in real earnings was
only 44 percent. From the first to the second post-termination years, as
some 1975 OJT participants lost their jobs and others proved themselves and
began to advance, real earnings increased by 15 percent, but employment
rose only 4 percent, so that earnings rate improvements accounted for 72
percent of the increase.
Comparing pre-entry year to second posttermination year real earnings, however, employment gains still accounted
for nearly four-fifths of the improvement.
Among 1976 on-the-job trainees, the fourth quarter pre-entry to fourth
quarter post-termination gain in employment accounted for 92 percent of the
earnings gain adjusted for the rising minimum wages, and 95 percent of the
earnings gain adjusted for nonagricultural real wage increases. The hourly
wage of OJT participants working in the fourth post-termination quarter was
$3.86 compared to $3.31 the fourth quarter before entry. The wage would
have been $3.84 if the hourly earnings for trainees had risen the same as
the average for private employment, and by even more if the average had
risen proportionately with the increase in minimum wages. 33/
Employment rates among nonparticipants also increased over the pre/
post period, so that the employment gains of participants may have
accounted for a smaller share of their net earnings gains relative to
controls than of their pre/post earnings increases. Yet the hourly wage
data for participants indicated that, on average, there was very little
improvement in real earnings rates. Unless it is assumed that the real
average wage for controls would have gone down over the same period (a very
unlikely development since controls had more time in the work force, more
tenure in the post-program period, and more chance to advance because of
seniority), or that the added labor force participants among program
terminees earned drastically less than the minimum wage and depressed the
post-program average wage and pre/post gain, then it is tautological that
the net post-program earnings of participants relative to controls was
mostly due to the differential in their employment gains from the pre
program to post-program period.
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While for classroom and on-the-job training the factors generating net
gains relative to controls must be inferred from absolute pre/post changes
for participants, both employment and earnings rates of Job Corps par
ticipants and controls were tracked. This evidence supports the inference
for OJT and classroom training that the major impact of training is on em
ployment probabilities rather than earnings rates. In the two post-program
years, Corpsmembers earned 10.7 percent more than controls (Table 3.6).
Over this same period, however, they worked 15.6 percent more hours. The
Table 3.6
Employment and Earnings of 1977 Corpsmembers and Controls
The Two Years After Termination
Comparison
Group

Job Corps
Participants

Difference

Fraction of time employed
0-6 months
6-12 months
12-18 months
18-24 months

.354
.412
.471
.453

.356
.463

.549
.543

+.012
+.051
+.078
+ .090

Fraction of time in labor
force
0-6 months
6-12 months
12-18 months
18-24 months

.653
.682
.701
.715

.682
.716
.747
.763

+.029
+.034
+.046
+ .048

Average hours worked per
week
0-6 months
6-12 months
12-18 months
18-24 months

13.13
15.84
18.38
17.73

14.46
17.82
21.55
21.39

+1.33
+1.98
+3.17
+3.66

Earnings per week
0-6 months
6-12 months
12-18 months
18-24 months

$43.82
58.38
72.48
73.73

$45.84
64.38
82.17
82.76

$+2.02
+6.00
+9.69
+9.03

Earnings per hour
0-6 months
6-12 months
12-18 months
18-24 months

$3.37
3.69
3.94
4.16

$3.17
3.61
3.81
3.87

$-.20
-.08
-.13
-.29

Source:

Charles Mallar, et_ aK The Lasting Impacts of Job Corps Par
ticipation (Washington, D.C.lGovernment Printing Office,
May 1980), pp. 45-47.
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average hourly earnings over the period were $3.66 for Corpsmembers but
$3.82 for nonparticipants. The lower earnings rates may have been due to
the fact that more of the Corpsmembers worked, including those who could
not command a high wage, that Job Corps made others willing to work for
lower wages, or that some of the nonparticipants acquired tenure in their
jobs and gained in earnings while Corpsmembers were participating.
Whatever the explanation, the earnings gains of Corpsmembers relative to
controls were totally the result of increased employment rather than
increased wages. Furthermore, Corpsmembers did not catch up in wages
during the post-termination period. The control group's earnings rate
increased by 25 percent over the two years while rising only 22 percent for
participants.
For classroom training and Job Corps which serve large numbers of
participants who were previously outside the labor force, the employment
gains of trainees are the result of increased labor force participation as
much as reduced unemployment. For second half 1975 classroom trainees, the
decline in the percentage outside of the labor force between the pre-entry
and first post-termination years equaled two-thirds of the increase in
employment over this period, while the decline in the percentage unemployed
equaled just one-third. From the pre-entry to second post-termination
years, the decline in the percent time unemployed equaled one-half the
increase in employment and the decline in the percent time outside the
labor force accounted for the other half. For 1976 classroom trainees, the
increased time in the labor force accounted for three-fifths of the gain in
employment from the fourth quarter prior to entry to the fourth quarter
after termination. The same pattern holds for Job Corps. During the two
year follow-up period, 1977 Corpsmembers were employed 48.0 percent of the
time compared to 42.3 percent for nonparticipants, and were unemployed 24.7
percent of the time compared to 26.5 percent for controls. The 1.8
percentage point differential in time unemployed thus represented less than
a third of the 5.7 percentage point differential in time employed, with the
remaining two-thirds reflecting increased participation.
The pattern is somewhat different for OJT. For 1975 on-the-job
trainees, the decrease in percent time unemployed equaled two-thirds of the
increase in the percent time employed between the pre-entry and first
post-termination years. The employment increase from the pre-entry to the
second post-termination year was totally explained by the decline in
unemployment, since the percentage not in the labor force was marginally
higher in the latter period than before entry. Reduced time unemployed
accounted for three-fourths of the increase in percent time employed from
the fourth quarter pre-entry to the fourth quarter post-termination for
fiscal 1976 classroom trainees.
These judgments, based on the averages for all trainees, are confirmed
by detailed information on the pre/post changes for individual partici
pants. Among 1975 classroom trainees, 22 percent experienced a decline of
5 percentage points or more in the percent time employed from the pre-entry
to second post-termination year. Another 22 percent experienced a change
of less than 5 percent in either direction. The remaining 56 percent went
up 5 percentage points or more in time employed. 34/ The increases in
percentage time employed for those who had zero employment in the year
before entry accounted for nearly three-fourths of the aggregated increases
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in percent time employed for all trainees (Table 3.7).
One-half of the
aggregated increases were accounted for by those individuals who had no
earnings before entry but were employed 90 percent or more of the time in
the second post-termination year. Persons employed 75 percent or more in
the year before entry experienced a net decrease in the percentage of time
employed.

Percent Time

Employed
Pre-Entry Year

0
1-24
25-49
50-74
75-89
90-99

100

Percent
of 1975
Classroom
Trainees
32.3
14.8
15.1
15.5
9.5

4.6

8.2

Percent
in Each
Category
Experiencing
Increase to
Higher Category
66.7
72.6
61.
61.
49.
41.6

Percent
in Each
Category
Experiencing
Decline to
Lower Category
14.5
31.9

32.8

34.7
44.4
49.2

Individual
Changes
Weighted by
Percentage
Among
All Trainees
14.4
+6.7
+3.4
+.6
-1.0
-.6
-4.0

*Est1mated from shift in category; changes may have occurred within category but are not noted.
to have employment equal to central point in category.

Contribution of
Each Category
to Aggregate
Increase in
Employment*

73.8
34.4
17.4
3.1

-5.1
-3.1
-20.5

Persons in category assumed

For on-the-job trainees, 17 percent of 1975 participants experienced a
decline in percent time employed from the pre-entry to second posttermination year of 5 percent or more, 19 percent stayed roughly the same
(neither declining nor increasing by over 5 percentage points), and 64
percent gained substantially (by 5 percentage points or more). While only
19 percent of OJT participants were not employed during the year before
entry, their net employment gains accounted for 45 percent of the
aggregated gains in employment for all OJT participants from the year
before entry to the second year after termination.
In terms of hourly wages, 28 percent of classroom trainees who worked
before and after experienced a drop of $.25 or more per hour from the last
pre-entry job to the predominant job in the second post-termination year.
Another 17 percent experienced an increase or decrease of no more than $.25
per hour in either direction, even though a $.35 per hour increase in the
average wage of classroom trainees would have been needed to keep up with
inflation. 35/ Persons with zero earnings in the year prior to entry who
subsequently secured jobs accounted for 70 percent of the aggregated dollar
wage gains for all classroom trainees (Table 3.8). Excluding the third of
enrol lees who were previously nonearners, only 38 percent of the classroom
trainees had experienced substantial hourly earnings increases (defined as
a move upward of two or more wage brackets as identified in Table 3.8) by
the second post-termination year, while 18 percent stayed in the same
bracket and 25 percent declined. Trainees who had jobs before entry that
paid $2.50 or less per hour accounted for four-fifths of the aggregated
wage gains among those previously employed--with most of this undoubtedly
reflecting the rise in the minimum wage over this period.
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Table 3.7
Changes in Annual Percent Time Employed From Year Prior to Entrv to
Second Year After Termination for Second Half Fiscal 1975 Hassroom Trainees
Share of All Trainees with Specific Transition Pattern
Percent Time Employed Second Year Post-Termination
75-89
50-74
25-49
1-24

0

0
1-24
25-49
50-74
75-89

10.77
"77T5~
2,53
1.65
1.27

4.06
1.90
T\?5
1.77
.38

3,80
2.53
1.01
ITSI
.63

2,79
1.52
1.14
jJ9
1.01

100

1.14

,38

.51

,76

90-99

.38

.38

,13

,63

90-99

100

.76
1,27
2.15
1.77
1.52

1 77
J89
1 01
1 14
.51

8 37
4^56
4 94
6^59
4 18

.76

73ff

4,13

T5T

.63

1 90

Share of Trainees with Specific Pre-Entry Pattern
Who Had Designated Post-Termination Pattern
0

0

1-24
25-49
50-74
75-89
90-99
100

33.33
14757
16.81
10,66
13.33
8,33
13.85

Percent Time Employed Second Year Post-Termination
75-89
50-74
25-49
1-24

12.55
12.82
TOT
11,48
4.00
8.33
4,62

11.76
17.09
6,72
10766"
6,67
2,78
6.15

8,63
10.26
7.56
5.74
15767
13.89
9,23

2.35
8.55
14.29
11.48
16,00
10.11

g!23

90-99

100

5,49
5.98
6,72
7.38
5.33
13.89
~67I5-

25.88
30.77
32,77
42.62
44.00
41,67
50.77

OJT
Share of All Trainees with Specific Transition Patterns
0

0
1-24
25-49
50-74
75-89
90-99
100

4.03
"38
,86
1,44
.58
-,29

Percent Time Employed Second Year Post-Termination
90-99
75-89
50-74
25-49
1-24

2.31
2.02
TBT
.58
,29
—
.29

1,73
.29
1,44
1.15
1,15
,58
,58

1,15
1,44
,86
2,02
~,W
.58
1.44

,58
1.73
1,15
1.44
1.15
T58~
,86

,86
1,15
2,31
2.02
1.44
174~4

Share of Trainees with Specific Pre-Entry Pattern
Uho Had Designated Post-Termination Pattern

0

0
1-24
25-49
50-74
75-89
90-99
100

Source:

20.90
5 13
6.12
6.33
4,88
—
1,96

Percent Time Employed Second Year Post-Termination

1-24

11.94
11.95
6,12
2!53
2,44
—
1.96

25-49

8.96
2,56
10.20

TTOT
9.76
9.52
3.92

5Q-74

5.97
12.82
6.12
8.86
773?
9,52
9.80

75-89

2.99
15,38
8.16
6,33
9,76
375?
5.88

90-99.

100

4.48
10,26
16.33
8.86
12.20
..

44,78
35.90
46.94
62.03
53,66
71.43
66,67
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Two Postprogram
Westat, Inc. CLMS Follow-up Report No. 3 (36 Months After Entry), Experiences in the First (Washington,
D.C.:
1975
Years, With Pre/Post Comparisons, For Terminees Who Entered CETA During January-JuneDecember
1980), Table 55,
Employment and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research,

Table 3.8
Earnings in Last Job Prior to Entry and Predominant Employment Second Post-Termination Year
Classroom Trainees
Second Half Fiscal 1975

$.00
$1.00-$1.99
$2.00-$2.49
$2.50-$2.99
$3.00-$3.49
$3.50-$3.99
$4.00-$4.99
$5.00-$5.99
$6.00+

Percent
in Each

Distribution
Among Enrollees
According to
Pre-Entry Wage

Wage Bracket
Who Gained
1 Bracket
in Income

34.2
9.8
20.0
13.8
9.0
4.4
4.2
2.3
2.3

68.2
67.7
62.4
53.5
51.4
33.3
27.8
—

65.2

Percent
in Each
Wage Bracket

Percent
in Each
Wage Bracket
Who Gained
2 Brackets
or More

Who Declined
1 Bracket
or More

62.6
53.2
44.9
38.5
45.5
25.7
9.1
—
~

24.7
16.5
18.3
23.9
22.8
51.5
55.6
55.6

__

Percent of
Aggregated Wage
Gains Accounted
For by Gains of
Individuals
in Each
Wage Bracket*

Percent of
Aggregated
Wage Gains
For Those With
Pre-Entry Job
Accounted For by
Individuals
In Each
Wage Bracket*

70.0
8.6
15.9
6.9
6.3
.5
-2.3
-1.5
-4.3

__
28.3
52.3
22.6
20.7
2.0
-7.6
-4.9
-14.3

On-The-Job Trainees
Second Half Fiscal 1975

Distribution
Among Enrollees
According to
Pre-Entry Wage

Percent
1n Each
Wage Bracket
Who Gained
1 Bracket
in Income

Percent
in Each
Wage Bracket
Who Gained
2 Brackets
or More

Percent
1n Each
Wage Bracket
Who Declined
1 Bracket
or More

Aggregated Wage
Gains Accounted
For by Gains of
Individuals
in Each
Wage Bracket*

Percent of
Aggregated
Wage Gains
For Those With
Pre-Entry Job
Accounted For by
Individuals
In Each
Wage Bracket*

21.0
4.0
24.5
15.0
13.0
8.1
8.9
2.3
3.2

79.5
85.7
81.2
59.3
60.0
64.9
64.5
50.0
--

79.1
64.3
56.5
51.9
42.2
39.3
6.5
-«

_
14.2

55.8
3.4
23.8
9.7
7.2
6.5
-.4
-1.2
-4.8

__
7.6
53.8
21.9
16.2
14.7
-.9
-2.7
-10.9

Percent of

$.00
$1.00-$1.99
$2.00-$2.49
$2.50-$2.99
$3.00-$3.49
$3.50-$3.99
$4.00-$4.99
$5.00-$5.99
$6.00+

4.7
9.6
17.7
28.6
35.5
62.5
54.4

*Aggregated wage gains are derived by summing the wage changes for all individuals. These are estimated by using the mid
points in each wage category and the two-way matrix of post-termination wage distribution by pre-entry wage category.
Source:

Westat, Inc. CLMS Follow-Up Report No. 3 (36 Months After Entry), Experiences in the First Two Postprogram Years
With Pre/Post Comparisons. For Terminees Who Entered CETA During January-June 1975 (Washington. D.C.:Employment
and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, December 1980), Table 56.
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Hourly Earnings Changes
From Year Before Entry to
Second Post-Program Year for
Fiscal 1975 Participants
Classroom
Trainees
Percent with no previous earnings
who secured employment during
the second post-termination
year
Percent with no previous earnings
who remained without jobs
Percent with previous earnings
who moved up one or more
brackets*
Percent who stayed in same bracket
Percent who declined one bracket
or more

On-The-Job
Trainees

22.5%

16.7%

11.9

4.3

37.9
11.8

51.0
18.7

16.1

13.5

(*Wage brackets as defined in Table 3.8)
Among 1975 on-the-job trainees who worked previously, 29 percent
experienced a decline of 5 percent or more in hourly wage from the job
prior to entry to the predominant job in the second post-termination year.
Another 16 percent changed less than 5 percent in either direction. In
other words, nearly half did not keep ahead of inflation. 36/ This is
roughly the same percentage as for classroom trainees. However, where the
wage gains of the zero prior earners accounted for 70 percent of the
aggregate wage gains for the classroom trainees, they accounted for only 56
percent of those for on-the-job trainees. Among all OJT participants with
prior earnings, half moved up two or more brackets compared to less than
two-fifths among classroom trainees with earnings. Trainees who had jobs
before entry that paid $2.50 or less per hour accounted for three-fifths of
the aggregated wage gains among all trainees who were previously employed.
The changes in annual earnings for individuals reflect the combined
effects of wage rate and employment rate changes. These change patterns
further document the importance of increased labor force participation as a
factor behind earnings gains. Among all second half 1975 classroom
trainees, 22 percent had earnings declines of $500 or more, comparing the
year before entry to the second post-termination year, 18 percent had a
change in either direction of less than $500, and 60 percent went up $500
or more. The comparable percentages for OJT were 18, 12, and 70 percent,
respectively. 37/ Classsroom trainees with zero earnings in the year prior
to entry accounted for 65 percent of the aggregated changes in earnings;
while those who earned $8,000 or more in the year prior to entry had, on
average, a loss in earnings. For the OJT participants, the zero earners
accounted for a smaller but still substantial share of aggregated earnings
gains. 38/
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Percent of Aggregated Changes in Earnings Attributed
to Changes for Persons in Different Pre-Entry Earnings Categories
Pre-Entry
Year Earnings
$ 0
$l-$999
$1000-$1999
$2000-$2999
$3000-$3999
$4000-$5999
$6000-$7999
$8000-$9999
$10,000 or more

Second Half 1975
Classroom Trainees

Second Half 1975
On-The-Job
Trainees

65.2%
12.3
9.4
5.5
8.4
2.1
0.8
-1.9

42.2%
16.9
12.1
12.8
14.2
5.4
-0.4
-3.1

Among 1976 classroom trainees, only 18 percent worked in both the
fourth quarters before and after termination and experienced more than a 10
percent annualized earnings gain (during which time the average wage in
nonagricultural employment rose 16 percent and the effective minimum wage
by 12 percent) (Table 3.9). The major category of gainers, accounting for
32 percent of all trainees, were those with no earnings prior who sub
sequently found jobs. The average annualized earnings gains of this group
exceeded the aggregated changes for all trainees. The remainder of
enrollees stayed the same or lost ground. Among OJT participants, the
first group accounted for a more substantial 27 percent of trainees and the
They accounted for two-fifths and nine-tenths,
second 34 percent.
respectively, of the aggregated earnings gains.
It is obvious that individuals with no earnings are most likely to
gain simply because they have more room for improvement. Yet the evidence
from the CLMS suggests that the groups with the lowest (or no) earnings and
employment prior to participation gained relative to like individuals who
did not participate, and that their relative gains accounted for much of
the net gain of all participants. Among 1976 classroom trainees, 53
percent were classified as low earners (i.e., persons with under $2,000
earnings in both 1973 and 1974). These individuals, who were predominantly
unemployed or outside the labor force before entry, had average 1977
earnings of $595 above like nonparticipants. Their net gains accounted for
68 percent of the 1977 aggregated earnings gains for all classroom trainees
terminating in calendar 1976. Likewise, the low earners, who accounted for
39 percent of on-the-job trainees, gained an average of over $1,300
compared to similar nonparticipants, accounting for 59 percent of the
aggregated earnings gains for all on-the-job trainees. 39/ Among first
half 1975 CETA classroom training entrants, those who worked less than half
a year earned $855 above their controls; while those who had worked more
than half a year earned $1025 less than controls. For OJT participants,
the gains were $2574, $2139 and $36, respectively. 40/
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Table 3.9
Annual1zed Earnings Change Patterns for 1976 Trainees
From Fourth Quarter Before Entry to Fourth Quarter Post-Termination
Classroom Trainees

Stationary
Earnings in both quarters
which were within 10 percent
Zero earnings in both quarters

Total

Stationary
Earnings in both quarters
which were within 10 percent
Zero earnings in both quarters
Losers
Earnings post were at least
10 percent below earnings
prior
Earnings prior but no earnings
post

Percent
of Total
Earnings Gains
Attributed to
Each Group

Annual
Earnings
Fourth Quarter
After Exit

3%
27

$6400
0

$6470
0

$ +70
0

7

8100

4300

-3800

-13.0

13

4792

0

-4792

-30.5

18

4820

9420

+4580

+40.4

32

0

6572

+6572

+103.1

100

2250

4290

2040

100.0

Losers
Earnings post were at least
10 percent below earnings
prior
Earnings prior but no earnings
post
Gainers
Earnings post were at least
10 percent above earnings
prior
Earnings post but no earnings
prior

Average

Percent
of
Total
Trainees

Average
Annual
Earnings
Fourth Quarter
Before Entry

Change

+ .1%
0

Percent
of
Total
Trainees

Average
Annual
Earnings
Fourth Quarter
Before Entry

On-The-Job Trainees
Average
Annual
Earnings
Fourth Quarter
After Exit

6%
15

$7550
0

$7470
0

$ -80
0

10

10090

5880

-4210

-14.8

8

5650

0

-5650

-15.9

27

4800

9370

+4570

+43.4
+87.5
100.0

Change

Percent
of Total
Earnings Gains
Attributed to
Each Group
-.2%
0

Gainers
Earnings post were at least

10 percent above earnings
prior
Earnings post but no earnings
prior

Total
Source:

34

0

7305

+7305

100

3210

6050

+2840

Westat, Inc. Postproqram Experiences and Pre/Post Comparisons for Ternrinees Who Entered CETA
During Fiscal Year 1976 (July 1975-June 1976) (Washington, O.C.: Employment and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, March 1979), Tables 69-72.
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SECTION 3.
INSTRUMENTAL FACTORS

Identifying the key factors which produce these employment and
earnings changes is crucial both to improve the design and targeting of
training efforts, and to understand the implications of the post-program
earnings gains realized by trainees. Job Corps, local classroom training,
and on-the-job training have several distinct elements which combine to
yield measured outcomes. Occupational training which seeks to improve
vocational skills is basic to all these activities, but they also include
remedial education elements as well as activities to improve career
awareness, motivation, appearance, dependability, confidence, and other
dimensions of job seeking and job holding skills. Another largely un
noticed element is sorting, which occurs under training programs in initial
selection from the universe of need, in making assignments to different
components, in setting and maintaining standards for completion, and in
In some cases, credential ing may be
placing trainees subsequently.
degrees or other certifications which
receiving
participants
with
involved,
them to compete in the labor market.
help
and
achievements
document their
At one extreme, completers of
access.
There may be varying degrees of job
find their own jobs, while at
to
left
institutional training may be simply
the other extreme, the employer reimbursement under OJT may be used to buy
jobs for participants.
There is, presumably, an optimum mix of these elements, both on
average and in different settings. One or the other of these factors may
be given too much or too little attention, or may be inadequately designed
For instance, more placement (job access) might be
and delivered.
necessary where credentials provided by training are not recognized in the
labor market. Improvements in either placement or credential ing might
improve employment probabilities in training-related jobs. Longer training
might result in greater sorting because fewer can make it through the
obstacle course, but longer training might also provide the time to achieve
certifiable skills. Greater improvements in employability skills may be
required in some cases to assure that occupational skills will be applied
or recognized. To determine such tradeoffs, it is important to determine
the interrelationships between these elements in producing the changes
documented for Job Corps, classroom and on-the-job training.
As the benefit-cost analysis of OJT so vividly illustrates, the
significance of the earnings gains produced by training is also dependent
on the assumptions about causal factors. If, for instance, the impacts of
OJT resulted from placement of highly-sorted individuals into OJT assign
ments similar to their previous work, then the reimbursement to the
employer would be a windfall, buying jobs for participants at the expense
of like nonparticipants; in this case, the net benefits to society would be
much less than the earnings gains of participants and the relative payoff
of OJT would be less than suggested by the relative success of its par
ticipants. Thus, the instrumental factors must be considered to give
meaning to impact estimates.
It is difficult enough to isolate the employment and earnings changes
produced by training programs; untangling the causal factors is even more
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challenging. While it is possible to get only a very general sense of the
relative importance of these factors, on average, for Job Corps, OJT, and
classroom training, these crude judgments are important in making pol-icy
decisions and in weighing the impact findings.
Training and Occupational Mobility
Training results in modest occupational advancement, predominantly for
those beginning at the lowest rungs of the occupational ladder who move to
occupations which are more stable albeit not much better paying nor
exciting career prospects. Among fiscal 1976 classroom occupational
trainees with prior work experience, 19 percent were garage workers,
transportation operatives, laborers, farm workers, or private household
workers in their longest pre-CETA jobs (Table 3.10). One in ten worked in
these occupations in their longest post-CETA job. Conversely, 20 percent
of entrants worked in clerical occupations previously, but the proportion
increased to 27 percent of post-program jobs. Craftsmen and welders rose
from 11 percent to 17 percent.
Despite these changes, training did not always achieve its objectives:
Less than 2 percent of occupational classroom trainees with prior work
experience were trained for low level jobs as garage workers, laborers,
household workers, or transportation operatives, even though 10 percent
ended up in such work. Conversely, 36 percent were trained as clericals
but only 27 percent of post-program employment was in clerical occupations;
34 percent were trained as craftsmen and welders even though only half this
percentage ended up in these occupations.
Occupational progress was even more limited for on-the-job trainees.
Among trainees with prior job experience, 13 percent worked previously as
farm and nonfarm laborers, transportation operatives, garage attendants,
and private household workers; but 15 percent worked in those low level
occupations in their longest jobs after termination. The proportion in
clerical jobs did not increase at all, while the proportion in craft and
welding jobs rose only slightly. The reason there was so little change is
simple: The aggregate distribution of OJT assignments was very similar to
the occupational distribution of prior work experiences. The only ex
ception was that just 6 percent of OJT assignments were as laborers and
farm workers compared to 18 percent of prior jobs; correspondingly, 21
percent of trainees previously worked in nonconstruction crafts or as
nontransportation operatives, but 27 percent of assignments were in these
fields.
These aggregate patterns result from upward mobility for some in
dividuals, no change for many and apparent declines for others. Three of
ten 1976 classroom trainees were trained in the same broad occupational
categories as their previous work experiences (Table 3.11). Among partici
pants whose previous jobs were professional or managerial, 37 percent were
assigned to clerical training, 16 percent to craft jobs and 23 percent to
service jobs. In contrast, for females with clerical experience, 66
percent were trained as clericals; while among entrants who had previously
worked in construction crafts, 57 percent were trained in welding, con
struction or other crafts. The upward mobility occurred primarily for
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Table 3.10
Occupational Mobility for Fiscal 1976 Trainees
Classroom Trainees

Professional

Manager
Clerical (traditionally female)
Clerical (traditionally male)
Construction crafts
Other crafts
Welders
Assemblers
Nontransportatlon operatives
Transportation operatives
Garage workers
Laborers
Farm workers
Service workers
Private household workers

Longest Job
Before Entering
For Those Who
Had Worked

First Occupation
of Training
in CETA For Those
With Prior Jobs

4.4
2.9
16.9
3.3
4.2
5.4
1.3
3.1
13.9
4.8
1.5
10.8
1.2
25.5

8
3
35 5
.5
4.8
19. 0
10. 5
1.1
3.8
1.6
.4
15.8

Longest
PostCETA
Job
6.8
4.1
24.9
2.1
7.0
5.1
4.7
2.8
11.7
3.2
.4
5.8
.3
20

On-the-Job Trainees

Professional
Manager
Clerical (traditionally female)
Clerical (traditionally male)
Construction crafts
Other crafts
Welders
Assemblers
Nontransportatlon operatives
Transportation operatives
Garage workers
Laborers
Farm workers
Service workers
Private household workers

Source:

Longest Job
Before Entering
For Those Who
Had Worked

First Occupation
of Employment

Longest
Post-

4.3
4.7
17.6
1.9
7.6
7.0

4.8
3.6
16.4
2.5
6.1
16.0
2.6
2.8
21.2
5.4
1 2
6.1
.3
10 .7
.2

6.1
5.7
16.8
2.9
4.7
16.2
3.3
2.8
16.5
7.1
.2
6.1
1.0
10.5
.2

2.7
2.3
14.0
6.9
I.4
14.3
3.6
II.0
.6

1n CETA For Those
With Prior Jobs

Westat, Inc. Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey, Fiscal 1976
Entrants, unpublished tabulations.
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those who were laborers or service workers. Nearly half of laborers and
farm workers were trained in the crafts or welding while 45 percent of
previous service workers were trained as clericals.
Less than half of 1976 classroom trainees who had post-program
employment experience worked in the same broad occupational classification
as their training. The correspondence was high for those trained in female
clerical occupations, as transportation operatives, and as service workers;
three-fourths of such trainees remained in the same broad category. The
correspondence was low for professional and nonconstruction craft training,
where only a third of trainees remained in the same broad occupational
category.
For 35 percent of on-the-job trainees with prior work experience, OJT
assignments were in the same broad occupational categories as their longest
previous employment (Table 3.12). At the lower levels of the occupational
hierarchy, the correspondence between prior work and the training assign
ment was much greater than for classroom training. For instance, 47
percent of persons who previously worked as nontransportation operatives or
as assemblers were placed in similar assignments under OJT, whereas only 7
percent of classroom trainees with this type of prior work experience were
placed in the same category. Among OJT participants who were previously
laborers, 19 percent were placed in assignments which "trained" them as
laborers.
Only half of the OJT participants who subsequently worked had their
longest post-program job in the same occupation as their OJT assignment.
As with classroom training, correspondence was high in female clerical
occupations; two-thirds placed in clerical OJT assignments who subsequently
worked were in clerical positions. Among trainees in construction crafts,
welding and other crafts, three-fifths of the subsequently employed had
longest jobs in the same occupational category, a much higher transition
rate than for classroom trainees in these same occupations. Those trained
for the top and the bottom of the occupational distribution, i.e., pro
fessional trainees and individuals assigned to "training" as farm and
nonfarm laborers, were least likely to transition into the same occu
pations.
Job Corps is basically a labor market entry mechanism. Few enrol lees
have held regular full-time jobs for any length of time. Vocational
training is an integral part of a comprehensive treatment which seeks to
improve general employability and not necessarily to prepare for a specific
career. Corpsmembers are young and extremely disadvantaged, and, there
fore, both highly volatile in career aspirations and difficult to place in
many occupations. Furthermore, less than a third of entrants stay long
enough to fully complete vocational training. According to 1978 Job Corps
placement records, less than half of these completers subsequently found
jobs in the same occupation. In other words, only one in seven Corpsmembers ended up as a completer with a training-related job (Table 3.13).
The placement rate for male completers was higher than that for female
completers, and even though the females who were placed tended to more
frequently get jobs in the vocation for which they were trained, the
percentage of females ending up in training-related jobs was smaller than
for males. Males earned more than females, but women trained in tra-
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Table 3.12
Relationship of Training Assignments to Occupation of Longest Jobs
Before and After Training, Fiscal 1976 On-The-Oob Trainees

OJT ASSIGNMENTS FOR PARTICIPANTS WITH DIFFERENT OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUNDS
Occupation of Assignment
workers
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Professional/manager
Clerical (traditionally
female)
Clerical (traditionally
male)
Construction crafts
Welder
Other crafts
Transportation operatives
Assembly operatives
Service workers
Laborers/garage workers
Farm workers
Private household workers
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2^2

17.5

—

J.I
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6.4
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6.0
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OCCUPATION OF POST-PROGRAM EMPLOYMENT BY OJT ASSIGNMENT
Occupation of Longest Post-Program Job

2
Professional/manager
Clerical (traditionally
female)
„_ ^ Clerical (traditionally
§ e
£_D>
££
gt
££;
0

Construction crafts
Welder
Other crafts
Transportation operatives
Assembly operatives
Service workers

Laborers/garage workers
Farm workers
Private household workers

Source:

43.3

12.8
14.0
12.0
9.1
7.1
6.4
5.7
7.9
61.8

S
5.0

16.8
20 1
5.3
-5.1
8.4
4.3
13.5
5.6

1.7

2.3

29.1
—
-1.3

-.
33.9
6.9
2.4

3.8

2.7

4.9

10.2

1.9
-.
-42 3
4.3
7.2
3.4

5.5

2.2

3.5

1.2

3.2

4.7

8.4
23.7
11.6
54 2
16.3
10.3
6.9
7.5

-3.6
22.7
4.4
39.9
TT
11.2
10.7

6.6
9.8
16.6
14 1
3.9
51.5
8.7
18.8

100.0

Westat, Inc. Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey, Fiscal 1976 Entrants, unpublished tabulations.

100 0
100.0
100.0

2.4
2.0
1.8
38.2

100.0

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

Table 3.13
Completion and Placement Rates by Occupation for 1977 Job Corps Enrol lees
All Enrol lees

Total

Wage Where
Job Training
Match

Average Hourly Wage
All Placements, i.e.,
Completers and Noncompleters

Completion
Rate

Percent
Completers
Placed

1.3
14.4
6.4

41.3
35.3
32.4

48.3
58.2
62.0

19.3
39.6
31.3

3.19
3.21
2.81

2.70
2.80
2.55

1.9
10.9
11.6
27.2
1.5
12.5
0.8
11.1

50.2
38.5
29.0
36.7
38.2
41.4
31.5
42.7

72.2
61.4
63.8
70.2
68.9
67.2
66.7
57.1

43.1
38.0
31.0
46.2
23.0
42.4
33.3
39.5

3.31
2.89
4.02
2.71
3.48
3.16
2.59

2.52
2.49
2.88
3.52
2.95
3.03
2.82
2.58

100.0

36.7

64.1

39.4

3.40

2.78

Percent of
Completers
Sub-professional
Clerical and sales
Service occupations
Forestry, farming and
gardening
Food service
Automotive and machine repair
Construction trades
Electric/appliance repair
Industrial production
Transportation
Health occupations

Percent
Completers
Placed
in TrainingRelated Jobs

Males and Females

Percent of
Completers
Sub-professional
Clerical and sales
Service occupations
Forestry, farming and
gardening
Food service
Automotive and machine repair
Construction trades
Electric/appliance repair
Industrial production
Transportation
Health occupations
Total
Source:

Completion
Rate

Percent
Completers
Placed

Percent
Completers
Placed
in TrainingRelated Jobs

Wage Where
Job Training
Match

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

1.0
3.9
8.1

2. 0
40. 2
2. 3

62.5
38.0
31.9

29.1
34.7
37.4

53.8
67.5
63.1

41. 5
55. 9
53. 2

22.5
47.0
32.2

15.4
37.8
23.4

3. 95
3. 99
2. 84

2.91
2.98
2.47

2.2
12.3
15.9
37.4
2.0
14.8
0.8
1.3

1. 0
7. 6
1. 0
2. 1
-6. 9
0. 9
35. 3

49.3
40.0
29.1
37.1
39.3
41.8
28.6
42.4

56.1
33.5
27.6
24.4
20.8
39.2
40.8
42.7

71.7
64.0
64.3
70.2
68.9
69.7
70.3
61.2

75. 0
51. 0
43. 8
63. 8
40. 0
53. 7
58. 6
56. 8

42.9
38.8
31.4
46.4
23.0
45.3
32.8
43.7

43.8
34.7
15.6
37.7
27.3
34.5
39.1

3. 28
N. A.
2. 88
4. 01
2. 71
3. 52
3. 38
2. 81

3.45
-3.67
4.81
-3.17
2.69
2.57

100.0

100. 0

36.5

37.3

67.5

55. 6

40.7

36.3

3. 57

2.92

Under, "Job Corps Vocational Offerings : An Analysis of Performance Indicators by Training Area
," Assessments of Job Corps Performance and Impacts, Volume II (Washington, D.C. Government
Printing Office, May 1980), pp. 1-245.
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ditionally male occupations did better than their male counterparts. The
converse was also true; males trained in traditionally female occupations
did well relatively and absolutely. However, sex stereotyping was the rule
rather than the exception. Seven of ten females who completed were trained
in clerical or health occupations, while two-fifths of male completers were
trained in construction and forestry.
The "best bets" for these young people, as judged by a composite of
completion rates, placement rates, job/training match probabilities and
wages in training-related jobs, were the manual occupations—forestry,
farming and gardening, construction trades, and industrial production
(Table 3.14). Clerical, sales and health training were the next best bets.
Training for subprofessional jobs, service occupations, automotive and
appliance repair, were less effective as judged by these measures. These
aggregate data do not tell the whole story, however, since training
assignments are made, in part, on the basis of ability and prior ex
perience. For instance, persons in need of intensive remediation are
usually placed in food service, though they may subsequently receive other
training if they remain in centers. Adjusting for some of the differences
in participants in the various clusters, and looking at the employment and
earnings experience two years post-program, the attractions of the manual
occupations dimmed, while transportation, clerical, and sales jobs in
creased in relative payoff.
The conclusion to be drawn from this potpourri of evidence is that
CETA training produces earnings gains without achieving substantial occu
pational mobility for more than a small minority of participants. The
occupational upgrading which occurs in classroom training is mostly from
laboring and service jobs into craft and clerical work,, On-the-job
training transforms some laborers into operatives and nonconstruction
craftsmen. "Quantum leaps" into new careers are achieved by few.
Sorting, Certifying, Training and Placing
Longer classroom training has greater earnings impacts. The 1978 gain
for 1976 classroom trainees who stayed in CETA over 40 weeks was more than
six times the gain for those who stayed 11 to 20 weeks (Figure 3.6). The
payoff of longer training was evident among all subgroups of trainees, but
particularly so for females. 41/

Table 3.14
Comparative Outcomes for Various Job Corps Training Occupations
Follow-Up of 1977 Participants

1978 Placement Data
Comparative
Ranking on
Four Variables:
Percent Completers,
Percent Placed,
Percent Placed
In Training
Related Jobs,
and Wage When
Placed in Such Jobs

Sub-professional
Clerical and
sales
Service
occupations
Forestry, farming
and gardening
Food service
Automotive and
machine repair
Electric appliance
repair
Construction
trades
Industrial
production
Transportation
Health occupations
Source:

Comparative
Ranking on
Wage in Job
Training Match

Comparative
Ranking on
Training
Related
Placement

Comparative
Ranking
For Males
Two Years
Post-Termination
Based on
Employment
Rates

Based on
Weekly
Earnings

Male

Female

Total

10

10

9

11

5

11

7

4

5

4

4

4

7

2

11

8

10

8

8

10

6

1
6

1
7

1
6

2
6

3
11

6
9

11
9

8

9

11

9

7

3

4

8

11

7

10

9

5

8

1

3

2

1

1

8

5

1
7
5

6
4
2

2
7
4

3
7
5

2
6
10

4
1
2

3
1
10

Comparative
Ranking
For Females
Without
Children
Two Years
Post-Termination
Based on
Employment
Rates

Based on
Weekly
Earnings

Joseph Nines and Brian Linder, "Job Corps Vocational Offerings: An Analysis of Performance Indicators
Printing
Go
Performance and Impact, Volume II (Washington, D.C.: Government
Center Performance ," Assessments of Job Corps_______________________
The Lasting Impacts of Job Corps Participation (Washington, O.C.: Government
Printing Office, May 1980), pp. 175-1777

Figure 3.6
Earnings Impacts and Length of Training for Fiscal 1976 CETA Enrol lees
1978 Annual Earnlnos Differential of
Classroom Trainees vs. Controls
(All Fiscal 1976 New Enrol lees)

1978 Annual Earnings Differential of On-The-Job
Trainees vs. Controls
(Fiscal 1976 New Enrollees)

$1377
$1300

$832

I
$.224
$83

1-10
weeks

1

11-20
weeks

21-40
weeks

$565
$468

1
I I

over 40
weeks

Total

o
en

$157

1-10
weeks

11-20
weeks

21-40
weeks

Total

-$537
over 40
weeks
Duration of Participation
Duration of Participation

Source: Westat, Inc. Supplement Number 1 to Net Impact Report No. 1, Impact on 1978 Earnings
of New FY 1974 CETA Enrollees in Selected Program Activities (Washington, D.C.: Em
ployment and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research,
February 1981).

106
Net Impacts in 1977
for Fiscal 1976 Classroom

Trainees Who Terminated
in Calendar 1976

White males
I-10 weeks
II-20 weeks
21-40 weeks
41+ weeks

$

Difference Between
Earnings Impact
of 1-10 Weeks of Training
and Longer Duration Training

-95
+522
+746
+722

$+617
+814
+817

+261
-35
+209
+1607

-296
-52
+1409

II-20 weeks
21-40 weeks
41+ weeks

-110
+325
+818
+2259

+435
+928
+2369

Minority females
I-10 weeks
II-20 weeks
21-40 weeks
41+ weeks

+118
+543
+628
+1540

+425
+510
+1422

Minority males
I-10 weeks
II-20 weeks
21-40 weeks
41+ weeks
White females
I-10 weeks

Less dependable estimates of 1977 earnings impacts for first half 1975
classroom trainees also suggest that long training pays off, but somewhat
less substantially than for 1976 trainees and with most of this effect
concentrated among individuals who were previously high earners: 42/
Estimated 1977 Earnings
Differential Relative to
Controls for First Half
1975 Participants
Length of Classroom
Training

Low
Earners

Less than 11 weeks
11-20 weeks
21-40 weeks
Over 40 weeks

$220
108
386
246

High
Earners
$-184
-120
345
431

Total
$ 31
-17
366
331

The earnings impacts of on-the-job training increase with length of
participation up to a certain point, then decline precipitously. Success
ful OJT ends when the participant is considered ready and is hired. Those
staying longest may be individuals who are not working out or are hardest
to train, and are therefore less likely to be employed on termination. On
the other hand, those with short duration participation include individuals
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who are not able to perform, those who can find better jobs, and some who
are so good they are immediately hired by the employer.
Length of stay has always been a key factor in Job Corps. Among 1977
entrants, two-fifths dropped out within 90 days, another 30 percent stayed
longer but did not complete their vocational training assignment; only 30
percent were full program completers. During the 12-18 months period after
termination, the annualized earnings per week of male completers were $1290
above those of their controls, while those of partial completers were $65
less. The percent of time employed was higher by 16 percent among male
completers but only 4 percent for partial completers. The earnings gains
of male completers accounted for six-sevenths of the aggregated earnings
impacts accruing to male participants during the first two post-program
years. Among females without children, completers had annualized earnings
$1580 above controls compared to the partial completers who earned $760
Female completers accounted for three-fifths of the earnings gains
more.
for all female participants. Thus, completion, as well as longer duration
of stay, seemed to be a key factor in the aggregate Job Corps impacts. 43/
Differences Between Job Corps Terminees and Controls,
12 to 18 Months After Termination, by Completion Status
Fraction of time employed
+.047
Male dropouts
Male partial completers +.044
+.155
Male completers

Female dropouts
Female partial completers
Female completers

+.054
+ .081
+.176

Earnings per week
$+3.92
Male dropouts
Male partial completers -1.25
+24.79
Male completers

Female dropouts
Female partial completers
Female completers

$+5.92
+14.63
+30.36

Probability in military during survey week
Female dropouts
Male dropouts+.032
Male partial completers +.058
Female partial completers
+.087
Female completers
Male completers

-.005
-.003
+ .011

Probability of having high school diploma or GED
+.049
Female dropouts
Male dropouts
Male partial completers +.143
Female partial completers
+.399
Female completers
Male completers

+.525
+ .392
+.683

The disproportionately greater payoff of longer institutional training
in Job Corps or local classroom programs might result from several factors:
First, the training activity might improve skills and abilities in
proportion to the length of stay. If such skills are accepted and utilized
in the labor market not as a continuum but at certain benchmark levels such
as a GED or ability to type 60 words per minute, longer training would be
associated with more than proportionately greater gains in post-program
employment and earnings.

108

Second, the training activity might serve as a mechanism for sorting
the "winners" from the "losers." Even though the previously-cited CLMS and
Job Corps impact estimates compare like people as matched by control
variables, participants with the same demographic characteristics and
backgrounds might be different in their ability to perform in training.
Those succeeding and staying longer might be the ones most likely to
succeed in subsequent jobs.
Third, longer stay may lead to a higher probability of placement
because those who are sorted and credentialed are easier to place, or
simply because the delivery agent has more time to find a suitable job or
to develop a commitment to the participant.
These factors are interrelated, but it is possible to get some sense
of their relative importance. There is no doubt that training is an obsta
cle course, that longer training is more demanding, and that the more able
are more likely to be assigned to the longer courses in recognition of
their greater chances of completion. Nevertheless, the degree of inprogram sorting under local classroom training appears modest, according to
evidence for 1977 training participants. Youths, blacks, high school
dropouts, and persons with employment barriers were somewhat more likely
than other more employable subgroups among participants to drop out of
training before completion (Figure 3.7). When the characteristics of 1977
dropouts and completers are weighted according to the post-program earnings
increases related to these characteristics (as estimated from regression
equations for all second-half 1975 CETA participants), the projected
earnings of the dropouts were 89.0 percent of the mean for all nonsummer
CETA participants while the projected earnings of completers are 91.4
percent. 44/ It is important to stress, however, that three-fifths of the
short-stayers who report on completion status are self-described completers
not dropouts.
Prime working age participants, whites, high school
graduates, and persons who were previously not in the labor force were more
likely to be assigned to long duration training as indicated by the
duration-of-stay distribution among self-reported completers.
These
differences in duration of planned training and in probabilities of
completion combined to determine length of stay. Trainees who were in
their prime working years, whites, high school graduates, post-secondary
students, primary earners, and persons who were predominantly employed
before entry into CETA had longer duration of stay.
While sorting is evident, the end result is hardly an explanation for
the massive gain differentials between long stayers and short stayers. The
CLMS-CPS impact estimates control for most of the key variables in the
employability equation, so that the long stayers, while somewhat different
in identifiable characteristics from early leavers, are matched with and
compared to individuals with similar characteristics who do not par
ticipate. The CLMS-CPS matching variables may not pick up all the effects
of sorting. Yet if additional factors were a major element in explaining
the substantial gains for long stayers relative to early leavers, negative
earnings impacts would be expected for short stayers relative to their
controls; i.e., if the "losers" according to characteristics not considered
in the CPS-CLMS matching were concentrated among the early leavers as a
result of program sorting, they would do worse off in the post-program
period than their controls selected according to the matching variables.

Figure 3.7
Distribution of 1977 Classroom Trainees by Duration of Stay and Completion
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The annual earnings of short-duration stayers (1-10 weeks) in classroom
training (among all trainees who left during calendar 1976) were only $3
below those of controls in 1977 and $110 above in 1978. In no way, then,
does sorting explain the estimated $1589 earnings gain in 1977 of classroom
trainees staying over 40 weeks. 45/
The sorting which occurs in Job Corps is greater because of the longer
duration of planned training, the competency standards for completion, and
the residential nature of the program. Less than one in three Job Corps
entrants completes compared to three of four classroom trainees. Entrants
in 1977 who had a high school diploma were almost half again as likely to
complete as high school dropouts. Having no children increased the chances
by a fifth; having previous arrests reduced them by a tenth, while prior
employment in a regular job increased the chances by the same pro
portion. 46/
Again, however, the regression analysis used to estimate net impacts
for completers, partial completers and dropouts compared them to like
persons and thus considered most of the measurable differences resulting
from the differing completion probabilities. The matching variables may
not have captured all the differences between participants who completed
and those who dropped out, yet if the substantial gains of completers were
to be explained by the sorting which was not controlled by matching
variables in regression equations, then early dropouts should have
performed far worse than their controls during the post-program period.
Excluding the first quarter transition period, dropouts had earnings above
their controls. During the 12 to 18 month follow-up period, the annualized
gains of male and female dropouts were $200 and $300, respectively, perhaps
reflecting that the control variables did not fully capture the motivation
and energy which led to enrollment in the first case, perhaps because some
of the early leavers were go-getters who left Job Corps because it did not
meet expectations, or perhaps because some dropouts benefited from the
experience or a few got placement help; certainly, however, this does not
suggest a degree of in-program sorting (over and above that captured by the
regression techniques) which would explain the four and five times larger
gains for completers.
If sorting occurs in classroom training and Job Corps but is not a
major explanative factor in the estimated gains from longer duration of
stay, this suggests that either credentials and skills improvements accrue
and pay off disproportionately with length of stay, or else placement
chances increase because of greater ease in placing long stayers or because
of greater placement efforts on their behalf. Placement is, without
question, a key factor. The benefits of training accrue chiefly to those
who enter employment at termination. Those 1976 classroom trainees who
were placed according to prime sponsor records earned $1400 more than their
controls in 1977, compared to zero gain for individuals not placed (Figure
3.8). Among on-the-job trainees, the gain was $1600 for those placed with,
again, no gain for those not placed. The payoffs of placement were
significant for all major race/sex subgroups among both classroom and
on-the-job trainees.
It is not surprising that those who were placed had more employment
and earnings immediately after termination. Yet the placement effect was

Figure 3.8
a
Determinant
of Post-Program Earnings Gains
Placement at Termination as

Annual Earnings Differentials of
On-The-Job Trainees vs. Controls
(Fiscal 1976 Trainees Terminating in Calendar 1976)

Annual Earnings Differentials of
Classroom Trainees vs. Controls
(Fiscal 1976 Trainees Terminatina in Calendar 1976)

All Trainees,
1977 and 1978 Differentials

-$43

-$200

-$236

-$150
1977

White Males

1977

$1250

$1577

$1350

$1377

Race/Sex Groups,
1977 Differentials

All Trainees,
1977 and 1978 Differentials

Race/Sex Groups,
1977 Differentials

White Males

$2500

$1100
$1209

$1072
-$350

$8

-$350

-$35

Minority Males

Minority Males
1978

1978

$1150

$1950
-$300

-$200
Sponsor Termination Records

White Females

White Females

Sponsor Te>m1/ia|: onRecords

$1400
Not Placed According to
Prime Sponsor
Termination Records

$50
Minority Females

Source:

Not Placed According to
Prime Sponsor
Termination Records

$1950
$450
Minority Females

Westat, Inc. Impact on 1977 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in Selected Program
Activities (Washington, D.C.: Employment and Training Administration, Office of Policy,
Evaluation and Research, December 1980); Westat, Inc. Supplement Number 1 to Net Impact
Report No. 1, Impact on 1978 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in Selected Program
Activities (Washington, D.C.:Employment and Training Administration, Office of Policy,
Evaluation and Research, February 1981).
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not just a transitional one. Participants placed at termination from
classroom training and OJT had earnings $1100 and $1200, respectively,
greater than their controls in the second post-program year. There is
further evidence to suggest that the payoffs of longer training were not
primarily the result of greater initial employment resulting from place
ment. For one thing, the employment gap between short stayers and long
stayers increased over time, the opposite of what would be expected if
placement were the sole factor in the payoff of longer stay. For instance,
among 1975 trainees with less than 60 days stay, the percent of time
employed rose from 44 percent during the quarter after exit to 50 percent
during the first post-termination year and 55 percent during the second
post-program year. In contrast, the employment rates for trainees with
more than half a year of participation increased from 42 percent to 57
percent and 66 percent, respectively. In other words, the employment rate
differential between early leavers and long stayers increased from nothing
in the first quarter to 7 percentage points in the first year, and then to
11 percentage points in the second. 47/ The jobs secured through placement
may have been more stable or the long stayers more successful in their
initial employment, but long stayers were also apparently more able to
secure jobs past the point when placement was a factor.
Placement chances increase with length of stay. Among 1977 classroom
trainees, the prime sponsor placement rates were as follows for individuals
with placement status recorded: 47/
Length of Stay

Placement Rate

Less than 120 days
120-179

49.3
53.7

180-269
270+

54.9
62.5

The evidence suggests that trainees who stay longer are more likely to
complete, and that completion makes a person more employable. The
proportion of persons placed among those reporting themselves as dropouts
from training was the same for persons staying over 180 days as for those
The placement rate among self-described
staying a shorter period.
completers increased only modestly with their length of stay in classroom
training. The overall upward trend in placement with duration of stay was,
thus, largely the result of increased chances that those with long duration
of stay would be completers. These judgments must be hedged by the fact
that participants may have considered themselves completers when they were
placed and dropouts if they were not; moreover, half of participants did
not even know whether they completed. Nevertheless, the data are
suggestive. 49/

113

Placement Rate for Fiscal 1977 Classroom Trainees
With Record of Placement or Nonplacement
Length
of Stay
Less than 120
120-179
180-269
270+

Self-Described
Completers

Self-Described
Dropouts

63.8%
61.4

18.5%
19.1

66.0
67.0

25.4
8.9

The evidence from Job Corps is also suggestive, albeit limited. When
asked whether Job Corps training, work experience, or education were
helpful in obtaining at least one job, 63 percent of completers, compared
to only 35 percent of partial completers and 26 percent of dropouts,
responded affirmatively. Only 41 percent of Job Corps leavers reported
contact with a Job Corps placement agency or the Employment Service; but
the rate among completers was 46 percent compared to 38 percent among
partial completers, after adjusting by regression for race, age, sex, and
center type. For those reporting a contact, the proportions reporting a
resulting placement were 45 percent and 39 percent, respectively, again
after adjusting for differentials. In other words, the placement effec
tiveness, although limited even for completers, was a third higher than for
partial completers. 50/
Finally, length of stay has an independent impact after placement
status is considered and these effects increase over the period out of the
program. The marginal effect on quarterly annualized earnings of an extra
month of classroom training has been estimated for males and females in the
second-half fiscal 1975 enrol lee group, holding constant placement and
adjusting for the differences between long stayers and short stayers in
age, family size and marital status, race, barriers to employment, previous
employment patterns, education, and veteran's status. After controlling
for all these factors, the pre-entry earnings of those who stayed longer in
classroom training were less for males but more for females than the
earnings of the short stayers, i.e., the more employable males (after con
trolling for measurable variables) apparently left early, while the more
employable females stayed longer. 51/ The post-program earnings impacts of
longer stay must be interpreted in this light. For males, the increases
related to longer stay must be added to the lower likely earnings because
of factors not controlled in the regression variables. For females, on the
other hand, the gains in post-program must be discounted since those with
higher earnings potential among female classroom trainees were more likely
to stay. Nevertheless, it is clear that each extra month of training paid
off for both males and females, peaking for males in the 6 through 12 month
post-termination period while continuing upward for females.
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Annual1zed Quarterly Earnings Coefficient of An
Additional Month of Stay for Second Half Fiscal 1975 Classroom Trainees
Males

Females

Pre-Entry Quarter
4
3
2
1

$-26
-72
-109
-33

$ 32
45
98
54

Post-Termination Quarter
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

-8
17
211
165
112
26
2
20

5
18
78
55
85
168
159
173

This does not diminish the importance of placement as both an
Besides the fact that
independent and interrelated success factor.
placement by itself looms so large in predicting earnings gains, it is an
instrumental variable that can be affected by policy and management
decisions. Granted that placement is easier for longer duration stayers
and those who have completed, and that length of stay and completion have
their own strong effects independent of placement, it is important to
understand how placement affects outcomes.
There is unquestionably a sorting effect in placement separate from
the sorting which occurs in completion. More than a fourth of the Title
IIBC terminees that prime sponsors recorded as placed in 1980 had found
their own jobs. 52/ In the remaining cases, the prime sponsors may have
worked harder for those more easily placed, or they may have had greater
success with those who were more employable. At any rate, the placement
chances were much greater for those who were more employable even before
training (Figure 3.9). White males, family heads and married participants,
high school graduates and trainees age 20 and above had noticeably higher
placement from both OJT and classroom training. While the CLMS-CPS
estimates of net impacts for those placed and not placed controlled for the
principal differences, it is likely that placement reflected characteristies or motivation not captured in the demographic and background
This is suggested by estimated annualized earnings in each of
variables
the four pre-entry and eight post-termination quarters of second half
fiscal 1975 classroom trainees who were placed and not placed after
control ling in regression equations for differences in age, family and
marital status, race, barriers to employment, previous employment patterns,
education, veteran's status, and length of stay. Those who were placed,
indeed, had higher earnings in the pre-entry period even after adjusting
for these factors. The pre-program earnings for males who were placed were
.8 percent higher than the average for male classroom trainees, while for
females who were placed they were 5.3 percent higher. Yet the post-program
payoffs for those who were placed were of a much larger order of
magnitude--two-fifths higher for males who were placed than for those not
placed, and nearly three-fourths more for female participants who were
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Figure 3.9
Placement Rate Fiscal 1977 Classroom and
On-The-Job Trainees as Recorded in Prime Sponsor Records
White Male
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placed than for those not placed. Moreover, the differentials in favor of
those placed remained quite large up to two years after termination.
Annualized Quarterly Earnings Differential Between
Second Half Fiscal 1975 Classroom Trainees Placed and Not Placed
Pre-Entry Quarter
4
3
2
1
Post-Termination

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Males

Females

81
175
87
-248

$ 202
113
28
-46

2,033
2,219
2,100
2,079
1,895
1,755
1,994
1,678

2,666
2,623
2,486
2,060
2,005
1,903
1,748
1,716

$

The interpretation is that sorting does occur in placement which is
separate from that occurring during participation and reflected in length
of stay.
The variables used in the CLMS-CPS impact estimates picked up
some but not all of the differences, since even when the CLMS-CPS match
variables and more were accounted for, those placed earned more than those
not placed prior to entry. Yet the magnitude of these pre-entry differen
tials was modest relative to the post-program earnings differentials which
persisted past the immediate transition period when placement would have
had its greatest payoff. This suggests, again, that placement accessed
better paying and more stable jobs, or ones where trainees could apply
their skills and advance more-rapidly.
The Invisible Ingredients
More than a third of local classroom trainees participate in nonoccupational or other remedial activities.
Occupational training is
usually supplemented by some degree of basic skills training, job search
assistance, and transition services.
In Job Corps, expenditures for
remedial education, counseling, world-of-work training, and health in
struction exceed the costs of vocational training. These other activities
have several basic missions:
first, they seek to improve reading and
writing skills and to provide academic credentials; second, they attempt to
alter attitudes and behavior, motivating participants and helping them
adjust to the mores of the labor market; and third, they aim to provide job
knowledge and job seeking skills to facilitate labor market entry.
Attitudinal change, basic skill gains, and employability skills improve
ments are difficult to measure, and because service components designed to
achieve these effects are usually short duration or supplementary ac
tivities, the impacts are not large enough to be easily identified even if
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the measurements were refined. Further, the attitude and employability
skill changes which are achieved may not be manifested in significant
employment and earnings changes or occupational mobility. For these
reasons, these "other" remedial activities have largely remained the
invisible ingredients in the training stew. The available evidence, which
is largely the product of the myriad research and demonstration activities
mounted under the Youth Employment and Demonstration Act, suggests that
these are not "extras," but rather basic ingredients, at least for the
younger program participants (under age 22) who represented half of all
trainees in CETA programs in 1980.
The Job Corps provides the best evidence concerning these factors,
since the treatments are more intensive and the impacts most observable.
The findings that Job Corps increases post-program employment but not
wages, that only three in ten entrants complete vocational training, that
placement activities are limited, and that the job/training match rate is
modest, suggest that something else is happening other than vocational
skills improvements and increased job access through placement leverage.
But the evidence is more than inferential. During 1975 through 1977, a
sample of Job Corps participants and a control group of applicants who did
not participate were interviewed at the entry point for participants and
approximately 18 months later, using a battery of questions scaled to
address 22 different dimensions of job-related noneconomic impactsincluding on-the-job behavior, job interests and attitudes, understanding
of the value of work, attitudes towards self, peers, family and authority
figures, as well as health and nutritional behavior. The study documented
significant impacts on attitudes about self and society for participants
who stayed more than 90 days in Job Corps. Self-esteem increased, par
ticularly for females. Family relations improved both for males and
females. Use of leisure time improved for males and somewhat for females.
Attitudes toward authority improved while criminal involvement declined
(Table 3.15).
Attitudinal changes, as measured by these psychometric test questions,
were reflected more tangibly in behavioral changes. During the first year
after Job Corps, 1977 Corpsmembers were a third less likely to be arrested
than like nonparticipants (10.9 per hundred vs. 16.7 per hundred), with
arrests for theft only a fifth as high (2.1 per hundred rather than 10.3
per hundred). At the two-year post-termination point, Corpsmembers were a
fourth less likely to be married, one-sixth less likely to be heads of
families, a fifth less likely to have had children, and an eighth less
likely to have had children out of wedlock. During the 18 to 24 month
post-termination period, Corpsmembers spent 4.4 percent of weeks in
college, vocational or technical school, or six times more than the control
group. Cumulative moves between cities for job opportunities (excluding
Job Corps relocations) were twice as high for Corpsmembers as controls in
the first year and a half after termination, reflecting the maturation and
greater self-reliance resulting from the residential experience. 53/
The evidence of substantial in-program and post-program gains for Job
Corps can be contrasted with the findings of the supported work youth
program which served dropouts very much like the Job Corps enrol lees,
providing structured and well-supervised full-time employment in local
communities. During the period of supported work participation there was
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Table 3.15
Summary of Results of the Job Corps Non-Economic Impacts Study*

Who Stayed
Three Months or
More in Job Corps
(Persisters)

Results for
Individuals Who
Did Not Attend
Job Corps
(No Shows)

Improved
No change
No change
No change
No change
Declined
Improved

Improved
No change
Improved
No change
No change
No change
Improved

No change

Declined

No change

No change

No change

Declined

Improved
Improved

Improved
No change

Improved
Improved
Improved

Improved
No change
No change

No change
No change

No change
No change

Mixed
Improved

Mixed
No change

Results for Enrol lees

Impact
Dimension
Job-Related Impacts
Job seeking skills
Job holding skills
Job knowledge
Work relevant attitudes
Work ethic
Job skill confidence
Job satisfaction
Vocational aspirations
(right now)
Vocational aspirations
(two years ago)
Vocational aspirations
(two years from now)
Social-Attitudinal Impacts
Attitude toward authority
Self-esteem
Criminal justice system
involvement
Family relations
Leisure time
Health Impacts
Health information
Nutrition information
Health care and health
habits
Nutrition behavior

Improvements and declines are those where statistical significance
was achieved on the change measures.
Source:

Abt Associates, "The Noneconomic Impacts of the Job Corps,"
Assessments of Job Corps Performance and Impacts, Volume I
(Washington, D.C.:Government Printing Office, May 1980),
pp. 407-565.
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evidence of a decline in hard drug usage relative to controls (11.3 percent
of supported work participants compared to 14.2 percent of controls
reported use of heroin, cocaine or psychedelic drugs), but an increase in
marijuana and alcohol usage (56.9 percent compared to 52.4 percent, and
68.1 percent compared to 65.5 percent, respectively). The average number
of arrests was higher for participants (.26 vs. .20) and the percent
arrested was higher (17.1 vs. 16.8). During the 10 to 18 month period
after entry, by which time most participants had left supported work, 16.8
percent of participants experienced at least one arrest compared to 15.2
percent of controls. During the 19-27 month point, participants in the
follow-up sample were less frequently arrested than controls (10.4 percent
vs. 13.6 percent) but for the small group followed-up 28 to 36 months, the
situation was again in favor of nonparticipants (23.1 percent vs. 16.7
percent). The same patterns were evident in number of arrests. In the
post-program period, participants and controls were about equally likely to
use marijuana and alcohol and participants were more likely to use drugs
other than marijuana and alcohol. 54/ In other words, it appears that
during the period these young adults were employed they were more likely to
use alcohol and marijuana, and more likely to be arrested, than when they
were unemployed and searching for work. Likewise the post-program earnings
effects of supported work were minimal for youth participants.
The differences between the Job Corps and supported work impacts may
be due to either the residential factor or the greater impacts of a
training rather than work approach. Indeed, it appears that training
activities may be somewhat more likely to alter attitudes and behavior.
For instance, the Career Intern Program was an intensive alternative
education program for mostly poor and minority dropouts and dropout-prone
youth, i.e., the same types who enter Job Corps and were in supported work.
The CIP approach included low teacher-pupil ratios, individualized,
self-paced and experienced-based instruction, linkages with the worldof-work, and an emphasis on student decisionmaking, peer group support and
motivation. In other words, it shared many of the elements of Job Corps
treatment. While CIP participants experienced rapid educational gains and
improved employment, three other impacts were measured by pre- and postprogram tests for participants and a control group using the Career
Development Inventory (Super, 1970), the Self-Esteem Inventory (Cooperstown, 1967), and the Internal-External Scale (Rotter, 1966). These tests
demonstrated a uniform and statistically significant effect on career
planning, career development resources, but not career information. There
was a slight positive effect on self-esteem, and no statistically sig
nificant effect on locus of control. 55/
A test of the impacts of in-school guidance, counseling, motivation,
and employability skills development efforts was provided by the Youth
Career Development demonstration which consisted of 36 projects offering
5-10 hours weekly of instruction and other activities for disadvantaged
students during or after the school day. In each site, control groups were
drawn from like individuals, and the participants and their controls were
given a battery of tests at entry and exit (one school year) which included
subsets of questions designed to measure changes in vocational attitudes,
work-relevant attitudes, sex-stereotyped perspectives and self-esteem, plus
job knowledge, job holding and job seeking skills. The participants gained
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significantly relative to controls in all areas except job knowledge, where
their gains fell just short of statistical significance, and in selfesteem, where there were no changes for participants or controls.
Big gainers in employability skills and attitudes were more likely to
have positive labor market outcomes than below average gainers. 56/

Status Three-Months After End of School Year For
YCD Participants and Controls
Relative
Size of
Pre/Post Gain
Vocational attitudes
Upper quartlle
Lower quartlle
Job knowledge
Upper quartlle
Lower quartlle
Job holding skills
Upper quartlle
Lower quartile

Work relevant attitudes
Upper quartile
Lower quartile
Job seeking skills
Upper quartile
Lower quartile
Sex stereotyping
Upper quartile
Lower quartile
Self-esteem

Upper quartile
Lower quartile

Percent 1n
Full-T1me
Job

Percent 1n
Skilled or
Semi-Skilled Job

Probability of
Working or InSchool or Both

29
25

18
9

71
56

31
25

16
11

75
52

25
24

13
10

65
65

28
26

15
11

77
64

22
25

12
10

71
58

24
23

14
9

70

20
29

12
8

68
65

64

Even though the transition services yielded statistically significant
gains in employability skills and attitudes, and measurable gains were
related to positive labor market outcomes, the compounding of the two
modest relationships resulted in limited, though positive, post-program
improvements for participants relative to controls. 57/
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Post-Program Employment and Education Status
of Participants 1n School-to-Work Transition Projects
Eight Months After
End of School Year

Three Months After
End of School Year
Controls

Difference

Participants

Controls

Difference

27.6
40.6

26.5
37.9

+1.1
+2.7

26.9
50.5

25.5
42.6

+1.4
+7.9

32.6

32.2

-.4

40.5

33.7

+6.8

15.0

19.5

-4.5

16.3

21.7

-5.4

10.9

15.0

-4.1

5.1

9.4

-4.3

Participants
Full-time work
Part-time work
Education and
work
Education and no
work
No work, no
school, no

training

It appears that change on some of the dimensions was more critical to
outcomes than change on others. As an example, the Jobs for Delaware
Graduates (JDG) program was a variant of YCD. It used a specially-created
business-oriented but broad-based intermediary to provide transition
services very similar in hours of activity and costs to those of YCD to
seniors in selected high schools in Delaware. JDG focused solely on
students who wanted to go immediately into the full-time labor market after
graduation but were expected to have problems. The aim of JDG was not
personal or character development to the extent of most YCD projects, but
rather the provision of the specific skills and help needed to get a job.
JDG produced statistically significant gains for participants (measured
relative to matched students in comparable high schools in Delaware which
were not served by JDG) on only two of the seven measures, compared to
statistically significant gains on five of the seven scales for YCD. Of
critical importance, however, JDG participants gained more on the job
seeking and job holding skills dimensions, i.e., where the program placed
its greatest emphasis.
Difference Between Gains of Participants and Controls
as Percent of Standard Deviation of Pretest Scores on Each Measure
Self-esteem
Sex stereotyping
Job seeking skills
Work relevant attitudes
Job holding skills
Job knowledge
Vocational attitudes
*

YCD

JDG

.004
.239*
.175*
.156*
.099*
.077
.142*

.096
.073
.227*
.012
.160*
-.021
-.140

Statistically significant

JDG also placed more emphasis on job development as well as arranging
placements before the end of the school year. It did not rely solely on
attitudinal changes in participants to yield improved labor market
outcomes. There was, as a result, a substantial difference in post-program
outcomes. JDG increased the chances of full-time employment three months
after termination by 17 percentage points, compared to the less than 2
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percentage point increment attributable to YCD.
On the other hand, JDG
youth were less likely than their matched controls to be in school or
training subsequently. 58/
The gains in employability skills documented for these in-school
transition projects might be contrasted with the tested outcomes for
participants in summer employment programs. The typical summer program
emphasizes work experience with, at most, a day or half-day each week of
"enrichments." The total summer treatments average 230 hours, or approxi
mately one-half the hours in YCD.
Several different evaluations of the
summer program using the same tests as for YCD and JDG found no gains for
summer participants relative to control groups on any of the measured
dimensions.
Even in summer demonstration programs which mixed work and
transition services half and half, or provided full-time vocational
exploration activities or transition services during the summer months,
there was no evidence of statistically significant gains on the same tests
where impacts were noted for YCD and JDG. There is some evidence that
these summer interventions reduced in-program but not post-program arrest
rates. They increased modestly the chances of returning to school and of
working while in school. 59/ But they did not, apparently, have a major
impact on employability skills and attitudes.
The Job Search Assistance demonstration provided short (one to four
week) interventions coupling formal instruction in job search techniques
with supervised job search activities for youth already looking for work
but with little success.
There was almost no emphasis on personal or
character development, occupational guidance, or vocational exploration.
Yet the evidence suggests that the help provided made a substantial
difference.
In one site, an average of 83 hours of activities included
supervised "work" in searching and applying for jobs combined with
instruction in resume writing and employer interaction. The same set of
pre- and post-tests were applied as for YCD.
There was no evidence of
improvement over the short period of the intervention even on the job
seeking skills subtests where a gain would be most likely. 60/ Yet the
post-program labor market outcomes were impressive:
Post-Program Employment Rates for Job Search Assistance
Participants and Controls

First follow-up
(10.5 weeks post-termination)
Second follow-up
26.5 weeks post-termination)
Third follow-up
(37.5 weeks post-termination)
Fourth follow-up
(45.5 weeks post-termination)

Participants

Controls

63.6%

47.7%

77.1

73.2

79.3

78.0

79.2

81.8

An even shorter-duration intervention was tested which provided two
days of non-stipended job search assistance to young Employment Service
applicants who were matched to a control group of nonparticipants. At the
six-week follow-up point, the actual employment rates were 51 percent for
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participants and 42 percent for controls, even though the latter were more
employable. At the three-month follow-up point, some of the effect had
faded but there were still noticeable differences. Finally, a study of job
search assistance programs under the Work Incentive Program found that
among persons under age 21 who participated, the employment rate after
leaving the program was 48 percent compared to 25 percent among youth
enrolled in routine WIN services. 61/
In summary, "other" training activities can result in documented
changes in employability skills and attitudes as well as altering behavior,
such as criminal activity, which may undermine successful performance in
the labor market. While improvements along these dimensions are associated
with greater post-program success, the changes achieveable with shortduration local interventions are not of a magnitude to dramatically alter
employment and earnings. Quite reasonably, long-duration and intensive
programs have greater measurable impacts. Structured environments in a
residential setting or in alternative schools appear to change attitudes
and skills more than when activities are provided in regular work and
learning environments. There is little evidence that work activities per
se change attitudes and awarenesses. Post-program benefits can be realized
without measurable changes in employability skills or attitudes. This is
the case with job search assistance. Here the key is providing the minimum
necessary at the point it is needed. The behavioral and motivational
interventions also appear to work best when the intervention is "going with
the flow." For instance, there are rapidly increasing probabilities of
labor force participation in employment with each passing teen year.
Disadvantaged youth lag behind more advantaged youth in the time of first
part-time in-school work, the time of first summer employment, and the
point of the first full-time bridge job. Apparently it is possible to
speed up this entry process by providing first summer employment ex
periences. High school graduates entering the full-time work force will
almost always get full-time jobs after a period of search. Focusing on
those who are interested in work rather than continued study and providing
the needed tools can apparently hasten this process without marked changes
in measurable employability skills. Likewise, there is a dramatic decline
in the propensity for crime and illegitimacy over the teen years and early
twenties. A program such as Job Corps is apparently able to speed up the
maturation process somewhat while providing a constraining setting for the
most critical part of this at-risk period.
All these judgments are highly speculative because the measures of
change are suspect, because the changes produced are modest, and because
the relationships between in-program changes and pos -I rc9 ram outcomes are
complex. Nevertheless, it does seem that motivation, maturation, and
employability skills are malleable and that interventions can produce
improvements which affect short-term labor market success, at least for
younger CETA participants.
The evidence on remedial education is somewhat more dependable because
changes can be measured using refined and relatively accepted standardized
tests, and since credentials are awarded which document achievementacademic credit for work experience, the GED and the diploma.
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Among all persons 14-21 who participated in CETA programs during 1978,
19.0 percent reported receipt of basic education services, 2.3 percent
English language training and 12.6 percent GED training, although the same
individuals may have participated in both GED and basic education, and
although the total hours of treatment varied widely. Among young high
school dropouts participating in CETA, a third reported receipt of basic
education and a third reported GED training (the same individuals may have
received both). 62/ All Job Corpsmembers except those with a high school
diploma and with tested competencies at an adequate level--all but a tenth
of entrants—participate in either basic education or remedial education
usually half-day or 20 hours weekly. How effective are these remedial
education offerings?
In a recent Job Corps experiment with various education approaches,
over 8000 Corpsmembers were tested at point of assignment to education
programs and after 90 and 150 hours of instruction, representing approxi
mately 19 and 30 weeks, respectively, of Job Corps participation. Ninety
hours in the traditional Job Corps reading and language arts classes
yielded a gain of 1.5 years in reading achievement (according to the SAT
test). Over the same period in mathematics classes, the gain was 1.0 years
in mathematics. At the 150 hour point, the reading gain was 2.1 years,
i.e., the gain rate per hour from 90 to 150 hours was only three-fifths of
that in the first 90 hours, but still quite substantial. 63/ For the
1972-1974 period when gains tests were a regular part of Job Corps, the
monthly gain rates of Job Corpsmembers averaged 2.0 and 2.3 months of
reading and math achievement, respectively. 64/ The more current data
translate into monthly gain rates of 3.3 and 2.2, respectively (assuming a
10-month school year to achieve one school year's increase on the SAT
tests).
The Career Intern Program offered a test of an alternative education
approach emphasizing individualized learning, high teacher-student ratios,
and infusion of education materials with work-related information in a
setting designed to maximize positive reinforcement and peer interaction.
This approach apparently increased the learning rates of dropout-prone
youth. Over half a year of treatment, youth in the alternative schools
moved from the 36.57 percentile in the distribution of the Metropolitan
Achievement Test to the 40.08 percentile, or by 3.51 percentage points,
whereas the control groups (in regular schools) advanced from 36.60 to
37.97 or by 1.37 percentage points. In mathematics, the increase for
treatment was 26.20 to 30.11 or 3.91 percentage points compared to an
increase from 28.55 to 29.18 or by .63 percentage points for controls. In
both cases, the gains of the participants were statistically signifi
cant. 65/ If no extra intervention had occurred, it is assumed that the
youth would have the same position on the distribution at post-test as at
pre-test.
While remedial education activities can advance tested reading and
math competencies substantially, only a minority of CETA participants with
educational deficiencies can be brought up to the level where they can be
credentialed with a high school equivalency (GED) certificate. As an
example, because Job Corpsmembers have an average tested reading capability
below the sixth grade level at entry into the program, and because the
average duration of stay is only six months, an increase of two grade
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levels achievable in this time brings the average up only to the eighth
grade level. Only one-sixth of enrol lees are eligible on entry or attain a
seventh grade level of reading during their stay, which is considered the
minimum to begin GED preparation. Two-thirds of these participate in a GED
program, 65 percent complete, and nine of ten who complete take and pass
the state GED test. 66/ Thus, only 7 percent of Job Corps participants
acquire a GED, which translates into a 5 percentage point higher likelihood
of having a GED or diploma than for like nonparticipants. 67/
In local CETA programs, which serve a less disadvantaged youth
population containing more individuals closer to the GED standards, the
record of success is roughly the same as for Job Corps. Under the Youth
Employment and Training Programs and Youth Community Conservation and
Improvement Projects, the number of GEDs received equalled 7.8 percent of
all dropouts who participated in fiscal 1980. 68/
There is some evidence that the GED certificate pays off in the labor
market, albeit less than a regular diploma. Adjusting for race, age,
occupational training cluster, and entry education status, 1977 male Job
Corps participants who completed a GED had a 68 percent chance of em
ployment at 18 months after exit, compared to 63 percent for others. For
females without children, the employment rates were 60 percent for those
with a GED compared to 51 percent for those without one. Male GED
recipients had the same post-program employment rates, but lower earnings,
than individuals who entered Job Corps with a high school diploma; while
for females without children, the employment rate for those entering with a
diploma was 6 percentage points above the rate for those acquiring a
GED. 69/
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SECTION 4.
WORK AS TRAINING

Work can serve a training function, and the historical emphasis on
subsidized employment activities under CETA has, in part, been defended by
the claim that work experience will increase future employability. This
might occur in several possible ways: Some individuals lack job ex
perience. They do not know how to interact with coworkers and supervisors,
how to accept and follow-through on instructions, or how to conform to
worksite mores. They may have fears about the unknown or may be unable to
get a job because they lack any work experience on their resumes. For such
individuals, a subsidized job might teach employability skills, help to
overcome fears and provide an employment reference. Work can also be
structured in combination with education or training components. There are
some individuals who may not be willing to sit in a classroom all day, but
will participate a few hours daily if this is required to secure a job the
remainder of the time. A subsidized job may also be used as a structured
training site to upgrade skills and credentials, in which case the aim will
be learning not just output. Alternatively, there may be part-time work
and part-time training, or a sequence of work and training, which may be
coordinated to provide specific skills. Finally, the subsidized job may
also be used to screen and train workers for permanent entry into regular
unsubsidized jobs in the public or nonprofit sectors, which account for as
many as one-third of all jobs in our economy. Because the subsidy for work
experience or PSE equals the full wage plus training costs, rather than the
subsidy of half the wages plus training costs available to private em
ployers under OJT, greater risks and a wider gap between hiring require
ments and the credentials of those hired can, in theory, be achieved in the
public sector.
While in all these cases, the subsidized work experience can be
assumed to have some positive post-program effects, there are other factors
which might minimize employability impacts. A subsidized job in the public
or nonprofit sector may simply utilize existing skills, providing a wage
which is largely offset by output. This occurs when job requirements are
well-matched with the skill levels of participants. It is possible, in
fact, for skills and productivity to exceed wages, so that the public and
nonprofit employers reap a double windfall benefit from putting the
unemployed to work. Work experience of this sort may help to avoid the
deterioriation of skills or motivation, and it may be a better reference
than an extended period of joblessness, so that it could increase the
likelihood of employment subsequently. On the other hand, the jobless
person can look for work full-time while the worker in a subsidized job
must only search in off-hours or upon termination. Even if the work
experience improves the chances of finding work after the temporary job,
persons who do not participate are more likely to be employed in the
post-program period because at least some of them found continuing jobs
during the time they might otherwise have participated. In this case,
higher earnings rates are likely because of accumulated senority. The
subsidized jobs may also be "makework," without any training or meaningful
work experience, with slack supervision and limited worksite discipline.
The jobs might be considered nothing more than constructive activities to
keep youth off the streets or simply a substitute for income transfers of
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relief recipients and older workers.
Where the jobs do not provide
structured, supervised work settings, they will not offer a very good aging
vat, nor serve as effective entry and reentry mechanisms. They might, in
fact, have negative impcts, instilling bad work attitudes, eroding skills,
and providing a black mark rather than a reference on the resume of the
participant.
The impact on employability is, thus, dependent on the match-up of
each worker with each job, the designed level of on-site or off-site
training, the transition mechanisms, and the effectiveness of the manage
ment. The major categories of subsidized work-in-school and summer jobs,
year-round work projects for dropouts, welfare recipients, offenders,
handicapped, and drug addicts, supported work and public service employment
for the structurally and countercyclically unemployed—all subsume a range
of local activities which vary widely in these dimensions. " Some summer
projects are training oriented while others are idle leaf-raking. Some PSE
employees are in makework jobs while others may serve in highly-skilled
positions where transferrable skills are learned. As a generalization,
however, the Summer Youth Employment Program emphasizes the aging vat and
constructive activity/income transfer approach, PSE Title VI places more
emphasis on the productive work and OJT approaches, while Title IID and
work experience under Title I IB more often emphasize work and training
combinations.
Providing Structured Work Experiences for the Hardest-to-Employ
The supported work experiment was a five-year demonstration and
research effort to determine the impact of work experience on the immediate
and future employability of four hard-to-employ groups: long-term AFDC
recipients, ex-addicts, ex-offenders and young school dropouts. Supported
work projects were designed--! ike most good work projects—to provide
increasing demands, close supervision, and peer support with the aim of
gradually improving the employability of the disadvantaged up to competi
tive labor market standards. While the actual work done in the 15 projects
nationwide paralleled the types of activities undertaken under most CETA
work experience programs—housing rehabilitation, painting, health care,
building maintenance, day care, and park maintenance—there was also a
limited degree of manufacturing and sale of services to the private sector,
as well as an attempt to involve business and labor in the activities. The
projects were run by carefully-selected operators under the oversight of
the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation. Where three-fourths to
four-fifths of most CETA-funded work experience program expenditures go for
wages and salaries, less than half of the full costs (net of research) of
supported work were for income support, reflecting greater supervision and
more careful management. The projects operated for three to five years and
were, thus, more stable than the normal subsidized work projects. The
average length of stay for participants was 6.7 months, compared to 5.0 for
Title IIB work experience participants and 11.3 months for Title IID PSE
participants in fiscal 1977-1979. In other words, the post-program impacts
of supported work are indicative of the effects of well-run, stable, "en
riched," and more targeted work projects. TO/ Any observed impacts are,
thus, likely to be more positive than the average for CETA work experience,
and similar to that portion of public service employment activities tar
geted to similar clienteles.
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Overall, supported work had minimal impacts on post-program labor
market success.
During the period 19-27 months after enrollment (after
adjusting for the fact that some of the participants were still in
supported work), the average employment rates of the ex-addict, youth, and
ex-offender groups were all below those of carefully matched control groups
(Figure 3.10). Only the AFDC cohort experienced employment gains. Monthly
hours of employment changed little for any of the groups, except again for
the AFDC cohort. Average wage levels rose noticeably for the AFDC group,
modestly for youth, and minimally for ex-addicts and offenders, as compared
to their respective control groups.
The gains of the AFDC group were primarily the result of increased
post-program public sector employment.
During the 19-27 month postenrollment period, the employment rate for the AFDC participants who had
left supported work was 6.5 percentage points higher than for controls.
The chances of being employed and in public sector jobs subsidized by CETA
or WIN were 2.8 percentage points higher for ex-participants than controls
during this period. The differential in employment rates in unsubsidized
public sector jobs was 8.1 percentage points. In other words, post-program
public sector jobs accounted for all of the employment gains relative to
controls. 71/
Another perspective is to consider the sources of average monthly
earnings for experimentals and controls during the 19-27 month period. Of
the estimated differential of $71 monthly in favor of the AFDC supported
work participants, 88 percent resulted for greater CETA, WIN, supported
work or other public sector earnings. 72/
Average Monthly Earnings of AFDC Supported Work
Cohorts and Controls During 19-27 Month Period After Enrollment

Participants
Earnings Al1 Jobs
Supported Work
CETA, WIN
Other Public Sector
Private Sector

$236.92
4.71
37.16
70.94
124.11

Controls

$166.34
0.00
30.69
19.92
115.73

Difference

Distribution
of
Difference

$70.58
4.71
6.47
51.02
8.38

100.0%
6.7
9.2
72.3
11.9

The lack of significant post-program employment impacts for the other
supported work client groups was, in turn, related to their lack of
transition into public sector jobs. For instance, supported work youth and
ex-offender participants were .2 percent and .6 percent, respectively, less
likely than their respective control groups to be employed in unsubsidized
jobs in the public sector during the 19-27 month post-enrollment period.
The likelihood of post-program subsidized employment was higher by 1.4
percentage points and .4 percentage points, respectively, but even these
differentials were substantially less than those between AFDC participants
and controls. The limited transition rates for the youth and ex-offenders
compared to AFDC participants reflected their relative employability. The
likelihood of unsubsidized public sector employment was 12.0 percent for
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Figure 3.10
Employment Experience of Supported Work Partictpants
and Controls, 19-27 Months After Enrolling
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period)
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The Board of Directors, Manpower Demonstration Research Cor
poration,
Summary and Findings of the National Supported Work
Demonstration (Cambridge, Mass.:
Bal linger Publishing CbTT
1980);Rebecca Maynard, The Impact of Supported Work on Young
School Dropouts, Stanley Masters and Rebecca Maynard, The
Impact of Supported Work on Long-Term Recipients of AFDC Benefits,
Katherine Dickinson and Rebecca Maynard, The Impact of Supported
Work on Ex-Addicts, and Irving Piliavin, The Impact of Supported
Work on Ex-Offenders (New York, New York: Manpower Demonstration
Research Corporation, 1981).
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the AFDC control group, 7.0 percent for the youth control group and 4.3 for
the ex-offender controls. In other words, even in the absence of supported
work and its placement/OJT effects, long-term AFDC recipients were con
sidered more favorably by the public sector employers than offenders or
dropout youth. 73/
This evidence suggests that supported work served as a try-out or OJT
mechanism for AFDC recipients but not for the other groups. Absent this
effect, it seemed to have little impact on employability. The effec
tiveness of supported work as a transition mechanism was limited since even
for AFDC participants, less than seven in a hundred more than expected
entered unsubsidized public sector jobs, while for the less attractive
ex-offender and youth groups, there was no increase in transition into un
subsidized public employment. 74/
Why PSE Yields Earnings Gains and Work Experience Does Not
For work experience participants in 1976, the Social Security covered
earnings in 1977 were an estimated $149 less than those of matched
controls, and $187 less in 1978. For PSE participants, the post-program
earnings were $261 and $326, respectively, higher than those of controls.
Adjustments for undercoverage of post-program public sector earnings
increase the differentials even more in favor of PSE. Why did PSE have
such positive effects while work experience did not?
An obvious consideration is that PSE served a more employable
population. The individuals who entered PSE in fiscal 1976 had Social
Security-covered earnings during 1974 which were double those for in
dividuals subsequently entering work experience. The 1977 average earnings
of the control group for 1976 PSE terminees were half again those of the
work experience participants. 75/ Yet this alone is not an explanation for
the differences, since the net impacts for PSE and work experience were
estimated by comparison with individuals having similar characteristics.
Moreover, most demographic groups, including the more disadvantaged among
PSE participants, experienced greater post-program employment than when
they participated in work experience (Table 3.16). Estimates of the
earnings of subgroups of PSE and work experience participants measured
relative to control groups suggest that annual earnings gains (the 1978
levels for all fiscal 1976 terminees) were higher for almost all cohorts in
the CETA population (Table 3.17).
The "extras" received along with PSE were certainly not an explanation
for these more favorable post-program outcomes. In fiscal 1976, before
training was required as a component of public service employment, only .3
percent of PSE funds were spent on training, so this was certainly not a
cause of the difference. 76/ Likewise, 9 percent of adult work experience
participants, compared to 8 percent of PSE particpants, received supportive
services (health or child care, transportation or residential support),
while 40 and 37 percent, respectively, received manpower services
(counseling, orientation, coaching, job referral, follow-up, or other).
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Table 3.16
Employment Rates Three Months After Termination of Fiscal 1976
Work Experience and Public Service Employment Participants

Selected Characteristics
Total
Sex

Public
Service
Employment
Participants

Male
Female
Age at Entry
18-21
22-29
30-44
45-54
55 and over
Education at Entry
8th grade or less
9th-llth grade
12th or equivalent
Beyond high school
Minority Status
White, excluding Hispanic
Black
Hispanic
Other
Employment Barrier at Entry
Physical/Health
Criminal record
Limited English
None of the above
Family Receiving Benefits at Entry
AFDC

Supplemental Security Income
Other public assistance
Food stamps
Housing assistance
None of these

Source:

Work
Experience
Participants

57%

52%

60
52

54
51

51
59
64
58
50

53
52
54
61
42

54
59
58
57

49
52
52
55

60
50
59
50

55
46
47
60

39
52
48
60

39
50
49
56

53
73
43
49
48
59

46
41
22
42
47
54

Westat, Inc. Postprogram Experience and Pre/Post Comparisons
for Trainees Who Entered CETA During "Fiscal Year 1976 (JuTy~
1975-June 1976) (Washington, D.C.
Employment and Training
Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research,
March 1979), Tables 37-38.
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Table 3.17
Estimated 1978 Participant/Control Earnings Differentials For
Fiscal 1976 Work Experience and Public Service Employment Participants
Difference
Between
Gains of
Public Service
Employment
Participants and
Work Experience
Participants
[(2) - (1)]

(1)
Gains of
Work Experience
Participants
Relative to
Controls

(2)
Gains of
Public Service
Employment
Participants
Relative to
Controls

17-18
19-21
22-25
26-29
30-44
45+

$249
-621
-121
-716
-436
563

$ 966
483
187
723
113
732

White males
Minority males
White females
Minority females

-471
-197
-34
442

429
-562
1192
1098

900
-365
1226
656

Low earners
Mixed and intermediate
earners
High earners

-195

834

1029

-228
-228

331
153

559
381

Source:

$

1104
308
1439
549
169

717

Westat, Inc. Impact on 1978 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees
in Selected Program Activities (Washington, D.C.:Employment and
Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research,
February 1981).

The major explanation for the differing earnings impacts of PSE and
work experience lies in their relative effects on transition rates into
unsubsidized public sector employment. For second half fiscal 1975 work
experience participants, the percentage engaged in unsubsidized public
sector work rose from 11 percent one year prior to entry to 24 percent one
year after termination (Figure 3.11). For PSE participants, the increase
was from 12 to 35 percent. The employment rate of work experience par
ticipants rose from 53 to 59 percent over this period, while for PSE
participants, the increase was from 55 percent to 68 percent. Thus, the
increases in post-program public sector employment (13 percentage points
for work experience participants and 23 percentage points for PSE)
accounted for all of employment gains for both work experience and PSE
terminees, while the difference in the increases in public sector em
ployment rates for PSE and work experience participants equalled the
differential in post-program employment rates. Among both groups, the
probability of employment one year after termination for participants not
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FIGURE 3.11
EMPLOYMENT RATES BY SECTOR FOR SECOND HALF FISCAL 1975
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Westat, Inc. CLMS Follow-up Report No. 3 (36 Months After Entry)
Experiences in the First Two Postprogram Years, With Pre/Post Com
parisons, For Terminees Who Entered CETA During January-June 1975,
Employment and Training Administration,
(Washington, D.C.:
Office of Policy, Evaluaton and Research, December 1980), Table
39.

subsequently employed in the public sector remained about the same as the
probability one year before entry.
For fiscal 1976 participants in work experience and PSE, the one-year
post-termination public sector employment rates were 18 percent and 24
percent, respectively. The differential between the employment rates of
the two groups was 8 percentage points in favor of PSE terminees. In other
words, the differential in public sector employment rates accounted for
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three-fourths of the overall employment differential. Alternatively, the
employment rate increases from one year pre-CETA to one year post-termina
tion were 7 percentage points for work experience participants and 16
percentage points for PSE participants. Assuming, as was the case for 1975
participants, that both groups had the same chances of public sector em
ployment a year before entry, the 6 percentage point difference between the
increases in public sector employment rates for work experience and PSE
terminees accounted for a major portion of 9 percentage point differential
in overall employment rate gains. 78/
Despite the negative post-program earnings impacts estimated from the
CLMS-CPS analysis, work experience had positive effects for the half of
participants who were placed at exit, of whom over half were working in the
public sector according to data for 1975 participants. The estimated 1977
earnings of 1976 work experience participants who were placed were $577
higher than those of controls. For 1975 PSE participants, 57 percent were
placed and 61 percent of these were employed in the public sector. Among
1976 participants placed, the earnings were $1433 higher in 1977 than for
matched controls. 79/
The conclusion is that the benefits of PSE or work experience accrue
primarily where it functions as a try-out or training ground for entry into
the public sector. The transition rates from work experience are lower
than for PSE, and hence the benefits less. PSE, in this sense, operates
like OJT, albeit with a lower transition rate. Fifty-five percent of 1976
PSE participants were employed one month post-CETA and only three-fifths of
those in public sector jobs, compared to 75 percent of OJT participants of
whom seven-eighths were in private sector jobs. It might be speculated
that PSE does not have as high a batting average as OJT because a segment
of PSE activities are very much like work experience—short-term project
work which is not directly linked to unsubsidized public jobs. This raises
the possibility that more recent PSE efforts, which emphasize the project
mode and are targeted to the most disadyantaged, may not achieve the sub
stantial net impacts of PSE as operated in fiscal 1976.
Work and Training Combinations
A small proportion of CETA participants are enrolled in "multiple
activities," i.e., they move from one primary activity to another. Among
fiscal 1976 entrants (excluding those in direct referral and summer youth
programs), 6 percent participated in activity combinations broken down as
follows: 80/
Classroom and on-the-job training
Classroom training and subsidized work
Subsidized work and OJT
Work experience and PSE
Three or more activities

19%
48
11
16
6

The estimated post-program earnings gains of these multiple-activity
participants were less than for classroom and on-the-job trainees, but more
than for participants in subsidized employment, i.e., work experience and
public service employment combined (Table 3.18). The benefits of multiple
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Table 3.18
1978 Estimated Earnings Relative to Controls For Significant Segments of
Fiscal 1976 Participants, By Primary CETA Assignment
Multiple
Activities

Classroom
Training

PSE/Work
Experience

On-The-Job
Training

Total

$164

$442

111

$574

White male
Minority male
White female
Minority female

-858
331

574
1131

421
130
747
698

3
-345
521
622

588
543
514
727

-164

110

-369

185

107

244

127

645

209

898

371

1273

1181

1384

231

284

420

132

811

315

266

44

342

-885

1061

8

400

165
-455
-66
317
708

183
-17
277
445
1278

387
-70
-47
84
-117

697
617
414
339
727

I-10 weeks of
participation
II-20 weeks of
participation
21-40 weeks of
participation
Over 40 weeks of
participation
Previously low
earners
Previously
intermediate
and mixed earners
Previously high
earners

17-18
19-21
22-25
26-29
30-44

years
years
years
years
years

Source:

of
of
of
of
of

age
age
age
age
age

Westat, Inc. Impact on 1978 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees
In Selected Program Activities (Washington, D.C.:Employment and
Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research,
February 1981).
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activities, even more than those of classroom training, were dependent on
length of stay, in part, perhaps, because the amount of classroom training
was diluted and in part because the multiple assignments may have reflected
transfer from stop gap components to treatment activities with only the
latter having earnings impacts. It appears that persons with mixed earn
ings patterns, minorities, and older participants benefited most from
multiple activities. However, these conclusions are extremely tentative
because of the small sample sizes in multiple activities.
Where the gains of classroom training increased from the first to
second post-program years, they declined for multiple activity recipients.
In this regard, multiple activities had an impact pattern more like
OJT. 81/
Estimated Annual Earnings Increment
For Fiscal 1976 Trainees Terminating in Calendar 1976
Change
1977-1978

1977

1978

Multiple activities

$356

$164

$-192

Classroom training

347

442

+95

58

71

+13

839

574

-265

Work experience
and PSE
On-the-job Training

The proportion of time that enrol lees in multiple activities spent in
each separate component is unknown. Suggestively, if each component in the
various multiple activities combinations is assigned equal weight, and the
earnings gains estimated for participants in each separate activity are
multiplied by their incidence in the various combinations, the 1978
weighted gain for the multiple activity category would be $196, or very
close to the actual $164 gain. One might speculate that the separate
effects of the components in the various combinations were additive.
The Service Mix Alternatives demonstration mounted under the Youth
Employment and Demonstration Projects Act sought to determine the relative
effectiveness of different training and work combinations for out-of-school
youth. In two sites, dropouts were randomly assigned to equally intensive
work, work and remediation, and strictly remediation components. In the
third site, they were assigned to either work or a work and remediation
combination. These alternative interventions yielded noticeably different
post-program outcomes. Participants in the training-oriented components
worked full-time more frequently in the post-program period but attended
school or training less frequently. Participants in combination activities
had patterns closer to the work experience component participants than the
training component participants. 82/
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Post-Program Status of Randomly Assigned Out-of-School
Youth Participants in the Service Mix Alternatives Demonstration

Site 1 and 2
Full-time work
Work/training
combination
Full-time training
Site 3
Full-time work
Work/training
combination

30%

26%

23%

43%

31
38

28
14

28
41

21
11

46

18

42
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Worksites as Training Sites
The Ventures in Community Improvement (VICI) demonstration in nine
sites was designed to provide intensive vocational skills training in the
workplace, and through linkages with unions and employer groups, to use
publicly subsidized work as a transition mechanism into construction jobs
and apprenticeships. Targeted to out-of-school youth, and providing work
activities such as refurbishing public facilities and repairing homes
occupied by the poor and elderly, the VICI program was similar to work
experience activities funded under the Youth Community Conservation and
Improvement Projects (as well as supported work for youth). Yet there were
also several important differences: VICI projects were larger (60 par
ticipants vs. an average of 8 under YCCIP); they were funded for two years
(vs. one for most YCCIP projects); they had more supervisors (one
supervisor for every six participants, compared to a 1 to 10 ratio in
typical YCCIP projects); much greater effort was placed on linkages with
labor unions and apprenticeship programs, including the hiring of journey
men as supervisors; the projects were better planned and managed than most
youth work projects; and, most importantly, the work activities were
structured to provide occupational skills training. 837
The differences between VICI and regular work projects are best
illustrated by the cost breakdowns. 84/
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Cost per person year
Cost per participant
Cost components
Administrative
Wages, salaries, and fringes
Worksite supervisors
Training
Services

Average
VICI

Average
YCCIP-1980

$13,833
$6,917

$7,793
$2,985

14%
38
32
15
1

20%
59
9
7
6

The basic question addressed by the VICI demonstration was whether
this greater emphasis on supervision and training would increase the impact
of the work experience on participant labor market success- without
sacrificing the output generated by menial work projects.
The costs of VICI and YCCIP were both offset by the productive output
of participants. In the case of VICI, the estimated ratio of value of
output (as judged by independent appraisers) to total costs including
overhead was $.42, and the value added per dollar of participant wages was
$.32. 85/ For a sample of YCCIP projects, the estimated output per dollar
of costs was $.50, with $.46 in value added per dollar of participant
wages. 86/ The simpler YCCIP projects had a higher output payoff because
they were organized to do the type of work which youth could already
perform or could master with very little effort, and there was limited
expense for training and supervision. In contrast, the VICI projects
involved work which required skills training and in which youth were
relatively less productive. Output improved dramatically as VICI projects
ran their course and participants acquired skills, whereas the productivity
of YCCIP projects did not improve with time. For instance, over the course
of a year, the value of output per hour in one of the VICI projects most
carefully studied rose by 15 percent reflecting the learning of par
ticipants. 87/
The post-program employment rates of VICI participants three months
after termination were roughly the same as those of a control group of
youth not selected for VICI and participants in comparably large-scale work
projects not emphasizing training, although they were higher than for
regular YCCIP participants. However, the hourly wages were higher for VICI
terminees because they more often found their way into construction jobs
and unions (Table 3.19). The benefits were largely realized by the 19- and
20-year-old participants.
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Table 3.19
Post-Program Employment Impacts of the Ventures
In Community Improvement Demonstration
Three-Month Follow-Up Status
Participants in
Comparably
Large-Scale

Control
VICI
Group
Participants Nonparticipants

Work Projects
Not
Emphasizing
Training

YCCIP
Participants

Employed

36.8%

34.3%

36.0%

Employed
full-time
17-18
19+

43.0

29.4

35.7
33.9

33.6
41.4

26.5
29.9

Employed
skilled
construction
(percent
total)

6.1

3.4

3.3

3.8

Union membership
(percent
total)

7.8

0.9

5.9

1.8

Average wage
among employed
Total
17-18
19+

$4.51
4.08
4.78

$3.88
3.35
3.88

$4.42
3.38
4.42

$3.31
3.31
3.31

Average wage
among al1
terminees
(earnings
divided by
total hours
of employment)
Total

17-18
19+

Source:

$1.66
1.20
2.06

Corporation for Public/Private Ventures. Ventures in Community
Improvement demonstration, unpublished findings.
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The VICI experience demonstrates that organizing work projects as
training sites, and establishing linkages into the labor market through the
hiring of journeymen as supervisors will increase the likelihood that
competencies will be gained and translated into job and apprenticeship
access. While only a minority of participants actually realize these
opportunities, the extra gains of this minority account for net impacts
from enriched projects which probably justify their added costs (assuming
that regular work experience activities such as YCCIP have no post-program
net impact).
Expediting Work Force Entry
The Summer Youth Employment Program (SYEP) was initially developed and
continues to be supported primarily as a way to "keep the streets quiet."
By providing a first work experience to young people who would not other
wise find work until later in their teens, the summer jobs will hopefully
ease the school-to-work transition problem. It is also anticipated that
the provision of income and earnings will to some degree forestall
economically motivated early school leaving.
Evidence suggests that summer employment does keep the streets
quieter. The arrest rates of participants in one large multi-site summer
demonstration focused on high-risk youth (one-fourth adjudicated offenders)
were 1.5 per hundred among participants but 3.2 per hundred among controls
during the summer months. For the offender subgroup, the rates were 4.9
per hundred for participants compared to 6.7 per hundred for matched
nonparticipants. The summer enrol lees age 14-17 at entry had a 1.4 per
hundred rate compared to 4.1 per hundred for controls. 88/ These results
might be contrasted with the negative findings of the supported work
experiment. Supported work served an older group (seven of ten par
ticipants were age 18 or over, compared to just one in five summer
enrol lees). It appears that the type of trouble with the law which occurs
for young teenagers during summer idleness can be deterred by constructive
options even though the types of crime committed by older, out-of-school
youth are not affected by work.
Summer jobs also have a positive impact on return-to-school proba
bilities. Only a minority of the summer enrollees are at risk of dropping
out, but a significant share of these are affected. Among a national
sample of 1979 summer participants, 6.1 percent did not return to school,
compared to 9.4 percent of a comparison group of nonparticipants. 89/ The
multi-site summer demonstration with high risk youth found the portion not
in school or training at the three-month follow-up point was 26 percent for
the participants compared to 30 percent for matched nonparticipants. 90/
Under the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects, the guarantee of a
summer and part-time school-year job for all poor youth remaining in or
returning to school increased the share of dropouts reentering school the
next fall from 22 percent to 36 percent and the proportion of underclassmen
returning the next school year from 76 percent to 80 percent. 91/ Since
many enrol lees chose to work only in the summer, the vast majority of
employment hours under Entitlement were in the summer months; thus, the
school retention and return effects were largely the result of summer
employment.
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The basic issue, however, is whether the summer work experience
accelerates entry into the work force. There is no question that the
disadvantaged youth served by the summer program would otherwise have few
employment opportunities. In 1980, 43 percent of the 700,000 summer
participants were age 14 or 15, and an additional 39 percent were age
16-17. Among these disadvantaged and largely (66 percent) minority youth,
53 percent had no earnings in the previous year, and 37 percent had
earnings less than $1,000. Only 29 percent worked in the previous summer,
and since 17 percent were previous CETA participants, it is a safe bet
that, for many, the previous employment was in the summer program. 92/ In
contrast, 25 percent of all 14-15 year-old students reported empToyment
while in school in March 1979, as did 48 percent of 16-17 year-olds.
Three-fourths of 16-17 year-olds, six-sevenths of the 18-19 year-olds, and
half of 14-15 year-olds held a job at some point over the course of the
previous year, which would yield a weighted work experience rate of 66
percent in contrast to the 47 percent rate for summer program entrants. 93/
The opportunity to begin working at an earlier age or more nearly at
the same time as nondisadvantaged youth, accelerates the labor market entry
process, increasing the likelihood of combining school and work. Three
months after the end of the 1979 summer program, 25 percent of par
ticipants, compared to 19 percent of nonparticipating controls, reported
that they had worked since the summer or were currently working in
part-time jobs. The part-time employment effect was most marked among
14-to-16-year-old black males with low reading skills, limited knowledge of
the world-of-work, and low self-esteem, as well as for black and white
females this age sharing these employment handicaps at entry. Among such
participants, the rate of post-program part-time work was 34 percent,
compared to 10 percent for controls. 94/ The large-scale demonstration
program with high risk youth also documented an increase in part-time
employment over the three-month follow-up period, with a rate of 14 percent
for experimentals, compared to 8 percent for controls. 95/
In summary, work experience can be useful for young people in
advancing the process of workforce entry. It can be combined with training
activities in a sequence, with benefits roughly proportional to the degree
of training in the activity mix. A worksite may be structured as a
training site and can yield some of the benefits of classroom and onthe-job training while producing useful output, but this model is the
exception rather than the rule in local work experience programs. In most
other circumstances, the subsidized work will only have post-program
impacts if it serves as a try-out or on-the-job training mechanism for an
existing unsubsidized job in the public or nonprofit sector.
Benefits and Costs for Work Programs
The limited post-program earnings impacts of work experience do not
necessarily mean that it is a poor investment. For instance, adminis
tration, services, and training under public service employment amounted to
less than 5 percent of the total cost in fiscal 1976. If participants
produced an output valued at close to their wages and salaries, and if the
post-program gains of $350-$750 annually were, indeed, net benefits to
society, there is no doubt that benefits exceeded the costs. The un
certainty is whether the post-program gains--which resulted largely from
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increased unsubsidized public sector employment—were, indeed, net
benefits. If the employment of PSE participants in regular public sector
jobs resulted in displacement of other similar workers who would have been
hired, there was no net social benefit. If the participants were more
disadvantaged than those ordinarily hired, and the jobs were secured
through leverage, these workers might have performed less effectively so
that the increased post-program employment would not necessarily represent
a social benefit. Only if the subsidized work experience provided training
for the subsequent job, so that skills improved, and only if the par
ticipants subsequently performed at the same levels as other hires, would
the post-program earnings gains equal benefits (and, then, only to the
extent that wages in the public sector were not inflated).
The supported work experiment provided the only careful benefit-cost
estimates for project-type work programs for the severely disadvantaged.
Using essentially the same methodology as in the Job Corps evaluation,
benefits and costs were calculated for each of the separate target groups
of supported work:
Supported Work Benefit-Cost Estimates
Participant
Group
AFDC
Ex-addicts
Youth
Ex-offenders

Low

High

Benchmark
Estimate

1.4
1.0
0.2
0.6

2.4
3.1
0.9
1.3

2.2
2.2
0.7

The output produced by the supported work projects was estimated to
offset 65, 77, 68, and 64 percent, respectively, of the costs of serving
each of these target groups. For the AFDC group, the present value of
in-program and projected post-program earnings gains were 32 percent above
the costs. However, for ex-addicts the present value of post-program gains
represented only 15 percent of costs, and for youth only 1 percent. But
for ex-addicts, the present value of crime reduction was estimated to equal
the cost. Clearly, then, work experience can pay off even if it produces
meager post-program changes in employment and earnings if the value of
output substantially offsets the costs, and if the groups served are high
risk so that their foregone earnings are limited and the chances of
reducing crime or drug abuse are higher. 96/
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SECTION 5.
A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

The purpose of training is to improve the ability of individuals to
compete and perform in the labor market. The impact of training is
ultimately determined not only by its quality, intensity, and targeting,
but also by the characteristics of the labor market in which it functions.
Where there are few job vacancies and an excess of already trained workers,
training will obviously have less payoff for participants and the economy
than in a dynamic labor market experiencing rapid employment growth and
technological change. Where discrimination is prevalent, the payoff of
training will be limited for its victims. To the degree that skills and
potential are measured by credentials rather than demonstrated capacities,
those trained but without acceptable credentials may not get jobs while
those who attain credentials even though lacking commensurate skills may
reap the rewards. Where firms limit hiring to entry jobs, filling all
advanced opportunities from within, or where the only available jobs are in
a secondary labor market characterized by low wages, high turnover, and
constrained opportunities for advancement, then the options for training
may be very limited. If career paths are a series of stepping-stones
rather than tracks, if the trainees enter a competitive labor market with
their chances improved but training-related jobs not assured, if employment
chances are rationed according to past accomplishments as much as current
abilities, and if job requirements are unstated, then training payoffs will
not be as direct or certain as when job requirements are known and workers
will be hired if they have the necessary skills whatever their backgrounds.
There are a number of theories and concepts describing the labor
market and how it functions. These give differing weight to competitive
processes, discrimination, firm-specific job structures, knowledge on the
part of employers and jobseekers, employment barriers, and other factors.
As a result, these theories have significantly different implications
concerning the impact and effectiveness of training.
The neoclassic marginal productivity theory, and the human capital
investment notion which is based on this theory, provide a reasonable
description of the aggregate levels and broad distributions of employment,
earnings, and wages. However, the assumptions of these concepts become
less realistic and the applications less predictive as the focus narrows.
The theories of credential ing, discrimination, labor market segmentation,
and internal labor markets or job structures have been introduced to
explain the anomalies in neoclassic predictions. They suggest that labor
is anything but homogeneous, that skills and abilities are not easily
determined, that acquired skills may not be recognized without credentials,
that they may not pay off equally for different groups, that the labor
market may not recognize training which occurs outside the workplace, or
even worse, may seek to maintain an unskilled, high turnover labor force.
Probablistic and Markovian labor market theories suggest that the chances
of employment and skill utilization at any one point in time affect those
at the next point in time in a cumulative fashion for each individual and
group. As a consequence, there are limits to what can be achieved by
limited duration interventions that can only alter a few variables in the
complex probablistic equation which predicts labor market success. While
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immediate chances can be improved, and while this may lead to cumulative
and positive effects, there are no certain routes and the future cannot be
easily rewritten.
Each of these sets of labor market theories and concepts is ap
propriate in certain circumstances and for certain purposes.
Yet they
offer differing and sometimes contradictory guidance vis-a-vis the role and
impacts of training.
Some conceptual integration of these theories is
needed to provide a framework for the diverse information about the
substance, impacts, institutional arrangements and outcomes of training.
One possible integration is as follows:
Ranking Jobseekers According to Documented Employability
Workers and would-be workers at any point in time can be ranked in
terms of "documented employability"--a combination of academic credentials,
vocational training, work experience, and employer recommendations, along
with age, race, sex, and other demographic characteristics. The mix of
factors used to document employability, and the weight they are given, will
vary in different situations.
At the lower end of the employability
ranking, evidence of dependable work habits, a high school diploma, and the
lack of black marks such as a criminal record, make one individual a better
bet than another who has no work experience and a GED rather than a regular
diploma. At the upper end of the scale, the differentiating factor may be
a sheepskin from an Ivy League rather than community college, or previous
employment with firms recognized for their strict hiring and employment
standards or their high quality staff development programs.
While these employability determinants and rankings cannot be
translated into specific mathematical functions, there is no doubt that
employers undertake such calculations each time they make a hiring
decision. The factors which enter into their rankings are those that can
be documented or observed, i.e., the types of information usually found on
applications for work.
Essentially, the employer must make a judgment
about each individual based on the averages for persons with similar
characteristics.
Until persons are placed in a job, it is hard to tell
whether they will perform better or worse than the averages for similar
persons. A variety of supplementary approaches may be used to discriminate
beyond what is readily observable--for instance, extensive interviews,
reference checking, and test batteries--but these screening devices merely
narrow the range of uncertainty, rather than eliminating it.
Persons who are available for work at any point in time—the un
employed and discpuraged--will have, on average, a lower level of docu
mented employability than those who are employed and will be more con
centrated in the lower tail of the employability distribution. This is
because entrants and reentrants into the labor force who have limited prior
work experience and skills, as well as the long-term unemployed who are
unable to find work in the competitive labor force, are overrepresented
among the unemployed and discouraged.
Yet the available work force also
includes some individuals with significant employability who are simply
facing temporary problems or are carefully shopping around for jobs (Figure
3.12).
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FIGURE 3.12
DOCUMENTED CMPLOYABILITV DISTRIBUTION OF AVAILABLE WORK FORCE
AND OF TOTAL WORK FORCE

TOTAL WORK FORCE
(EMPLOYED, DISCOURAGED AND UNEMPLOYED)

AVAILABLE WORK FORCE
(UNEMPLOYED AND
DISCOURAGED)

LOW

«——— EMPLOYABILITY

———,

HIGH

The individuals at the lowest tail of the documented employability
distribution of the available work force include the mentally retarded,
emotionally disturbed, drug addicts and others who have the most severe
impediments to employment. Next are young school dropouts with limited
work experience, ex-offenders and perhaps long-term welfare recipients and
the physically handicapped. The bulk of high school graduates who have
only a few years work experience and no post-secondary or on-the-job train
ing, are concentrated in the next segment, along with female re-entrants
into the labor force who may have a higher level of education but have not
had substantial or recent work experience. Prime age workers with
measurable skills and longer work histories occupy the central portion of
the distribution. The upper tail consists of professionals, managers and
technical workers with increasingly specific skills and credentials.
These segments of the distribution are not demarcated. For instance,
a high school dropout with limited work experience and with a criminal
record might be considered a better bet than others with the same back
ground if he or she completes a pre-apprenticeship program, acquires a GED,
or serves honorably in the military. Conversely, the dropout with a
dishonorable discharge or an unsuccessful training experience might be
shunned by employers willing to hire other dropouts. An experienced worker
with an obsolete skill will rank lower than an inexperienced entry worker
trained in a new technology.
Varying Potential of Individuals with Similar Credentials
Individuals in the available work force who are ranked at the same
level of documented employability may nevertheless vary in their ability
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and readiness to function in the typical job which will hire them. They
may also differ in their capacity to learn once on the job, to improve
their skills and productivity by outside experiences, and to advance in the
internal labor market. As an example, young dropouts ranked at the lower
end of the documented employability distribution include some individuals
who left school because of the lack of challenge, who will blossom in the
work place and who have the potential to complete college or to master the
most demanding skills. Others may be "street-wise" youth who talk a good
game but lack the brains or "sticktuitiveness" to perform adequately on the
job or to gain high school level competencies. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to distinguish at the hiring door between these individuals.
As another example, three high-school graduates may each have had five
years of intermittent experience in construction work. One may be an
extremely hard worker, another may do just enough to get by and not be
fired, and the third may have been fired from jobs, but in another city
where references cannot be easily checked. The differences cannot be
ascertained until after the hiring decision.
The labor market, the education system, and time itself serve as
sorting mechanisms and proving grounds which test potential and document
success or failure, translating potential into documented employability.
Thus, there will probably be less variance in potential among individuals
ranked at the upper end of the documented employability distribution.
Because the stakes are greater for the employer hiring for more skilled
jobs and the individual seeking more skilled work, much more care is taken
in specifying requirements and determining individual skills and abilities.
But the frequent turnover of even the highest level executives suggests
that uncertainties remain.
Varying priority may be placed on the two basic factors determining
potential employability--the ability to perform immediately and the
capacity to improve and advance. At the lowest end of the employability
distribution, the capacity to learn and advance may be given modest weight
by employers who are concerned with present needs and expect little more
from employees. For instance, employers hiring teenagers during the summer
or the hard-core unemployed for transient jobs are rarely doing so with the
expectation that such workers will stay and advance. Future potential is
probably given more weight at mid-levels in the employability distribution,
but less at the highest levels where the individual is paid to deliver the
skills and abilities which are more precisely documented. Employers hiring
workers at any specific documented employability level will also vary in
the weight they give present vs. future potential. Some employers are more
concerned with immediate capacity, others with the future capacity, but in
setting the documented employability level required for the job, they
implicitly accept the average immediate and future potential among persons
at this level.
The weight given in employability documentation to any observable
factor depends on its ability to distinguish between the likely performance
of individuals with and without this feature. Thus, dropout youth are al1
ranked low because, on average, they are poor bets. It is difficult to
distinguish between them and thus risky to hire them directly into
career-entry job since there is a high chance of failure, even though a
large percentage might also be able to succeed. Obviously, individuals
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with high potential, but characteristics usually associated with negative
performance or simply greater uncertainty, will suffer. Race or sex may be
used as a shorthand in identifying likely performance, disregarding that
the variance among persons of the same race will be quite large. Such sta
tistical discrimination, which assigns to each person with an attribute the
average potential of all persons with this attribute, may be justified from
the employer's perspective to the extent it is based on experience rather
than prejudice, yet the result is to handicap those minorities or females
with above average potential. Such discrimination may also be compounded
by racism or sexism. For instance, an employer may act on a stereotype
concerning a race or sex group without a statistical experience base to
document these judgments. Likewise, where employment experiences are
cumulative, past statistical discrimination can have cumulative impacts,
i.e., those victims of discrimination with innate potential have less of a
chance to prove themselves and to develop.
The distribution of potential employability among individuals at each
level of documented employability can be illustrated by an overlaid
distribution (Figure 3.13). Those with documented employability level A
FIGURE 3.13
POTENTIAL EMPLOYABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS AMONG PERSONS WITH LOW, MEDIUM
AND HIGH DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY

LOW

EMPLOYABILITY

HIGH

can be ranked according to potential employability as represented by the
curve intersecting the documented employability distribution at this point.
The distribution of potential at documented employability level C illu
strates the lesser variance in potential posited at higher levels of
documented employability.
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The Demand for Workers with Each Level of Documented Employability
The employment opportunities available at any point in time, which are
reflected in want-ads and job vacancy measures, may also be ranked
according to the standards that the employers set for entry workers, i.e.,
their "documented employability requirements" for the jobs (Figure 3.14).
At the high end of the distribution are the most technical, desirable and
remunerative jobs with the "best" employers. In the lower tail of the
distribution are the menial, undesirable and low-paid "secondary labor
market" jobs which can utilize workers who lack training or previous
experience. These jobs are often structured in the expectation of high
turnover. By reaching far down the labor queue, they will accept workers
of widely varying potential, fire those with limited ability, and not be
concerned when the workers with greater ability soon leave for greener
pastures. There is a minimum employability requirement—individuals with
documented employability below this level will not be hired without
subsidy. The floor is determined, in part, by the minimum wage, but more
significantly, by the aggregate balance of jobseekers and jobs, and by the
fact that workers with severe handicaps are likely to subtract from, rather
than add to, output because of the high probability of turnover and the
need for extra training and supervision.
FIGURE 3.1A
AVAILABLE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES BY DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY REQUIREMENTS

\

MINIMUM
EMPLOYABILITY
REQUIREMENTS
LEVEL

LOW

.EMPLOYABILIl
REQUIRED

HIGH

The pressures of supply and demand in the labor market determine the
requirements which are established for any set of jobs. Every employer
wants the best possible workers but must settle for an average skill level
among new hires which, in neoclassical terms, will earn its marginal
revenue product. If the overall labor market is slack, and a firm can get
more qualified or lower risk workers at the same compensation, the employer
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will usually increase the documented employability requirements. Con
versely, in tight labor markets, when there are fewer skilled workers
available and they must be paid more, the employer will accept workers who
in normal times would be considered inadequately qualified.
Varying Potential Among Jobs With Similar Entry Requirements
Among the employment opportunities requiring any specific level of
documented employability, there is significant variance in "career po
tential," i.e., the chances that the average worker who is hired will
perform satisfactorily and be satisfied, and that he or she will be able to
use this experience as a stepping stone for advancement. One firm may
utilize lower level, entry positions to sort among individuals who have low
levels of documented employability in order to identify the more able and
motivated for training and assignments which will lead to advancement
within the internal labor market of the firm. Other firms hiring similar
workers provide few rewards for extra effort or continuing employment. A
menial job with a compassionate supervisor and friendly coworkers may be
much more attractive than a similar job with excessive discipline and an
unruly work force. Individual jobseekers will vary in how much they weigh
present vs. future considerations. The immediate work conditions are of
most importance to the majority of job applicants, since few will stay
around for the future opportunities if the job is intolerable, and since
future benefits must be discounted to present value. However, those who
know they have above average ability compared to others with similar
credentials are likely to place more weight on the longer term, and are
willing to live with the present if the prospects look good. To the extent
positive employment conditions or greater advancement opportunities can be
demonstrated, the employer can increase the minimum hiring requirements.
However, knowledge is imperfect among applicants, and there is uncertainty
whether promises of advancement potential are a "come-on." Moreover, the
career potential is not determined solely by the conscious policies of em
ployers. A firm may have high turnover because of suddenly bad labor rela
tions or a few harsh supervisors despite an internal training program and
advancement policy, or it might be experiencing business fluctuations which
foreclose normal career tracks. A job may offer access to other oppor
tunities without, itself, being attractive, for instance, a job in a
placement agency which exposes the agency personnel to a variety of job
offers. In other words, the potential of a particular job for the average
applicant with requisite skills, or for any particular applicant, cannot be
fully determined until after employment.
It is reasonable to assume that the range of career potential in jobs
requiring higher levels of documented employability is relatively narrower
than for jobs requiring less skills. Because of the higher stakes in
volved, applicants will invest more time in assessing career possibilities
and work settings, while employers with better opportunities will try
harder to document and advertise them, so that these factors are more
likely to be factored into documented employability requirements. Most law
school graduates know which firm to clerk for, or medical students, where
to intern, in order to get ahead. Likewise, the outstanding research
hospital or law firm can set higher entry standards for recruits because
more students v/ant this opportunity. A person choosing between retail jobs
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in a variety of local retail stores will have a harder time determining
which will offer the greatest opportunity over the long run; one store may
have little advantage over another paying the same wage but not offering as
many management trainee positions.
While the distribution in career potential of jobs is a hypothetical
construct, it can be represented by an overlay at any employability
requirements level on the distribution of available opportunities (Figure
3.15). If, as posited, the variance in career potential is greater among
entry jobs with lower documented employability requirements, the career
potential distribution at point C will be narrower than at point A, as
illustrated.
FIGURE 3.15
CAREER POTENTIAL DISTRIBUTIONS AMONG EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES WITH LOW,
MEDIUM AND HIGH DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY REQUIREMENTS
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The supply of workers in the labor market can be visualized as a dis
tribution of the available work force ranked according to documented em
ployability, while demand can be visualized as a distribution of employment
opportunities ranked according to documented employability requirements
(Figure 3.16). At higher levels of documented employability, the number of
jobs probably exceeds the number of workers; while at the lower end, there
are far more workers than jobs. This is a reflection of structural
imbalances at the lower end and skills bottlenecks at the upper end. The
ratio A/B is an indicator of the structural mismatch between supply and
demand at low skill levels. There are unfilled jobs which could employ
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some of the unskilled unemployed and discouraged workers, but not nearly
enough to employ all of them. The larger the gap between vacancies and job
seekers with the required skills, the harder and more discouraging it is to
find work and, hence, the greater the probability of long-term joblessness
among persons with this skill level. The shaded area at the lower end of
the distribution represents the portion of the available work force which
FIGURE 3.16
DISTRIBUTION OF AVAILABLE WORK FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
BY DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY AND EMPLOYABILITY REQUIREMENTS

DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY
OF AVAILABLE WORK FORCE
DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY
REQUIREMENTS OF EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITIES

CONSIDERED'
NOT
'
EMPLOYABLE

LOW

EMPLOYABILITY

HIGH

is considered superflouous or nonemployable under existing conditions,
i.e., they fall below the minimum employability requirement. At higher
levels of employability, the ratio C/D reflects "skill bottlenecks" where
employers are chasing workers who have desirable skills—computer software
experts, geologists, engineers, or persons with demonstrated management
ability. In this situation, joblessness is usually temporary and transi
tional among unemployed individuals with advanced skills.
These curves may be used to portray conditions at any point in time in
the national economy or a local labor market. Economic conditions, tech
nology, demography, past and present human resource investment policies,
structural barriers, and the efficiency of labor markets determine the
shapes of and the gaps between, the distributions of employment oppor
tunities and available workers. Some of the likely interrelationships are
suggested by the following alternative scenarios:
Scenario 1: A severe recession will shift the employment opportuni
ties distribution downward, moreso at the lower end of the skills distri
bution (Figure 3.17). As the ratio of total opportunities to available
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workers declines, employers can and do raise minimum hiring standards. The
available work force at all levels increases, exacerbating the structural
problems at the lower end of the distribution, and in particular, In
creasing the number of individuals ranked below minimum employability
requirements. But the recession reduces the number of employment oppor
tunities below the number in the available work force even at the highest
skill levels, so that the professionals who lose their jobs have a hard
time finding new ones at the same level even though the number without work
may be small relative to the total employed and the unemployment rate low
relative to that for unskilled workers.
Figure 3.17
Available Work Force and Employment Opportunities
Distributions in Severe Recession and Under Normal Circumstances
AVAILABLE WORKFORCE,
NORMAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
AVAILABLE WORKFORCE,
SEVERE RECESSION
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES,
NORMAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES,
SEVERE RECESSION

NORMAL ;

;

SEVERE RECESSION
NOT EMPLOYABLE

Scenario 2: In a wartime economy, the available work force is reduced
by military conscription, affecting mostly young men otherwise concentrated
at the lower end of the documented employability distribution (Figure
3.18). At the same time, there is a significant increase in the manu
facture of military consumables, with greatest impact at the lower and
mid-ranges of the employment opportunities curve as manufacturing jobs
expand. Employers tend to lower their documented employability require
ments, gladly accepting "Rosie-the-riveters" who would be excluded in
normal times. The employment opportunities curve may shift above the
available work force curve even at low levels in the employability distri
bution, creating inflationary pressures and leading to wage compression
during wartime.
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Figure 3.18
Available Work Force and Employment Opportunities Distributions in
Wartime and Under Normal Circumstances
AVAILABLE WORKFORCE,
————————NORMAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Tr,.T.,,..r. AVAILABLE WORKFORCE,
WARTIME
- ___ _ __ -EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES,
NORMAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
****** **EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES,
WARTIME

Scenario 3: A central city economy, contrasted with a microcosm of
the national economy has an abundance of available workers at the lowest
skill levels (Figure 3.19). A large share of central city residents have
no real chance of employment. The city might also have a disproportionate
number of highly skilled and professional workers, because these workers
are able to afford the high costs of residing in protected central city
enclaves, because they are attracted by the city's amenities, or because
professional employment opportunities are concentrated in the city. The
middle class workforce is less in evidence because manufacturing, wholesale
and retail jobs, along with the workers who fill them, have moved to the
suburbs.
Scenario 4: An increased minimum wage will probably increase the
number of job seekers at the low skill levels because work is made more
remunerative, but it will also raise the threshold employability requirements of employers while increasing the opportunities which require skills
just above the threshold as labor intensive firms go out of business,
substitute capital for workers, or workers whose productivity is slightly
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Figure 3.19
Available Work Force and Employment Opportunities
Distributions in Central City and Microcosm of National Labor Market
AVAILABLE WORKFORCE,
.MICROCOSM OF NATIONAL ECONOMY
AVAILABLE WORKFORCE RESIDING
"•IN CENTRAL CITY
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES,
"MICROCOSM OF NATIONAL ECONOMY
^EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR
CENTRAL CITY RESIDENTS

above the minimum for those slightly below (Figure 3.20). The result is to
increase the portion of the population considered nonemployable. If the
employment opportunities distribution is steeply sloped but not "cliffed"
at the minimum, which is the most realistic assumption, the effect is to
increase the difference in employment probabilities between those below and
those above the juncture where the employment opportunities distribution
begins to slope steeply. (For convenience, the minimum employability
levels in the other charts are portrayed by perpendicular lines.)
Figure 3.20
Available Work Force and Employment Opportunities
Distributions Before and After Increase in Minimum Wage
_______ AVAILABLE WORKFORCE,
BEFORE INCREASE
»,,,,,,

AVAILABLE WORKFORCE IN
RESPONSE TO HIGHER
MINIMUM WAGE
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES,
BEFORE INCREASE
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES,
INCREASED MINIMUM

BEFORE '
AFTER
INCREASE INCREASE
NOT
EMPLOYABLE
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Demographic and labor force participation changes
5:
Scenario
projected for the next two decades will shift the available work force
distribution (Figure 3.21). There will be a decline in the absolute and
relative size of the youth cohort, as well as a reduction in the annual
number of female labor force entrants as the increase in labor force
participants deaccelerates and as more women maintain steady work patterns.
At the same time, the numbers in the mid-to-upper ranges of the em
ployability distribution should increase as the post-war baby cohort ages
into the prime working years, and as females who have steady labor force
attachment compete more equally and forcefully for career advancement. The
result will be an increase in the probabilities for employment among those
at the lowest end of the distribution and a reduction in bottlenecks at
higher levels.
Figure 3.21
Likely Shifts in Available Work Force
Distribution Over Next Decade
AVAILABLE WORKFORCE,
CURRENT CONDITIONS
.AVAILABLE WORKFORCE,
1990
•EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES,
ASSUMED CONSTANT

The Match-Up of Job and Worker Potentials
The available jobs requiring any given level of documented em
ployability vary in career potential, while the available work force with
any level of documented employability vary in potential employability. The
firms offering jobs with greater career potential resulting from their
conscious internal labor market policies would prefer to hire workers drawn
from the high end of the potential distribution among applicants meeting
entry requirements. Likewise, workers who know they have potential and are
motivated would like to find the jobs which will offer career ladders and
stepping stones. All employers would prefer those workers at any level of
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documented employability who will perform better immediately in the job,
and all persons in the work force would like the jobs which will prove most
compatible and amenable. The problem lies in the inability of either the
employers or jobseekers to precisely determine immediate and future
potential beyond what is already factored into documented employability
requirements of jobs and the documented employability determinants for
workers. What occurs, instead, is that high potential workers at any
documented employability level have the same chances as low potential
workers of finding high potential jobs (Figure 3.22). For a worker tfith
documented employability level A but potential employability B, the chance
of matching with a job that fully utilizes potential is proportional to the
ratio of the lined area to the total area under the career potential curve
(and is, of course, also related to the gap between employment oppor
tunities and the number of available workers at documented employability
level A which determines the chances of getting any job).
FIGURE 3.22
THE CHANCES OF MATCH-UP BETWEEN HIGH POTENTIAL
WORKERS AND CAREER POTENTIAL JOBS

DISTRIBUTION IN POTENTIAL
/\ EMPLOYABILITY OF AVAILABLE
JTORK FORCE WITH DOCUMENTED
EMPLOYABILITY LEVEL A

DISTRIBUTION IN CAREER POTENTIAL OF
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES REQUIRING
DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY LEVEL A
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W >-)
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Those workers with greater potential who chance to make the match with
jobs which offer commensurate career potential will perform well and
subsequently move up, translating potential into documented employability.
Many of those who do not get into high potential jobs will become dis
satisfied with the lack of advancement and will try again, giving them
another chance for a higher career potential job match. Over time, an
increasing portion of those with higher employability potential will match
with career potential jobs and will acquire work experience and training
that moves them forward in the documented employability ranking. In
contrast, individuals with less potential will be more likely either to
stabilize in the jobs in which they are initially hired or to be fired and
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to subsequently bump from one position to another. These "failures" may,
in fact, move down the documented employability ranking over time. Thus,
frequent unemployment and menial jobs will count against a 35-year-old,
whereas joblessness or unskilled work would not be as much of a black mark
against a 20-year-old. This matching and iterative process is far from
perfect. Some individuals with high potential may never make an ap
propriate match; after repeated attempts to find a career ladder, they may
give up or else become identified inescapably with the losers who had a
chance but failed, so that they move down the documented employability
ranking. For these unfortunates, there is an increasing rather than
narrowing gap over time between documented employability and initial
potential, i.e., they are among the persons occupying the upper tail of the
potential distribution among those at lower levels of documented em
ployability, along with individuals who have not had the chance yet to
document their ability and who will experience, on average, a declining gap
over time between potentials and credentials.
The Role of Employment and Training Programs
These analytical tools can be used to describe the setting and func
tions of the CETA system. The subset of the available work force that
participates in CETA is concentrated at the low end of the employability
distribution. This is a consequence of eligibility requirements, i.e., all
participants must be from poor families and must be unemployed for a period
of time, and priority among those eligible is determined by need factors
which are many of the same determinants used by employers to screen put
applicants. The low level of subsidized wages and allowances also
discourages participation by all but the most needy. Yet among CETA
participants, there is variance in both potential and documented em
ployability.
Some participants are employable and have reasonable
potential, but their employment probabilities are limited because of the
depressed labor markets in which they reside. Some have documented
employability below the minimum required for unsubsidized employment, yet
they have potential to develop if provided help. Others have severe
problems which reduce both documented and potential employability below the
minimum.
The CETA system in each locality has working relationships with and
usually some leverage over a subset of employers—those that are socially
motivated, who depend on government contracting, or who are subject to
affirmative action pressures, as well as employers who find it cheaper to
recruit from CETA than other sources.
Conceivably, the employment
opportunities which can be accessed by CETA through these relationships and
this leverage could equal or exceed the number of participants, since
except in the most depressed areas, the number of low-level job vacancies
in the entire community will exceed the number of CETA participants, who
are usually only a small proportion of the residents with limited employability. More realistically, the prime sponsor will have working re
lationships with and leverage over a marginal complement of employers, and
the jobs it can access add to the employment opportunities available to any
person of limited employability, but do not guarantee placements for par
ticipants.
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These relationships can be illustrated with the documented em
ployability and employment opportunities constructs (Figure 3.23). Among
individuals in a local labor market, the number with documented employability level x is represented by E. A subset of these represented by C are
participants in CETA. The number of employment opportunities in this labor
market for workers with documented employability level x is represented by
D. If CETA had no special relationships or leverage with employers, the
participants would have the same chances of employment as others with the
same documented employability. The employment opportunities for them would
be a subset of D represented by A, and the ratio of (A-C) divided by A
would equal (E-D) divided by E. But CETA is able to access some of these
job opportunities for its participants, represented by B minus A. The more
effective the prime sponsor's job development and employer relations, the
greater the relative chances for employment among participants compared to
nonparticipants, i.e., the more the ratio B/C will exceed the ratio D/E.
The larger the share of participants who fall below minimum levels of
documented employability as represented by the darkened area, the lower the
placement rate that can be achieved by job access alone. Thus, the
expected placement rate from CETA, disregarding the quality of human
resource development activities which it offers, is affected by its ability
to "access" jobs, by the portion of its participants who fall below minimum
employability, by the distribution of documented employability among
participants, and by the gaps between availability opportunities and the
available work force at these levels of employability.
Institutional Training Impacts
Under this scheme, focusing on the subset of employment opportunities
and documented employabilty curves for CETA participants as portrayed in
the previous figure, the possible effects of CETA institutional training
first, to increase the documented employability of
are threefold:
individuals; second, to sort and certify the individuals at any documented
employability level who have greater potential; and third, to increase
potential employability so that the individuals will be more likely to
succeed once hired, thereby increasing documented employability in the
future.
As an example of this
Increasing documented employability.
1.
effect, a six-month CETA course might serve AFDC recipients who lack a
diploma and are thus ranked at documented employability A; its aim is to
prepare them for entry clerical jobs requiring documented employability
level B (Figure 3.24). There are some participants (represented by an
individual at point 1 on the potential employability distribution) who do
not have the capacity—they failed in the schools or turned to welfare
because they did not have the mental or behavioral characteristics to learn
the basics, and they still lack these traits. They do not gain at all from
training because it becomes clear that they do not have the necessary
foundation. If the failure to complete training is noted when they apply

FIGURE 3.23
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND DOCUMENTED
EMPLOYABILITY FOR LOCAL CETA PARTICIPANTS
DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY
OF AVAILABLE WORK FORCE
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
IN LABOR MARKET
DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY
DISTRIBUTION OF CETA
PARTICIPANTS
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
FOR CETA PARTICIPANTS
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FIGURE 3.24
CHANGES IN DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY FOR PERSONS OF
VARYING POTENTIAL PARTICIPATING IN TRAINING
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for the next job, and the employer considers the individual as a higher
risk, it may result in a regression along the documented employability
distribution; they would thus have documented employability B- the next
time they seek work. There are some participants (represented oy point 2
on the potential employability distribution) who can learn some skills
required for a clerical job within six months of training, but not up to
the 60-word-per-minute typing standard. If this is the minimum required
for a secretarial job, such an individual will remain at the documented
employability level A, benefiting not at all from training. If a lesser
job can be secured by attaining 40 words per minute, or if the training
changes the commitment or attitude of the participant, then the training
might lead to advancement to B either immediately or after securing a job
and proving commitment. A nunroer of trainees (represented by point 3 on
the potential distribution) may just reach the 60-word-per-minute standard
because this equals their potential or because it is as far as the course
goes. The demonstrable ability to type, or a certification of this skill,
will add to their resume and to their attractiveness to employers. They,
then, forward in the documented employability distribution to B as
intended. Finally, some of the trainees (represented by point 4 on the
potential distribution) may advance beyond the scope of the training within
the six-months and have potential for even further improvement. If the
training is individualized competency-based, if the job requirements are
strictly specified, and if there are no institutional barriers, then the
quality of training determines the gains in documented employability and
the individual could be hired for a job at documented employability level
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B.. However, these conditions are the exception rather than the rule.
Even if one of the AFDC recipients advances to 80 words a minute in the
six-month course, he or she may be placed in the same job as the one typing
60 words per minute because welfare recipiency and childrearing responsi
bilities are considered negative factors or because the employer does not
believe in the quality of training or that other skills such as reading and
writing are commensurate with typing. This individual would be hired at
level B, although, perhaps, subsequently advancing to B. by proving greater
capacity.
If the training is inadequate, the graduates, on average, will fall
short of the skill levels averaged by persons at documented employability
level B. If testing is used to document competency, no participants will
be accepted at this level because employers will immediately note the in
adequacies. If graduates of training lack needed skills but these cannot
be easily tested, employers will later discover the deficiencies and will
subsequently discount all graduates of the training program, i.e., par
ticipation will not be accepted in documenting B-level skills.
2.
Sorting. An activity which is nominally labeled as training may,
in fact, do little to improve individual skills but may rather serve as a
sorting mechanism to better document potential employability. This may
work in several ways. The training program may require a waiting period,
participation in a pre-entry activity, or simply an extended period of
attendance. It may provide the means for closer observation and more
detailed assessment than is feasible at the hiring door. Likewise,
training may require performance in a set of structured activities which
have little relevance to actual jobs but help to identify those who can and
cannot master simple tasks. Sorting may also be self-initiated. For
instance, a training program may become recognized based on its past track
record as a meaningful opportunity, attracting those from the upper end of
the potential employability distribution. These individuals know their
innate capabilites and are attracted to training which opens advancement
opportunities even though employers or program screeners could not
distinguish them from persons with lower potential but the same documented
employability. On the other hand, if allowances were too high they might
attract participants who wanted a free ride, not just persons interested in
improving future prospects.
If the sorting occurs before entry into the training activity, the
trainees will do better in the labor market than nonparticipants because
they have greater potential employability even if the training does not
increase either potential or documented skills. Further, it might be
possible to market these sorted individuals to employers identified as
offering above-average career-potential jobs. This identification is
possible if the delivery agent's long-term experience with employers
enables it to track the career patterns of individuals hired by different
employers, or if employers putting more emphasis on the advancement
potential of recruits are attracted to a program which identifies high
potential candidates more effectively than can be determined by the
employers' own screening devices. In this sense, the training institution
is intermediating between the high potential workers and career potential
jobs at any employability level in order to increase the successful match-
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up chances (Figure 3.25). For an individual at documented employability
level A but potential employability level B, the chances of matching with a
job equal to or greater than his or her ability is represented by the ratio
of the darkened area to the total area under the career potential
distribution for employment opportunities at level A. The chances will be
increased to the ratio of the darkened area to the lined area if the
program sorts above average individuals and matches them with above average
career potential jobs. This individual will not immediately move up the
documented employability distribution but will have a higher probability of
moving up in the future (i.e., post-program follow-up would show evidence
of gains which may increase with time).
FIGURE 3.25
SORTING AND PLACEMENT WITHOUT IMPROVEMENTS IN SKILLS

ABOVE AVERAGE EMPLOYABILITY
POTENTIAL

ABOVE AVERAGE CAREER POTENTIAL

HIGH

Improving Potential Employability. Training may increase poten
3.
tial employability without immediately altering documented employabllity.
For instance, an individual might be taught job mores, his or her selfesteem, maturity, and motivation might be increased, or basic academic
skills might be improved (although not to the point where the individual
could be academically credentialed). In these cases, an employer would not
necessarily be able to differentiate at the hiring door between individuals
who had previously received or not received training; but once on the job,
performance and advancement would differ and improved potential would be
translated over time into increased documented employability. To the
extent success breeds success, the initial impact of "getting off on the
right foot" might even be magnified.
As an illustration, the training might move the individual from point
A to point B on the potential employability curve for persons with docu
mented employability x at time T, (Figure 3.26). The participant would not
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be observably better than similar individuals not trained, nor would he or
she have improved employment chances initially. However, the likelihood of
success once on a job are represented by the darkened area under the career
potential curve if no training occurred, but the lined area if the in
dividual's potential were improved. Success on the job or a series of jobs
will move the individual or trainee to a higher documented employability
curve to equilibrium at B by time T ; without training the individual
would fall to A over time as repeated failures would be translated into a
negative resume factor. If initial success or failure magnifies, then the
equilibrium might be illustrated by B" or A", respectively. In other
words, for training focused on improving maturity, attitudes, or the like,
one would expect little immediate post-training differential in employment
or earnings rates, but the trainee would have greater employment stability
after securing a first job, or perhaps more rapid advancement through a
series of jobs.
FIGURE 3.26
IMPROVING POTENTIAL EMPLOYABILITY

LOW

EMPLOYABILITY

HIGH

4.
Combining Training and Sorting.
Training and sorting almost
always occur simultaneously because only a portion of the individuals at
any level of documented employability have the potential to be prepared for
and to function at a higher level. The portion who can accomplish training
goals diminishes with the ambitiousness of the training effort, i.e., the
increment in documented employability it seeks to achieve. This may be
visualized by focusing on the employability potential curve at a given
point X on the documented employability distribution (Figure 3.27). In a
short-term training program aimed at improving documented employability
modestly, from X to Y, the percentage in the lined area under the potential
employability distribution have the capacity, with training, to perform at
or above the average of persons already at documented employability level
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FIGURE 3.27
PROBABILITIES OF ACHIEVING VARIOUS DOCUMENTED
EMPLOYABILITY LEVELS THROUGH TRAINING

! I_ —DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY LEVEL FOR COMPLETERS OF LONG-TERM TRAINING
I - —- -DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY LEVEL FOR COMPLETERS OF SHORT-TERM TRAINING
'- ----AVERAGE DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY BEFORE TRAINING

Y. If the aim is to achieve a "quantum leap" to documented employability
level Z through more intensive training, only those in the darkened area
have the necessary potential. In other words, the sorting—the ratio of
the unshaded or unlined area to the total area under the potential
employability level--will necessarily be greater for longer-term training
aimed at a greater increase in documented employability. If the training
program is inclusive so that it does not involve pre-screening and if its
standards are strict, all participants with inadequate potential will
drop-out or be terminated unsuccessfully during the course of the program.
If there is some type of pre-screening activity to identify individuals
with greater potential, the batting average will improve. In other words,
noncompletion is to be expected and accepted, and will be higher if the
goal of training is more ambitious (although high termination rates might
also result from ineffective operations rather than ambitous training and
effective sorting).
Training programs may differ in their standards. A rigorous training
program may aim to assure that all completers can perform above average for
persons with the documented employability level required in the occupation
of training. A less Draconian goal would be to assure that, on average,
the immediate skills and advancement potential of graduates equals the
average for those who are normally hired for the target jobs. If the
training program does not maintain at least these standards, the graduating
cohort will be judged by its average, which will be below the expectations
of employers. Trainees will either not find jobs, or will experience high
failure rates once on jobs, discouraging employers from accepting sub
sequent graduates (Figure 3.28). As an example, if a training program for
persons at documented employability level A "graduated" all those who were
advanced to within a standard deviation of the average potential of persons
at the targeted after-training documented employability level B, the
average post-program potential level for the graduates would equal that of
individuals with documented employability level C. Employers would, then,
discount the certification for future trainees, ranking them at documented
employability C rather than B.
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FIGURE 3.28
TRAINING WITHOUT ADEQUATE SORTING

A = PRE-TRAINING DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY
B - TARGET DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY
LEVEL FOR COMPLETERS
C = EQUILIBRIUM DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY
LEVEL FOR GRADUATES

I _C_ _B

MINIMUM LEVEL FOR "GRADUATION"

There are, then, inherent limits to employability development. To the
degree that the sorting and documentation mechanisms in the labor market
and the schools are effective, the potential distribution at any documented
employability level will be narrower and a smaller proportion of in
dividuals at this level will have the potential to make a quantum leap.
Even if there is a significant variance in potential among individuals at
any documented employability level, so that many have the capacity to
perform at higher levels, employers offering career ladders may view with
some skepticism individuals who have been brought a long way just to meet
minimum entry requirements. This may be true regardless of the quality of
training or the degree of sorting for the very good reason that the
individuals who graduate may be at the high end of the employability
potential distribution for those who started at a lower level of documented
employability, but will have less potential to move ahead compared to those
already at the more advanced level of documented employability (Figure
3.29). For instance, the lined area under the potential distribut
documented employability level A represents individuals who haveionparat
ticipated in a program and have been trained and sorted so that, on
average, they can perform at average for the workers at the higher
documented employability level B. Among these trainees, 1 few have the
potential to advance further so that employers in the upper tail of the
career potential distribution, certainly those beyond point C, will not be
interested. On the other hand, these same trainees may be a good bet for
the employers who do not offer advancement opportunities and who want
someone who will show up for work, perform adequately and not be motivated
to move on to greener pastures.
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FIGURE 3.29
POTENTIAL EMPLOYABILITY LIMITATIONS AMONG TRAINING COMPLETERS
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EMPLOYABILITY LEVEL
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QmDoPOTENTIAL DISTRIBUTION OF COMPLETERS
:PROPORTION OF PERSONS ALREADY
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LEVEL B WITH POTENTIAL EMPLOYABILITY ABOVE MAXIMUM POTENTIAL
PEHSONS AT DOCUMENTED EMPLOY4BILITY LEVEL A

On-the-Job Training Effects
The mix of sorting, documented employability improvements and changes
in potential employability differ when training is on-the-job rather than
in an institutional setting, and another element is involved—the hiring
subsidy. All else being equal, training which takes place on the job has
three basic advantages over institutional training: First, the individual
who leaves institutional training has to find a job, while the OJT
participant is already hired. Second, training which occurs in the work
place is accepted by the employer so there is no documentation problem and
no waste from overtraining. Third, the sorting which occurs is consistent
with the needs and expectations of the particular employer so that there is
less uncertainty about the potential employability or career potential.
These same features can be disadvantages. If a firm does not hire a
participant after a training assignment, he or she is then back at square
one. The "training" on the job may not be recognized by other employers.
Failure in an OJT assignment may, itself, be a black mark even though the
individual might perform better in another setting. If the initial
assignment is in a dead-end position or one which does not add to
documented employability, the individual may eventually be worse off than
if training were in an institutional setting and provided some credential
which would help him or her compete more effectively for high potential
jobs. The payoffs of OJT relative to institutional training are, thus,
determined by the relative strength of these various factors. OJT will be
more effective the wider the proportionate gap between the available work
force and employment opportunities distributions at the point of targeted
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training, and, hence, the less the chances of securing a training-related
job after institutional training. OJT will be more beneficial the less
specific and objective the factors in employability documentation for the
targeted jobs.
OJT is also a system for subsidizing risk and altering employers'
documentation requirements so that they will reach further back down the
labor queue than usual and take more chances. The subsidies become
windfalls if training is limited, risks are not taken, nor hiring standards
changed. In such cases, the net impacts of OJT may be modest compared to
those of institutional training, even though on-the-job trainees will
evidence gains relative to like nonparticipants. The several possible
patterns of impact can be illustrated by the same analytic schema:
Scenario 1:
The employer subsidy is just buying a job if the OJT
employer would have hired individuals with the same qualifications as those
of assigned participants, and if the subsidized employers are typical of
all firms hiring at this documented employability level (Figure 3.30). The
employment chances of the participant are increased (from the ratio of E/F
to the ratio of D/F), but this reduces the employment chances for nonparticipants commensurately (from ratio B/A 1 to C/A 1 ).
FIGURE 3.30
OJT SUBSIDIES MERELY INCREASE CHANCES OF EMPLOYMENT
AT SAME DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY LEVEL
B

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR NONCETA PARTICIPANTS AT DOCUMENTED
EMPLOYABILITY LEVEL A IF CETA
DOES NOT BUY JOBS

C = EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR NONCETA PARTICIPANTS AT DOCUMENTED
EMPLOYABILITY LEVEL A IF CETA
BUYS JOBS
D - EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR CETA
PARTICIPANTS AT DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY LEVEL A If CETA BUYS JOBS
E - EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR CETA
PARTICIPANTS AT DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY LEVEL A IF CETA DOES NOT
BUY JOBS
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EMPLOYABILITY
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Scenario 2:
If the agency contracting for the OJT slot is able,
where an individual jobseeker is not, to distinguish those employers whose
jobs have more career potential, then the subsidy buys each participant a
greater probability of finding a job as well as an increased probability
that the job found will have higher career potential (Figure 3.31). The
employer in this case still gains a windfall, while nonparticipants lose
both employment opportunities and chances to match with high career

FIGURE 3.31
OJT SUBSIDIES ACCESS JOBS WITH ABOVE AVERAGE CAREER POTENTIAL
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potential jobs. In both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, there is no gain
overall for the economy, pure windfall for employers, and immediate gains
for participants; in Scenario 2, however, the continuing gains for
participants are greater since they are more likely to secure good jobs.
Scenario 3:
If CETA uses its special knowledge of participants or
pre-screening activities to sort out those individuals who have more
employability potential and, then, matches them to jobs with greater career
potential, the high potential individual represented by B in the potential
employability distribution for participants with A level documented
employability will be assigned to a high career potential job represented
by B" in the career potential distribution for employment opportunities
requiring documented employability level A (Figure 3.32). This matching
allows the labor market to operate more effectively. Lower potential
nonparticipants have reduced chances of getting higher potential jobs, but
their losses are modest since they could not benefit from the career
opportunities; the upper tail of the potential employability distribution
for nonpartici pants is reduced to the extent OJT sorts in the high
potential individuals.
Scenario 4:
If all the OJT reimbursement is used to subsidize the
extra risks of dealing with a less advantaged population and the extra
costs of training, there is no windfall to employers (Figure 3.33). In
this case, the group in the lined area of the potential employability dis
tribution at documented employability level A has the average potential of
those at the higher employability level B; the risk is the cost of hiring,
trying to train and eventually firing those below the cutoff point, as well
as training those above, in order to get to the average which already
exists among persons at documented employability level B. The darkened
area represents the portion of trainees initially at level A who, as a
group, can be brought up to the average of level C employability. As a
crude approximation, the subsidy to employers hiring at level C must be
larger than the subsidy to employers hiring at level B in proportion to the
greater numbers who must be hired, trained but eventually sorted out, as
suggested by the ratio of the nondarkened to the unlined area under the
employability potential distribution at documented employability level A.

FIGURE 3.32
OJT USED TO MATCH INDIVIDUALS WITH HIGH POTENTIAL
EMPLOYABILITY AND JOBS WITH HIGH CAREER POTENTIAL
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FIGURE 3.33
SUBSIDY FOR SORTING AND TRAINING TO DIFFERENT
LEVELS OF DOCUMLNTED EMPLOYABILITY
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Scenario 5:
If C is the equilibrium point where a given OJT subsidy
level will just cover the extra costs to get a group of trainees indicated
by the darkened area up to the average potential of persons already at
documented employability level C, as well as to cover the hiring and firing
of all participants with lower potential employability, then either an
extra subsidy or a lower equilibrium point is necessary if the employer is
expected to retain a larger share of the participants (Figure 3.34). If,
for instance, there is a rule of two—that one of every two trainees must
be permanently retained, as a minimum, or else the employer will no longer
be eligible for subsidization—then the average post-program potential for
the trainees will be at the B rather than C level, and a subsidy will be
required to offset this reduced productivity. The larger the gap between B
and C, the larger the necessary hiring subsidy to make up for below average
performance.
In actual operation, OJT is a melange of all five scenarios.
For
instance, where the CETA prime sponsor pre-screens to those at the upper
end of the potential employability distribution, a "rule of two" may be the
means to avoid a windfall profit, since risk is already minimized by the
pre-screening.
For institutional training, the sorting occurs in the
program and the costs are absorbed in the differential between cost per
participant and cost per completer.
For on-the-job training, where the
employer must hire first, he bears this cost, and the subsidy can be
reduced if the sorting occurs prior to hiring. If the OJT employer gives
greater weight to growth potential relative to current performance, the
fact that completers of on-the-job training can perform but are more likely
to be at the peak of their potential will discourage the employer's par
ticipation or necessitate a larger subsidy. Such employers are more likely
to participate if they can determine either through a try-out on the job or
successful completion of some screening activity, that the participants
will have high potential.
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FIGURE 3.34
OJT WITH SUBSIDIZATION TO COMPENSATE FOR
BELOW AVERAGE POTENTIAL EMPLOYABILITY AFTER TRAINING
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DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY REQUIREMENT OF OJT EMPLOYER
AVERAGE EMPLOYABILITY AFTER TRAINING FOR THE BEST ONE OF EVERY TWO
TRAINEES WHO MUST BE HIRED
DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY OF PARTICIPANTS

Conceptual Implications of the Model
The implications of the conceptual framework are heavily dependent on
the labor market and programatic realities which determine the levels and
slopes of the distributions and the relative importance of different
patterns of impact for institutional and on-the-job training. It is
impossible to precisely determine relative and absolute magnitudes and to
sort out interacting factors—just as it is impossible to definitively
measure the elasticity or equilibrium of supply and demand curves, or the
marginal revenue products of individual workers. However, to the degree
the conceptual framework itself makes intuitive sense and squares with what
is known about labor markets and training impacts, it highlights some
important considerations and perspectives for training programs and
policies.
Most critically, the model suggests that there is variability among
individuals and jobs which cannot be determined at the hiring door. Jobs
with the same entry requirements, pay levels, and other observable
characteristics may offer enormously different immediate and long-term
prospects. Available workers with similar education and work experience
can differ enormously in potential to perform immediately, to improve, and
to advance. There is certainly not a homogeneous labor supply or demand.
For interventions which prepare individuals for and match them with
specific jobs, these differences are of critical importance.
There is not perfect knowledge in the labor market. The immediate
potential productivity of applicants cannot be determined precisely
employers even if they supplement all the background information which
be gathered with test batteries, interviews and the like. Potential
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only be determined with greater certainty when the individual is observed
in a work or activity setting where performance is required and there are
opportunities for learning and developing. The best place to determine
potential is in the worksite, since the setting of each job and the
standards for determining potential vary. But some degree of determination
is possible in a training program. By the same token, individuals looking
for work cannot know in advance the comparability of the conditions they
will encounter in different jobs and where the different opportunities will
lead them. Part of the uncertainty is inherent. But an agency that keeps
a track record of employers can make a better decision than an individual.
The increased knowledge can be used to improve the match-up rates between
higher potential individuals and higher potential jobs.
The conceptual framework suggests that the placement is not an end to
itself, nor does the acquisition of a skill or competency provide a
permanent career passport. Particularly at the lower levels of the
documented employability distribution, where the job is usually an entry or
reentry step, the issue is not just employment, but where the job may lead
in the future. Once a skill is acquired that is documented, the in
dividual's chances of finding jobs are improved but not certain, and entry
into a job setting which does not utilize and develop the skill may reduce
or eliminate its long-term payoff to the individual. In other words, there
is a great deal of slippage in a probablistic world where there is a wide
gap between employment opportunities and the available work force at any
given documented employability level, and the variance in the potentials of
workers and jobs is large. This makes it all the more important to couple
bridging mechanisms and placement with skills training if a payoff is to be
realized.
"Employability" is not an absolute. Employers do use batting averages
to guide hiring decisions, weighting characteristics by their perceived
validity in predicting individual performance. But this is not a sta
tistical exercise. Skills and competencies are not always measurable and
certifications may be discounted to varying degrees. Sticks or carrots in
the tax structure, public appeals or social mores may influence per
ceptions, while experience over time may change an employer's decision
weights. Prejudice may exist, although hidden in the weighting structure
of different characteristics rather than directly tied to color or sex; for
instance, race may be related to a 5 percent lower performance, on average,
as may the lack of a high school diploma, but the employer may give greater
weight to the race factor as a predictor. In general, however, there is a
rationale for the process and employers will not be convinced they are
discriminating, particularly when the cumulative effect of stunted
opportunities is to leave the victims of discrimination far short of their
innate potential. Long-term changes can only be achieved by identifying
individuals with more potential, improving their competencies, and
documenting this in a way that can be demonstrated to employers. If
employers are coerced or persuaded to hire trainees with lesser credentials
or those whose credentials have been upgraded, and if these trainees do not
meet, or perhaps even exceed, average performance, the effect will be to
reinforce the employer's standards even if some of the referred individuals
are better than average. Few credentials are accepted at face value, and
in most cases they serve merely as another factor in the hiring equation.
Credentials will be given varying weight depending on their source, and
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this depends to a large extent on the the average performance of those with
the credential.
If an effort is made to improve the employability of a group of
individuals who have the same measurable characteristics, their varying po
tential will result in varying success in the acquisition of skills and
competencies. Where the aim of a training program is to produce completers
who can perform as well as or better than the average of individuals with
greater documented employability, then sorting is unavoidable. Even if
individuals can acquire entry skills which are commensurate with the
average for individuals with the same credentials, they may have reached
the upper limits of their potential, so they will be at the low end of the
employability potential distribution for all individuals with similar cre
dentials.
Training can raise earnings in very different ways with very different
implications. The skills and abilities of individuals may be improved
without increasing documented employability; in this case, the individuals
will be no more likely to get a job or a better job when they complete
training, but they may search more diligently or may perform more effec
tively once they are employed. Society gains marginally by more effective
performance in lower level jobs, as do the trainees. The matching process
may be improved so that individuals with more potential are matched to jobs
with more potential rather than relying on a random iterative process in
the labor market. This may modestly ease frictional problems. Earnings
may increase in the short-run if documented employability is increased and
the skills that are documented are demanded in the labor market; earnings
will increase over the long-run if the skills and credentials lead to
career ladders. Society will benefit from better performance in entry jobs
if training is of limited ambition; it will benefit from reductions in
skills bottlenecks if the training leads to "quantum leaps." But em
ployment and earnings may also be improved without any gains in skills or
competencies through the leverage or subsidies of the hiring agencies.
Buying or accessing jobs increases the chances of participants by reducing
the chances of like nonparticipants; in other words, there is simply a
real!ocation among those in need. Thus, earnings gains are prima facie
evidence that training has impacts on participants but not that it has the
same degree of impacts on the economy or on those in need.
Fleshing Out the Conceptual Framework

While these perspectives are important in their own right, the impli
cations are heavily dependent on the underlying labor market and opera
tional realities concerning documentation factors, the employability
distributions of jobs and workers, the gaps between available opportunities
and job seekers at each skill level, the patterns of sorting and skill en
hancement, and the like. These issues have received very little attention
in the research and evaluation literature and much more work is required.
Nevertheless, the preceding volume of evidence provides some sense of
general magnitudes and relationships for a few of the key factors:
First, evidence suggests that although CETA serves individuals from
the lower end of the employability distribution, there is a fairly sub-
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stantial range in documented employability among participants. As a
proxie, documented employability might be measured in terms of annualized
earnings in the year before entry. The fiscal 1979 enrol lees in nonsummer
CETA programs were concentrated in the lower tail of the earnings dis
tribution for the entire labor force for the obvious reason that entrants
were unemployed for some time before entering CETA. Yet they were also
concentrated at the lower end of the distribution for labor force par
ticipants with less than full-year employment, i.e., labor force entrants
and reentrants during the year as well as persons experiencing some un
employment (Figure 3.35). Among 1979 entrants, 35 percent had no earnings
at all in the year before entry and another 15 percent had earnings less
than $1000, while a fifth had earnings above $4000.
Of equal importance, CETA serves only a small proportion of the labor
force in any earnings category. CETA entrants with no earnings represented
only one of every twenty persons in the labor force who earned less than
$1000 in 1978, and only one in forty of those who earned less than $4000.
In a given local labor market, the percentage might be higher, particularly
since CETA funds are distributed in part on a severity-of-needs basis, but
it is likely that in most communities there are enough job vacancies with
low documented employability requirements to absorb most of the CETA
clients if the jobs were allocated to them rather than to nonparticipants.
For instance, there were over 10 million jobs listed with the Employment
Service in 1980, compared to the less than 2 million total CETA enrollments
and 1.2 million nonsummer enrollments. The disadvantaged might not be eli
gible for all these jobs, or might not be trainable up to the entry
standards, but only a small portion of all job vacancies are listed with
the Employment Service. The point is that CETA could get jobs for all or
most of its clients simply by taking them away from similar nonparticipants. This makes it all the more critical to determine whether access and
placement efforts, rather than human resource development, account for the
major impacts of training.
Second, there is some evidence to suggest that the variation in
potential employability is quite significant among individuals at the low
end of the documented employability distribution where CETA is targeted.
The data on characteristics gathered at CETA entry and in evaluations of
employment and training programs are at least as inclusive as the in
formation which employers might request in job applications and use to make
hiring decisions.
Most of these characteristics are predictive of
subsequent employment and earnings success, both for participants and
control groups. Thus, it is possible to construct an employability scale
for each individual. The regression coefficients in equations relating
demographic and background characteristics to future earnings suggest how
much each factor contributes or detracts from earnings when all other
factors are held constant; the employability of any individual can be
estimated by weighting his or her characteristics by these coefficients.
Likewise, the square of the correlation coefficient in regression equations
predicting future earnings success suggests the strength of these charac
teristics and factors in explaining or predicting future successes. In
almost all studies of CETA participants and controls, the characteristics
and job histories are predictive enough to separate groups of likely
winners from likely losers, and the differences in future earnings (which
reflect, at least in part, differences in ability and skills) are large
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FIGURE 3.35
ANNUAL EARNINGS DISTRIBUTION OF THE LABOR FORCE
IN 1978 AND PRIOR YEAR EARNINGS OF FISCAL 1979
I-SUMMER CETA ENTRANTS

ALL LABOR FORCE
PARTICIPANTS
IN 1978
ALL LABOR FORCE
PARTICIPANT WITH
LESS THAN FULL-YEAR
EMPLOYMENT
ALL NONSUMMER CETA
PARTICIPANTS BY
EARNINGS IN
PREVIOUS YEAR
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Westat, Inc. Characteristics, of Enrollees_ Who Entered AdultOriented CETA Programs During Fiscal Year1979 (October 1978
Through September 1979) (Washington, D.C.:Employment and
Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and
Research, February 1981), Table 5; Bureau of Census, Money In
come of Families and Persons for the United States P-60 No. 123
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 1980),
Table 56.
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enough to justify hiring on the basis of these factors. On the other hand,
the residual of the correlation coefficient suggests the differences in
individual potential which are not picked up by the observable experience
and background variables, as well as chance factors. There is substantial
unexplained variance in even the most detailed regression equations
predicting the future labor market success of employment and training
program participants:
t
Among second half fiscal 1975 CETA participants, a regression
equation relating the annual earnings two years after participation to 28
variables including sex, race, age, education, family and marital status,
family income and size, veteran status, previous employment and earnings
levels and patterns, program activity, and time in program, explained
(i.e., the square of the correlation coefficient equaled) 28 percent of the
variance in earnings. 97/
t
Where annualized earnings in the four quarters before and eight
quarters after participation were estimated for second half 1975 CETA
participants in classroom training using an equation which included 68
documenting variables (such as age, barriers to employment, family and
marital status, race, length of stay, placement status at exit, prior
employment pattern and education), the factors explained 28 percent of the
variance in earnings for males and the same percentage for females. The
same equations for fiscal 1975 on-the-job trainees explained 32 percent of
the variance in earnings for males and 36 percent of the variance for
females. 98/
•
Regression equations relating the percent of time 1977 Job Corps
participants and controls were employed in the 18-24 month post-termination
period to 23 characteristic and pre-program experience variables (including
age, education, race, health status, previous employment, arrests, and drug
use) explained 37 percent of the variance in percent time employed for male
participants and 42 percent for female participants. 99/
As these equations suggest, more detailed information far a narrower
range of participants will increase the portion of variance explained, yet
in all cases the unexplained variance remains quite large. No doubt chance
is involved, including the fact that the individuals secure jobs with
varying career potential so that some are forced to move from one to the
next or find themselves subsequently out of work, while others find jobs
which turn out to have career potential, matching their own potential
employability. Unquestionably, however, much of the unexplained variance
is related to the differences in potential of individuals with like
characteristics and backgrounds; and it is significant that the unexplained
variance is so large.
Third, the evidence suggests the relative importance of improvements
in documented and potential employablity, sorting and job access in pro
ducing the aggregate results for classroom training, on-the-job training,
and Job Corps. The impacts of classroom training are concentrated among
long stayers and those participants who are placed at termination.
Negative sorting occurs before entry, i.e., those CETA entrants who have
more limited employability characteristics are assigned to classroom train
ing; but sorting on the basis of positive characteristics occurs there-
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after. The more employable are more likely to complete training, as well
as to be placed, whatever their duration of stay. However, this sorting is
not enough to explain the extraordinarily large gains for the long-stayers
and those placed. Because of the short duration of treatment and the lack
of completion standards, only a fourth of participants drop out, and
although dropouts have more limited employability than completers, the
differences are not major. Those who do not complete usually leave within
the first few weeks. It is significant that the post-program earnings of
early leavers are almost the same as those of their controls in the first
post-program year and slightly higher in the second. The early leavers
include positive terminees as well as dropouts, but if in-program sorting
which identified the winners and losers among those with like charac
teristics were to explain the substantial gains of the long-stayers, it
would be necessary for the earnings of the short stayers to be much lower
than those of their matched controls.
Longer-term classroom trainees are more likely to be placed at
termination. It is not surprising that placement has an effect on postprogram earnings after controlling for length of stay and other variables,
since those moving immediately into jobs will surely have higher postprogram earnings than those who undergo a period of job search. However,
the differential related to placement remains substantial in the second
post-program year. Either the immediate post-program jobs use the skills
taught, are more stable and higher paying, or else the persons placed have
greater potential employability which is identified during the course of
participation. The latter possibility is discounted by the fact that
classroom trainees not placed earned the same as their controls the second
year after termination. This would not have occurred if those not placed
were the "losers" whose lesser potential was discovered or emerged during
participation. Hence, the gains of the "winners" who were placed were not
primarily the result of their inherently greater potential
The individual and aggregate patterns of employment and earnings
changes and occupational mobility suggest that the primary effect of
classroom training is to secure primary labor market jobs with greater
stability for those who are placed. The first post-program year earnings
gains are largely the result of increased employment, which in turn is
largely the product of greater labor force participation. In the second
post-program year, higher earnings rates and less unemployment are more
important factors. The greater stability of employment may result in part
from improved potential. No matter what the duration of stay, placement is
a major factor in explaining earnings levels in the post-training period,
so that this must be seen as a key mechanism in securing the more stable
jobs. Yet the long-term stayers experience substantial gains independent
of placement. Those who stay long enough apparently secure credentials or
skills that are accepted in the labor market independent of placement
efforts, although also making placement easier.
For Job Corps, the annual earnings gains result not from higher wages
but from increased employment and labor force participation. Most
Corpsmembers who find jobs do so without placement assistance. There is a
range of evidence demonstrating the effects of Job Corps on behavior and
maturity. Improvements in mobility are also a factor. Corpsmembers are
more likely to move where jobs are available for persons with their skills.
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On the other hand, the effects on documented employability are concentrated
on a small minority of total participants. The completers of vocational
training account for a substantial share of post-program earnings gains and
are far more likely to receive placement assistance than the 40 percent of
entrants who drop out within 90 days and the 30 percent who stay longer but
do not complete training. Yet even for completers, less than two-fifths
are subsequently placed and in training-related jobs, and they represent
less than one in seven total enrol lees. Corpsmembers who acquire a
credential such as a GED have higher earnings, all else being equal, but
they account for only one in fourteen Job Corps entrants. Job Corps works
for this minority by moving the individuals directly into career tracks and
by providing transferrable certificates, and this minority of participants
accounts for a disproportionate share of gains. Nevertheless, the major
effect on most participants is to increase maturity and mobility.
Sorting does occur. The demands of a residential program result in
self-sorting, while the individualized, competency-based curricula does not
permit individuals to graduate from training and education unless they
acquire competencies. Yet the dropouts do not earn less than controls in
the post-program period after they get over their immediate transition
problems, so that inherent differences in potential between noncompleters
and matched controls do not account for a major share of the higher
earnings of the completers.
For OJT, a good deal of sorting occurs prior to participation. The
persons assigned to OJT are the most employable among CETA participants.
Sorting also occurs on the job, since somewhere between 30 and 40 percent
of participants according to different estimates either leave their
assignment or are not retained at the end of the training period. The
participants who are not placed are more disadvantaged than those who
remain with their jobs, and matched to comparison groups on measurable
characteristics, they earn noticeably less in both the post-training years,
suggesting that the employers do separate winners and losers during the
try-out period. Many of the OJT assignments are in the same occupation as
previous employment, while in only a few cases representing clear occu
pational advancement. There is no evidence whether training really occurs
on the job. The decline in net impacts between the first and second
post-program years suggests that some OJT participants subsequently lose
their jobs and are unable to secure other employment, i.e., they have not
secured transferrable skills and credentials to the degree these are
provided in classroom training, where impacts increase over the postprogram period. It is difficult to determine whether OJT subsidies are
buying jobs that would have otherwise gone to the same types of in
dividuals, but the evidence suggests that this is a good possibility.
Fourth, since the number of entrants and reentrants into the labor
force is a major determinant of the relative levels and slopes of the
available work force and employment opportunities distributions, dramatic
changes over the next two decades can be predicted with a fair degree of
certainty. These will affect the role of CETA and CETA training. During
1980, entrants and reentrants accounted for nearly two-fifths of the un
employed. Thus, the gap between the available work force and employment
opportunities distributions in the ranges where CETA activities are focused
is highly sensitive to labor force entry and reentry patterns. The changes
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which can be predicted with reasonable certainty are massive. The average
number of youth and adult female labor force participants rose by 16.5
million from 1970 to 1980. Net employment growth absorbed only 14.2
million of these extra entrants and reentrants, so that the number of unem
ployed females and youth rose by 2.3 million (Table 3.20). From 1980 to
1990, according to projections by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, youth and
adult female labor force participants will grow by only two-fifths the
absolute increase over the previous decade. If employment opportunities
for these participants expanded at the same rates as over the entire 1970s,
there would be an excess of 4.4 million jobs in 1990. If they grew at the
1975-1980 rate, there would be an excess of 8.9 million jobs. If jobs for
youth and women only increased at the rate of total employment growth in
the 1970s, there would be a shortfall of 2.7 million jobs, but this would
represent about half of their job deficit in 1980. Such simplistic
projections are not meant to suggest that jobs will be available for all
entrants and reentrants, or that production functions will remain static
with no effort to substitute the greater numbers of mid-level workers for
entrants; but it is clear that there will be a substantial change from the
1970s.
These bits and pieces of information do not go far towards fleshing
out the theoretical framework, but they certainly lend credence to the
underlying notions and suggest at least the rough magnitudes of some of the
primary factors. Even though CETA is concentrated among individuals with
severe problems, there is wide variation in both the documented and
potential employability of its participants. Training improves skills and
productivity which can improve employment chances and subsequent earnings,
but this is only one of the processes producing the measured training
impacts. Much of the gain results from easing the transition into the
labor force of entrants and reentrants. Placement is a key variable, and
not just because of its immediate effect on earnings. Apparently more
stable jobs are secured. Sorting is evident in Job Corps, as well as
improvements in potential employability as a result of maturational
experiences. OJT might, to a significant degree, achieve its impacts
simply by buying jobs rather than training. All these findings relate to
training as it operated in the climate of the 1970s. The demographics of
the 1980s will be markedly different, shifting needs and potentials for
interventions.
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Table 3.20
Labor Force Projections and Alternative Employment Scenarios
Projections

Actual

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

Civilian labor force
Civilian employment if grew at 1970-1980 rate

82,715
78,627
4,088

92,613
84,783
7,830

106,821
97,271
9,550

114,985
108,360
6,625

122,375
120,336
2,039

127,542
134,054
-6,512

16-24 labor force
16-24 employment
Projection 1

17,830
15,860

22,265
18,684

24,623
21,217

24,446

22,607

21,846

24,093

27,359

31,068

24,506

23,383

32,782

24,342

27,927

32,040

23,593

26,248

29,188

353

-4,752

-9,222

-60

-5,776

-10,936

22

-5,320

-10,194

853

-3,641

-7,342

39,531

45,107

48,726

39,262

49,193

61,636

37,290

43,751

52.064

35,952

41,248

47,324

34,845

38,766

43,108

269

-4.086

-12,910

2,241

1,356

-3,338

3,579

3,859

1,402

4,686

6,341

5,618

Job gap (labor force-employment)

if grew at 1975-1980
for youth employment
if grew at 1970-1980
for youth employment
if grew at 1975-1980
for all employment
if grew at 1970-1980

Projection 2:
Projection 3:
Projection 4:

for all employment
16-24 job gap (labor force-employment)

rate
rate
rate
rate

if grew at 1975-1980 rate
for youth employment
if grew at 1970-1980 rate

Projection 1.

Projection 2:

3,581

3,406

for youth employment
if grew at 1975-1980 rate

Projection 3:

for all employment
if grew at 1970-1980 rate
for all employment

Projection 4:

Adult female labor force
Adult female employment
Projection 1: if grew at 1975-1980 rate
for adult females
Projection 2: if grew at 1970-1980 rate
for adult females
Projection 3: if grew at 1975-1980 rate
for entire population
Projection 4: if grew at 1970-1980 rate
for entire population
Adult female job gap (labor force-employment)
Projection 1: if grew at 1975-1980 rate

Projection 2:
Projection 3:
Projection 4:

Source:

1,970

for adult females
if grew at 1970-1980 rate
for adult females
if grew at 1975-1980 rate
for entire population
if grew at 1970-1980 rate
for entire population

23,405
22,444

961

26,891
25,010

1,881

33,150
31,336

1,814

Employment and Training Report of the President, 1980 (Washing
Government Printing Office, 1981); Howard N.
ton, D.C.:
Fullerton "The 1995 Labor Force: A First Look," Daily Labor
Reporter (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, January
21, 1981).

This theoretical interpretation is descriptive more than predictive.
The curves and constructs do not, of themselves, suggest appropriate train
ing policies and approaches. They do, however, forcefully argue for
attention to a number of issues which have been given minor attention in
labor market and human resources research and policymaking, such as (1) the
factors which document employability and are the basis of hiring decisions
for different jobs; (2) the distribution of jobs and workers according to
such standards; (3) the variance in potential among individuals sharing
certain sets of characteristics; (4) how potential can be better measured
and documented; (5) the career pathways which are provided by different
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jobs and occupations with similar entry requirements; (6) the variance in
immediate employment conditions in jobs and occupations with similar entry
requirements; (7) how many can be moved how far by human resource develop
ment activities; (8) what competencies are acquired by trainees and the
reference systems which best structure and document competency attainment;
(9) the iterative post-program experiences of trainees beyond the immediate
outcomes; and (10) the perceptions of employers towards the trainees and
training programs, as well as the realisim of these perceptions and how
they can be altered.
It is also necessary to very carefully examine management and delivery
systems, regulations, performance standards, and the other real-life
factors which provide the structure for decisionmaking and delivery.
Relative magnitudes and interrelationships of the key factors in the
theoretical framework cannot be inferred from analyzing outcome and impact
information alone. The nuts and bolts issues such as performance indi
cators and management information systems provide incentives for different
patterns of behavior at the delivery level. It is these factors which are
manipulable and can alter the outcomes and impacts. These are examined
next.
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NOTES

1. The CLMS evaluation has produced a series of reports detailing
methodologies as they have evolved over the years. The preponderance
of the long-term follow-up data available for analysis in this volume
relates to fiscal 1975 entrants. A capsule description of the
procedures and assumptions used for the fiscal 1975 survey are
provided in:
Westat, Inc. CLMS Followup Report No. 3 (36 Months After Entry),
Experiences in the First Two Postprogram Years With Pre/Post Compari
sons, For Terminees Who Entered CETA During January-June, 1975. (WashEmployment and Training Administration, Office of
ington, D.C.:
Policy, Evaluation and Research, December 1980), Appendices A-C.
2. Westat, Inc. Impact on 1977 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in
Selected Program Activities (Washington, D.C.: Employment and Train
ing Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research,
December 1980).
3. Ibid.
Inc. The Impact of CETA on Participant Earnings: Entrants
4. Westat,
Employment and
During the First Half of 197"5 (Washington, D . C . :
Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research,
January 1980), pp. 3-39.
5. Westat, Inc. Impact on 1978 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in
Selected Program Activities (Washington, D.C.: Employment and TrainTrig Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research,
February 1981).
Inc. The Impact of CETA on Participant Earnings:
6. Westat,
During the First Half of 1975, op. cit.

Entrants

7. Westat, Inc. Multivariate Analysis: 36 Month Follow-up of Terminees
Who Entered CETA During January-June 1975 (Washington, D.C. : Employment and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and
Research, November 1980).
The coefficients in the text were from unpublished tabulations.
These equations do not consider placement as a variable, since this
would pick up some of the differential placement chances related to
participation in different primary activities.
8. Charles Mallar, et. a! . The Lasting Impacts of Job Corps Participa
tion (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1980), pp.
9. Robert Taggart, "Considerations in Cost-Benefit Analysis of Job
Assessments of Job Corps Performance and Impacts, Volume I
Corps,"
Government Printing Office, May 1980), ppT
(Washington, D.C. :
110-129.
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10. Charles Mallar^t. aj_. op_. cit., pp. 119-163.
11. The assumption of a 14 percent a year fade-out of real earnings gains
was based on a study of MDTA which estimated a 50 percent fade-out of
impacts for adult males after five years, and no fade-out for adult
women. The Job Corps benefit-cost study, in its benchmark assump
tions, projected that the gains for both males and females would
fade-out at the same rate as previously estimated for adult males
participating in MDTA. The earlier study was a five-year follow-up of
1970 MDTA participants. Inflation then was about half of the rate
which has prevailed over the last five years, and it is uncertain how
fast real earnings gains eroded in the late 1970s.
12. Charles Mallar et. al. Evaluation of the Earnings Impact of the Job
Corps Program Second Follow-Up Report (Washington, D.C.: Employment
and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and
Research, April 1980), p. 153.
13. The high benefit assumptions are more plausible for classroom training
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ments in fiscal 1976 compared to only a fourth of Job Corps par
ticipants. According to the CLMS-CPS impact estimates, females also
accounted for four-fifths of the 1978 net gains for all classroom
trainees, whereas females in Job Corps accounted for only a third. In
brief, the use of the same discounting and fade-out assumptions in the
Job Corps and classroom training benefit-cost studies may not be ap
propriate and probably understates the relative effectiveness of
classroom training.
14. Westat, Inc. Postprogram Experiences and Pre/Post Comparisons for Terminees Who Entered CETA During Fiscal Year 1976 (July 1975-June 1976)
(Washington, D.C.:Employment and Training Administration, Office of
Policy, Evaluation and Research, March 1979), Table D-8. Estimates on
spending by functional activity under classroom training were provided
by Employment and Training Administration, Office of Community
Employment Programs.
15. Ibid. Tables D-2 and 14; Westat, Inc. CLMS Follow-up Report No. 3 op.
cit., Table 34.
It is important to note that the interview data for second half
fiscal 1975 trainees suggested an increase from entry to exit in
transfer usage, contradicting the more dependable findings for fiscal
1976.
16. The Board of Directors, Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation,
Summary and Findings of the National Supported Work Demonstration
(Cambridge,Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co.,1980); Charles Mallar
op. cit., p. 45.
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The public benefits receipt rates for Job Corps and supported
work controls were as follows:
Proportion 1n Control Groups Receiving Benefits
Baseline
(1-9 Months)
Supported Work AFDC Controls
Unemployment compensation
Welfare
Food stamps
Supported Work Ex-Addict Controls
Unemployment compensation
Welfare
Food stamps
Supported Work Youth Controls
Unemployment compensation
Welfare
Food stamps
Supported Work Offender Controls
Unemployment compensation
Welfare
Food stamps
Job Corps Controls
Unemployment compensation
Welfare
Food stamps

Follow-up
(19-27 Months)

Change

2.0%
97.7
94.6

2.0%
85.1
82.3

0.0
-12.6
-12.3

7.4
50.7
45.7

6.0
40.2
38.8

-1.4
-10.5
-6.9

4.0
17.0
32.4

3.8
20.6
29.0

-.2
+3.6
-3.4

4.8
28.1
36.0

6.3
24.0
30.0

+1.5
-4.1
-6.0

(0-6 Months)

(18-24 Months)

Change

2.5
9.4
18.4

4.0
10.8
16.9

+1.5
+1.4
-1.5

17. Charles Mailer op. cit., p. 135.; Westat, Inc. Postprogram Exper
iences and Pre/Post Comparisons for Terminees Who Entered CETA During
Fiscal Year 1976 (July 1975-June 1976J op. cit., Table 8.
The in-program savings were calculated by dividing annualized
cost by the percent of the year the average participant was in the
program, and then multiplying by the percentage reduction in receipt
of each benefit. The percentage decline in receipt from the first to
second post-program year was multiplied by the proportion receiving
each benefit at exit, and this was multiplied by the average
annualized benefit to estimate post-program savings which were then
assumed to fade-out at 14 percent a year and were discounted at 5
Without question this is a very crude "guestimation"
percent.
technique. The real issue is whether the benefits would have declined
in the absence of participation. The above evidence from supported
work suggests that much of the decline would have occurred in the
absence of participation.
18. The Board of Directors, Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation,
op. cit.
19

It is important to stress that these findings apply to CETA training
in fiscal 1976. Two developments since then may have increased the
First, the female proportion of
payoff of classroom training.
trainees increased, from 50 percent in fiscal 1976 to 57 percent in
fiscal 1980. The CLMS estimated earnings gains relative to controls
were two and a half times greater for females than males. All else
being equal, the shift in the sex composition of trainees would in-
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Title IIBC (formerly Title I) increased from 4.3 to 5.1 months from
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I), Title IID (Formerly Title II) and Title VI, Fiscal Years 1975
Through 1979," (Employment and Training Administration, Office of
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and 7.————————
Reservations
tute, 1971), p.
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under age 19. Obviously, the matching of these 13 individuals with a
correspondingly small number of minority, female teenagers in the
Current Population Survey cannot yield very dependable estimates of
net impact. The statistical estimation problem is compounded by the
matching problem. The controlling variables may be more appropriate
for some subgroups than others. For instance, there are doubts about
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the comparability of youth who participate in CETA and those with
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mediation while 30-44 year-old participants are receiving intensive
occupational training. A finding that youth would benefit less than
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33. Ibid.
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Although both the screening and placement hypotheses
may have validity, the magnitude of the wage rate dif
ferential between experimentals and controls in the postprogram period suggests that Supported Work also tended to
increase the ability of its participants to work effec
tively. Empirically, however, it is very difficult to
distinguish among these hypotheses."
75. Westat, Inc. Impact on 1978 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in
Selected Program Activities op. cit.
76. Employment and Training Administration, Management Information System
Annual Summary Report, unpublished.
77. Westat, Inc. Postprogram Experience and Pre/Post Comparisons for Terminees Who Entered CETA During Fiscal Year 1976 op. cit., Tables 9-11.

192

78. Westat, Inc. Postprogram Experiences and Pre/Post Comparisons for Terminees Who Entered CETA During Fiscal Year 1976 (July 1975-June 1976)
op. clt., Tables 51, 5-10.
79. Westat, Inc. Impact on 1978 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees In
Selected Activities op. cit.
80. Westat, Inc. Postprogram Experiences and Pre/Post Comparisons for Terminees
Who Table
Entered
1975-June 1976)
op. cit.,
3-3. CETA During Fiscal Year 1976 (July————————
81. Westat, Inc. Impact on 1978 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in
Selected Activities op. cit.
82. Service Mix Alternatives demonstration.
provided by Educational Testing Service.
83.

Unpublished

tabulations

Corporation for Public/Private Ventures, Enhanced Work Projects—The
Interim Findings From the Ventures in Community Improvement Demonstra
tion (Washington, D.C.:Government Printing Office, May 1980).

84. Ventures in Community Improvement demonstration.
tabulations by Corporation for Public/Private Ventures.

Unpublished

85. Ibid.
86. David Zimmerman, Mathematica Inc. Unpublished tabulations from study
of value of output of YEDPA youth worksites.
87. Corporation for Public/Private Ventures, Enhanced Work Projects—The
Interim
the Ventures—————————————————————
in Community Improvement Demonstra
tion
op. Findings
cit., pp.From
75-95.
88. Sherry Pomerantz, "Summer Court Involvement," Opportunities In
dustrialization Centers of America, addendum to Career Exploration
Program Final Report (Washington, D.C.:
Employment and Training
Administration, Office of Youth Programs, March 1981).
89. A.L.
Nellum,
Inc.
Evaluation of the 1979 Summer Youth Employment
Program (Washington, D.C.: Employment and Training Administration,
Office of Youth Programs, December 1980).
90. Sherry Pomerantz and Patti Kirst, Career Exploration Program Final
Report op. cit.
91. David Farkas et. a!. Early Impacts From the Youth Entitlement Demon
stration: Participation in Work and SchoolI'Tig"(New York: Manpower
Demonstration Reserach Corporation, 1980).
92. Westat,
Inc.
Characteristics of Enrollees Under Age 22 Who Entered
CETA Programs During Fiscal Year 1979 (October 1978 Through September
1979)(Washington, D.C.:Employment andTrainingAdministration,
Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, January 1981).

193

93. Work Experience of the Population in 1978, Special Labor Force Report
236(Washington,D.C.:Bureauof Labor Statistics,January 1981).
Inc.
Nellum,
94. A.L.
Program op. cit.
95. Sherry Pomerantz
Report op. cit.

and

Evaluation of the 1979 Summer Youth Employment
Patti

Kirst,

Career Exploration Program Final

96. The Board of Directors, Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation,
op_. cit., pp. 135-148.
97. Westat, Inc. Multivariate Analysis: 36 Month Follow-up of Terminees
Who Entered CETA During January-June 1975 op. cit., Table C-16.
98. David Finifter An Analysis of the Two Year Post-Program Earnings Paths
of CETA Participants Using the Early CLMS Cohorts (January 1975-June
1975 Entry) op. cit., Tables A-l through A-4.
99. Charles Mallar,
cit, p. 94.

The Lasting Impacts of Job Corps Participation

op.

CHAPTER 4
NUTS AND BOLTS
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SECTION 1.
DIVERSITY IN LOCAL TRAINING EFFORTS

Patterns of Variation
Cost averages, national participant counts, aggregate employment and
earnings change patterns, statistically-derived gains measures, benefitcost and theoretical analyses, all provide an orderly and comprehensive
picture of the CETA training system, its general impacts and effectiveness.
They achieve this order and comprehensibility by averaging out, rounding
off, assuming away, cleansing, massaging, and sometimes ignoring the
diversity, volatility, and complexity of operational realities. The
aggregates which are summarized and analyzed are the product of the actions
of 484 local decisionmaking units, under the oversight of ten Department of
Labor regional offices offering varying interpretations of the diverse
regulations and guidance issued by relatively independent national
bureaucracies in the Employment and Training Administration which have
responsibility for the separate categorical programs under CETA. Below the
prime sponsor level, there are thousands of subagents and tens of thousands
of delivery agents which have their own interests, objectives, and inter
pretations. Decisionmakers at each separate level share some perspectives
and concerns, and answer more to some drummers than others, but there is
also great diversity. The national fiefdom in charge of Title IV youth
programs has different interests than the office in charge of Title IIBC
that serves both adults and youth. Regional offices have varying styles
State governments serving as prime sponsors have
and perspectives.
different decisionmaking procedures and concerns than multi-jurisdiction
consortia, which, in turn, may differ from small city prime sponsors.
Community-based organizations, schools and union organizations vary in
their interests and comparative advantages as delivery agents. National
ly-linked community-based groups may, in turn, differ from indigenous
neighborhood organizations, and in the same local area, one indigenous
organization will be different from another.
All decisionmakers must consider the federal law and the regulations,
but both consciously leave room for a range of differing interpretations.
Sticks and carrots—both financial and bureaucratic—affect decisionmakers
at each level. Institutional history, linkages, and personality all play a
role. Real needs and perceptions of these needs vary widely, as do the
institutional conditions which affect how these needs can best be met.
Varying contractual and planning procedures influence the substance as well
as the form of decisions. It is not surprising, then, that in almost every
dimension of CETA activity and performance there is enormous variability.
To begin with, there is widely-varying emphasis on training vs. job
creation. Prime sponsors have the authority to use almost all their
CETA-allocated funds for training. The usual alternative is to support
subsidized jobs of one sort or another. Some prime sponsors do' almost no
training, relying primarily on job creation and to some extent, on direct
referral and transition services. Others focus almost exclusively on
training. As an average among prime sponsors, half of participants under
Title IIBC of CETA in fiscal 1980 were enrolled in classroom training, but
a fifth of prime sponsors enrolled less than 30 percent of participants in
this component, while a tenth enrolled over four-fifths (Figure 4.1). The
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Figure 4.1
Variations in Prime Sponsor Training Activity
Under Title IIBC, Fiscal 1980
DISTRIBUTION OF PRIME SPONSORS BY TRAINEES AS A
PERCENTAGE OF FISCAL 1980 TITLE IIBC PARTICIPANTS
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Employment and Training Administration, Management Information
System Reports, Fiscal 1980.

standard deviation for the classroom training shares among prime sponsors
was 43 percent of the mean (this ratio is a statistical measure of
variability called the coefficient of variation). On-the-job training
enrollments averaged 11 percent of Title IIBC participants, but over half
of sponsors had less than 10 percent of enrol lees in OJT, while one in ten
sponsors enrolled more than 30 percent.
There was even greater variation among prime sponsors in their
emphasis on training under the other titles of CETA (Figure 4.2). Under
Title I ID, the average prime sponsor enrolled 38 percent of participants in
mostly part-time training, using 11 percent of PSE expenditures for this
purpose. \] The coefficient of variation—the ratio of the standard
deviation to the mean--was 74 percent for the participant share and 92
percent for the cost share. Under Youth Employment and Training Programs—
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Figure 4.2
Variations in Prime Sponsor Training Activity
Under Title IID PSE and Title IV YETP Programs
DISTRIBUTION OF PRIME SPONSORS BY
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which offer the same comprehensive service possibilities as IIB--the
proportion of participants in classroom training or OJT averaged 17
percent, but the coefficient of variation was 130 percent.
Prime sponsors may also choose to invest intensively in a few in
dividuals or to spread resources by using less costly treatments. In
fiscal 1980, there was enormous variance in costs per participant—much
more than could be explained by the differences in the costs of providing
similar training in different areas. A fourth of prime sponsors spent less
than $1000 per classroom trainee under Title IIBC, while one in eight spent
over $2000, even though the average was $1328 (Figure 4.3). The OJT cost
per participant averaged $1130 across prime sponsors, but the standard
deviation among prime sponsors equalled three-fifths of the mean.
Figure 4.3
Distribution of Prime Sponsors by Cost Per Participant
In Title IIBC Training Programs, Fiscal 1980
Prime Sponsor
Average Cost
per Participant

Classroom
Tr, lining

On-Tlic— Job Training

$500 or less ID3.0
———16.7
501-750
751-1000
1001-1250

16.5

113.5
——————————120.5
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Source:

3.1
Mean of Cost Averages = $1130
Standard Deviation = $697
Coefficient of Variation - 61.7%

Employment and Training Adminstration, Management Information
System Reports, Fiscal 1980.

Prime sponsors also varied enormously in the outcomes from the
services they offered. While data do not permit a determinaton of the
outcomes for participants in each separate component of Title IIBC, the
average outcomes in 1980 were obviously related to the outcomes from
training since three-fifths of IIBC participants were in OJT or classroom
training. The "positive termination" rate (i.e., the proportion of
terminees who were either employed, returned to school, entered training or
the military, or achieved program objectives) averaged 67 percent across
prime sponsors, and the coefficient of variation was a relatively low 18
percent (Figure 4.4). But "positive termination" is a catch-all category,
and the differences between placement or "entered employment" rates were
more significant. As an average for all prime sponsors, only two-fifths of
Title IIBC terminees entered employment, but a fourth of prime sponsors
placed less than 30 percent while another fourth succeeded in placing over
half. Given the variance in both costs per participant and in successful
termination rates, it is no surprise to find vast differences in the cost

Figure 4.4
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Variations in Prime Sponsor Outcomes Under Title IIBC, Fiscal 1980
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per positive outome. While prime sponsors averaged $3170 cost per positive
termination, the coefficient of variation was 61 percent. The cost per
placement averaged $6508 but had a coefficient of variation of 70 percent.
Possible Causes for Diversity
In light of the preceding evidence that OJT is an extremely effective
strategy, that classroom training, particularly of long-duration, pays off,
that placement upon termination is a key factor related to long-term as
well as immediate gains, and that work experience has little post-program
impact, these disparities in service mix, costs, and placements take on a
critical importance. A primary thrust of the Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act was to localize decisionmaking under federally-funded manpower
programs so that choices concerning who would be served and how would be
based on the needs of each community, its economic conditions, and delivery
capacities.. The instrument for promoting rational local decisionmaking was
the annual plan. Each year the prime sponsor must assess local labor
market conditions and the universe of need, deciding on the participants
and services for the coming year. The federally-required planning pro
cedures place a heavy emphasis on presentation of labor market data and
assessment of labor market trends, as well as of the relative needs of
various population segments. One would expect, then, that the variations
in local conditions, and in target groups selected on the basis of needs
analysis, would be major factors explaining the diversity in training
levels and intensities. Since unemployment rates are used to allocate
funds, and since this is probably the best available indicator of relative
labor market conditions, it would be reasonable to expect different service
patterns in high unemployment areas—for instance more OJT in tight labor
markets, or a priority on job creation in areas facing severe job deficits.
If target groups were selected on the basis of need, with subsequent
decisions about how best to serve them, it would also be reasonable to
expect differences in service mix paralleling differences in participant
mix. The youth share should, in particular, be a primary factor, con
sidering that OJT may not be appropriate where education is not completed
or career plans are uncertain, and that nationwide, youth are less
frequently assigned to classroom training than other CETA entrants. The
Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 froze the youth
share under Title IIBC to the level of fiscal 1977 in order to avoid
slippage in the existing service levels under comprehensive programs as new
resources were added specifically for youth programs. A constant complaint
from advocates of decentralization was that this federal intervention not
only resulted in services to youth out of proportion to need in some local
areas, but that it necessitated a continuing emphasis on work experience.
To the extent these complaints were valid, there should have been a
negative relationship between the youth share among participants and both
on-the-job and classroom training levels.
Surprisingly, local unemployment rates and the youth shares among
participants bore almost no relationship to prime sponsors service mix
decisions. Regression equations relating the OJT and classroom training
shares of prime sponsors under Title IIBC in fiscal 1980 to their youth
shares among IIBC participants and iheir unemployment rates yield very low
coefficients of determination (or r which is a measure of the percent of
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variance in the dependent factor explained by the variance of the inde
pendent factors), as well as low regression coefficients (the degree that
change in one variable is associated with change in another): 2J
Equation 1. Prime sponsor IIBC classroom training par
ticipants as percent of total IIBC participants = a + b (prime
sponsor unemployment rate) + c (percent of IIBC participants who
were under age 22).
r2
a
b
c

=
=
=
=

.08
30.3
-.60
-.55

Interpretation—The unemployment rate among prime sponsors
averaged 7.0 percent in 1980 and the standard deviation was 2.6
percentage points (i.e., two of three prime sponsors had un
employment rates between 4.4 and 9.6 percent). A prime sponsor
with an unemployment rate a standard deviation above average was
likely to have a 1.6 percentage point lower proportion of IIBC
participants enrolled in classroom training. This increment
represented less than a tenth of a standard deviation in the
classroom training shares of prime sponsors. In other words, a
very large relative difference in the local unemployment rate was
associated with a relatively much smaller difference in the
classroom training share. The 1980 youth share was 48.3 percent
with a standard deviation of 7.8 percentage points. A prime
sponsor with a youth share a standard deviation above average was
likely to have a 4.3 percentage point lower proportion of IIBC
participants enrolled in classroom training, which represented
only a fifth of a standard deviation in the classroom training
share. However, variations in unemployment rates and in the
youth shares among prime sponsors explained only 8 percent of the
variation in classroom training shares. Other factors clearly
predominanted in determining the emphasis on classroom training.
Equation 2.
Prime sponsor IIBC classroom training ex
penditures as a percent of total IIBC expenditures not including
administration = a + b (prime sponsor unemployment rate) + c
(percent of IIBC participants who were under age 22).
r2
a
b
c

=
=
=
=

.06
69.9
-.42
-.40

Interpretation—A prime sponsor with an unemployment rate a
standard deviation above average was likely to have a 1.1 per
centage point lower proportion of IIBC funds committed to class
room training. This increment represented only 6 percent of a
standard deviation in classroom training expenditures. A youth
share one standard deviation above average was associated with a
3.1 percentage point lower classroom training expenditure share,
an increment representing less than a fifth of a standard de-
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viation. However, the variance in unemployment rates and youth
shares among prime sponsors explained only 6 percent of the
variance in classroom training expenditure shares.
Equation 3. Prime sponsor IIBC on-the-job training par
ticipants as a percent of total IIBC participants = a + b (prime
sponsor unemployment rate) + c (percent of IIBC participants who
were under age 22).
r2
a
b
c

=
=
=
=

.03
9.9
.61
-.05

Interpretation—A prime sponsor with an unemployment rate
one standard deviation above average was likely to have a 1.6
percentage point higher on-the-job training share. While this
represented less than a fifth of a standard deviation in the OJT
shares of prime sponsors, the relationship was contrary to the
hypothesis that lower employment would facilitate more OJT. A
standard deviation increment in the youth share was associated
with a .4 percentage point decrement in the OJT share, or less
than a twentieth of a standard deviation. In other words, in
creased youth service levels did not appear to constrain OJT
levels. Together, the variations in the unemployment and youth
shares explained very little of the diversity in OJT levels.
Equation 4. Prime sponsor IIBC on-the-job and classroom
training participants as a percent of total IIBC participants = a
+ b (prime sponsor unemployment rate) + c (percent of all IIBC
participants who were under 22).
r2
a
b
c

=
=
=
=

.18
100.5
.41
-.84

Interpretation—A prime sponsor with an unemployment rate a
standard deviation above average was likely to have a .9 per
centage point greater share of participants in training.
Although this represented less than 5 percent of a standard
deviation in the training share, the finding is contrary to the
expectation that work experience rather than training would be
emphasized in areas with larger job deficits. An increment of a
standard deviation in the youth share was associated with a 9.0
percentage point decrement in the training share, representing
almost two-fifths of a standard deviation. The differences among
prime sponsors in unemployment rates and youth shares offered
more explanation for the variations in the overall training
emphases than they did for the OJT or classroom training shares
alone. In other words, economic conditions and particularly the
youth enrollment affected the decision to emphasize training vs.
work more than the decision over which type of training to pro
vide.
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The prime sponsor receives funds under several different titles which
authorize similar activities. As noted, both YETP and Title IID provide
for the same services available under I IB (i.e., excluding upgrading and
retraining). It is plausible that prime sponsors would make decisions on
how to use Title IIBC funds in consideration of the services provided under
these other titles. One reasonable hypothesis is that prime sponsors with
higher levels of training under Title IIBC would need to put less emphasis
on training under PSE and YETP. This hypothesis is not supported by the
evidence:
Prime sponsors' classroom and on-the-job
Equation 5.
training expenditures as a percent of Title IIBC expenditures = a
+ b (prime sponsor's PSE expenditures for training as a percent
of total PSE expenditures) + c (prime sponsor YETP expenditures
on training as a percent of total YETP expenditures) + d (percent
of Title IIBC participants who were under age 22).
r2
a
b
c
d

=
=
=
=
=

.20
60.35
.19
.28
-.24

Interpretation—Prime sponsors offering more training under
PSE and YETP also emphasized training under Title IIBC. A prime
sponsor with a PSE training expenditure share a standard de
viation above average was likely to have a Title IIBC training
expenditure share 1.9 percentage points above average, which
represented an eighth of a standard deviation among prime
sponsors Title IIBC training shares. A standard deviation
increment in the YETP training expenditure share was associated
with a 5.6 percentage point increment in the Title IIBC training
share, or nearly a third of its standard deviation.
Prime sponsors consist of units of government serving populations of
100,000 or more, consortia of governmental units with a combined population
over 100,000, and states which serve all the remaining jurisdictions with
lesser populations. The governmental decisionmaking units, thus, include
states, cities, counties and consortia (and a few hybrids such as trust
territories and rural CEPs). These prime sponsors vary enormously in
population and population density. Government structure and size might be
expected to have some impact on service decisions. For instance, smaller
jurisdictions might be more aware of local employers and more capable of
forging OJT linkages, but might be less likely to have classroom training
facilities. Large cities or counties with high unemployment rates might
emphasize job creation moreso than state governments because the political
benefits are greater than when jobs are so widely distributed that they
have negligible impacts in any location. Consortia--created to take
advantage of job and training opportunities throughout a labor marketmight be expected to put greater emphasis on OJT and training.
Service patterns do vary by governmental unit and prime sponsor size,
but the patterns of variation are complex (Table 4.1). First, it appears
that consortia and states generally place less emphasis on classroom train-

Table 4.1
1980 Title IIBC Training Activity by Size and Structure of Prime Sponsors

Number
With
Complete
Data*

Classroom Training
Participants as
Percent of Total
IIBC Participants*

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Classroom Training
Expenditures as
Percent of Total
IIBC Expenditures*
Mean

Standard
Deviation

OJT Participants
as Percent of
Total IIBC
Participants*
Mean

Standard
Deviation

OJT Expenditure
as Percent of

Total IIBC

Expenditures*
Mean

Standard
Deviation

Classroom Training
and OJT Participants
as Percent of Total
IIBC Participants*

Mean

Classroom Training
and OJT Expenditures
as Percent of Total
IIBC Expenditures*
Mean

Labor Force Less Than 100,000
Consortia
Cities
Counties
States
Rural CEP
Total

9.7*
7.0
9.6
16.5
6.8

42. 9%
59.9
51.4
45.6
34.8
51.3

19.1%
17.9
24.4
10.6
34.2

43.7%
56.5
44.8
45.0
30.6
46.6

16.1%
12.5
19.2
13.5
15.5

13.1*
9.2
13.1
23.7
16.4
12.6

53
17
42
2
114

47.1
48.2
52.2
36.3
49.0

16.5
20.3
19.6
—

49.0
55.0
48.2
40.0
49.4

16.6
17.7
14.8
—

9.0
8.7
11.1
18.2
9.9

5.6
6.1
6.3

34
12
27
16
W

48.8
61.0
65.4
34.2
"5278

22.9
19.0
21.9
15.3

47.4
57.7
61.9
36.2

15.1
12.8
13.1
12.5

10.3
6.2
8.5
16.1

52.6
51.6
40.3
33.7
"JO

28.8
24.3
8.1
12.8

50.4
50.7
51.3
41.6

27.1
17.5
12.5
12.7

15.8
10.0
9.5
14.4
T3T5

32
38

111
3
4

8.5%
6.5
10.3
15.4
10.0
9.3

6.4%
5.7
7.4
8.1
6.2

56.0%
69.1
64.5
69.3
51.2
63T9

52.2%
63.0
55.1
60.4
40.6
56.1

56.1
56.9
63.3
54.5
58.8

57.1
66.3
58.3
52.6
58.8

Labor Force 100,000-200,000
Consortia
Cities
Counties
States
Total

8.1
11.3
10.1
12.6
~9~4

7.4
10.3
6.7
—

7.0
5.5
7.3
9.9

8.0
5.2
6.2
15.4
~O

5.8
3.7
4.5
11.9

59.1
67.2
73.9
50.3

55.4
62.9
68.1
51.6

14.6
8.2
7.9
8.7

10.5
9.9
10.0
11.2
10.8

8.5
6.7
7.3
5.5

68.4
61.6
49.8
48.1
54.3

60.9
60.6
61.3
52.8

Labor Force 200,000-500,000
Consortia
Cities
Counties
States
Total

Ton

Labor Force 500,000+
Consortia
Cities
Counties
States
Total

4
28
78

*The training activity levels for each classification are the average of the levels for the various prime
sponsors in this classification rather than a weighted average.
Source:

Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor, unpublished Management Information
System data for fiscal 1980.
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ing, as judged by expenditure and participant shares, than do cities and
counties. Second, there is modestly increasing emphasis on classroom
training up through the 200,000-500,000 prime sponsor size range and then a
decrease beyond that point. Third, OJT activity is most prevalent under
balance-of-state programs, and tends to be lower in cities. Fourth, there
is no clear relationship between prime sponsor size and OJT activity,
although the OJT emphasis appears to be least in cities and counties with
labor forces of 200,000-500,000, i.e., the same areas where classroom
training is given greater emphasis.
Regression analysis helps to sort out these patterns, adjusting for
differences in unemployment rates and youth shares between prime sponsors
of differing sizes and governmental structures:
Equation 6. Prime sponsor classroom and on-the-job trainees
as a percent of total IIBC participants in fiscal 1980 = a + b
(size of prime sponsor labor force: 1 if less than 200,000; 0 if
200,000 or more) + c (prime sponor unemployment rate) + d (per
cent of IIBC participants who were under age 22).
r2
a
b
c
d

=
=
=
=
=

.08
88.46
-.04
-.16
-.55

Interpretation—The labor force size of a prime sponsor had
very little impact on the training shares after considering the
differences in unemployment rates and youth shares. The re
lationship between unemployment rates and training levels was
slightly negative but inconsequential, since a standard deviation
increase in unemployment was associated with a .3 percentage
point increase in training share.
Equation 7. Prime sponsor on-the-job trainees as a percent
Title IIBC participants fiscal 1980 = a + b (size of prime
sponsor labor force: 1 if less than 200,000; 0 if 200,000 or
more) + c (type of government unit: 1 if state; 0 if city,
county or consortia) + d (prime sponsor unemployment rate).
r2
a
b
c
d

=
=
=
=
=

.06
6.3
1.47
5.53
.57

Interpretation—Larger prime sponsors had on-the-job
training shares 1.47 percentage points above smaller, nonstate
prime sponsors. This differential represented a fifth of a
standard deviation in the OJT share. State prime sponsors had
OJT share 5.53 percentage points higher after controlling for the
effects of size and unemployment. This increment represented
nearly two-thirds of a standard deviation. This would suggest
that small balance-of-state jurisdictions and small prime spon
sors have more access to employers or greater preference for OJT.
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Equation 3.
Prime sponsor classroom trainees as a percent
Title IIBC participants = a + b (size of prime sponsor labor
force: 1 if less than 100,000 labor force and 0 if greater) + c
(prime sponsor unemployment rate) + d (percent IIBC participants
who were under age 22).

r2
a
b
c
d

= .14
=36.1
= +4.02
= -.10
= -.74

Interpretation—Small jurisdictions were apparently not
lacking in classroom training facilities, or at least this was
not reflected in their service mix. Prime sponsors with less
than 100,000 labor force had a slightly higher percentage of
classroom training participants after controlling for differences
in unemployment rates and youth shares.
Another factor which may explain the diversity in service mix is
variance in interpretation and enforcement of national policies by the
Department of Labor regional offices. The regions must review and approve
plans, and could, presumably, pressure the prime sponsors into undertaking
more OJT or classroom training. Performance monitoring efforts might also
vary. For instance, ambitious OJT targets are seldom met. If a region
pressures prime sponsors to maintain or improve OJT shares from year to
year, and if it follows through with enforcement efforts, the result may be
a greater incidence of OJT for sponsors in the region. It is also possible
that prime sponsors in different areas of the country share different
perspectives, or institutional and historical factors which lead to simi
larities in behavior. For instance, the prime sponsors in Region IX (San
Francisco) are largely concentrated in California and might, therefore,
uniformly take advantage of the extensive and low cost state post-secondary
education system.
The 1960s categorical jobs programs concentrated
disproportionate funding in the large Northeast cities, so that historical
patterns may have been established which have only gradually been altered
under CETA.
There are significant differences between regions in the levels of
training activity (Table 4.2). In fiscal 1980, prime sponsors in Regions
III (Philadelphia), IV (Atlanta), VII (Kansas City), and IX (San Francisco)
put the most emphasis on classroom training. Sponsors in Regions II (New
York), VIII (Denver), IX (San Francisco), and X (Seattle) gave greatest
priority to OJT. Total expenditures for training were lowest among prime
sponsors in Regions VI (Dallas), X (Seattle), and V (Chicago). There was a
16 percentage point differential between the regions with the highest and
lowest shares of participants in training.
Regression analysis suggests that the variability among regions was
not the result of differing unemployment rates or youth shares for the
prime sponsors within the various regions.

Table 4.2

Variations Between Department of Labor Regions in Training Activities
of Prime Sponsors Under Title IIBC, Fiscal 1980

Region
Region
Region
Region
Region
Region
Region
Region
Region

I (Boston)
II (New York)
III (Philadelphia)
IV (Atlanta)
V (Chicago)
VI (Dallas)
VII (Kansas City)
VIII (Denver)
IX (San Francisco)

Region X (Seattle)

Classroom Training
Participants as
Share of Total
Participants

Classroom Training
Expenditures as
Share of Total
Expenditures

47.8%

47.5%
46.8
51.2
51.6
46.8
43.2
55.2
45.9
51.6
42.7

51.2
52.9
51.6
49.8
42.1
55.9
50.1
55.8
42.6

OJT
Participants as
Share of Total
Participants
12.6%
15.5
9.0
9.0
8.7
11.4
13.8
16.4
13.4
15.9

OJT
Expenditures as
Share of Total
Expenditures
9. OS
11.7
6.4
6.7
8.2
8.6
10.1
8.1
11.7
12.1

Training
Participants as
Share of Total
Participants
60.4%
66.7
61.9
59.6
58.5
53.5
69.7
66.5
67.5
58.5

Training
Expenditures as
Share of Total
Expenditures
57. 5i
60.0
60.6
59.2
55.0
51.8
65.3
64.0
63.3
54.8

*The training activity levels for each Region are the mean of the activity levels for each prime sponsor rather than a weighted average.
Source:

Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor, unpublished management information system data for fiscal 1980.
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Equation 9. Prime sponsor classroom and on-the-job trainees
as a percent Title IIBC participants = a + b (region in which
prime sponsor located: 1 if Region II, VII, VIII or IX; 0 if
other) + c (prime sponsor unemployment rate) + d (percent IIBC
participants who were under age 22).
r2
a
b
c
d

=
=
=
=
=

.18
96.5
4.00
.33
-.78

Interpretation—The greater emphasis on training (and hence,
less on work experience) in the regions averaging the higher
training shares was not a reflection of the youth shares or
unemployment rates of prime sponsors in these regions.
Equation 10. Prime sponsor on-the-job trainees as a percent
of IIBC participants = a + b (region in which prime sponsor
located: 1 if Region II, VIII or X; 0 if other)+ c (prime
sponsor unemployment rate) + d (percent of IIBC participants who
were under age 22).
r2
a
b
c
d

=
=
=
=
=

.07
10.6
4.0
.29
-.04

Interpretation—The prime sponsors in Regions II, VIII or X
had a half a standard deviation higher OJT share than prime
sponsors in other regions, after adjusting for differences in
unemployment rates and youth shares.
Variations in the per participant costs are affected by idiosyncratic
participant flow patterns (i.e., some prime sponsors may have stable
participation levels for an entire year while others have phased up in the
latter part of the year) and by differences in costs for training of a
given type and intensity. But since the cost of training per se is usually
related to duration per participant and the intensity per week, par
ticularly since allowance components increase with hours of treatment, the
per participant cost variations are primarily related to variations in
intensity and duration of training.
For all prime sponsors, the cost per participant for IIBC classroom
training in 1980 was negatively related to the percentage of participants
in training (correlation coefficient = -.18) and the cost-per participant
in classroom training bore very little.relationship to the cost-per par
ticipant in on-the-job training (correlation coefficient = +.05).
Differences between prime sponsor unemployment rates and the youth shares
had very limited relationship to variations in per participant costs:
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Equation 11. Prime sponsor cost per participant in Title
IIBC classroom training = a + b (prime sponsor unemployment rate)
+ c (percent IIBC participants who were under age 22) + d
(classroom trainees as a percent of total IIBC participants).
r2
a
b
c
d

=
=
=
=
=

.07
$1698
$24.5
-$3.4
-$7.2

Interpretation—A prime sponsor with an unemployment rate a
standard deviation above average was likely to have a classroom
training cost per participant 4 percent above the average, which
could reflect lower dropout rates due to limited alternatives, or
could be related to more intensive training as a policy in higher
unemployment areas. A prime sponsor with a youth share a
standard deviation above average was likely to have a $37 lower
cost, probably because less expensive "other classroom training"
was provided more frequently to youth. A standard deviation
increment in the classroom training share was associated with a
$157 decrement in cost, which represented 11 percent of the mean
cost or three-tenths of a standard deviation.
Equation 12. Prime sponsor cost per participant in Title
IIBC OJT = a + b (prime sponsor unemployment rate) + c (percent
IIBC participants under age 22) + d (prime sponsor on-the-job
trainees as percent IIBC participants).
r2
a
b
c
d

=
=
=
=
=

.06
$1357
-$29.5
$2.3
-$14.1

Interpretation—An unemployment rate a standard deviation
above- average was associated with an OJT cost $67 or 6 percent
below average. While this represented only a tenth of a standard
deviation in OJT costs, there was apparently no premium to secure
OJT slots in high unemployment areas. Likewise, a prime sponsor
with an OJT participant share a standard deviation above the mean
was likely to have average costs $120 or 6 percent below the
mean, suggesting that generosity in employer reimbursement was
not the means they used to secure more OJT slots.
The average cost for classroom training was a sixth higher among
primes with a labor force of 500,000 or more than among those with a labor
force less than 100,000 (Table 4.3). OJT costs were lower in the smallest
primes. States had lower costs for classroom training than other units of
government (perhaps because of the use of state-funded training and
education facilities), and for OJT (perhaps because costs were less in
rural balance-of-state operations). There were some substantial cost
differences between the prime sponsors in different regions (Table 4.4).
Regions II (New York) and III (Philadelphia) had the highest cost per
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Table 4.3
1980 Title IIBC Training Costs by Size
and Structure of Prime Sponsors
Number
With
Complete
Data*

Classroom
Training
Expenditures
per Participant*

OJT
Expenditures
per Participant*

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Mean

Standard
Deviation

32
38
111
3
4

$1487
1459
1211
1188
1411
1314

$ 608
518
514
262
515

$ 871
952
1018
877
740
973

$ 333
471
384
170
270

53
17
42
2

1397
1434
1380
1740
1402

589
684
558
__

1135
1948
1211
920
1208

640
2024
411
--

34
12
27
16

1447
1447
1474
1314
1431

581
469
388
453

1075
1613
1206
1104
1192

330
1030
678
443

8
8
4
28

1375
1638
1845
1485
1522

576
618
469
467

1186
1914
1593
968
1214

677
1081
482
292

Labor Force Less
Than 100,000
Consortia
Cities
Counties
States
Rural CEP
Total

Labor Force
100,000-200,000
Consortia
Cities
Counties
States
Total

Labor Force
200,000-500,000
Consortia
Cities
Counties
States
Total
Labor Force 500,000+
Consortia
Cities
Counties
States
Total

*The training cost levels for each classification are the average of the
levels for the various prime sponsors in this classification rather than
a weighted average.
Source:

Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor,
unpublished management information system data for fiscal 1980,
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Table 4.4
Variations Between Department of Labor Regions in Title IIBC
Training Costs, Fiscal 1980
Classroom Training
Cost per Participant*
Region I (Boston)

OJT Cost
per Participant*

$1335

$ 991

Region II (New York)

1509

1660

Region III (Philadelphia)

1480

1060

Region IV (Atlanta)

1411**

Region V (Chicago)

1278

1203

Region VI (Dallas)

1380

1105

Region VII (Kansas City)

1332

920

Region VIII (Denver)

1069

1139

Region IX (San Francisco)

1335

1219

Region X (Seattle)

1407

1078

916**

*The training cost levels for each region are the average of the levels
for the prime sponsors in the region rather than a weighted av
erage.
**Excludes one balance-of-state prime sponsor with extraordinarily high
cost per participant.
Source:

Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor,
unpublished management information system data for fiscal 1980.

classroom training participant. Region I had by far
OJT participant, while Regions VII (Kansas City) and
lowest. The difference in classroom training costs
highest-cost region was more than two-fifths, while
fifths.

the highest costs per
IV (Atlanta) had the
from the lowest- to
for OJT it was four-

The variation in outcomes as measured by placement rates, positive
terminations, costs per placement and costs per positive termination may be
explained by differences in service mix, service intensity, participant mix
and local economic conditions. Presumably the residual reflects either
real differences in the effectiveness of services and placement or else
aberrations in the data.
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The degree of emphasis on training is only a minor factor in ex
plaining outcomes (Table 4.5). A prime sponsor with Title IIB OJT levels a
standard deviation above the average for all prime sponsors in 1980 was
likely to have a .6 percentage point higher positive termination rate.
Differences in classroom training shares had almost no relationship to
positive termination rates.
Table 4.5
Title IIB, Positive Termination Rate FY 1980 (N = 399)
r = 22.1
Local Factors
Enrollee Characteristics
Percent female
Percent age 14-15
Percent age 16-19
Percent age 45-54
Percent age 55+
Percent black
Percent Hispanics
Percent other minorities
Percent AFDC recipients
Program Mix Variables
Percent participants in OJT
Percent participants in classroom
training—skill
Percent participants in classroom
training—other
Average length of stay

Cost per enrollee

Local Economic Variables
Unemployment rate
Employment growth rate

Source:

Percentage point change in posi
tive termination rate associated
with a 1 percentage point change
in the factor (except as noted)

.26
.46
.15
.51
.01
.04
.04
.15
.07
.07
-.01
.00
A one-month increase in length of
stay was related to a 1.47 percent
age point decrease in the positive
termination rate.
A $100 increase in cost per
enrollee was related to a .04
percentage point increase in
the positive termination rate.

-.34
.15

Department of Labor, Office of Assistant Secretary for Policy,
Evaluation and Research, unpublished calculations for performance
indicators work group.
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Several simpler regressions focusing on the training intensity also
find little relationship to positive termination rates:
Equation 12. Prime sponsor Title IIBC positive termination
rate = a + b (prime sponsor unemployment rate) + c (percent IIBC
participants under 22) + d (percent IIBC participants in class
room training or OJT).
r2
a
b
c
d

= .04
=64.1
= .05
= .15
= -.05

Interpretation—More training was associated with a slightly
lower positive termination rate while an increased youth share
was associated with a higher rate (because return to school for
in-school programs is counted as a positive termination).
However, the service mix factor was negligible. A standard
deviation in the training share was associated with only a 1
percentage point difference in the positive termination rate.
Equation 13. Prime sponsor Title IIBC positive termination
rate = a + b (prime sponsor unemployment rate) + c (percent IIBC
participants under age 22) + d (cost per participant in IIBC
classroom training and OJT) =
r2
a
b
c
d

=
=
=
=
=

.03
60.19
-.13
+.19
-.00

Interpretation—More intensive or expensive training was not
related to increases in the positive termination rate.
In light of the earlier evidence that placement status at termination
as recorded by the prime sponsor was a powerful predictor of individual
earnings gains relative to matched controls, the variances in placement
rates among prime sponsors are of considerable interest. Differences in
service and participant mixes and local economic conditions explained
nearly two-fifths of the variance among prime sponsors in their fiscal 1980
placement (entered employment) rates (Table 4.6). However, program mix
factors were only a minor part of the picture. OJT contributed to higher
placement rates, but a prime sponsor with an OJT share one standard
deviation above the mean had a predicted placement rate only 2.5 percentage
points higher, which represented less than a fifth of a standard deviation
in the placement rate. Placement rates were slightly higher where more
skill training was provided, but other training was associated with
marginally lower placements.
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Table 4.6
Title I IB, Entered Employment Rate FY 1980 (N = 399)
r = .38
Local Factors
Enrollee Characteristics
Percent female
Percent age 14-15
Percent age 16-19
Percent age 45-54
Percent age 55+
Percent black
Percent Hispanics
Percent other minorities
Percent AFDC recipients
Program
Percent
Percent
Percent
Average

Mix Variables
OJT
classroom training—skill
classroom training—other
length of stay

Cost per enrollee

Local Economic Variables
Unemployment rate
Employment growth rate
Quit rate

Source:

Percentage point change in entered
employment rate associated with a 1
percentage point increase in the
factor (except as noted)______

.03
.36
.24
.39
.28
.05
.03
.18
.16
.29
.01
-.04

A one-month increase in length of
stay was related to a .33 percent
age point decrease in entered em
ployment rate.
A $100 increase in cost per
enrollee was related to a .06
percentage point increase in
entered employment rate.
-1.62
.30
.40

Department of Labor, Office of Assistant Secretary for Policy,
Evaluation and Research, unpublished calculations for performance
indicators work group.

Several simpler regressions focusing on the training variables support
the conclusions from the more detailed regressions:
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Equation 16. Prime sponsor IIBC placement rate = a + b
(prime sponsor unemployment rate) + c (percent IIBC participants
under age 22) + d (classroom and on-the-job trainees as percent
total IIBC participants).
r2
a
b
c
d

=
=
=
=
=

.16
71.3
-1.16
-.51
.00

Interpretation—While the unemployment rates and the youth
shares strongly affected placement rates, there was no observable
relationship between the training share and the placement rate.
Equation 17. Prime sponsor IIBC placement rate = a + b
(prime sponsor unemployment rate) + c (percent IIBC participants
under age 22) + d (classroom and on-the-job training expenditures
as percent total IIBC expenditures).
r2
a
b
c
d

=
=
=
=
=

.16
73.4
-1.16
-.53
-.02

Interpretation—There was almost no relationship between
variations in training expenditure shares and placement rates.
Equation 18. Prime
a + b (prime sponsor
participants who were
participant in classroom

sponsor IIBC positive termination rate =
unemployment rate) + c (percent IIBC
under age 22) + d (expenditures per
training and OJT).
r2
a
b
c
d

=
=
=
=
=

.18
69.4
-1.28
-.52
+.003

Interpretation—A prime sponsor with training costs
(intensity) a standard deviation above average was likely to have
a 1.7 percentage point higher placement rate. The coefficient is
so small that this is not a dependable estimate, but it is
consistent with the higher placement rates noted in the CLMS for
long stayers in training.
The cost per placement from Title I IB was also affected very modestly
by the program mix (Table 4.7). A standard deviation increase in the OJT
share was associated with a 6 percent lower average cost per placement.
Conversely, a standard deviation increase in skill training shares was
associated with a 4 percent increase in costs per placement, and other
classroom training with a 3 percent increase, presumably because classroom
trainees returned to school rather than entered the labor market.
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Table 4.7
Title IIB, Cost Per Entered Employment FY 1980 (N = 399)
r2 = .39

Local Factors
Enrollee Chacteristies
Percent female
Percent age 14-15
Percent age 16-19
Percent age 45-54
Percent age 55+
Percent black
Percent Hispanics
Percent other minorities
Percent AFDC recipients
Program
Percent
Percent
Percent
Average

Mix Variables
OJT
classroom training—skill
classroom training—other
length of stay

Local Economic Variables
Unemployment rate
Employment growth rate
Quit rate
Source:

Dollar change in cost per
entered employment associated with
a 1 percentage point increase in
the factor (except as noted)___
8.65
46.23
6.85
-96.81
-43.52
1.61
-7.31
-22.40
-.73
-44.42
14.52
12.79
A one-month increase in length of
stay was related to a $551.36
increase in cost per entered
employment.
438.06
-2.4
-459.31

Department of Labor, Office of Assistant Secretary for Policy,
Evaluation and Research, unpublished calculations for performance
indicators work group.

In summary, state and local decisionmakers are responsible for the
In 1980, prime
service mix choices for the majority of CETA dollars.
sponsors chose to use less than a fifth of the total resources available to
them for classroom and on-the-job training, instead emphasizing job
Yet among prime sponsors, there was enormous variance in the
creation.
degree of emphasis on training. According to net impact estimates, OJT had
a very high payoff; yet under Title IIBC, less than one in nine par
ticipants were in OJT. Again, the range in emphasis among prime sponsors
was significant. Longer classroom training paid off in greater net gains,
but the average length of stay under Title IIBC was only 5.1 months. The
intensity of training, as proxied by the cost per participant, also varied
Finally, placement was a key success factor in classroom
enormously.
training and all other CETA components. Only two-fifths of Title IIBC
terminees in fiscal 1980 entered employment upon termination, but, again,
there was great variability among prime sponsors.
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The unemployment rate and youth share among participants are not major
explanatiye factors for the service mix decisions of prime sponsors. While
the statistical analysis is crude, these variables do not bear much
relationship to classroom training and OJT participant or expenditure
shares under Title IIBC. In many cases, the relationships are the opposite
of a priori expectations. For instance, OJT levels are apparently higher
in prime sponsors with higher unemployment rates. Other factors such as
type of jurisdiction, size and region have more explanative power. Area
conditions and participant mix are much more powerful predictors of
outcomes. However, outcomes are not significantly affected by service mix
decisions. In other words, prime sponsors would be more likely to alter
the mix of participants than the mix of services if they wanted to increase
placement and positive termination rates. After considering a significant
number of service and participant mix as well as area economic factors, the
unexplained variance in placement among prime sponsors is still very large.
Thus, despite the very significant variation between prime sponsors in
their decisions and outcomes, the patterns of variation provide few clues
as to why prime sponsors on average put so much emphasis on work ex
perience, why they emphasize classroom training more than OJT, why
classroom training is usually short-term rather than longer-duration, why
there is extensive creaming into the few OJT opportunities, or why
placement is not higher. The answers to these questions lie elsewhere.
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SECTION 2.
THE DELIVERY PERSPECTIVE

Elegant assessments of local needs and the findings of esoteric
research and evaluations have little relevance at the delivery level. The
realities which dominate prime sponsor decisons are much more pedestrian.
Judgments concerning what works for whom are quite different at the
delivery level than when propounded from the ivory tower. The accounting
system mandated for CETA activities provides an inadequate foundation for
decisionmaking and management, biasing service and participant mix
decisions. Even if prime sponsors could determine what worked best for
whom and could accurately measure activities and outcomes, rational
decisions are undermined by an uncertainty and volatility of funding and
the constant changes in federal policy.
Can Effectiveness Be Judged Locally?
Even if a prime sponsor had the resources and the interest to
duplicate the procedures of the national evaluations, net impacts could not
be accurately assessed at the local level. To measure a 5 or 10 percent
difference in post-program earnings requires a large sample size of
participants and substantial control groups of nonparticipants. If the aim
is to isolate the effects of a component of a total program, or even more
specifically, to determine its relative effectiveness in serving different
subsegments of the participant population, the sample size for each
activity/participant combination and the related control group must be
large enough to discern these marginal impacts. Even with the large
samples in the CLMS (with its concomitantly large pricetag), the con
clusions become quite "iffy" when disaggregated to significant segments or
to detailed components such as occupational vs. nonoccupational classroom
training. Most prime sponsors do not have enough enrol lees in activity/
participant cells to determine in any statistically reliable way the
relative payoff even if all were tracked. Furthermore, the control group
in the CLMS is drawn from other quite expensive samples—the Current
Population Survey and the Social Security records. Neither are feasible as
controls for evaluating local activities.
But prime sponsors are supposed to be running programs not evalua
tions; they lack the resources and reason to conduct long-term follow-up
and to maintain control groups. To the extent they consider effectiveness
at all, they must necessarily focus on absolute rather than net impacts,
and on immediate post-program outcomes rather than longer-term results.
Even if the information about the costs and benefits which is available
from national evaluations were calculable locally, prime sponsor's inter
pretations and decisions might differ, since the resources (costs) are
federal rather than local, and since the prime sponsor is a governmental
unit with responsibilities for delivering goods and services which can, in
part, be provided by CETA participants. Local decisionmakers might be
quite rational in their decisionmaking and quite concerned with the
effectiveness of local services, and yet still reach decisions which are
less than optimal from a national, ivory tower perspective.
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The heavy emphasis on work experience in local CETA programs is a case
in point. The national data suggest that adult work experience has no
post-program earnings impacts whereas classroom training substantially
increases earnings relative to controls in the two post-program years.
According to the CLMS interview data for the fiscal 1976 participants, 54
percent of the adult work experience participants were employed at exit,
compared to only 29 percent of classroom training participants (Figure
4.5). Three months later—the maximum time over which CETA will usually
follow-up participants—the percentages were 52 percent and 46 percent,
respectively. Because the adult work experience group was more likely to
be working a month before entry, the gains in employment were about equal
at the three-month point but significantly in favor of the work experience
participants at exit. It was not until a half year after termination that
the pre/post gains for classroom trainees noticeably exceeded those for
work experience participants. If the prime sponsor judged effectiveness by
termination results, work experience would be preferred. If the judgment
were based on 90-day follow-up, the average results for the first three
post-program months would still favor the work approach. Rarely does a
prime sponsor track beyond this point.
From a local budgetary perspective, work experience also makes more
sense. In fiscal 1980, the prime sponsor cost for a classroom training
person-year under Title IIBC was half again the cost for work experience.
Both pay the minimum wage but classroom training must purchase the training
in addition to the stipend. Because work experience has a shorter duration
of stay than classroom training, its average cost per participant in fiscal
1980 was only three-fifths as great. More exactly, for every 100 par
ticipants in classroom training, the prime sponsor could serve 159 persons
in work experience.
From the prime sponsor's perspective, however, the cost must be offset
further by the value of work product. Classroom trainees do not produce a
social product, whereas work experience participants, if worked hard and
matched to useful jobs they can perform, may pay back all of the wages and
fringes. Assume, however, the productivity equals 75 percent of the slot
cost. The per participant cost of the program from the local perspective
is, thus, only one-sixth that of classroom training. In another sense, the
work experience pays back the local jurisdiction 75 cents on the dollar in
output, plus local taxes on the in-program wages which are three-fifths of
expenditures, plus reductions in locally-financed income transfers; in
contrast, training results in no output, local income taxes are usually not
paid on the allowances which are only two-fifths of expenditures, and there
is less reduction in locally-financed income transfers because allowances
are reduced where public assistance is received. The jurisdiction will
benefit from the discounted value of future local taxes relative to the
increased future earnings but this would amount to only a few dollars a
year on the $400 increment in earnings resulting from clasroom training
according to national studies (although not observable at the local level).
It is understandable, then, why prime sponsors do not favor training
over work approaches. Local decisionmakers are the ones who feel the
pressure of needs which exceed resources, and will want to serve as many as
possible. There is little evidence locally that training produces more
earnings impacts and some indication that the opposite is true. The local

Figure 4.5
Post-Program Employment Status of Fiscal 1976 Work
Experience Participants vs. Classroom Trainees

Experience
Classroom Training

54

52

52

50

46

56

54
48

51

42
31

29

a-

26

27
23 ,12

.25

^

27

34
29

9

Exit

1 month 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months
Percent Employed at Various
Post-Program Times

Exit

1 month 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months
Increase in Percent Employed Relative
to Status One Month Before Entry

Source: Westat, Inc. Postprogram Experiences and Pre/Post Comparisons for Terminees Who Entered
CETA During Fiscal Year 1976 (July 1975-June 1976) (Hashinqton, D.C.:Employment and
Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, March 1979), Table 51
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government gains nothing from trainees whereas it gets some useful output
from work experience participants.
Training on the job appears effective from both the local and national
perspectives. For 1976 on-the-job trainees, the employment rate one month
after termination was 62 percent compared to the 50 percent rate among work
experience participants, at three months the differential was as great, 64
percent vs. 52 percent, respectively. The employment rate gains measured
relative to the labor market status of participants three months prior to
their CETA entry were 29 percentage points for OJT, compared to only 23
percentage points for work experience, at one-month post-program; or 31 and
25 percentage points, respectively at three-months post-program. 3_/ The
cost per slot for OJT in fiscal 1980 under Title IIBC was essentially the
same as the cost of work experience. While OJT produces no public product,
OJT slots will benefit local employers or may in some cases serve as an
economic development tool.
The problem is not the desirability of OJT to local decisionmakers but
the difficulty of arranging it. First, work experience slots are usually
The summer program, for example, averaged eight
secured in clusters.
On-the-job training is usually arranged for one
worksite.
per
participants
Second, work experience slots tend to be
or two placements at a time.
refillable and a bank of "good" work experience slots can be cumulated over
OJT is a treadmill. A small firm may need a press operator. It
time.
cannot afford to have more trainees than its job needs, since the firm
receives only 50 percent subsidy, in contrast to the public sector where
employing agents can easily take on several PSE or work experience
participants who are fully subsidized in order to find one who can
ultimately fill an available job. The on-the-job trainee has a one in two
chance of making it into the job permanently, in which case there is no
need for another trainee. This contrasts with a transition rate less than
half as high for work experience. If the first trainee is a failure, the
firm may decide not to go the OJT route again, whereas work experience
slots, which are free to the public or nonprofit agency, will usually be
refilled even if some of the workers prove ineffective. Third and most
critically, the OJT formula does not provide much incentive to employers
and most are uninterested. Many do not want to get involved whatever the
subsidy. As an example, a five-site demonstration program, which aimed to
compare the benefits of work in the private sector vs. work in the public
sector, provided a full wage subsidy for firms hiring out-of-school
disadvantaged young adults, i.e., it equalized the reimbursement to
In the public sector, 53
private-for-profit or nonprofit employers.
percent of contacted employers ended up providing at least one worksite
compared to 35 percent of those in the nonprofit sector but only 25 percent
of those in the for-profit sites. On average, it required 1.2 contacts to
develop a single job in the public sector, 2.0 in the nonprofit sector, and
3.4 in the private sector. 4/ The administrative effort to market the same
clients to the private sector with only a 50 percent subsidy would have
been incredible.
Prime sponsors are most
OJT. They do not set higher
attain even the modest targets
actual IIBC OJT enrollments

conscious of the difficulties of marketing
goals because they are frequently unable to
currently set in their plans. For instance,
realized by prime sponsors in fiscal 1980
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averaged 83 percent of planned enrollment (after modification probably had
reduced originally planned figures when it became apparent they could not
be attained). In marked contrast, the actual classroom training en
rollments averaged 111 percent of plan. Only one in five prime sponsors
fell short of its classroom training enrollment goals by more than 10
percent, and just one in twenty achieved less than 75 percent of the
planned figure. Even though OJT goals were quite modest in most cases,
half of prime sponsors fell short by 10 percent or more and three in ten
fell short by 25 percent of more. j>/
If work experience is emphasized because it looks more effective when
judged from the local perspective than from national studies, while OJT is
downplayed because of marketing difficulties, the absence of long-duration
classroom training results from both the difficulties of mounting such
programs and the dubious payoffs as judged by solely short-term outcomes.
The national net impact estimates suggest that there is a very substantial
gradient in the relationship between length of stay and post-program net
earnings gains. But the prime sponsor sees a quite different picture.
During the immediate post-program period, employment prospects are not much
better for long-term vs. short-term trainees. For instance, for fiscal
1975 classroom trainees staying less than 60 days, the employment rate in
the first quarter after termination was 44 percent, compared to 43 percent
for trainees staying 60 days or more (Table 4.8). It was only over the
course of time that the benefits of longer duration training became more
evident. During the second year after termination, the employment rate for
participants with less than two months stay was 5b percent, compared to 60
percent for trainees staying over two months, and 65 percent for those
staying half a year or more. The differences are best visualized by
showing the change over time in the differential between the annualized
earnings of trainees in each length of stay category and the average for
all trainees in the first post-program year (Figure 4.6). Over time, the
earnings of all trainees increased, but they rose by more for the long
stayers.
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Table 4.8

Percent of Time Employed in Post-Program Period
Second Half Fiscal 1975 Classroom Trainees

Days of Participation

Post-Termination
Period

8-29

30-59

60-90

91-181

182-364

First quartet
Second quarter
Third quarter
Fourth quarter
First year

45%
55
56
57
53

43%
49
45
49
47

43%
49
55
63
52

41%
48
51
52
48

46%
55
63
63
57

Fifth quarter

55
59
57
57

54

64
61
61
63

53
54
54
58

63
65
68
68
66

Sixth quarter
Seventh quarter
Eighth quarter

57

Second year
Source:

53
57
56

54

63

55

Westat, Inc. CLMS Follow-up Report No. 3 (36 Months After Entry),
Experiences for the First Two Postprogram Years, With Pre/Post Com
parisons, for Terminees Who Entered CETA During January-June 1975
Employment and Training Administration,
(Washington, D.C.
Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, December 1980),
Table 43.

Figure 4.6

Post-Program Earnings and Earnings Increases by
Duration of Stay, Second Half Fiscal 1975 Classroom Trainees
Annualized Earnings Second Year
After Termination By Duration Of
"*~~ Of Stay-;-Average Earnings All
Terminees First Year After Termination

$2000.

$1000 .

r

,- — r
0-30 30-60'60-90.
l

$-1000

Source:

Annalized Earnings First Year
After Termination By Duration of
Stay-^Average Earnings All
Terminees In First Year After
Termination

91-180

180-364

Duration of Stay
Annualized Earnings First Quarter
After Termination By Duration of
Stayf Average Earnings All Trainees
First Year After Termination

Westat, Inc. CLMS Follow-up Report No. 3 (36 Months After Entry),
Experiences for the First Two Postprogram Years, With Pre/Post Com
parisons, for Terminees Who Entered CETA During January-June 1975
Washington, D.C.: Employment and Training Administration, Office
of Policy, Evaluation and Research, December 1980), Table 47.
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While prime sponsors do not see the impacts of longer-duration
training, they are unavoidably faced with its cost. Assuming a uniform
training cost of $500 per month, the cost per participant and cost per
placement would have been as follows in 1976: 6/
Assumed
Cost Per
Participant

Placement Rate
According to
Prime Sponsors
Records

Three-Month
Post-Program
Employment Rate
for 1976
Participants

Cost Per
Placement

Cost Per
Three-Month
Employment

Duration of Stay
0-29

$ 500

43

44

$1163

$1136

30-59

1000

49

43

2041

2326

60-89

1500

50

48

3000

3125

90-119

2000

54

45

3703

4167

120-149

2500

51

49

4902

5102

150-179

3000

47

53

5263

5660

180-209

3500

55

53

6364

6604

210+

4000

59

55

6778

7273

The net earnings gains for long-duration stayers more than make up for
the costs of longer-duration training. For instance, 1976 participants who
stayed one to ten weeks in classroom training essentially experienced no
gains while those who stayed 40 weeks or more gained in the neighborhood "bT
$1400 annually through the second post-program year. The prime sponsor,
however, does not observe net impacts but only post-program outcomes; a
great deal of faith in the efficacy of long-term training is necessary to
justify costs per placement for long-term training which are six to seven
times those for short-term training.
Finally, the short-duration stayers for whom net impacts are minimal
include those enrolled in short-term courses, those who drop-out of
long-term courses because they fail, and those who leave training because
It may well be that the
they find better immediate opportunities.
graduates of short-term training do better than those who fail in long-term
training. For instance, the dropout from a two-year registered nurse
training program may remain an orderly, whereas the participant in a short
English-as-a-second-language course will gain entry into the labor market
by learning language fundamentals course. Since the chances of failure
increase with the duration of training (even though there is a rapidly
declining increment in failure rates after the first 30 days), and since
the costs of failure (both programmatic outlays and foregone earnings)
increase- with duration of time before failure, then if the dropouts
experience no earnings gains, the long-duration training will appear even
less worthwhile to the prime sponsor. In such a case, the local viewpoint
would be more appropriate than the conclusions drawn from aggregated
national data. Given the fact that the majority of short-stayers are
scheduled short-stayers, the likelihood that those who fail to complete
longer training will realize at least some gains, and the fact that the
dropouts include some who left to take advantage of better opportunities,
it is unlikely that the payoff of scheduled short-duration training is much
higher than the average return for all trainees who stay a short-duration.
But it surely is another factor seen at the local but not national level
which adds to the arguments for short training.
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The assignment patterns for different subgroups of participants may
also be explained, in part, by the differences between the ivory tower and
For instance, both younger and older par
delivery level perspectives.
ticipants are underrepresented in training and overrepresented in work
experience. 7J
Distribution of Fiscal 1980 Participants by Age

16-19
20-21
22-44
45+

On-The-Job
Training

Classroom Training
(Including PSIP)

4.0
9.6
9.4
5.5

22.7
35.3
39.6
24.8

Nonsummer
Work Experience,
PSE and
Direct Referral
73.3
55.1
51.0
69.7

Based on the estimated 1978 earnings gains for all 1976 participants,
it appears that the 17-18 and 19-21 cohorts could benefit most from OJT,
and the 19-21 group does better in classroom training than work experience,
although not particularly well from either. 8/
1978 Earnings Gains of All 1976 Entrants

17-18
19-21
22-44
45+

On-The-Job
Trainees

Classroom
Trainees

Work
Experience
Participants

$776
526
528
640

$204
94
647
487

$441
45
60
665

It also appears that minority males, and particularly young adults,
benefit from OJT but from little else. 9/
1978 Earnings Gains of All 1976 Entrants
Minority
Males

17-18
19-21
22-25

Classroom Trainees

On-The-Job
Trainees

$531
-150
-607

$ 888
490
1275

Work Experience
Participants
$ -29
-54
-162
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Yet for minority male CETA entrants in 1980, the chances of assignment
to OJT were far below those of white males. 10/
Percent Black
Male Enrollees
in 1980 Assigned
to OJT
16-19
20-21
22-44

3.8%
10.3
9.3

Percent White
Male Enrol lees
in 1980 Assigned
to OJT
6.6%
13.0
14.1

Unquestionably, one reason for the low relative rates of OJT par
ticipation for these groups is their lower success probability in OJT
Among 1976 minority male participants in OJT, the postassignments.
training placement rate was 52.9 percent, compared to 57.5 percent for
white males. Among 17-21 year-old OJT participants, the placement rate was
45.4, compared to 64.1 percent for 22-25 year-olds, ll/ These placement
differentials parallel those from other service components; for CETA as a
whole, 31.9 percent of all minority males, compared to 34.4 percent of all
white males, were placed, as were 29.6 percent of 17-21 year-olds compared
However, where the consequences of
to 36.2 percent of 22-25 year-olds.
nonplacement fall on the participant in the case of work experience or
classroom training, a negative termination in OJT can turn the employer
against the system, affecting the possibilities for subsequent placements.
This residual effect may explain—although not justify—the reluctance of
prime sponsors to assign high risk participants to OJT even though they
benefit substantially. Another factor may simply be that employers will
more likely reject minority referrals, or will not be inclined to sign up
Additionally, minority enrollees are probably more
in the first case.
concentrated in poverty areas where it is difficult to arrange OJT
placements.
There is also a heavy emphasis on classroom training and work
experience for participants with limited earnings histories (less than
$2000 in each of the prior two years), and little emphasis on classroom
training for high earners ($4500 or more in each of the prior two years).
Yet the low earners gain most from OJT where they are least likely to be
placed, whereas the high earners benefit relatively more from classroom as
opposed to on-the-job training: 12/
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Fiscal 1976 Participants
Low Earners

High Earners

36.0%
10.9

28.9%
20.6

53.1

50.5

$420
811

$1061
400

334

-52

Percent in classroom training
Percent in on-the-job training
Percent i n work ex Perience >
PSE or multiple activities
Estimated 1978 earnings gains
relative to controls
Classroom trainees
On-the-job trainees
Participants in work
experience, PSE or
multiple activities

For 1976 OJT terminees, the employment rate three-months after
termination was 73 percent for individuals who earned $4000 or more in the
year before entry, compared to 58 percent for the lower earners, despite
the fact that the low earners gained more relative to low earner con
trols. 13/ Again, in allocating the scarce OJT slots there is apparently
an emphasis on reducing the risk of failure even though some in the higher
earner group might be better served by classroom training and many in the
low earner group would be better served by OJT. In these judgments about
what works best for whom, the pronouncements from the ivory tower are
hedged with uncertainties because of the difficulties of accurately
estimating net impacts for subgroups. Certainly local prime sponsors can
make no better estimates. In light of the difficulties of developing OJT
slots, and the evidence from both national and local experience that all
participants benefit from OJT, it is understandable that decisions might be
made on the basis of employer preferences and institutional expediency
rather than distinctions between the relative gains.
The Management Misinformation System
Planning, contracting, performance measurement, and management
decisions by prime sponsors and delivery agents (as well as those of the
regional and national offices of the Department of Labor), rest on a set of
definitions, counting rules, and report formats detailed in the Forms
Preparation Handbook. 14/ This management information system categorizes
participants, services, expenditures, and outcomes. There are three
primary reports counting up the dollars and bodies assigned to the defined
categories. Each report is required from prime sponsors quarterly and
annually covering each of the CETA subparts (YETP, YCCIP, Title IIBC, Title
IID, Title VI, SYEP and PSIP). The annual prime sponsor plans prepared
before the start of each fiscal year for each of these subparts include
quarterly and annual projections of the elements in these reports. Below
the prime sponsor level, subagents are usually required to provide the same
information, frequently on forms which duplicate the prime sponsor's
reports.
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1. The Financial Status Report (FSR) categorizes expenditures by
functional activity and by program component (Table 4.9). The functional
activities are "administration," "allowances," "wages," "fringe benefits,"
"training," and "services." These functional activities are defined so
that they are mutually exclusive and cover all outlays. The program
components are "classroom training," "on-the-job training," "public service
employment," "services," "work experience," "transition services,"
"vocational exploration," and "other activities." These categories are
also designed to be mutually exclusive and to sum to total of expenditures.
The wages and allowances, fringes, services, training, and administration
which are necessary to support each of these program components are
allocated to it. Thus, a service year of classroom training in 1978 under
Title IIBC, included $1,950 (42 percent) for allowances, $835 (18 percent)
for administration, $975 (21 percent) for training and $452 (16 percent)
for services. 15/ Training, as a functional activity, included the $975
for each service year of classroom training provided under Title IIBC, but
also included OJT employer payments as well as the training expenditures
including worksite supervision tor Title IIBC participants whose primary
activity was work experience.
2. The Program Status Summary (PSS) records the current and
cumulative quarterly enrollment, termination and termination status data
for each subpart, as well as the current and cumulative participation
levels, but not termination results, for each of the program components
supported under the subpart (Table 4.10). Individuals are enrolled from
the day they receive employment and training services and must be
officially terminated within 90 days of the point when they leave a program
component. Ihe major termination classifications include entry into
unsubsidized employment, transfer to other subparts of CETA, other
"positive terminations" such as return to school or achievement of intended
participation goals, and "nonpositive" terminations.
3.
Ihe bummary ot Participant Characteristics (SPC) identifies par
ticipants, terminees, and terminees who enter unsubsidized employment
according to sex, age, education, income, family and previous employment
status (Table 4.11). For each of the CETA subparts, each prime sponsor,
thus, reports quarterly and annually on the number of male and female
participants, the number of school dropouts, students and graduates, the
number of mentally or physically handicapped, and the like. There is no
reporting on the characteristics of participants in different components of
each subpart, tor instance, classroom training under Title IIBC, and no
reporting according to characteristics combinations, such as the number of
dropout youth served.
As a basis for these reports, the prime sponsor must maintain a record
for each participant which includes an application form (which must have at
least the detail necessary for the Survey of Participant Characteristics),
the necessary background information and documentation for determining and
reviewing eligiblity, an individual employability development plan, plus a
record ot entry and exit tor each program component, along with enough
detail to track total hours of work experience over a five-year period and
cumulative weeks of participation in other activites. The individual
record must also note the occupation of training or work, the wage or
allowance provided, and the termination status data (at least in the detail
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Financial Status Report Format

CETA
FINANCIAL STATUS REPORT

I. GRANTEE'S NAME AND ADDRESS

*

% ol Plan
OP
FUNDS

a

Program Outlay!

Co

y±hU J6

'

c

B

Clalltoom Training

1

37
2

On th« Job Training

3

PSF
a Subsld Employ
b training [Wngov/
rrlnun or Allow
anccil
c "ie.vlcei (Wag.i/
rrlngrl Of Allow

d Icng Coill

i

S»>rvletl Coiti
(No eompen»atlon)

'

' '\

:

D

- ;, ; >;
,-

;o

D Fl>ed

3

; '> •_
. "

D Final

irrvu,

$

7.

37

A

Total Carry In

B

Accrued R«

ptndlturei O ' la
»olfj

59

it±t3'6

2

Allowance

3

w»gn

Total CETA Fundt

12

- ,% ,

ll ii 1.3-126

B«ncllti
5

WorKlllt
Sup«r«lllon

6

Training

St-JJur

«B

14

——l^^l.

nmirlng

COMMFNTS

Source:

7

37

411

. .

31
i

^
•{

i

[nLaf)
; '

<<1

,

'

-'*

1
'""

'

,Jf
1

Strvlctl

; / era TIFICA TICK
1 CrRTirr nm in ihr ^rrr nf mi »no..lnf/r' •«<! *'!"•' ""•' ""•

JcHF6———

rrport is rnrrrcr and cmnplrtr OIK/ that ftl onrtoit anil ntpmi/

Non F.flrral Shurt
of Program Outlay!

13 Upgrading

.

, u£^ r .

I
> l \'~\

37

11

.

•"" "

70

99
Sunniwr Fntlll»m.nt

' "

'

i

37

10

„

1
4«

-,—— - - ~

Othor Acllvltlx

Carcnr Employmnnl
Fffperlinct

1
1

_
r mtncm

70
6.

rvdoril Sh»f»

^4^* -'L\<\-r -j— -

WO'K E»r>»rlenc«
Servlcntn
Pnitlclpantl

$
f

O Pr«d«t*rmln«^t

48
4

1

>'

'

B»<*

|c

Rate

b

"""

D Provisional

'

-Li i\ j|26
K! 1 »1

rx

a iv
a o»»» ....

a ii o
a vi

, \ „„,,
a vii

Typ» 31 R»t«

E

D "i

° "-B.C

PnOGRAM

:.

.>;&*> ^>,U«Ht*'l>1 lii

,

:,,/., ;U-..v:-.|

NOME

_

J

TITLE

nwPNF NO

SIGNATURE

D/M* <i'n"iii»n

Forms Preparation Handbook For Prime Sponsors Under the Compre
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Table 4.10
Program Status Summary Format
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Table 4.11
Summary of Participant Characteristics Report Format
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of the Program Status Survey) with verifying placement information.
Follow-up at three months is required for all placements into unsubsidized
employment, although the prime sponsor may choose to follow-up a sample of
other terminees as well.
Mountains of paper are, thus, collected on each participant and each
activity. Prime sponsors use this information to generate the three
federal reports for each subpart which are dispatched quarterly to the
regional offices of the Department of Labor, where they are reviewed,
entered into an automated system, and transmitted to the national office
with between a six and nine month lag for reporting on the full complement
of prime sponsors. Unfortunately, this massive effort does not provide
very accurate information about what is happening to whom, at what cost,
and with what outcomes. Decisions based on this management information
system are distorted in several ways:
The problems begin with the program component descriptors. "Classroom
training" may be five hours a week or forty hours a week. Participants and
expenditures for both intensive and limited training are reported in the
same categories. But classroom training may also be in combination with
work experience. If the training accounts for less than half of par
ticipation time, the expenditures and participants are assigned to work
experience; otherwise, they are assigned to classroom training. It is not
possible to sort out these combinations from the separately reported
For example, the allowances paid under
functional activity totals.
classroom training are counted along with those paid during transition
services or during training hours supplementing work experience. There is
no way of determining from the FSR what proportion of the aggregate
allowances were paid as part of classroom training. An individual who
participates in a sequence of activities is either a transfer between
subparts or titles, in which case the program components of previous
participation are impossible to track in the aggregate reports, or is
catalogued according to the major component over the period of par
ticipation (unless, as is sometimes the case, he or she is double counted
by separate delivery agents).
Another extremely critical problem is the lack of accounting for
non-CETA public expenditures. Unless the funds are actually administered
by the prime sponsor, there is no record whatsoever. A prime sponsor in a
state with free or heavily subsidized post-secondary education may pay very
little for training, and hence the classroom training expenditures recorded
on the FSR include mostly allowances. In another state, there may be few
post-secondary training institutions or these institutions might exclude
CETA types, so the prime sponsor will pay to establish separate training
facilities as well as covering allowances. A third possibility is that the
CETA resources simply substitute for those that would otherwise be provided
from another source, for instance, stipending students already enrolled in
training and subsidizing the costs of this training. All three activities
may have the same outcomes and have the same public costs. The prime
sponsor in the first case would look good from a unit cost perspective,
while in the second case, where probably doing the most good, the costs
would appear high and indistinguishable from the third case where the CETA
outlays would be having no net effect. Similarly, one prime sponsor might
serve primarily unemployment compensation recipients and thereby reduce
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allowances, while another might face a situation where few of the CETA
participants were covered by unemployment insurance and hence most
allowances would have to come from CETA funds. The MIS-recorded unit costs
would be higher in the latter case even though public costs would be the
same.
The termination status categories are obfuscated by three major
issues: First, a participant may receive no service for 90 days and still
be carried on the records. In fact, if he or she were called back for a
short treatment such as job search assistance, termination would not be
required for another 90 days. Because the chance of employment increases
with time for any unemployed person, it pays to keep participants on the
books in order to increase the "entered employment" tally. Since no funds
are expended, this also reduces the recorded person-year cost for the
activity, and hence, has a double effect on cost per placement and cost per
person year. There is no way to determine how many persons are in holding
at any point in time since they continue to be identified with the last
program activity. It is entirely possible, for instance, that the in
creased average duration of stay for classroom training, which is indicated
by the MIS data over the last few years, reflects increasing use of this
loophole by prime sponsors rather than longer training.
Second, there is no recording of whether an unsubsidized job, if
secured, is appropriate considering the type and duration of training. A
graduate of law school would hardly be considered a positive outcome if
placed as a janitor, but any placement is counted the same under the CETA
MIS. While the wages averaged before entry and after termination are
dutifully recorded, the pre-program mean depends on how many worked and how
long ago. For instance, the earnings of young participants who may have
held casual jobs as babysitters or lawnmowers, or refugees who last worked
in Asia, are computed in the average.
Third, there is great confusion concerning what constitutes a positive
termination. Returning to or continuing in school is a positive termina
tion—even if the terminee dropped out of an in-school work or vocational
exploration assignment, failed to graduate or enrolled because of the
inability to find a job. Achievement of an activity objective is rated as
a positive termination, but there are no hard-and-fast rules about what are
reasonable activity objectives. Where youth are participating heavily in a
program, the positive termination rates go up and the placement rates go
down.
There are also problems with the participant characteristics in
formation. Even though the categories are relatively detailed, the body
counts reported to the feds--which are frequently all that is calculated
and considered by the prime sponsor—do no permit classification by
mulitiple characteristics. It cannot be determined from reported MIS data
how many teenage dropouts are being served, or welfare mothers, or female
college graduates. Hence, it is almost impossible to determine from the
SPR whether the clientele of one delivery agent or prime sponsor is more or
less employable than the clientle of another.
The separate reporting of costs, activities and participant charac
teristics for each subpart makes it impossible to determine what services
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are received by specific individuals and how well they are doing as a
result. For instance, in the planning process, there is much attention to
the equitable distribution of resources according to participant shares.
Yet the participant share measure is almost totally meaningless without
knowledge of the program component and its cost. As an example, Hispanics
in a prime sponsor area may represent 20 percent of the universe of need
and 20 percent of Title IIBC participants, while whites represent the same
shares of both. It is entirely possible that the Hispanic participants are
all 16- and 17-year-old students in a vocational exploration component with
an annual unit cost of $1,000, while the whites are all 22- to 44-year-olds
enrolled in two-year apprenticeship or licensed practical nurse training
with an average expenditure of $20,000 per individual.
A primary use of the MIS is for budgeting both at the federal and
local levels. To maximize cost-effectiveness, it is important to reduce
the outlays for any unit of service as far as possible without reducing
quality. Yet while all subparts of CETA provide for a range of possible
activities and activity intensities, the MIS provides no clear specifica
tion of either mix or intensity. Hence, cost cutting can be and usually is
achieved by shifting to less expensive and less intensive interventions.
The easiest route is to reduce average hours of participation, which are
not even noted in the MIS. In work experience, where there is apparently
little post-program effect, reduced intensity will mean reduced output for
society and reduced earnings and well-being for participants, although it
will not make much difference in long-term earnings. Given the strong
relationship between intensity of treatment and outcomes for classroom
training, fewer hours may substantially lower net impacts. Another
cost-cutting approach is to shift to job search assistance or other
placement-oriented strategies, and to keep more individuals in holding.
The placement rates may actually improve and costs will fall, even though
the net lasting impacts would be reduced since less human resource
development activity occurred.
Another obvious way to "economize" is to serve more individuals who
cost less to bring up to a level of employability. Refugee populations,
for instance, may be able to get jobs easily after a few weeks of Englishas-a-second-language training. Serving three or four refugees in classroom
training may cost the same as serving one native disadvantaged youth with
severe remedial needs. All may be classified as disadvantaged, all may be
school dropouts (in the sense that the refugees do not have diplomas
although sometimes well educated in their own countries), and all may come
from public assistance recipient families. The refugees, however, may also
have been more likely to make it without any help. The prime sponsor who
wants to look good on paper will focus on those who can be effectively
served at lower cost.
Finally, there will also be an incentive to piggyback on other
activities; for instance, paying allowances to persons already training in
vocational institutions and regular schools, since the training costs are
already covered and do not count in the CETA MIS. Cooperation is to be
encouraged, but piggybacking reduces the net effect of CETA dollars and
increases the chances of fiscal substitution.
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There is too much play in the system to achieve improvements through
emphasis on placement alone. As with cost-cutting pressures, the response
to placement pressure will be a shift within the system to treatments which
have the best placement rates even if these are short-term results (unsubsidized placements are to be followed-up, but only at 90 days, and there
is no record of the follow-up submitted to the Department of Labor).
Because there is no emphasis on training-related placements, any job that
can be found for classroom or on-the-job trainees will count. As long as
significant segments are served, it is possible to enroll the most employ
able in each segment in order to increase placements, and then to tran
sition them into jobs they could have secured on their own. If gains in
average wages are used to assess job quality, it will pay to work with
participants who have been out of the labor force for some time and
therefore are sure to have a substantial wage gain. Obviously, "quantum
leap" treatments and the sequencing of services over time are not likely
when there are either cost-cutting or placement pressures and when there is
no recognition of intensity or of the starting point of the individuals
involved.
There is no question, then, that the current management information
system is fundamentally inadequate and that its use for planning,
budgeting, performance monitoring and evaluation pushes the system in the
direction of low-cost, short-duration services, creaming, and shell games.
Those most knowledgeable about these inadequacies are also the ones who
have a stake in maintaining the status quo, whether they are prime sponsors
wise in the ways of maximizing placements or 0MB budgeters seeking
substantive cuts while arguing for improved efficiency. It is not an
overwhelming challenge, however, to design a management information system
that would overcome most of these problems:
First, it is necessary to more accurately identify the human resource
input into the system. An employability index could be derived for each
individual, summarizing the characteristics data already gathered in a way
which would better suggest whether programs are reaching those most in
need. The marginal effect of each participant characteristic on placement
and positive termination chances could, for instance, be calculated based
on regression analysis of the CLMS data. The characteristics of each CETA
entrant could be multiplied by these marginal weights and an aggregate
score calculated. The scores would, then, be averaged for significant
segments, participants in different treatments, or for all participants in
a prime sponsor's program. If a short, standardized reading and math test
were required at entry, and perhaps an employability skills test, combined
with employment and earnings pattern variables used in the CLMS, the
predictive power of these indices could be increased. This would help to
reduce the amount of creaming within significant segments; it would improve
the assessment process; and it would facilitate comparison of the effec
tiveness of different agents and prime sponsors in serving similar in
dividuals.
Second, the treatments need to be better identified by streamlining of
the activity descriptors. For instance, the descriptors might include:
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Occupational training in a classroom
Employability skills, job-seeking skills, counseling, and
placement activities
Remedial education
On-the-job training
Work experience
Worksite training
There could also be nationally-established service codes for each of
these activities further specifying the occupation of vocational classroom
training, OJT, and worksite training or work experience; and for remedial
education specifying ESL, basic reading, basic mathematics, GED or college
preparation. The prime sponsor might have further identifers for the
various local delivery agents.
Third, intensity measures are needed. The most direct approach is to
record weekly or monthly hours in each activity for each participant. For
instance, someone with 60 percent classroom training (half in skills and
half in remedial education) and 40 percent worksite training during 40
hours weekly participation would be recorded as receiving 12 hours of
occupational training, 12 hours of remedial education, and 16 hours of
worksite training in that week. If the individual were shifted to OJT
after two months of such participation, 40 hours of OJT would be recorded
for each week in the third month. In other words, at the end of the
quarter, this individual would be noted as having:
Occupational training—96 hours
Remedial education—96 hours
Worksite training--128 hours
OJT--160 hours
Total—480 hours
Aggregating the individual records, it would then be possible to
report cumulatively and in the current week the number of participants and
the average hours in each of these components, as well as the distribution
by hours of treatment and the percentage within different activity com
binations. For terminees, it would be possible to identify the averages,
distributions and percentages cumulated for the entire period of par
ticipation.
For each hour of participation, the allowance or wage and fringes
received by the individual would be noted (and perhaps also the supportive
services). In the contracts negotiated with each service deliverer for the
coming year, the projected hours of treatment could be calculated, the
costs allocated, and parameters developed which could be entered into the
individual account for each hour of participation with the delivery agent.
Where the hours of participation included treatments paid for from non-CETA
public funds, they would be valued at the cost to the providing agency and
would be entered under a separate category. Thus, the record for the
prototype individual might be fleshed out with cost figures such as the
following:
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Fiscal Year Activity Record

Activity
Occupational
training
Remedial
education
Worksite
training
OJT

Service
Intensity
(Hours)

Service
Identifier

Estimated CETA
Cost of
Activity
(Excluding
Income
Maintenance)

96

II. 7

$150

—

$250

96

I.I

—

$150

$250

128
160

IV. 7
IX. 7

$200
$320

——
__

$500

Estimated

Non-CETA
Public
Cost

Allowance,
Stipend or
Wage

Fourth, an individual would be considered a terminee immediately upon
leaving one of these activity units without planned transfer to another
within 30 days. A 90-day follow-up would be required for a sample of all
terminees to track experiences over the three-month period. It would
include identification of the relation of post-program employment to the
training or work assignment during participation. The individual record
would be open-ended so that in the event of later reapplication to CETA, an
employment log would be filled in, backdating to the time of previous
enrolIment.
Finally, the individual record would also note the beginning and
ending point of the participant relative to standard competency hier
archies. For instance, the SAT score at entry and the SAT score at
completion of remedial education would be noted. In the major occupations
of training, such as carpentry, there would be standard competency level
hierarchies established as part of the MIS and the beginning and ending
skill levels would be noted on the individual record.
Fifth, the service, cost, and outcomes data, presented in the various
distributional arrays and with the averages, would be calculated for
cross-classified groups such as dropouts under age 22, high school
students, black males age 22 to 45, and the like. The distributions and
averages would also be presented according to groupings on the employability scale.
Since most of these data elements are already gathered but utilized in
different ways, and since the concepts are so straightforward, the opera
tional burdens of the reformed MIS would be less than, or certainly not
greater than, the current system. The result would be a better ability to
track service combinations, to assure that creaming did not occur, to
identify service intensity and real costs, to assure that public resources
were more equitably distributed among significant segments; and to permit
assessment of delivery agent performance.
However, redesign of the MIS would be traumatic. The entire system
from top to bottom has grown familiar with current approaches and has
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developed the analytical, information processing, and programming systems,
in light of current report formats and activity definitions. Short of such
total reform, there are several immediate steps which might improve the
effectiveness of the current system. First, categories could be created
for long-duration occupational and "other" training, respectively, so that
budgetary pressure would not simply reduce the intensity of services. For
instance, there might be a distinction between entry, intermediate, and
career training based on intended treatment lengths—perhaps defined as
less than 350 hours, 350 to 1000 hours, and 1000 hours or more. Second,
for public service employment, there is currently an identifier of the
training which supplements work, including a distinction between training
costs with and without stipends. This could be adopted for work experience
to isolate work/training combinations. Third, participants for whom
placement is not an intended goal in the employability development plan
could be identified on the intake form and on the Program Status Summary in
a special category, so they are not confused with those for whom placement
is intended but not achieved. Fourth, outcomes and participants could be
reported for each major program component, i.e., classroom training as
subclassified above, OJT, work experience, and a category including
transition services plus vocational exploration and other services. Fifth,
a subcategory of unsubsidized placements might be added noting whether the
job is related to the occupation of training or subsidized work experience.
The choice between a complete overhaul and more modest reform largely
depends on the degree of change envisioned in the organization and manage
ment of the employment and training system. If there are only modest
changes in the groundrules for operating different components and for
moving participants through the system, and if the organization remains the
same at the local level, then the massive disruption which would result
from implementation of a new MIS may not be worth the costs. If the CETA
system is totally realigned, however, the MIS should also be altered, which
can help to realign thinking and decisions at the local level. A com
promise would be to begin with measured changes in components and ac
tivities at the local level, combined with the moderate reforms of the MIS,
and then to implement the more comprehensive modifications as the capacity
developed locally to mount long-term training and to move individuals
through the system in a more orderly way.
Uncertainty and Instability
The decisions of prime sponsors may, in part, be based on their
perceptions about what works and what does not as judged from a local
perspective. Some may consciously design and manage programs to look good
on the management information system reports. Overwhelming both of these
factors, however, is the uncertainty and instability in funding, legis
lation, and federal policy which makes rational decisions or by-the-numbers
management almost impossible.
Between fiscal 1975 and 1976, the increase in job creation expendi
tures (measured in constant dollars) equalled 90 percent of cumulative
increases since the beginning of the War on Poverty. Between 1977 and
1978, the increase in a single year was again equal to 90 percent of the
cumulative increase in all preceding years. The constant dollar declines
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in the next two years erased three-fourths of this growth even though the
aggregate level of unemployment hardly improved. In 1978 and 1979, massive
youth programs were mounted and then abruptly phased down in 1980 and 1981.
There were side ventures such as PSIP, STIP, and HIRE, as well as varying
emphases on CETA and weatherization, CETA-and-the-Arts, CETA and economic
development, and the like. Such staggering fluctuations in funding,
activity mix and focus have ruptured the delivery system. Any private
sector business doubling in size every four years would have growth pains,
but if the product mix were substantially altered each time without
warning, while the organizational structure and accounting procedures were
constantly changing, there is no way it could perform effectively. This is
what has been asked of the employment and training delivery system, which
has then been blamed for failures of management.
National funding volatility and ever-changing missions are not the
only problems. Resources are allocated according to relative unemployment
rates, and, as a result, there are dramatic year-to-year fluctuations in
local activities even when the aggregate funding levels do not change, and
even though structural problems do not fluctuate dramatically from yearto-year in either absolute or relative terms. Each year, the local prime
sponsor must prepare an annual plan dividing its slice of the pie into
smaller pieces, and must await approval of this plan before contracting
This one-year planning and contracting horizon
with delivery agents.
generates enormous instability and has severe consequences. Even if
federal budget levels were decided, the funding levels for local areas
would not be known until very near the start of the fiscal year in October
because unemployment data for the previous year are not available until
Spring. The uncertainty has been compounded by the failure of Congress to
act on the budget in a timely fashion. Thus, none of the delivery agents
at the local level knows for sure whether or for how much they will be
funded until the start of the year or later. For subagents receiving
support for the first time or launching modified or expanded activities,
new staff and materials must be secured in a rush once notification is
given. Enrollment must be increased as quickly as possible to get up to
planned operating levels. Training of staff and shakedown must occur at
the same time. Enrollment must subsequently be surged in order to achieve
contracted person-years, since there will be many dropouts and since the
phase-up takes some time. Staff tends to remain at a stable level over the
year while enrollment surges. As the year progresses, administrative staff
must begin to focus on the competition for the next year's funding. There
are significant costs involved in annual application. The operating
personnel realize the uncertainty and wonder about their own futures; some
look for and take other jobs. As participant termination occurs, there is
a hard choice between carrying a smaller number of enrol lees with fixed
overhead or bringing on new enrol lees who might receive only a limited
period of service. If money has not been spent or enrollment goals met,
there is usually a hasty effort to bring on more participants and meet
goals. If the activity is refunded, then there is either a gradual
phase-down as dropouts occur over the next year, or a build-up if en
rollment has been allowed to decline. If subagents are not refunded, all
remaining participants must be transferred. Delivery agents may, in fact,
hold participants hostage in order to secure refunding by the threat of
sudden dislocation of large numbers of persons in need.
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This instability almost totally disappears in the national data.
Monthly enrollments are not recorded in the management information system,
and end-of-quarter enrollments are "fixed" by most prime sponsors by
concentrating terminations a few days later. Prime sponsor data average
out the instability of subgrantees, while national data average out the
anomalies among prime sponsors. At the delivery level, however, chaos
rules.
This is suggested by the detailed evidence for a set of school-to-work
transition projects (which would be classified primarily as "transition
services" if funded under YETP and "other classroom training" if funded
under Title IIBC) where the aim was to prepare youth over the school year
for employment the next summer and beyond. All the projects were targeted
to start up coincident with the 1978-79 school year, i.e., just like most
other new activities initiated by the Youth Employment and Demonstration
Projects Act of 1977. The aggregated enrollments for 60 of these schoolto-work transition projects show a steady phase-up, a drop associated with
the end of the school year, and then maintenance of enrollment over the
second year (Figure 4.7). This is the predictable and orderly pattern
reflected in national MIS totals. The underlying reality is suggested by
the monthly enrollment patterns illustrated for three sets of six projects
typical of the larger sample. There are incredible fluctuations from
month-to-month, with the patterns significantly different for each project,
reflecting unique circumstances, problems and accomplishments:
t

During the 1978-1979 school year, when implementation was
intended to coincide with school schedules, 85 percent of
projects had their first enrollments in November or later
and a fourth not until January or later, suggesting the
difficulties of new program implementation at the local
level.

t

Over a third of the projects took a half year or more to
reach 75 percent of planned enrollments. Only a third ever
reached their planned maximum enrollments, and a third did
not reach half of their planned maximums.

•

After a year's operations, the projects still had average
enrollments less than half of peak enrollments during the
1979-1980 school year.

t

Over three-fifths of projects experienced significant modifi
cations within their two school years of operation.

t

Half the projects had at least one change of directors, and
one in ten had three directors or more. The annual staff
turnover rate averaged 50 percent over two years of opera
tions. 16/

Instability affects not only operational performance, but equally
important, it influences the types of activities which are mounted and the
choice of service deliverers. Programs with the lowest common denomina
tor—those with the least complexity that are extensions of existing
efforts and which can be expanded or reduced with little problem are un-

Figure 4.7
The Hidden Instability of CETA Local Activities
MONTHLY PROJECT ENROLLMENT AS A
PERCENTAGE OF PEAK ENROLLMENT
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avoidable. The interventions selected are short-term so that they can be
surged and can have an immediate impact. Such interventions rarely
anticipate multi-year or longer-term sequences for individual participants.
Sequences could only be arranged by the prime sponsor by linking together
separate activities, but these all have very uneven enrollment patterns
dictated by annual funding schedules. Staffing patterns are also affected.
Only certain types of persons are willing to live with the uncertainty or
can be found on a moment's notice. They are usually uncredentialed and
frequently ready to leave for other jobs, undermining stability of program
delivery. Finally, the stop and go pattern, and the annual division of
spoils among competing claimants, almost foreordains the use of existing
community resources rather than the development over time of improved
training programs since their continuity cannot be guaranteed. Even when
existing community institutions are utilized, however, they are unlikely to
be used optimally. For instance, employability skills projects cited
previously were supposed to be initiated in the schools and linked to the
educational offerings. Yet the contracting cycle from CETA does not
provide funds until the start of the fiscal year (October 1) or later,
while school staffing and assignment plans are made in the summer.
Likewise, post-secondary institutions may mount CETA training, but given
the uncertainty in funding, their efforts usually entail short-term special
classes to fill idle capacity rather than integrating CETA clients into
regular training activities. In the last few years, there has been a great
deal of uncertainty whether CETA would even be reauthorized, so that
long-term treatments and the institutional linkages needed to achieve them
have been further undermined.
The solutions are quite straightforward. Aggregate funding levels for
CETA human resource development activities should be stabilized. The al
location formula distributing these resources to prime sponsors should be
based on structural factors, which do not change rapidly from year to year.
Two-year contracting at the local level should be encouraged rather than
reallocating unspent funds each year in a punitive way. Alternatively,
half of local contracts might be revolved each year on a two-year funding
cycle.
Plans should include long-range institutional development and
linkage goals as well as one-year activity commitments.
These steps are as unlikely as they are sensible. Congress is not
predisposed to committing money in advance. Present allocation formulae
are the result of political compromises and any changes would be con
troversial. Planning and contracting procedures have become institution
alized and will be difficult to change. Yet the fact remains that un
certainty and instability are a major reason why programs are not and
cannot be, more effectively and rationally designed, managed and targeted
at the local level. The responsibility is at the federal level. The
problem can be overcome. And this solution may be more important than any
possible legislative or administrative repackaging of CETA programs.
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SECTION 3.
FEDERAL OVERSIGHT AND INTERVENTION

Although the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act was intended to
decentralize decisiomnaking and management, the authority of prime sponsors
is far from absolute. The prime sponsors must spend the federal funds they
are allocated consistent with the law and the federal regulations inter
preting the legislation. They are subject to Department of Labor review to
assure the regulations are obeyed and, further, that adequate performance
is achieved. Finally, there are several set-aside and special-purpose
programs where the activities are selected and managed locally but the
Department of Labor keeps its thumb in the pie.
In theory, the regulations, federal performance monitoring, and
set-aside or special-purpose programs apply equally to all prime sponsors
except for some limited exceptions. While the preceding analysis of
patterns of variation among prime sponsors raises possibility that regional
offices of the Department of Labor are not uniform in their interpretations
and enforcements of the rules, federal oversight and intervention are more
determinant of the averages than the variances. A uniform complaint of
state and local decisionmakers is that federal requirements and secondguessing restrict their flexibility to respond to local needs and con
ditions. If prime sponsors were asked why they avoid long-term training,
why they do not achieve more OJT, why they emphasize subsidized work
experience, why their placement rates are low, or conversely, why they
cream from among eligible participants, they would point to one villain—
"the feds". It is difficult to sort out the rhetoric from the reality.
Yet it is critical to determine how federal policies and enforcement affect
the levels, types, targeting, and effectiveness of training at the local
level.
The Regulations
The law and the regulations are surprisingly nonrestrictive when it
comes to training, particularly classroom training. Under the Title IIBC,
Comprehensive Employment and Training Services subpart, prime sponsors have
the regulatory freedom to use all of their allocated resources for
training. Under Title IV Youth Employment and Training Programs, they may
also use all of their allocated resources for training. Under the Title
VII, Private Sector Initiative Program, they are encouraged to use all
their funds for training activities. Under Title IID, Structural Public
Service Employment, prime sponsors have the authority to use all funds for
training and are required to use a legislatively-specified portion of funds
for this purpose. Under Title VI, Countercyclical Public Service Em
ployment and the Title IV, Summer Youth Employment Program, they also have
the authority to use all allocated funds for training. The fact that less
than a fifth of all locally-allocated CETA funds in fiscal 1980 were
utilized for classroom and on-the-job training was not a result of legal or
regulatory restrictions, and the fact that some prime sponsors had training
shares under all their local 1980 allocations which were double or triple
those of other prime sponsors with the same unemployment rates and youth
shares among participants offered proof that more training was allowable
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and could have been achieved. If anything, the law and the regulations
emphasize the use of training, particularly since the 1978 amendments which
added the PSIP training title, required training under Title IID, and
increased set-asides for vocational education and for linkages with state
education systems.
The regulations further require that transition
services be provided to all participants in the summer program, while and
encouraging training and remedial education. While employment is offered
to students under YETP, it must be coupled with counseling, placement,
occupational information, and efforts to overcome sex-stereotyping.
The regulations provide few restrictions or prescriptions for the
types and targeting of classroom training. Occupational skills training is
limited to those occupations where there is a reasonable expectation of
employment, but is not allowed for "high" turnover, "low" wage jobs.
"High" and "low" are defined in relative rather than absolute terms, i.e.,
relative to other local jobs which participants might secure. The training
of sewing machine operators is proscribed except under specified con
ditions. Skill training is restricted to occupations that require more
than two weeks of preparation.
The only specificity is about allowances, not about the content of
training. Classroom training participants are entitled to an hourly allow
ance equal to the federal, state, or local minimum wage, whichever is
higher, for the time spent in classroom training. An additional $5 weekly
is provided for each dependent over two, up to a maximum of $20 for six or
more. The basic allowance is reduced by the amount of unemployment
compensation if this is received by the participant for the same week. If
Basic Education Opportunity Grants are received during participation, they
may be subtracted at the option of the prime sponsor. Public assistance
recipients are provided a $30 weekly incentive allowance supplementing
their welfare check in lieu of an hourly stipend. For all categories of
classroom trainees, additional payments cover transportation or other
extraordinary participation costs. There is limited flexibility in these
allowance requirements. The basic allowance can be waived, but only if the
waiver applies to all participants in a course, does not discourage
participation of individuals with limited means, and increases the number
of participants served or the intensity of services. Individual waivers
are permitted only with the written agreement of the participant and only
if funds allocated for allowances have been obligated and unfilled training
opportunities are available. Dependent and incentive allowances cannot be
waived.
On-the-job training rules are much more specific, and there is no
doubt that these affect the marketability of this approach to private
employers.
The training assignment must provide opportunities not
otherwise available for the participant which promote upward mobility and
lead to economic self-sufficiency. In matching participants and jobs,
prime sponsors are to assure that the participant lacks the normal
education, training, or work experience required for the job, although the
employer is entitled to the final selection among individuals referred by
the prime sponsors. Individuals who do not have serious skill or ex
perience deficiencies are to be referred to OJT only when there are no
other suitable placement, work or training opportunities.
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The OJT participant is hired first and trained later. Employers are
compensated for the cost of extra supervision and training needed for the
CETA client as compared with usual entry employees. The regulations
indicate that the reimbursement should usually equal 50 percent of the
participant's wage during the period of training. The employer may also be
reimbursed for the actual costs incurred for classroom training or other
allowable employment and training services and supportive services
purchased for OJT participants. The total reimbursement may be provided on
a declining schedule over the period of training if there are higher
initial training costs. In special circumstances, the employer subsidy
(net of the reimbursement to cover any outside classroom training and
services) may be more than half the wage if the characteristics of the
participant indicate greater obstacles to employment than those of the
normal CETA participant or if the training is at an unusually high skill
level. In such cases, however, approval of the Department of Labor is
needed.
The wage paid to the OJT participant cannot be lower than the federal,
state, or local minimum, or the rate required by an applicable collective
bargaining agreement. It must be "reasonable" considering such factors as
industry, geographical region, and the participant's skill. OJT partici
pants are to be provided workers' compensation and other benefits to the
same extent as regular workers. Unemployment compensation coverage may be
provided at the election of the prime sponsor if otherwise not required
under state law. Working conditions may not be unsanitary, hazardous, or
dangerous to the participants' health and safety.
The subsidies to employers come with some strings attached. Each
assignment requires a contract detailing the length and nature of training,
the method and amount of reimbursement, the number of participants, a job
description and a statement of the duties, participant wage rates, costs to
be reimbursed above the wage subsidy, and procedures for tracking attend
ance. The employer must comply with the Act and regulations, including
equal employment opportunity provisions. OJT contracts may only be awarded
to employers who have not been seriously deficient in their conduct of or
participation in any Department of Labor program.
These restrictions make OJT a none too attractive package for em
ployers, and certainly less attractive than available options. Under the
Targeted Jobs Tax Credit, for instance, an employer can get essentially the
same amount for hiring welfare recipients, ex-offenders, poor Vietnam
veterans, disadvantaged out-of-school youth, and cooperative education
participants. Under TJTC, the employer may screen and sort his own candi
dates, narrowing them down to those acceptable, sending them for certifi
cation, and thus avoiding all the paperwork and governmental oversight
associated with OJT.
Experiments with alternative OJT formulations have documented that in
order to increase penetration into the private sector, it is necessary both
to enrich and to alter the groundrules for OJT subsidization. Under Youth
Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects, the law authorized 100 percent wage
subsidies in the private sector, i.e., payroll ing youth from CETA while
they worked in private sector assignments and subsequently reducing the
subsidy level if they became more employable. In other words, the employer
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could try the youth before making a hiring commitment and before getting
involved in any paperwork. Entitlement was targeted to a group from the
lowest end of the documented employability distribution--16-19 year-old
poor students or dropouts who had returned to school. It was a saturation
program in the demonstration sites, providing jobs to al 1 eligible youth
and, thus, requiring a three- or fourfold expansion of CETA youth jobs in
some sites. Yet even at this intensive level, one-fifth of the work
provided was in the private sector. In contrast, OJT enrollments under
YETP represented only 3 percent of total participants. In fiscal 1979,
when there were 5100 participants in OJT under YETP nationwide, there were
over 6000 under YIEPP in just 17 of 484 prime sponsors.
In order to determine the importance of the subsidy levels and
formats, an experiment was initiated under Entitlement which offered either
100 percent, 75 percent, or 50 percent wage subsidies to stratified
representative samples of private businesses. Participation rates of
businesses, adjusted by multiple regression to control for differences in
employer characteristics, were 18 percent for firms offered a full-wage
subsidy, 10 percent for those offered a three-fourths wage subsidy, and
less than 5 percent for firms offered a one-half wage subsidy. The levels
and elasticity would unquestionably be different if the jobs were for older
workers and were other than part-time school-year and full-time summer, but
the evidence suggests that there is a responsiveness to the subsidy level
and that the 100 percent subsidy, which eliminates much of the paperwork
burden by keeping the workers as CETA employees during a try-out period,
can increase the employer participation level substantially. IT/ Further
confirmation was provided by the five-site demonstration program for
out-of-school youth which fully subsidized a six-month period of full-time
employment in the private sector. Although it was more difficult to
develop jobs with private than public or nonprofit employers, 900 place
ments were secured for dropout youth in just five sites, compared to less
than 10,000 OJT slots nationwide for dropout youth under PSIP and Title
IIBC combined in fiscal 1979. 18/
There is nothing in the regulations which encourages short-duration
training interventions. Classroom training may last no more than two and a
half years (of which only 104 weeks may be stipended). Since only .9
percent of 1977 entrants who subsequently completed classroom training
stayed more than 15 months, the duration limitation can hardly be con
sidered a real constraint on local discretion. The length of on-the-job
training is limited to the period of time generally required for the
acquisition of skills needed for the assigned position, as specified in the
Specific Vocational Preparation Codes in the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles. Whether anyone ever refers to this reference is doubtful, but the
guidance it provides concerning the primary occupations of CETA training is
sobering. All but the most menial entry jobs in each occupation require
more than six months of occupation-specific training.
In addition,
language and mathematical competencies are usually required which are
beyond the reach of many disadvantaged CETA clients (Table 4.12) As an
example, a clerk typist job requires dexterity, good vision and three to
six months specific skill training. But this assumes the individual
already has math, reading, and writing abilities equivalent to a functional
high school level. If the trainee has educational deficiencies, then these
need to be addressed first. The successful education methods in Job Corps
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Table 4.12
Competency Requirements and Training Times for
Assorted CETA Training Occupations

DOT
Classification

Mathematics
Skills Needed*

Language
Skills Needed*

Welding
Arc welder

810.384-014

4

3

Gas welder

811.684-014

3

3

Machine helper
Welder-assembler

819.666-010
819.381-010

1
3

1
2

Occupation

Automotive Service
Auto-body repair

807.381-010

3

4

Automobile mechanic

620.261-010

3

3

Automotive painter

845.381-014

2

2

Construction
Bricklayer

861.381-018

3

3

Carpenter, apprentice

860.381-042

3

3

Glazer

865.381-010

2

2

Hod earner

869.687-026

1

1

Paperhanger

841.381-010

2

2

Painter

840.381-010

2

2

Clerical
Bookkeeper I

210.382-014

4

3

211.362-010

3

3

Cashier I

Specific Vocational
Preparation Needed

Over 6 months up to
and including 1 year
Over 6 months up to
and including 1 year
Short demonstration
Over 1 year up to and
including 2 years
Over 2 years up to and
including 4 years
Over 2 years up to and
including 4 years
Over 1 year up to and
including 2 years
Over 4 years up to and
including 10 years
Over 2 years up to and
including 4 years
Over 2 years up to and
including 4 years
Anything beyond short
demonstration up to and
including 30 days
Over 2 years up to and
including 4 years
Over 2 years up to and
including 4 years

Over 1 year up to and
including 2 years
Over 6 months up to
and including 1 year
Over 3 months up to
and including 6 months
Over 3 months up to
and including 6 months
Over 1 year up to and
including 2 years

Checker I

203.362-010

2

3

Clerk-typist

203.362-010

2

3

Computer operator

213.362-010

2

3

079.371-010

3

4

Food-service worker

355.677-010

2

2

Nurse aide

355.674-014

2

2

Practical nurse

354.374-010

2

3

Physical therapist
aide

076.244-010

2

3

Over 3 months up to
and including 6 months

249.367-074

4

4

Over 1 year up to and
including 2 years

359.677-019

2

3

Over 3 months up to
and including 6 months

195.367-010

3

5

Over 1 year up to and

Medical Services
Dental assistant

Education
Teacher aide
Nursery school
attendant
Social Services
Case aide

Over 1 year up to and
including 2 years
Anything beyond short
demonstration up to and
including 30 days
Over 3 months up to
and including 6 months
Over 3 months up to
and including 6 months
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Level

1

Mathematics Skills Needed

Language Skills Needed

Add and subtract two digit numbers. Multiply and
divide 10's and 100's by 2, 3, 4, 5. Perform the
four basic arithmetic operations with coins as
part of a dollar.

words.

Perform operations with units such as cup, pint,
quart; inch, foot, and year; and ounce and pound.

Reading:
Recognize meaning of 2,500 (two- or three-syllable
Read at a rate of 95-120 words per minute.

Writing:
Print simple sentences containing subject, verb, and
object, and series of numbers, names, and addresses.
Speaking:
Speak simple sentences, using normal word order, and
present and past tenses.

Add, subtract, multiply, and divide all units of
measure. Perform the four operations with like
common and decimal fractions. Compute ratio,
rate, and percent. Draw and interpret bar
graphs. Perform arithmetic operations involving
all American monetary units.

Reading:
Passive vocabulary of 5,000-6,000 words. Read at
rate of 190-215 words per minute. Read adventure
stories and comic books, looking up unfamiliar
words in dictionary for meaning, spelling, and

pronunciation.

Read instructions for assembling model cars and
airplanes.
Writing:
Write compound and complex sentences, using cursive
style, proper end punctuation, and employing
adjectives and adverbs.
Speaking:
Speak clearly and distinctly with appropriate pauses
and emphasis, correct pronunciation, variations in
word order, using present, perfect, and future tenses.
Compute discount, Interest, profit, and loss;
commission, markups, and selling price; ratio
and proportion, and percentages. Calculate
surfaces, volumes, weights, and measures.
Algebra:
Calculate variables and formulas, monomials
and polynomials; ratio and proportion variables;
and square roots and radicals.
Geometry:
Calculate plane and solid figures, circumference,
area, and volume. Understand kinds of angles, and
properties of pairs and angles.

Algebra:
Deal with system of real numbers; linear
quadratic, rational, exponential; logarithmic,
angle, and circular functions, and inverse
functions; related algebraic solution of equa
tions and inequalities; limits and continuity,
and probability and statistical Inference.
Geometry:
Deductive axiomatic geometry, plane and solid;
and rectangular coordinates.

Algebra:
Work with exponents and logarithms, linear
equations, quadratic equations, mathematical
induction and binomial theorems, and permuta
tions.
Calculus:
Apply concepts of analytical geometry, differenti
ations, and integration of algebraic functions
with applications.
Statistics:
Apply mathematical operations to frequency distribu
tions, reliability, and validity of tests, normal
curve, analysis of variance, correlation techniques,
ch1-square application and sampling theory, and
factor analysis.

Source;

Reading:
Read a variety of novels, magazines, atlases, and
encyclopedias.
Read safety rules, Instructions in the use and
maintenance of shop tools and equipment, and methods
and procedures in mechanical drawing and layout work.
Writing:
Write reports and essays with proper format, punctu
ation, spelling, and grammar, using all parts of speech.
Speaking:
Speak before an audience with poise, voice control,
and confidence, using correct English and wellmodulated voice.
Reading:
Read novels, poems, newspapers, periodicals, journals
manuals, dictionaries, thesauruses, and encyclopedias.
Writing:
Prepare business letters, expositions, summaries,
and reports, using prescribed format, and conforming
to all rules of punctuation, grammar, diction, and style.
Speaking:
Participate in panel discussions, dramatizations, and
debates. Speak extemporaneously on a variety of subjects.
Reading:
Read literature, book and play reviews, scientific and
technical journals, abstracts, financial reports, and
legal documents.
Writing:
Write novels, plays, editorials, journals, speeches.
manuals, critiques, poetry, and songs.
Speaking:
Conversant in the theory principles, and methods of
effective and persuasive speaking, voice and diction,
phonetics, and discussion and debate.

Dictionary of Occupational Titles (Washington, D.C.: U,S, Government Prvnting Office, 1979); and
Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined In the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (Washington, D.C.:
U.S, Government Printing Office, 1981).'
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require 150 hours of reading instruction to advance skills two grade
levels. Assuming four hours daily in reading instruction (and the
remaining time in math), it would take at least two months to move a person
with a tenth-grade equivalent reading level up to twelfth-grade competency.
This would add on to the total training time, pushing it over six months
for most CETA clients assuming they learn typing skills as fast as the
And most other occupations require longer skill
nondisadvantaged.
training. An arc welder needs six months to one year of skill-specific
training and a high school functional level. Interestingly, the sexstereotyped occupations on which females are usually trained and placed
require less training time than the construction and other craft jobs
usually targeted for males.
In other words, there is nothing in the "bible" which would suggest
that short-duration institutional or on-the-job training is reasonable for
the types of jobs which are the primary emphasis of CETA training, par
ticularly when considering the beginning deficits of trainees. Certainly,
the limited guidance offered by the Department of Labor does not constrain
the duration of training.
Performance Monitoring
Each fiscal year prime sponsors must submit plans to the Department of
Labor indicating how they will use the funds allocated under each CETA
subpart. The plans include numerical goals for the coming year—total new
enrollments and average enrollments by quarter and cumulatively for each
activity component and for each subtitle; projected expenditures for each
category of activities; the characteristics of those who will be served;
and the outcomes expected. These data are used to derive projected
performance indicators, particularly, placement and positive termination
rates, as well as costs per placement, per participant and per positive
Each quarter, performance is reviewed relative to the
termination.
numerical goals in the plan and relative to the derived performance
indicators. At the end of the year, there is a top-to-bottom review of
each prime sponsor by the regional offices of the Department of Labor which
identifies problems in need of corrective action and determines eligibility
and conditions for funding the subsequent year. Thus, federal leverage
could be exerted at the initial point of plan review before its approval,
at the end-of-the year when performance relative to plan is ultimately
assessed, and during the year whenever there is an extreme variance from
quarterly projections. The degree of actual leverage depends on how much
attention is paid to design issues, service mix, and performance indicators
in the initial plan review, the degree of flexibility allowed during the
course of the year, and the rewards and punishments for performance as
assessed at the end of the year.
The enormous variance among prime sponsors in service and participant
mix, service costs, and performance as judged by placement and positive
termination rates, costs per placement and costs per positive termination,
is prima facie evidence that the federal performance monitoring system has
not forced prime sponsors into a Procrustean bed. On the contrary, it
appears that the monitoring system generates a lot of paper and workload
with very little constructive outcome.
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To begin with, performance goals in each prime sponsor's plan are to
be set based on the previous year's experience, with the aim of improving
each year, unless there is some justification such as locally rising
unemployment. There are some guidelines supposedly used by regional
offices during plan review. Yet the variance in classroom training and OJT
shares for Title IIBC approved plans in 1980 was almost as great as the
variance in actual classroom training and OJT shares; and the same held for
expenditure levels. Prime sponsors are also free to modify their approved
plans during the course of the year, and apparently this is a regular
occurrence. For instance, during fiscal 1979 under Title IIBC, actual
current enrollment in OJT was 66 percent of plan in the first quarter
before modifications could be made, but then rose to 77 percent of modified
fourth quarter targets. For the entire fiscal year, the ratio of currentto-planned OJT enrollment (as reported after modification of plans
throughout the year) was 72 percent. In the first quarter the cumulative
OJT enrollment was reported to be only 70 percent of plan. By the end of
the year it was up to 82 percent of plan. There is no way current
enrollment could have averaged 72 percent of plan, never rising higher than
77 percent, and yet achieved 82 percent of the cumulative goal unless this
final goal reflected substantial mid-course corrections. This same
quarterly pattern is evident for aggregate IIBC enrollments and ex
penditures in fiscal 1979, as well as for other years. Obviously, both
current and cumulative planned enrollments are modified substantially over
the course of the year. The usual practice is simply to approve modifi
cations of planned service levels and expenditures unless they represent
some massive breakdown in local performance or unless the prime sponsor is
otherwise in the doghouse. Thus, even if approved plans at the start of
the year required improved performance over the previous year, the plan in
force at the end will usually be less ambitious as a result of "mods." For
instance, the end-of-year approved placement rate for Title IIBC in fiscal
1980 was 48.6 percent, compared to 50.8 percent in 1979, while the positive
termination goal was 68.6 percent vs. 76.2 percent. 19/
The end-of-the-year review which is the "big stick" of the Department
of Labor turns out to be a weak reed. All titles of activity are assessed
by the regional offices. In each case, the design, management, and
statistically measured outcomes are weighed according to a quantitative
rating system. Based on the point ranking, prime sponsors are classified
as eligible for immediate funding, having problems that need corrective
action but do not hold up funding for the next fiscal year, and having
serious problems that must be addressed before refunding. In fiscal 1980
under Title IIBC, seven of ten prime sponsors were rated as eligible for
immediate funding, a fifth as having problems identified, and one in ten as
having serious problems. Averaging the scores for all CETA titles, one in
twenty primes were rated as having serious problems overall.
It would appear, then, that federal review is serious business. Yet
only two prime sponsorships in the history of CETA have been reconstituted
under federal mandate. No other primes have been refused funding for a
fiscal year. One of the major shortcomings of the present system is that
there are no marginal penalties for poor performance. It is essentially an
either/or proposition. Problems are never so severe that the feds can
justify holding up or cancelling allocations which would turn those in need
out on the streets. So the usual recourse is to generate a corrective
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action plan, to demonstrate some progress in alleviating the most visible
abuses, and to operate under conditional approval. The only marginal
incentives and penalties lie in the use of the Secretary of Labor's
discretionary funds, but they are too small a share of total resources to
make a difference, and prime sponsors with serious problems have frequently
received discretionary funds despite inadequate management of their
formula-allocated resources.
Moreover, a detailed look at the review format reveals that it has
less to do with the quality of programming and performance than with the
acceptability of procedures and the adequacy of required paperwork. The
federal priorities are manifest in the weights for different aspects of
management, design, and numerical performance (Table 4.13).
Correct
planning formats, eligibility determination procedures, and equal op
portunity and complaint handling systems together account for more points
than placement performance. Even when numerical goals are judged, the
prime sponsors must be 25 percent below modified plan levels in order to
get no points. The qualitative, substantive aspects of employment and
training activities account for only 18 of the 150 points. On-the-job and
classroom training programs of a prime sponsor are not likely to be
reviewed in the same year, and when they are, the review criteria focus
almost exclusively on procedures rather than the substance of the training
activities. There is no necessary monitoring of actual training sites or
training curricula. For instance, the key points in the assessment of OJT
are an analysis of OJT contracts or agreements to assure that they contain
information on the skills to be learned, the training time, the employer
reimbursement, a job description, and an assurance that the employer will
comply with the regulations; there is no way of knowing from review of
these pieces of paper whether the indicated conditions are actually being
met. The prime sponsor must have written standards for selecting OJT
opportunities; whether or not these standards are utilized is unknown.
Based on interviews with staff, the reviewer must determine whether
procedures are used to select participants who are in need of OJT. The
prime sponsor must evidence procedures for follow-up on OJT participants.
If enrollment goals are not being achieved, the reviewer must determine
whether there is a reasonable justification and whether corrective action
is being taken. For classroom training, the review focuses on whether the
activities are the same as those in the plan, if the training occupations
are adequate (presumably self-evident if the plan is met since the training
courses were already approved), and a determination whether corrective
actions are being taken if enrollment goals are not being met.
With these assessment criteria and this weighting schema, it is not
surprising that among the 28 prime sponsors rated as having serious
problems over all titles in 1980, the quality or quantity of training was
mentioned as one of the deficient aspects only three times (one prime
sponsor totally failed to comply with the 15 percent training requirement
under Title IID; the IIBC performance indicators were inadequate for
another; and the third underutilized the vocational education set-aside).
In comparison, inadequate EEO compliance systems were mentioned nine times
and inadequate monitoring or eligibility determination systems were a
factor in 21 of the 28 prime sponsors. For the prime sponsors with serious
problem rankings on Title IIBC, the quality or management of training was
not mentioned once as a primary factor.
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Table 4.13
1981 Performance Assessment Factors and Weights
Management
Independent Monitoring Unit
Eligibility Determination, Verification
and Tracking
Financial Management
Planning (composition of council
and procedures)
Subagent Management (includes having a
system for performance management as
well as procedures to assure special
consideration for community-based groups)
Equal Opportunity
Complaints Procedures
Corrective Action Procedures

50
6

Program Design
Recruitment and Selection of
Participants
Assessment and Employability Development
Plans
Job Development and Transition Services
Services to Youth
Program Activities (two of the four
reviewed in any year)
OJT
Classroom Training
Upgrading and Returning
Work Experience
Corrective Action Follow-Up

50

Numerical Performance Individuals
Positive Termination
Entered Employment Rate
Indirect Placement Rate
Private Sector Placement
Cumulative Enrollment
Accrued Expenditures
Cost Per Positive Termination
Cost Per Entered Employment
Cost Per Indirect Placement

50
5
8
10
5
5
5
4
4
4

Total

4
8
6
5
7
7
7
7
4
18
(9)
(9)
(9
(9
7

150

Eligible for immediate funding
Corrective Action needed
Serious Problems
Source:

6
8

105
76-104
75 or less

Fiscal Year 1981 National CETA Assessment Handbook, Employment
and Training Administration, Department of Labor (Washington,
D.C.: Department of Labor, November 1980).
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There will be increased priority on performance and less on process in
For the fiscal 1982 cycle, performance goals have been estab
future.
the
lished by regression estimates which consider participant mix, service mix
and area employment conditions. Prime sponsors will be rated relative to
predicted performance rates. Whether this will have a major effect on
quantitatively measured performance depends on several things: First, the
weights in the annual review which are given to numerical performance
indicators must be increased much more substantially. Second, the points
awarded for numerical performance along different dimensions must be sorted
out. For instance, more youth services may yield a higher positive
termination rate, lower cost per positive terminations, and higher enroll
ment rates, but lower placement rates, and higher costs per placement. As
this example suggests, any mix or management decision will affect some in
dicators differently than others, sometimes in contradictory directions.
Third, plan modification policies must be tightened and applied uniformly.
Fourth, the performance assessment system must be accurate enough that it
does not dictate who is served or how intensively, i.e., does not cause
prime sponsors to cream the most employable and to provide band-aid
services. Fourth, the system must assure that net impacts are maximized
and not just immediate outcomes. Finally, there must be marginal in
centives for good performance and penalties for poor performance. It is
questionable whether such conditions can be met. Regression estimates
built on management information system averages for each prime sponsor
cannot capture the variances in severity of need, service mix and
intensity, or labor market conditions in a reliable enough way to justify
heavy penalities except in cases of extremely and unquivocably poor
performance. The data are not adequate to protect against creaming and
band-aid approaches if placement performance is stressed. The possible
outcomes are too variable to limit attention only to immediate placement,
and the placement rate alone does not assure maximization of net impacts.
No doubt, then, marginal changes in weighting and incremental penalties for
the extremely poor performers will somewhat increase the torque of the
monitoring system. But this will take time. There is no evidence that
federal oversight and secondguessing has been a major factor so far in the
history of CETA despite the exaggerated protestations of prime sponsors and
boasts of federal managers.
Set-Asides and Categoricals
Much of the classroom training provided by CETA is the result of, or
at least funded through, set-asides. The Governor's Supplemental Voca
tional Education Assistance grant, representing 6 percent of Title IIBC
funds, provided over a tenth of the expenditures for training activities
(i.e., not including allowances, services, or administration) under al1 of
CETA and nearly a fourth of the training purchased under Title IIBC. The
leverage of these funds is even greater since they are used almost entirely
for the training itself, with the allowances, services, and administration
provided by the prime sponsors out of their Title IIBC allocations. The
increase in the vocational education set-aside from 5 percent to 6 percent
in the 1978 CETA amendments was a significant factor in the increase in
classroom training under Title IIBC from 46.5 percent of expenditures in
1978 to 52.3 percent in 1979 and 57.1 percent in 1980. In fiscal 1979,
this extra 1 percent represented $19 million, which, when matched by al-
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lowances and services, equalled half of the increase between fiscal 1978
and 1979 in outlays for classroom training under all local CETA programs.
Another important set-aside was the training requirement under Title
IID public service employment program mandated by the 1978 CETA amendments.
In the belief that structural PSE should offer more than temporary em
ployment, Congress required that a minimum of 10 percent of Title I ID funds
for each prime sponsor in fiscal 1979 be used for training, increasing to
15 percent in fiscal 1980 and 20 percent in fiscal 1981. Training had
always been an allowable activity under public service employment, but the
share of funds used for this purpose only became substantial after the
training requirement took effect. 20/ By 1980, training expenditures under
Title IID and VI represented one-fifth of expenditures for training
activities under all CETA local programs. The increase in classroom
training (as a full-time activity) under Title IID from fiscal 1978 to
fiscal 1979 accounted for one-fourth the increase between fiscal 1978 and
1979 in total classroom training under all CETA local programs. This
occurred despite the fact that three-fourths of prime sponsors fell short
of the 15 percent target under Title IID in fiscal 1980, and two-thirds
used less than 10 percent of funds for training. 21/
Training activities
as share of public
service employment

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

Title IID

.3

.3

.3

2.8

7.5

Titles IID and VI

.3

.3

.3

2.3

5.5

A variant of the set-aside approach is a categorical program which
distributes funds for specific purposes either on a competitive application
basis or on a formula basis with specifications concerning how these can be
used by prime sponsors. The Skills Training Improvement Program or STIP is
an example of the first approach. The Secretary of Labor's discretionary
funds were specifically augmented to support "quantum leap" activities of
longer duration which would not ordinarily be provided locally. Prime
sponsors applied and were awarded grants on a competitive basis, with 45
percent eventually receiving funds. These grants were monitored by the
feds as a separate local categorical program.
STIP resulted in more and longer duration training. The program
phased up rapidly in 1978, reached a peak in 1979, and declined rapidly in
1980. Between 1978 and 1979, it accounted for one-fourth of the increase
in classroom training expenditures under CETA local programs. The duration
of training averaged 5.9 months in fiscal 1979, compared to 5.2 months for
participants in IIBC classroom training. The cost per service year was a
seventh above the level of IIBC classroom training (excluding adminis
tration in both cases); and because of the longer duration of stay, the per
participant costs were more than a fourth above those in Title IIBC
classroom training. 22/ Apparently the program had the expected payoffs.
Although there was some creaming into the STIP program, the post-program
success rates for STIP participants exceeded those for similar individuals
under Title IIBC (Table 4.14). Almost half (49.7 percent) of all STIP
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Table 4.14
Characteristics and Outcomes for 1979 STIP and Title IIBC Participants
1979
STIP

1979

1979
STIP

1979
IIBC
Classroom
Training

Entered
Employment
Rate

Total

100

100

52.4

43.6

Male
Female

61
39

40
60

53.7
50.6

45.6
41.7

31
65
5

37
59
5

49.7
54.0
49.3

33.4

53.4
51.5

2
22
58
18

4
34
48
14

49.9
46.6
53.4
57.5

10.4
45.7
54.6
54.4

AFDC

14

20

44.3

29.4

Family head

46

59

52.1

51.0

White
Black
Hispanic
Other

45
40
11
5

48
34
13
5

53.7
46.5
62.9
62.7

46.4
38.1
45.5
46.0

Veteran

16

11

51.4

55.5

62.1

57.5

Age

Less than 22
22-44
45+

Education
High
High
High
Post

school student
school dropout
school graduate
high school

Unemployment compensation
recipients
Source:

Title IIBC
Entered
Employment

Rate

Employment and Training Administration, Management Information
System Fiscal 1979 Summary Reports, unpublished and Westat, Inc.
Characteristics of Enrol lees Who Entered Adult-Oriented CETA Pro
grams During Fiscal Year 1979 (October 1978-Through September 1979)
(Washington, D.C.: Employment and Training Administration, Office
of Policy, Evaluation and Research, February 1981).

participants were reported as having entered employment, which might be
contrasted with the 43.5 percent figure for 1977 CETA classroom trainees
reported by the CLMS. 23/ The median wage before entry into STIP for 1980
temn'nees was $3.43, and the median wage at placement was $4.78. This
two-fifths gain contrasts with the one-fifth increment for IIBC and PSIP
terminees in 1980.
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The Private Sector Initiatives Program authorized in 1978, and highly
tauted by both Democratic and Republican administrations, was an attempt to
increase private-sector-linked local training activities, particularly OJT,
through both a set-aside of funds and changes in the delivery and decisionmaking systems locally. Private Industry Councils were mandated in each
prime sponsorship. These councils required predominant representation from
the business sector. They were to dictate the use of the local Title VII
allocation, and were permitted to manage these activities.
Despite the favorable rhetoric, the record of PSIP has been anything
but impressive by the standards and performance measures usually applied to
employment and training programs. The 1978 amendments to CETA were to take
effect no later than April 1979, and the PICs had a head-start with money
reprogrammed from PSE. Although Private Industry Councils had been
established in most prime sponsor areas by fiscal 1981 and were approving
plans for the expenditure of the funds allocated under Title VII, a
qualitative assessment based on case studies was that in mid-1981 only
about one in ten PICs was really an active body separate from normal prime
Allowing for start-up in fiscal 1979, the
sponsor operations. 24/
activity levels achieved in fiscal 1980 were not overwhelming. A fourth of
prime sponsors reported no PSIP activity. Total participants in fiscal
1980 were also less than three-fourths of plan, completions only twothirds, and unsubsidized placements only two-fifths. More significantly, a
primary aim of PSIP was to increase OJT levels. It was originally planned
in fiscal 1980 that two-fifths of cumulative enrollments would be in OJT.
In fact, less than half of this target was achieved, compared with more
than one-hundred percent of the original classroom training goal. In
fiscal 1980, PSIP accounted for only 11,800 person years of service, which
represented just 3 percent of classroom training service years provided by
prime sponsors and 8 percent of OJT service years. The mix of OJT vs.
classroom training was only slightly different for PSIP than for Title IIBC
training activities; OJT accounted for three-tenths of the PSIP years of
service and enrollment in 1980 (the remainder being classroom training)
compared to one-fifth of Title IIBC training (i.e., disregarding work
experience). In other words, the PICs apparently did not find it much
easier than the prime sponsor to access private employers through OJT, and
had a modest effect overall on the aggregate OJT placement activities at
the local level.
The very early returns suggest that PSIP has been able to achieve
somewhat better outcomes than Title IIBC. In 1980, 42.4 percent of PSIP
terminees entered employment compared to 37.2 percent for Title IIBC; the
private sector employment rates of terminees were 34.1 percent and 26.1
percent, respectively. Yet these results were the result, in part, of
higher expenditures and significant creaming (as well as the proportion
ately higher level of OJT since PSIP has very little work experience
compared to IIBC). The cost per service year of PSIP in 1980 was $9400--or
a fifth above a like mix of services under Title IIBC. A comparison of the
1980 PSIP enrollees with those in IIBC overall as well as its classroom
training and OJT components, documents that PSIP was more selective (Table
4.15). If PSIP had the same age mix of participants as Title IIBC, and the
entered employment rates for each age group were the same as among PSIP
participants in fiscal 1980, the entered employment rate differential
between IIBC and PSIP would have been reduced from 5.2 percentage points to
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Table 4.15
Characteristics of PSIP and IIBC Participants in Fiscal 1980

PSIP

IIBC
Classroom
Training
and OJT
(Weighted
in Proportion
to Training
Shares
Under PSIP)

All
IIBC

57.3

46.0

47.7

36.3
58.6
5.1

34.6
59.4
6.0

47.8
45.7
6.4

School dropouts
Student
High school graduate
Post high school

29.7
4.7
48.3
17.3

36.4
3.7
45.4
14.5

29.3
19.6
32.9
13.2

Receiving public assistance

21.4

32.1

27.0

9.0

8.2

5.3

Single parent

20.1

25.4

18.2

White
Black
Hispanic
Other

48.6
32.3
14.5
3.5

50.7
32.8
11.0
5.6

50.8
33.1
11.7
4.5

6.0

6.9

5.0

12.0

9.9

7.8

Male
Age

Under 22
22-44
45+

Unemployment compensation
recipient

Limited English
Veteran
Source:

Employment and Training Administration, Management Information

System, Fiscal 1980 Summary Reports, unpublished and CETA Supple
mental MIS Tables by Initial Program Assignment, New Enrollees Dur
ing October 1979-September 1980 (Employment and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, 1981).

1.7 percentage points. Similar weighting for differences in educational
attainment and status would reduce the differential to 1.2 percentage
points. Other factors were less critical but in the same pattern.
Adjusting for sex of participants would reduce the placement differential
by .4 percentage points while race would change it to .2 percentage
points. 25/
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The thrust of this analysis is not to negate the value of PSIP over
the long run, but simply to suggest that there is no reason to believe that
the "private sector" linkage approach, using PICs, can make more than
minimal changes in service levels and mixes. It may be able to "cream"
and, hence, get more OJT placements, but it has not, by its achievements,
demonstrated that linkages are major factors impeding involvement of
employers in OJT or, if they are, that they can be successfully forged
through Private Industry Councils. The payoff, instead, is simply more
training because the funds are categorized for this purpose, and perhaps
more payoff from the classroom training which is undertaken because it may
come closer to employer standards so that private sector placements more
often result for trainees.
Thus, if more training is desired in the CETA local programming mix,
it appears that either set-asides or categorical approaches will achieve
this outcome. The upward trend in CETA training in the last several years
is almost totally explained by the increase in the vocational education
set-aside, by the training requirement under PSE, by HIRE and STIP, and the
new PSIP program. The choice among different set-aside and categorical
approaches depends on the aim. The vocational education set-aside is an
effective way to achieve more classroom training and to link with existing
institutions, although the product may be "more of the same." There is a
possibility of substitution, with prime sponsors reducing training ex
penditures from locally-allocated funds if they get more from Governor's
grants, but this does not appear to be a problem overall. Federal
specification and leverage is apparently needed to produce longer-term,
higher cost investments which yield higher placement rates but also serve
the more employable segments of the eligible population. Process changes
can be encouraged through set-asides such as PSIP which dictate insti
tutional arrangements locally, although the short-term yield is apparently
modest and limited to those areas and dimensions where process is really
the problem. The earmarking of funds for specific purposes does not
significantly alter the potentials for different approaches. For instance,
there are apparently omy a suFset of state and local areas with the
capacity or opportunity to mount long-duration intensive training programs,
whether they are selected by competition as in STIP, or they seize
initiative within broad flexibility as a few PICs have done under Title
VII. Where the aim is to take advantage of targets of opportunity, the
competitive approach may be best. Where the aim is to gradually change the
system, the formula-funded categorical approach is probably better.
Likewise, there are apparently no delivery alternatives or funding
arrangements that can drastically increase the use of OJT as currently
designed. It is hard to sell to employers, whether the marketer is an
employee of a PIC or a prime sponsor staff. However, earmarking may make
the local decisionmakers work harder to achieve specified goals by
foreclosing the paths of least resistance, such as work experience when OJT
cannot be marketed, or "other" classroom training when quality occupational
training is not feasible.
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SECTION 4.
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION-LESSONS FROM JOB CORPS

In its history, philosophy, targeting, design, and management, Job
Corps contrasts markedly with local CETA training efforts. These contrasts
raise some important issues. While the transferrability of Job Corps
approaches to a local setting is uncertain, the lessons are worth con
sideration in light of the evidence concerning some of the shortcomings of
local operations and decisionmaking.
Investing A Lot In Those Who Need It Most
The Job Corps offers comprehensive and intensive services to the
hardest-to-employ segment of the CETA-eligible population—dropout youth
from impoverished backgrounds who have limited or no work experience,
minimal reading and math competencies, and frequently health or behavioral
problems. Job Corps has not wavered from this mission and approach in 16
years of operation.
Without question, separate categorization and national direction have
led to greater targeting and more intensive investments. Among the 1.2
million participants in local CETA nonsummer programs in fiscal 1979, less
than one of every seven was a disadvantaged, dropout youth. Such in
dividuals unquestionably needed training because their employability was so
limited. Yet only a third were assigned to training (and only one in
twenty to on-the-job training). The remainder were placed in work
experience positions (despite the compelling evidence from supported work
that out-of-school work experience has little or no impact on post-program
employability). The classroom training slots locally were allocated to
other enrollees who, while burdened by many problems, were clearly less
disadvantaged.
CETA
Classroom
Training
1980

Job Corps
1980

Under age 22
16 or under

42%
7

100%
25

Minority

51

69

High school dropout

39

86

7

19

Offender

Put another way, one of every three disadvantaged, dropout youth who
received CETA authorized employment or training services in 1980 (other
than summer only employment) was a Job Corps enrol lee even though Job Corps
participants represented only 3 percent of all CETA entrants. The number
of dropouts entering Job Corps in 1980 was half again the number of dropout

259

youth entering classroom or on-the-job training as a primary activity under
all local CETA programs. 26/
Differences in dropout rates and placement prospects may be reasons
why prime sponsors choose not to serve dropout youth, but another factor is
that they are unwilling to concentrate resources in order to make the sub
stantial investment required to permanently increase employability. The
total cost of Job Corps in fiscal 1980 was three-fifths higher than the
service year cost of classroom training and almost two and a half times the
service year cost of work experience. Given the average length of stay of
6.0 months in Job Corps, 5.2 months in local classroom training, and 4.6
months in work experience, each Job-Corps type enrollment was, thus, the
equivalent of two classroom training positions, three work experience
opportunities, six summer employment opportunities, or three school-to-work
transition slots. There are more claimants than resources at the local
level, and hence an understandable inclination in a politically-oriented
delivery system to spread the loaves and fishes among the multitudes.
There are over 100 Job Corps centers and 484 prime sponsors. Job
Corps studies suggest that the optimal center size is between 400 and 600
enrollees, and that smaller centers experience severe diseconomies. Few
prime sponsors serve enough disadvantaged dropout youth, of whom only a
portion might want Job Corps treatment, to maintain a residential facility.
During 1980, there were 1300 Job Corps recruits from New York city, 850
from Baltimore and 340 from Detroit. 27/ A typical 500-bed center will
have 1000 enrollees a year. In the rural poverty areas from which many of
the recruits are drawn, state-operated residential facilities are a possi
bility, but only a few of the states with Job Corps centers provide enough
recruits to fill the centers located within the state; likewise, few of the
states currently without centers recruit enough Corpsmembers to fill a
400-600 enrol lee center if it were established.
There is also some question whether locally-based operations would be
appropriate. Perhaps the most important element in a nationally-operated
residential program is the inherent impact on mobility. All local training
programs are based on training for jobs in the locality, and it is there
that placements must be made. Funds are allocated on the basis of need so
that training resources become concentrated where there are the fewest jobs
to train for, as well as the greatest pressures to provide immediate aid
for large numbers. Job Corps provides an exit route from ghettos, barrios
and depressed rural areas. As noted previously, increased mobility is a
major factor behind Corpsmembers 1 success. In the first 18 months postprogram, 35 percent of 1977 Job Corps terminees moved between cities for
job-related reasons and a total of 41 percent moved for some reason (ex
cluding Job Corps moves). Among matched nonparticipants, the rates were 23
and 24 percent, respectively. Other than the military (where enlistments
increased from 5 percent to 9 percent as a result of Job Corps partici
pation), there is no other institutional mechanism for achieving mobility
offered by CETA. 28/
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Standards and Standardization
Another very important feature of Job Corps is the use of standardized
competency-based curricula for basic and advanced education and worldof-work training, structured around standardized measurement and tracking
frameworks for vocational and educational activities.
The Job Corps reading program is a self-paced individualized approach.
Based on a 13 minute preliminary reading test, students can be identified
as beginning readers (0-3.5 grade levels), intermediate readers (3.5 to 7.5
grade level) or advanced readers (7.5 grades or higher). They are then
provided more detailed tests to be placed in one of the eight levels in
beginning reading or eight levels in the intermediate category (each equal
to roughly half a school grade), and seven sublevels for those in advanced
reading. There are separate unit and section tests at each level and, to
advance, a participant must first pass the separate unit tests and then
pass a level test. In each level, there are a variety of reading selec
tions cross-referenced so that specific materials are prescribed depending
on the specific problems identified in the tests. The mathematics program
operates in the same way. The GED program, which serves students who
achieve the 7.5 grade level or above, is based on the five subject areas of
the GED. Each student is given a GED practice test and, based on scores on
the five subtests, is assigned to individualized, self-paced units.
Using the detailed competency assessment and prescription system, Job
Corps has been able to screen alternative educational materials and
cross-reference them to the system, so that the best available in the
private and public sectors can be utilized. Job Corps has also developed
some of its own materials in order to fill the gaps. The reading and
mathematics placement tests have been validated to other national tests
such as the SAT and Gates reading tests, and have proven effective during
years of applications. The documented learning gains of Corpsmembers in
the reading and math programs dramatically exceed their own previous
achievement rates, as well as school norms, providing proof that the Job
Corps treatment works.
Given the evidence that existing remedial education approaches can
increase the gain rates of the educationally disadvantaged, and that
improvement up to credential able levels is necessary to realize a greater
payoff in the labor market, it is significant that only a minority of
participants with educational deficiencies are receiving remediation under
local CETA programs and that the short-duration of participation in CETA
limits the chances that those who receive education services will be able
to advance to the certifiable high school equivalency. What would make
sense is either to increase the length of stay in full-time educational
components, or else to combine education and work or training activities in
a way that a person participating in CETA at several different points could
gradually progress towards a GED. The educational system in Job Corps—
structured as an open-entry, open-exit system offered several hours a day
in combination with other activities—could easily be adapted for use in
remedial components integrated with local work activities. Furthermore,
there is exciting potential for local delivery through the use of com
puters. One of the experiments under Job Corps was a test of computerassisted instruction (CAI)--where lessons were provided on a terminal
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linked to a minicomputer or on a stand-alone microcomputer, and computermanaged instruction (CMI)--where the diagnostic tests were taken on the
terminal, the results analyzed by the computer, and the individual assigned
to either computer-assisted lessons or printed materials. The reading gain
scores of Corpsmembers who received CAI as a supplement to the traditional
Job Corps materials were half-again the substantial gains of students in
the regular reading programs. Where GED materials were provided through a
CMI-CAI combination, the preparation times were substantially shortened.
Attendance also increased. 29/ There were experiments with a network of
terminals tied into a single" minicomputer in order to serve surrounding
local communities or several Job Corps centers. Several prime sponsors
have now mounted and are currently operating similar systems, with
terminals provided to the schools capable of delivering a pre-screened set
of CAI lessons, along with the written materials constituting the basic Job
Corps reading and mathematics program. These have been supplemented by a
competency-based world-of-work package, and several vocational training
packages are being prepared which can be delivered in a combined CAI-CMI
mode. Because of the rapid decline in minicomputer and terminal prices,
and with the increased diversity of materials that are presently available,
it is possible to delivery self-paced, individualized educational in
struction and basic life skills training in any setting where there is a
telephone to link a terminal to a central minicomputer, i.e, at almost any
site where employment and training activities are taking place. Micro
computers with parallel CAI lessons can be used whenever such minicomputer
networks are infeasible. The costs of such offerings, particularly the
marginal costs of adding extra terminals to minicomputer systems, are
extremely low. They are further reduced when the management information
system uses these same terminals and technical assistance for staff is
provided along with CAI lessons for participants.
Vocational training in Job Corps is also competency based. Each
occupation of training has a standardized Training Achievement Record which
itemizes a hierarchy of skills and knowledge steps (Table 4.16). Each
participant is judged on the basis of performance and knowledge relative to
this hierarchy. The TAR is the framework for structuring individualized
instruction so that each trainee can move at his or her own pace which is
necessary because Job Corps is open entry and exit. Each center contractor
develops its own vocational curriculum, but it must be structured to
provide, as a minimum, the competencies outlined in the TAR. The TAR
approach, thus, provides some standardization of the programs developed by
diverse operators, as well as a way to measure and check the performance of
training at different centers. With such a standardized framework, it is
possible to interchange the materials developed at different centers.
Individual performance can also be judged when Corpsmembers apply for
advanced vocational courses. In some cases, particularly welding, the TAR
has been used by employers to determine the skills and appropriate
placements for terminees.
Most other dimensions of center operations are also subject to uniform
guidelines specifying minimum components and qualitative standards. For
instance, centers are required to provide a comprehensive medical examina
tion within two weeks of entry. All Corpsmembers staying over 90 days are
to receive dental examinations and appropriate treatments. The facilities
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Table 4.16
An Example of the Vocational Competency Assessment and
Tracking Framework--The Training Achievement Record for Carpentry
TTTCS————————
DATE TRAINEE EHTERED
TRAINININC

SOCIAL SECURITY
NO.

Carp»nter, Construction

PEHFORMANCE

A CM 11

I

3

J

4

1 Ptacuot safety oa th> job ..... ... ...... . . . ....... ., . . 4d
• 2. Kaow ud tu> aft pacuoi hudlmg toots, woodworking nucnbMry .... .... 4d
Ghasrai

3 Kaow aad imbnuad cuptBtat tnmLulofT ....................... *l

4. Us. "*** M**.m>m COCUDOQ hud IDOll

.............»***.*. .......

Jc

5. Urn tad maintain ntuunaq tools ud •qulpraal ....................
6. Un ud ""•""'" power optnud woodworking marhlrnt ...............
7 R«*d. undtntand ud interpret buildup sketches ....................
Fouadauaas. Walls, Floor* aad Sun
8. Lay out building linn and set cukn lor grading ....................
9 BuUd and plan straight ooocrtt. forms .... .....................
10. Lo>* up and brao* concnt. wallj tod columns .................. ...
11. L«y out footui^i, bujld or plac* formi ud bna ....................
12. Bxuld im^ulu coocnn forms
...... .......................
13. L^y out «nd cut sum 4nd tnuds; mstaU nfliags ....................
fr*nw9 (Toundjoonj and VaillJ
14. Lay out ud fnnM tills ind fmltn.............................
15. FnoM ud tH floor jo«> . ................................

5=
3c
2b
Se
Sc
3c
3c
3c
2b
5«
3c

16. Lay oat walls and paruuofls .................................

3c

1? End valis aad paruuoiu ..................................
18. imuB tiMMing ud ptuttr youadj .............................
Root*
19 Fam. ud «t oonunon nftm................................
20. FOOM ud •! nlky nflin .................................
21 Fain, ud m hip nften ..................................
22. FnuiM ud stt >ack ra/ren ..................................
i3. Appty tlijaihnq, oomponuon AloqUi aad o(b«r typm of roof coming .......
Brunar >Uiwo/k
24. DtttmuM comet tools ud -"' <*<«. tupolm for talk ................
li. Op«4it itill aw. dectnc dnll ud under ...... .................
26. Sn up and oocrau Unch aw . .... ....... .................
twtnor WaJ Cowing
27 Apply wood co<«lDgi........... .........................
23. Apply composition. ibMt rock or ttbtr board ......................

3c
3c

29 lonall bavoouds

........

Floan
30 Uay cub-Hooruig ........

..........................

..................

.

...

2b
3c
3c
Jo
So
3c

.........

31 Lay rub flooring
. ....................... .
32 Build And plan forms for concnt. floors .... ..............
.
lourjor fiAuh
33 Cut and Dl baj. ud mouldings . . . ......................
.
34 S4| door jambs, Hi and rung doors . .................... ....
35 Fit and hang windows .
................................
36 Fit and fania hardwar*
.
...,......,,,....,,..........

Sc
3o
3o
3c
3c

3c
Ic
3c
Jc
3c
Jc
Jc

Rtmootltnq

37
M.
39
40.
41.
42.

Install aluminum aad nnyl siding .... . ......... ...........
Install comouuuon norm windows and doors .......... ... ... . .
Lay nrw tooling maintals . . . . . . .....................
Install aluminum porch tndosurcs. awnings, pauo covtn
.
.
......
Install m«ul porch rails and stair mil
. .
......
Iniull o*rfhfaa qar*g< coori ano ragic^controlled ttirag* door opener

1
2.
3
4

Us. mitrucuoru fumuhcd in wntien, oral, diagram or schedule form . . . . ,
Us. anthmcuc. apply practical alegrbn and geomltry . . . .
. .
Rtad and innrpnt ttchmcal maittvali
. . . ...... ...........
Prvpan npom and summanci. conforming to good English usag*
. . . . .

COUCATIOH

Jc
Jc
Jc
3c
Jc
3c

TtCHNICAI. KNOXLf OCE-JOB PHYSICAL PROFILl

d

1. Abl« to Uft 50 Ibs. mammum, carry to 2i Ibs, walk and stand conODuoully . . ,
2. Abl. to cumb and us. back muacl.f and 1*93 to stoop, knt«l. crouch, crawl
3. Abl. to ua fingers, hands, arms to nach, handl., fe«l
. . .
.....
4. Abl* to SM «fficuntly. .
.
...
.................

5. Work both mdoon and outdoon when physical hazards udst

Source:

..........

Employment and Training Administration, Office of Job Corps and Young
Adult Conservation Corps.
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on center or those secured under contract must meet very specific re
quirements covering such things as the number and types of dental chairs,
x-ray equipment, nursing personnel, and the like. Information on medical
facilities utilization and costs are required in detail each quarter and
are used as a management tool. In addition, medical experts review each
center once a year to determine the adequacy of treatment. Likewise, there
are standards for the food served at centers specifying the number of
entrees, vegetables, and calories at each meal. There are guidelines
concerning the types of recreational activities which must be provided, as
well as for counseling and psychiatric assistance, and student government.
The financial and activity reports for each Job Corps center provide
detailed statistics on most of these dimensions, and there is top-to-bottom
on-site review each year by a team of federal personnel to assess
compliance with qualitative and quantitative standards for each component.
In other words, maintenance of these minimum standards can be and usually
are assured by federal monitoring.
Standardization of minimum components also means that performance can
be meaningfully assessed from a few key indicators. In comparison to prime
sponsor operations which consist of an incredible melange of activities
provided to a diverse participant group with enormous variability in the
match-ups of service types and clients from prime sponsor to prime sponsor,
the variance in participants and treatments from center to center is quite
modest. Thus, comparison of centers according to performance indicators is
much more meaningful. For instance, there is no question that longer stay
in Job Corps is associated with greater post-program gains, so that length
of treatment is a reasonable indicator of impact (as long as it is assured,
as it is by regulation and monitoring, that Corpsmembers are free to exit
if they choose). In contrast, long stay in a work experience, job search
assistance, or even an ESL component under a prime sponsor's operation may
not be desirable. In centers where beds need to be filled and studentteacher ratios are established to achieve maximum efficiency, the capacity
utilization rate is a meaningful indicator of performance. In contrast,
prime sponsors may be operating programs with large fluctuations in
enrollments, as witnessed by the utilization figures in the school-to-work
transition projects cited earlier, yet these fluctuations are averaged out
in the aggregated, quarterly data for the prime sponsor and there is no way
to determine utilization of available resources. Since Job Corps re
cruitment and placement activities are usually outside the aegis of the
center, the placement results, on average, tend to reflect the quality of
treatment on center; in contrast, good placement results for a prime
sponsor might result from creaming of participants or a job access emphasis
which masks ineffective treatments. Thus, where a center differs sub
stantially from Job Corps norms concerning duration of stay, capacity
utilization, or placement, there is reasonable certainty that a problem
exists. A one- or two-month rise in the weekly termination rate of a
center will usually tell as much as a ream of CETA management information
system reports from a prime sponsor.
This is suggested by comparison of some of Job Corps and CETA
performance indicators. As noted previously, the coefficients of variation
for prime sponsor Title IIBC performance indicators in 1980 (i.e., the
standard deviation in the indicator divided by the mean for all prime
sponsors) were quite substantial:
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Coefficients
of Variation
Plan/actual OJT enrollment
Plan/actual classroom training enrollment
OJT cost per participant
Classroom training cost per participant
Cost per placement
Entered employment rate

56.4
35.2
61.7
43.7
70.3
35.3

These might be compared with the coefficients of variation for the
four principle Job Corps center performance indicators in fiscal 1979:
Coefficient
of Variation
Completion rate
Weekly termination rate
Capacity utilization rate
Placement rate

16.7%
19.4
4.7
4.2

Moreover, it is possible to get immediate corrective action, par
ticularly in the case of contract centers where poorly performing operators
can be replaced. Among the ten centers ranked lowest on each of the four
Job Corps indicators in fiscal 1978, half had moved out of the bottom ten
for each particular indicator by fiscal 1979. In three-fourths of the
cases performance on the relevant indicator improved noticeably from one
year to the next. 30/
Contracting for Management
Most prime sponsors utilize contract delivery agents, but the over
whelming majority of such agents are not-for-profit groups. A few prime
sponsors contract for delivery of whole segments of their operations, such
as youth programs, to community groups, but the prime sponsor usually
retains management responsibility.
In Job Corps, both management and
delivery may be contracted, and frequently the contractor is a privatefor-profit operator. In 1979 there were 53 contract centers in addition to
the 35 conservation centers operated by the Departments of Interior and
Agriculture on federal land (plus two centers in Puerto Rico operated by
the Commonwealth); among the contract centers, 43 were operated by
private-for-profit groups. 31/ Over the life of the Job Corps a number of
major U.S. corporations have served as managing agents, including Litton
Industries,
Packard-Bell
Electronics
Corporation,
Teledyne,
General
Electric, Burroughs, Thiokol, Philco-Ford, Westinghouse, Bendix, RCA, AVCO,
and Singer. In recent years, several smaller and minority-owned firms have
also become center operators.
Managing and delivery agents are selected by a competitive process.
Each contract center is competitively bid every two years, although a
contract may be extended for a third year if operations are adequate, or
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rebid before two years if performance is totally inadequate. In the early
years of Job Corps, many companies were involved because of federal
pressure or to demonstrate corporate citizenship. Not surprisingly, there
was a high turnover among contractors. In the 1970s, this turnover
declined as the corporations which remained active developed expertise and
extended operations to multiple sites. From 1976 to 1980, there were only
three cases where rebidding led to changes in for-profit contractors of
particular centers, compared to 7 changes between 1971 and 1976. However,
there have been frequent changes in the staffs of particular centers, in
response to poor performance and under threat of losing out in the next
competition. Private sector contractors are able to fire personnel more
easily than the public sector operators as well as to shift individuals to
centers where their talents can be most effectively utilized. Most of the
contractors also achieve economies of scale and standardization of
offerings through management and operation of multiple sites.
For
instance, in 1979, Thiokol managed four centers, RCA managed eleven, Singer
managed nine, Teledyne five, and AVCO five.
The cost of private sector participation includes a fee—usually 4
percent of the center's operating expenses—and a government approved
administration and overhead rate. In 1977, fees and overhead amounted to
10 percent of center operating costs per Corpsmember year in contract
centers, or 7.5 percent of the total Corpsmember year costs including
allowances, recruitment and placement, transportation, union contracts, and
federal administration. 32/
The performance of the contract centers can be compared with that of
conservation centers, operated by the Departments of Interior and Agri
culture. These conservation centers are generally smaller and have a lower
female enrollment than contract centers, so that economies of scale cannot
be as easily achieved. The conservation center costs also include work
project expenses, which are offset by output. Finally, unions operate
training programs in the conservation centers under national contracts.
Adding the union costs and subtracting the higher work project costs per
Corpsmember, the average expenditure in conservation centers in 1977 was a
sixth above that in the contract centers, without counting the extra
federal overhead in the Departments of Agriculture and Interior. The
evidence from the 18-month follow-up of male enrollees suggests that after
adjusting for size of centers, location, coed status, race, age, and high
school status of enrol less, that the employment increases from preenrollment to the week prior to follow-up were 17 percent for contract
center enrollees and 11 percent for conservation center enrollees. Among
terminees, the portion who reported that the training had helped in
obtaining at least one job was 27 percent for participants in contract
center compared to 24 percent for participants in conservation centers. 33/
If the figures on union placements are at all accurate, the union operated
programs in conservation centers must account for a substantial share of
the placements, and conservation centers enrollees who do not participate
in these programs apparently do not fare well.
Within contract centers, the performance of for-profit contractors can
be compared with the performance of public and nonprofit contractors in
cluding state and local education departments, community-based organi
zations, and special-purpose groups such as the Texas Education Foundation.
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While there are no data on the costs of public and nonprofit versus
private-for-profit operators in contract centers, the limited evidence from
the Job Corps impact study is that participants in publicly-run contract
centers do better in terms of post-program employment and earnings, all
else being equal. 34/ In part this may reflect the effects of competition
which results when there are viable alternatives. There has been turnover
in public and nonprofit contractors: two centers run by public contractors
were closed, and managing agents in two other cases were changed between
1971 and 1976. Another change occurred in 1978 when an otherwise effective
public contractor chose not to rebid, because with the rise in public
salaries, it could no longer operate within Job Corps cost limits. Most of
the public and nonprofit contractors were able to hire staff outside local
civil service procedures so that they had many of the advantages of forprofits. Some also operated multiple centers, achieving economies of
scale. Thus, while the evidence suggests that there is no magic in private
sector management per se, competitive contracting assures options in the
case of poor performance and some incentives to maintain the performance of
staff as well as flexibilities to replace operators if they are not
adequate.
Many CETA programs have smaller annual budgets and no more complicated
operations than large Job Corps centers. The use of private sector
management agents working under contract to local units of government might
improve performance in some areas or at least provide needed options.
Administrative costs now average nearly a fifth of expenditures under local
CETA programs, and have skyrocketed since the advent of "cost-pooling"
which allowed prime sponsors to take a cut off the top of allocations under
each title with very little accounting for outlays. It appears that
private sector fees and overhead would not represent any significant cost
increase and might help to achieve greater effectiveness in some cases.
Certainly this approach is worth trying where prime sponsors have performed
unacceptably as managers.
Opportunity Ladders
The fundamental approach of CETA local programs is to provide work,
training, or other services for a limited period, and then to place the
participant as soon as possible into a job. Job Corps, from its inception,
has aimed to provide comprehensive, individualized, self-paced human
resource development activities over an extended treatment period in order
to assure each participant the opportunity to advance as far and as fast as
possible. Job Corps has also sought to provide as many training and
education options as feasible so that the needs of each individual can be
accommodated. One of the inherent advantages in having a national network
of centers, and provision for transportation and residency, is that it
permits specialization in training at specific centers to service par
ticipants with special interests and abilities drawn from all centers.
While the range of basic Job Corps vocational offerings are roughly the
same from center to center, advanced programs have been instituted at
various centers which focus on reclamation, solar energy, marine trades,
high level automotive mechanics, clerical training for the transportion
industries, and computer training. Additionally, certain centers have
developed special adaptations of education and other programs in order to
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deal with special needs segments of the eligible population such as
handicapped youth and the learning disabled, Indochinese refugees, single
parents and the like.
The Advanced Career Employment and Training Program (ACET) is the most
ambitious of the "quantum leap" training efforts. Under a contract with
the Job Corps, Control Data Corporation (CDC) trains Corpsmembers as
computer operators and customer engineers. Trainees are selected from Job
Corps centers throughout the nation. To be eligible for this advanced
program, the Corpsmembers must have participated at least three months in
regular centers and have attained an eighth grade reading level and a GED
or high school diploma. CDC tests are also used to determine interest and
ability, with the highest scorers placed in customer engineer training, the
more advanced of the offerings.
The training occurs at the Control Data Institute in Minneapolis,
Minnesota, and the work experience assignments are within CDC branches
around the country. The computer operator training component is eight
months and the customer engineer training 14 months. Trainees utilize the
PLATO computer-based education system developed by CDC and the University
of Illinois. This system provides self-paced, individualized instruction
so that more capable students can move more rapidly through training. The
courses cover remedial education, electronics, binary math, computer logic,
the fundamentals of data processing and computer equipment. During the
period of training, Corpsmembers receive full Job Corps benefits including
room and board, training and counseling, transportation, a clothing
allowance, and other special services. The training is followed by
full-time subsidized internships for up to one year, but less if the
trainee becomes fully productive earlier. During the internships, the
trainees are responsible for their own support but receive the entry salary
for customer engineers ($1083 monthly in 1980) or computer operators ($885
monthly). Jobs are then guaranteed by the Control Data Corporation for all
completers. The guarantee stipulates a minimum beginning salary ($12,000
for customer engineers in 1980 and $9,300 for computer operators). The
occupations of training were selected because of the availability of
employment opportunities but also the salary progressions experienced by
previous trainees. Annual salaries for customer engineers in CDC in 1980
ranged from $12,000 to $28,000, and those for computer operators from
$9,300 to $14,400. The usual entering employee in these fields experienced
a real increase in salary of at least a fifth over two years.
The first cohort of ACET trainees entered in March 1979. Of the 113
participants 90 completed—an incredibly low dropout rate compared to the
overall Job Corps program. The rate of progress through training was
faster than expected, and the needed internship period proved to be less
than a year. The significance of the Corpsmember success rate is suggested
by the fact that enrollments in regular Control Data Corporation training
programs are predominantly persons with 2 years of college or more in the
case of customer engineer training, or high achievers among high school
graduates for computer operator training. Prior to ACET, the Control Data
Institute trained almost no individuals with the disadvantaged background
of the Corpsmember participants, and the chances for these individuals
getting into such growing job areas in the absence of ACET would otherwise
have been nonexistent.
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Such advanced training in corporate facilties is expensive, with a
comprehensive cost for the first cohort of trainees of almost $20,000 for
each completing computer operator and $33,000 for a customer engineer. The
subsidized internship accounted for half of the cost in the first case, and
two-fifths in the latter. Since this was an experimental program involving
start-up costs and uncertainties about the abilities of disadvantaged young
people to complete training, the costs were high. Under the extension of
ACET, per slot costs were reduced by about a fifth in real terms, including
a shortening of the internship period, but the pricetag for customer
engineer training remains more than four times the per participant cost of
Job Corps and ten times the per participant cost of local classroom
training. Is such an investment warranted?
Based on normal salary projections and the placement rates of the
first ACET participants, the full cost would be recouped in state and
federal taxes within six years and the training costs net of the internship
in less than three years for computer operators and less than four for
customer engineers. 35/ Completers in Job Corps who participated in 1977
(and did not enter the armed forces) averaged roughly $5000 in annual
earnings over the first two years out of the program, or a gain of
approximately $1250 over controls. 36/ The average annual earnings of ACET
completers were roughly $11,500. Net gains relative to controls could,
thus, have been as much as $7250 annually, which would cover the extra cost
(as judged from a social benefit-cost perspective) in just three years.
Moreover, because the training occupations were selected on the basis of
career potential, the relative payoffs are likely to increase over the
years. In other words, even these crude calculations suggest that the
advanced training, despite its high pricetag, was cost-effective compared
to regular Job Corps programming (which itself was cost-effective), at
least for the minority of Corpsmembers who had greater potential.
Advanced training is also provided in union-affiliated programs oper
ated mainly in conservation centers but also in some contract and special
centers. In fiscal 1979, the union programs accounted for 12 percent of
all training in Job Corps, including programs with the carpenters, brick
layers, plasterers and cement masons, painters, operating engineers, rail
way and airline clerks, autoworkers, and the Appalachian Council. These
programs have higher entry standards, taking only those Corpsmembers who
have performed in regular training, and in some cases requiring a GED or
diploma as well as a minimum age. Only 40 percent of entrants complete
union training (compared to over half of persons staying more than 90 days
in regular center training programs) although half of the noncompleters are
transferred into less demanding nonunion Job Corps training. But among
graduates in 1979, two-thirds were placed in training related jobs and 15
percent in school or the military, with the unions handling these place
ments. This contrasts favorably with the Job Corps-reported 40 percent
training-related placement rate for all completers. Moreover, the average
wage of union-trained participants who were placed in 1979 was 70 percent
above the average for all Job Corps-recorded placements. 37/
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Linking to the Employment and Training System
Because Job Corps is an expensive, comprehensive treatment in a
residential setting, it is important from both a cost and effectiveness
standpoint that enrollees really need this type of approach, will stay long
enough to benefit, and cannot be as effectively served in alternative
treatments. The legislation specifies that recruits must be living in an
environment "so characterized by deprivation, a disrupted homelife, or
other disrupting conditions as to substantially hinder prospects for
successful participation in other programs providing needed training,
education, or assistance." Job Corps must determine through a screening
process that recruits "have the present capabilities and aspirations needed
to complete and secure the full benefit of Job Corps and to be free of
medical and behavioral problems so serious that the individual could not
adjust to the standards of conduct, discipline, work and training which the
Job Corps involves."
While roughly 5 percent of Job Corps enrollments nationwide are nonresidential participants, and while some of the residential participants
are drawn from nearby communities, most Job Corps enrol lees are some
distance from their homes. For many, this is the first mobility oppor
tunity and this is unquestionably a positive experience on average—as
witnessed by the changes in behavior and attitudes and increases in
subsequent mobility. Nevertheless, it creates a disjuncture and a re
adjustment problem upon Job Corps termination. All participants are to
receive placement services. Terminees must, in fact, check in with
designated placement agencies in their home community or area of relocation
in order to receive their readjustment allowances. But the low employment
and earnings rates of Corpsmembers relative to controls in the first two
post-program months document that the transition is difficult for some.
Ideally, then, Job Corps should be closely linked to local CETA
activities. The prime sponsors presumably have a large pool of dropout
youth from which they can choose those best served by Job Corps in light of
Presumably also, the local
knowledge about alternative treatments.
operators would be best situated to arrange for placement and transitional
assistance when the participants return from Job Corps. Unfortunately,
such commonsense linkages have not been forged.
Job Corps is a nationally-operated program. Working primarily through
the federal/state Employment Service plus nationwide groups such as Women
in Community Service (WICs), and Joint Action for Community Service (JACs),
Job Corps maintains a separate system for recruiting, screening and
placement. While the Employment Service has offices everywhere in the
nation, it is responsible for local employment and training activities in
only a minority of areas. Moreover, Job Corps does not benefit from the
use of existing capacity. Job Corps must pay for services at roughly $250
In
per head for recruiting, screening, and subsequent placement!
Employment Service offices, there are separately funded personnel solely
responsible for recruiting and placement; frequently they operate in
relative isolation from other Employment Service activities.
Critics of Job Corps have focused on the recruiting and placement
aspects of the program as its weak link. One charge is that many youth
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enter Job Corps who could be better served in community treatments or do
not need Job Corps treatment, so that the money is wasted. This is
supported by the charge that the recruiters sometimes coerce or mislead
candidates in order to fill quotas and receive payments. 38/ There are
several rather compelling counterarguments. First, the demographic profile
of Job Corps recruits has changed hardly at all in the last 16 years, and
it is self-evident that the overwhelming majority of enrollees face serious
barriers to employment and need help. Indeed, the major change in re
cruiting and screening procedures in the last decade has been dis
continuance of detailed screening on the basis of criminal records because
it is no longer possible to gather this information in many states and
localities. These records were used to screen out those not considered
likely candidates. Second, the evidence does not support the notion that
there are a profusion of options. The previously cited enrollment figures
document that training opportunities for dropout youth in local CETA pro
grams are meager. The experiences of the control group selected to assess
the net impacts of Job Corps in 1977 suggest what would have occurred if
Corpsmembers had remained in their communities. On average, over the two
years of tracking, only 3 percent of the controls at any time were enrolled
in CETA programs and less than 4 percent were enrolled in any work or
training program. Less than 4 percent were in vocational and technical
school or some alternative school, while 8 percent were, on average,
reenrolled in high school. 39/ Third, Job Corps recruits largely seek out
this program rather than being pressured into application, i.e., they are
self-selected not shanghied. Among 1977 recruits, 63 percent first heard
about Job Corps from friends or relatives, 11 percent from advertisements
or news articles, and 5 percent from schools. Only 17 percent first heard
about the program from the Employment Service or a probation officer. Most
then went to the Employment Service to get more information. They entered
Job Corps primarily for job training, to get a job, or because they could
not find work (71 percent noted these as the primary reasons), or else to
get a GED or education (50 percent). Only 5 percent reported enrollment in
order to stay out of trouble or because of a court decision, while 29
percent cited reasons such as self-improvement, getting away from home,
nothing better to do, or the attraction of the allowance. Significantly,
nine of ten enrollees subsequently rated the characteristics of Job Corps
training and education about the same as or above expectations; and eight
of ten gave the same rating to recreational and social characteristics of
the program. The only aspects where the program proved less than expected
were the food (hardly a surprising complaint, whether among Corpsmembers or
college students) and the allowance. 40/ The latter should not have
occurred, since allowance policies are quite specific. Therefore, Job
Corps prepared a simple brochure explaining all aspects of Job Corps
including pay and allowances, rights, responsibility, and chances of
securing training of choice. This must now be provided to every recruit,
and presented orally to those who cannot read. The recruit must then
indicate in writing that he or she understands all the information. Books
are also provided to recruiters showing pictures of centers and detailing
the training possibilities. In other words, it is unlikely that there is
much false advertising in recruiting, if there ever was.
This does not alter the fact, however, that there are youth in the
eligible population, and certainly many who apply to local CETA programs,
who have more need for Job Corps treatment than some of those who enter.
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If Job Corps recruited from a unified local system, and particularly from
prime sponsors who, rather than the Employment Service, usually allocate
local employment and training opportunities, Job Corps opportunities might
be distributed more equitably and efficiently. Certainly Job Corps should
not be paying for recruiting and screening to the Employment Service when
CETA and the Employment Service have their hands on and are not now
adequately serving large numbers of disadvantaged youth.
The charges against Job Corps placement efforts are much more on
target, although the object of criticism is usually the reporting system
rather than the placement activities per se. The Job Corps system is,
indeed, misleading (although steps have been taken to improve it). In
fiscal 1978, for instance, there were 44,900 terminations. Placement
status was recorded for only 32,300, of whom 2300 were ill, incarcerated,
or females with full-time family responsibilities and therefore considered
"not available for placement." Of the remaining 30,000, 93 percent were
reported as "placed" including 20,500 who entered eployment, 6000 in
education and training programs, and 1,400 who entered the armed
forces. 41/ A Job Corps placement is, therefore, more like a positive
termination than a placement in the CETA management information system. In
CETA, the individuals not followed-up at termination are counted as not
placed and as nonpositive terminations so that they reduce the positive
termination rate, whereas in Job Corps they are subtracted from the
denominator which increases the reported rate. Only recently have time
limits been placed on how long after termination the labor market status
must be reported. The placement records for fiscal 1978 would suggest a 66
percent employment rate at the point in time the placement status was
noted. In contrast, the follow-up data on 1977 Job Corps participants
found that the employment rate of those not in the military averaged 41
percent during the first year after termination. 42/
Yet the real issue is not just whether placement claims are mis
leading, but whether placement services are offered and whether they are
effective. In the first-year follow-up of 1977 Corpsrnembers, three of five
reported that they had not had any placement contact with Job Corps
personnel or any agency referred to them by Job Corps, including JACS and
WICS or the Employment Service. Three-fourths of Corpsmembers claimed they
could have used additional help in finding a job. Among those with a
placement contact, only 43 percent reported a successful placement as a
result, representing less than one in five terminees. Considering that the
Employment Service was paid on a per capita basis for placement services
and its contracts covered the preponderance of terminees, it is shocking
that only one in ten Corpsmembers reported that they got a job through the
Employment Service. 43/
Where advanced career training is provided, or where the Job Corps
center is serving youth from nearby areas, it would be appropriate for the
training agent or center operator to be responsible for placement.
However, in most cases the responsibility should be with the local employ
ment and training system from which the participant was referred or to
which he or she is returning. Only if the system has responsibility for
recruitment can it also be expected to have responsibility for placement.
This will only occur if it gets credit in the CETA MIS for recruitment and
placement, and probably only if quotas are set. Unless the prime sponsor
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understands and tracks the Job Corps treatment, it will be unable to make
an appropriate placement. In other words, the nationally-administered Job
Corps needs to be integrated on the recruiting and placement ends, with
local CETA programs. Any nationally-directed training activity will have
to pay attention to such linkages so that there are not a crazy-quilt of
institutions competing for recruits and subsequent placements in each labor
market.
Is Longer Training Feasible?
Job Corps has disproportionately greater impacts on long stayers and
completers. All studies of Job Corps over the years have reached this same
conclusion. There have been efforts, therefore, to increase the duration
of stay. Since the Job Corps serves a volatile population which is the
least likely to make and follow-through on long-term commitments, the
experience in this regard has implications for local training.
It appears that the duration of stay is policy manipulable. The
average stay has improved steadily since the early days of Job Corps—from
a mean of 4.3 months averaged in 1966 and 1967 to 4.8 months in fiscal
1975, and 6.0 months in fiscal 1980. The latter figure is rather re
markable. The Job Corps was in the midst of a doubling of center capacity
in 1980. In the past, high turnover rates had been experienced whenever
new centers were opened. The improvement in fiscal 1980 was achieved even
though new center enrollment represented a third of on-board strength.
There are four principal ways in which the recent and longer-term
improvement was accomplished. First, a conscious effort was exerted to
reduce the transhipment of youth and to keep them as close to home as
possible. Leave poliies were also changed to permit more frequent visits.
This probably accounted for improvements in duration of stay in the late
1960s, although the closing of a number of centers in the early 1970s
increased the average distance from home and, therefore, was a negative or
certainly not positive, factor in the 1970s. The new centers established
in 1979 and 1980 were consciously planned to achieve a better geographic
distribution, so that this may have been a positive, albeit modest factor
in the 1980 improvement.
Second, a performance system was implemented in 1976 to judge both
center operators and regional Department of Labor Job Corps personnel
according to the weekly termination, capacity utilization and completion
rates averaged in centers (in addition to the placement rates). This
unquestionably had an affect on the 1977-1980 improvements.
Third, Job Corps allowances are structured to reward enrollees who
remain and perform well in the program. At the beginning of fiscal 1980
the incentives were increased as allowances in Job Corps were doubled.
Enrollees in centers 0-60 days are paid $40 monthly, with automatic
increases to $60 per month for 61-180 days in center and to $80 monthly
after 180 days. There are rules for denying the automatic increase for bad
behavior, and there are rewards of up to an extra $20 monthly for exemplary
performance (with restrictions on the percentage of total center enrollees
who can be rewarded). When enrollees leave the center and return home,
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they are provided readjustment allowances of $75 for each month of par
ticipation if they have remained less than six months, but $100 for each
month beyond this. If they have stayed more than 271 days, they receive
the $100 for all months of participation. 44/ There is no doubt that these
incentives have had some effect on length of stay. This was particularly a
factor when pay and allowances were increased in September 1979. In the
prior year, the weekly termination rate in Job Corps averaged 3.7 percent.
In the year after, it averaged only 3.5 percent despite predicted increases
as a result of the opening of new centers. 45/
Fourth, the expansion of advanced career training offerings in Job
Corps increased the length of stay both because these are open only to
Corpsmembers who have stayed more than 90 days and performed well in the
core center programs, and because they have a scheduled longer duration
with clear job and earnings payoffs at the end of the line. An an example,
in 1977 a program was introduced to place a yearly average of between 1250
and 1500 Job Corps youth in individualized career-oriented program in
colleges and post-secondary vocational schools where they would receive
full Job Corps support, services and allowances. To be eligible, youth had
to be in Job Corps for 90 days and had to have secured a GED or high school
diploma. Three-fifths of Corpsmembers in the centers from which the
first-year enrollees were selected indicated that they would stay longer in
order to take advantage of the college option, and, in fact, completion
rates in GED programs rose noticeable in these "feeder" centers.
Corpsmembers who were selected for this program achieved the same grade and
retention levels as other entering students in the institutions to which
they were assigned. Over two-thirds returned the next year. Thus, the
retention rate past the 90-day point was substantially greater for those
ACT participants than for regular center enrollees. 46/ Because all the
advanced programs together account for only a sixth of Job Corps en
rollments, the extra length of stay of participants has a diluted effect on
overall duration of stay but there is no doubt that expansion of these
offerings has been a positive factor in the last several years. The lesson
is that when meaningful "quantum leap" programs are provided, at least a
minority of even the most disadvantaged youth are willing and able to
complete long-term training when they can clearly see the benefits.
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CHAPTER 5
VISIONS AND REVISIONS
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SECTION 1.
THE END OF AN ERA

During two decades of extraordinary growth, employment and training
activities targeted for those at the end of the labor queue enjoyed broad
consensus and support. Prior to 1979, the upward climb in real expendi
tures was interrupted by only three years of modest retrenchment. There
was sporadic debate about countercyclical vs. structural goals, emphasis
shifted between different intervention strategies and target groups,
federal and local responsibilties were periodically realigned, but the
underlying programmatic elements, in their design and delivery, remained
relatively consistent.
A manpower program savant of the late 1960s returning to the delivery
level after a decade's absence would have noticed the increased scale of
activities, a greater diversity of delivery agents, better institutional
relations and less friction, as well as more women and college graduates
delivering services and making decisions. Probably the biggest shock would
have been the legions of monitors and the mountains of paper. Yet under
neath these trappings, the services offered would have been recognizable—
in quite a few cases, provided by the same local delivery agents in the
same settings and sometimes by the same people whose thinking had changed
little over the years. Classroom training remained a short-term inter
vention preparing for entry-level jobs, operating for the most part without
standardized curricula, competency standards, or qualitative input re
quirements, and providing few opportunities for the acquisition of skills
or credentials that could be expected to improve lifetime prospects.
Income maintenance continued as major element, attracting some to training
who only wanted the money, fostering retention even when participants
performed poorly. Local training was, as in the past, focused on local
opportunities, so that the areas with disproportionate funding based on
need were burdened by attempts to prepare participants for and to place
them in scarce local jobs. OJT was, as always, a preferred approach most
difficult to market other than to employers at the lowest levels in the
primary economy, and sometimes those simply wanting cheap labor. The
observer would not have been surprised by the "creaming" in OJT, and the
reluctance of delivery agents to risk the precious few slots on the
"hardest of the hard core." Neither would he have been shocked by the
ignorance of the delivery agent about what was really occurring at OJT
training sites. A trip to the typical Job Corps center would have evoked a
sense of d£ja vu, particularly if the center were one of the many which had
continued in operation since the early days. Job Corps was a good design
from conception and it kept the faith, improving efficiency by trimming
some excesses, weathering occasional political and publicity storms, but
gradually gaining acceptance as one of the Great Society programs that
worked.
Returning from the delivery level to the ivory tower, the manpower
savant might have been overwhelmed by the volume of the literature and the
sophistication of econometric techniques, and somewhat bemused by the
investment of so much to learn so little new, but the findings themselves
offered no surprises. Recent evidence has confirmed the conclusions from
past studies that training efforts are worthwhile—increasing earnings of
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those who participate and paying off modestly as a social investment. Yet
this payoff is achieved without dramatically improving the status of very
many participants, without noticeably affecting the functioning of the
economy, and despite some obvious and persistent shortcomings.
What has changed over the last two decades is the consensus that
supported expansion and the faith that new initiatives or better management
would necessarily improve performance. At the end of the 1970s, there was,
for the first time, a substantial reversal of the long-term growth trend.
While public criticism focused on employment components, doubts were raised
about the entire system, and, indeed, the entire mission. For the first
time, a significant body of opinion questioned whether we could live
without such activities, rather than proposing modifications or al
ternatives.
If our modern day Rip Van Winkle returns a decade hence, what will he
find? Given the current mood of social welfare retrenchment, there may be
little left to justify" a return visit. More likely, considering the
inertia of politics and institutions, business will continue as usual,
albeit on a reduced scale, as the employment and training system, like
welfare, proves too beneficial to completely eliminate but too entrenched
or costly to reform. It is also possible, and certainly to be hoped, that
today's challenges will prove constructive rather than destructive, and
that rational analysis and reasoned debate will lead to the emergence of a
new system, building on the lessons of the past and its institutional
foundations, but designed to meet some very different needs that can be an
ticipated in the years ahead.
The decisions in the immediate future will largely determine which of
these scenarios prevails, since the Comprehensive Employment and Training
Act is subject to reauthorization in 1982, coincident with the reauthori
zation of vocational education. Defenders of the present system who argue
for finetuning, critics who seek to wipe the slate clean and leave it that
way, as well as visionaries with commitment to building a new system, can
all agree on the need for a careful and objective assessment of present
performance, reexamination and resolution of underlying issues which have
largely been unquestioned since the beginning of employment and training
programs, as well as discussion of the long-term goals.
The reams of facts and figures synthesized in the preceding analysis
and summarized here serve as one component of such a comprehensive review.
The following interpretations of the evidence, discussions of the issues,
proposals for the long-term, and recommendations for next steps are based
on this evidence. Other interpretations, normative judgments, immediate
policy prescriptions and future visions are possible, indeed probable,
using the same information. Nevertheless, the facts and figures should not
be ignored in decisionmaking. Some gainsayers claim we know too little to
reach reasoned judgments—that there is no proof about what works and why,
or even whether anything works. Such claims have dubious merit. Few
social welfare activities have been scrutinized as thoroughly as employment
and training programs, and few can provide equally compelling documentation
of their positive impacts.
The reliability of the evidence varies, but
most findings can be confirmed from several different sources. The problem
is not the availability, but the profusion of information, and the
challenge is to make sense of it all.
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SECTION 2.
TRAINING AND ITS IMPACTS—
A SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS

Recipes for the "Leftovers"
There were five and a half million individuals in the labor force 50
weeks or more in 1980 whose employment and earnings problems were so
serious that their wages and salaries, even when combined with earnings of
other workers in their families, were below the poverty level. There were
fifteen million who did not earn the equivalent of the minimum wage for the
hours and weeks each was willing and able to work. Economic growth and
tight labor markets have modest effects on the structural problems of these
low earners, totally and intermittently unemployed, involuntarily part-time
and discouraged workers. There will be, under any foreseeable economic
scenario, millions of "leftovers" who lack education, skills, experience,
equal opportunity, or good fortune.
There are several options for dealing with these "leftovers." They
can be neglected, either benignly or malignantly, and left to continue
struggling in the labor market with inadequate help from income maintenance
programs. Alternatively, the "safety net" of transfer programs can be
improved to reduce the hardship resulting from their employment problems.
Financial incentives and appeals to corporate conscience may be used to
encourage employers to reach further down the labor queue. Job placement,
mandated job search, worker relocation, and economic development strategies
can try to better match these workers with available employment. Sub
sidized jobs might be created for them. Finally, training may be provided
in order to improve their ability to compete in the labor market.
Since the Great Society, and particularly under the Carter adminis
tration, the job creation and training options have received priority.
Employment and training activities were the premier growth area of social
welfare policy in the last two decades. Beginning near zero at the start
of the 1960s, real expenditures rose to the billion dollar level in fiscal
1965; they doubled again within the next year; redoubled by 1972; and then
tripled between 1972 and 1978, before dropping precipitously at the close
of the decade. The training components experienced steadier growth to $650
million in 1968 and to $1.9 billion in 1980.
The relative prominence and mix of training activities have fluctuated
over the years. The training share of employment and training expenditures
was predominant until the War on Poverty; training declined to 63 percent
of total expenditures in 1969 and to only 15 percent of expenditures in
1978. Despite rapid growth and a two billion dollar pricetag, remedial
efforts for the "leftovers" in the labor market represent only a small
share of our nation's total education and training activities and reach
only a small portion of the universe of need. Public expenditures for
higher education and vocational education in 1980 were twenty-five times
those targeted to persons at the end of the labor queue. In 1980, new
participants in targeted training represented only 1 percent of the labor
force, and the average monthly enrollment in training programs represented
less than one-twentieth of average unemployment.
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Training Activities
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act is the legislative
umbrella for most of the activities targeted for the "leftovers." Under a
complex array of separate categorical authorizations, it provides funds by
formula to states and localities for local programs they design and manage
within the framework of federal law, regulations and oversight. CETA also
funds national programs for special needs groups, as well as the Job Corps,
a nationally-operated residential training program for severely disadvantaged youths.
There are four categories of training provided under CETA: (1) local
classroom training is a full-time activity, which includes both occu
pational instruction and other training and remediation provided in an in
stitutional setting; (2) on-the-job training is a full-time activity, where
a participant is hired by an employer and trained primarily at the work
site, with public funds covering the extra costs of supervision and
training; (3) supplemental training is a part-time or short-term activity
enhancing subsidized work experience or a limited intensity service to help
in the transition into the labor force; and (4) Job Corps is a structured
program of vocational instruction, basic education, work experience,
counseling, health care, and living experiences in a residential center.
Job Corps is the most comprehensive and intensive, as well as most
targeted of the training approaches. It serves only the most disadvantaged
among those in need—young school dropouts from poor families. Its costs
were over $13,000 a training year in fiscal 1980. Local classroom
training, which is nonresidential and deals with a somewhat more employable
group, had a cost of $8,000 per year. On-the-job training serves the most
employable of those in need and had a cost of $6,000. Supplemental
training for participants in subsidized public service employment (PSE)
cost $2,700 per training year, while transition services in-school youth
averaged $800 per service year.
Most CETA training is typically short-term, aimed to prepare the par
ticipant for entry level occupations or to provide basic educational
credentials or English competency. Job Corps is ambitious, with an average
duration of stay for completers of 1.1 years. However, there is a high
early dropout rate with 40 percent of participants leaving before 90 days
and another 30 percent leaving before full completion, so that the average
duration of stay is 6.0 months. Local classroom training averages 5.5
months for completers, but because of early dropouts, the average duration
of stay is around 5.1 months. On-the-job training averages 4.3 months.
Job Corps vocational training is concentrated in the construction
trades, automotive and machine repair, health and food services, and
clerical occupations. Local classroom training is predominantly in the
clerical, craft, and service fields. Local on-the-job training is mainly
in the clerical, operative and nonconstruction craft occupations. Most
training assignments are sex stereotyped, with women assigned primarily to
clerical and health services training, while males are assigned primarily
to training in the crafts and in welding.
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All Job Corps participants receive basic education or GED preparation
along with vocational training and a comprehensive array of manpower and
supportive services. A fifth of local classroom trainees are exclusively
in education activities and another fifth are in a combination of voca
tional and educational activities. There is very little remediation
associated with OJT, since the training mostly occurs at the worksite and
the trainees are the least disadvantaged of CETA participants.
Because job creation has received priority over training under CETA,
classroom training opportunities were available for less than a fifth of
new enrol lees in local programs in fiscal 1980, or three in ten excluding
the summer program, while OJT was available for less than one in twenty, or
still less than one in ten excluding the summer program. Enrollments in
Job Corps accounted for only 5 percent of youth enrollments in CETA local
programs.
Females, Hispanics and "other" minorities, dropouts, single parents
and CETA participants with inadequate English-speaking ability, have above
average chances of assignment to classroom training. In marked contrast,
on-the-job training slots are reserved for the most employable among the
CETA participants—whites, males, graduates, and parents in two-parent
families. Job Corps is the "program of last resort" for poor youth age 16
to 21 who have dropped out of school (85 percent of enrol lees), been
rejected by the military (one of every four) or had trouble with the law
(two of every five). The dropouts who entered Job Corps in 1980 repre
sented one-third of all dropout youth served by CETA and half again the
total of dropout youth in local training.
Earnings Impacts
Classroom training in MDTA and other pre-CETA programs increased the
earnings of participants between $250 and $300 in the year after termina
tion. OJT under JOBS and MDTA increased annual earnings $400 to $900. Job
Corps and adult basic education increased earnings, but less substantially,
according to past studies. The recent evidence suggests impacts of the
same order of magnitude.
CETA classroom training for 1976 entrants increased earnings $350 in
the year after leaving, a 10 percent increment above the earnings of a
comparison group of nonparticipants. Moreover, the gains rose to nearly
$450 in the next year. On-the-job trainees gained $850, an 18 percent
increase. However, the gains eroded to less than $600 the second postprogram year. In contrast, fiscal 1976 work experience participants had
earnings in the two post-termination years that were below those of like
nonparticipants, although public service employment participants gained
$250 in the first year and $350 in the second.
Job Corps increased the civilian earnings of 1977 participants by $200
above those of the comparison group in the first post-program year and
nearly $500 in the second year, or 8 percent and 13 percent, respectively.
Job Corps also increased military enlistment substantially, so that the
total earnings impacts were even greater.
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All race, sex and age groups among 1976 participants benefitted
significantly from on-the-job training when compared to like nonparticipants. Persons with low or no earnings before entry, particularly
labor force reentrants and middle-aged participants, did especially well in
classroom training.
Females accounted for half of participants but
four-fifths of the aggregated post-program gains of classroom trainees.
The impacts increased between the first and second post-program years for
most subgroups of trainees, but particularly for females. All groups
gained more from OJT than work experience, and all except minority females
gained more from classroom training than work experience. Female Job Corps
participants gained more than males in terms of earnings, although males
gained slightly more in terms of hours of employment. Females without
children did better than females with children.
The public investment in training for persons of limited employability
is profitable, as equivocally as this must be judged by benefit-cost
analysis. Under reasonable and purposefully conservative assumptions about
the fade-out of earnings gains measured in the two post-program years,
about the dollar value of nonearnings impacts, and about the appropriate
discount rate, Job Corps provides social benefits with a current value of
$1.45 for every $1.00 invested. Utilizing the same assumptions and the
estimated post-program earnings gains for 1976 local classroom trainees,
CETA training returns $1.38 in benefits for every $1.00 invested. The
estimates for OJT are less precise because of uncertainty concerning the
real training cost incurred by employers, the productivity of trainees
relative to regular hires, and hence, the degree of windfall in the
employer reimbursement. But the range is from a low of $1.21 to a high of
$8.48 in benefits for every dollar invested, with a "best" estimate of
$2.55. Thus, on-the-job training pays off most, where Job Corps ranks
next, and local classroom training follows closely. The benchmark
benefit-cost assumptions probably overstate the relative payoff of OJT and
understate the relative payoff of classroom training. Job Corps has
noticeable earnings impacts but the "socialization" effects are equally
significant. The reduction in crime is so substantial during participation
and in the year after, while the costs of crime and its treatment are so
great, that the present value of the crime cost savings is about equal to
the present value of the earnings gains per participant from local
classroom training. Even though the increase in post-program earnings per
dollar of investment is greater for classroom training than for Job Corps,
the total payoff is slightly less because there are minimal effects on
crime and modest effects on dependency.
The public beneficiaries of training include participants as well as
the taxpayers who support it. Social benefit-cost calculations exclude
transfer payments from costs and count as benefits all increased earnings.
From the taxpayer perspective, transfers are included among costs and the
benefits are not the post-program earnings gains, but rather the taxes they
generate as well as the resulting reductions in dependency. Taxpayer
benefit-cost ratios are, therefore, lower than social benefit-cost ratios,
and though the latter are a more appropriate consideration from a social
policy perspective, the former will more likely concern the voters in a
period when taxes are a major concern. Job Corps has the highest taxpayer
benefit-cost ratio because the crime reductions are a savings to taxpayers;
there is a return compared to alternative uses of the same resources of
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$.96 for every $1.00 invested according to the most reasonable, albeit
conservative, assumptions. The intermediate estimate for OJT is a return
between $.0 and $1.06 for every $1.00 invested. Local classroom training
returns $.73 for every dollar. Such recondite analysis hardly figures in
the political equation, but it certainly justifies the solid political
support for Job Corps and the preference for more OJT in the local activity
mix.
Benefit-cost analyses of pre-CETA institutional and on-the-job train
ing programs generally found that benefits exceeded costs. Estimates for
Job Corps varied considerably, with several suggesting benefits less than
Using standardized assumptions which focus only on earnings
costs.
effects, the benefit-cost ratios calculated from recent impact estimates
for Job Corps and CETA classroom training are in the high range relative to
past estimates, while the ratios calculated from recent OJT impact esti
mates are in the mid-range relative to past estimates.
The Anatomy of Impacts
Increased employment rather than increased earnings rates account for
most (though certainly not all) of the real earnings gains achieved through
For fiscal 1975 classroom trainees, over four-fifths of the
training.
increase in real annual earnings from the year prior to entry to the first
year after termination resulted from a rise in the percent time employed.
Comparing the pre-entry to the second post-termination years, increased
Approximately
employment accounted for three-fourths of the real gain.
half of classroom trainees with employment before and after participation
had no improvement in real hourly pay from the year before entry to the
For fiscal 1975 on-the-job trainees,
second post-termination year.
increased employment accounted for all of the real earnings improvement in
the first year and four-fifths of the gain between the pre-entry and second
post-termination years. However, two-thirds of the trainees with previous
earnings kept ahead of inflation in their hourly wages. Fiscal 1977 Job
Corps participants earned 11 percent more than controls in the first two
post-program years but worked 16 percent more hours; in other words, all
their gains came from increased work time.
The employment gains, in turn, resulted from increased labor force
participation as much as reduced unemployment. Among fiscal 1975 classroom
trainees, the increase in the percentage of time in the labor force from
the pre-entry to first post-program year equaled two-thirds of the increase
Three-fifths of the net
in percent time employed for all trainees.
increase in time employed from the pre-entry to second post-program year
for classroom trainees was accounted for by individuals who had zero
For OJT participants, twoearnings in the year before entering CETA.
thirds of the employment gains in the first year were also explained by
increased participation, and zero earners before entry accounted for 45
percent of the net increase in percent time employed from the pre-entry to
second post-termination year. Increased labor force participation by 1977
Job Corps participants accounted for two-thirds of their gains in em
ployment relative to controls over the two post-program years.
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Success Ingredients
Training tends to move individuals from the secondary labor market and
irregular jobs into low level but more regular jobs. Among 1976 classroom
trainees with previous experience, a fifth had worked primarily as garage
attendants, transportation operatives, laborers, farm workers or private
household workers. Only a tenth of trainees with work after termination
held such jobs. The share working as craftsmen and welders increased from
11 to 17 percent, while clericals rose from 20 to 27 percent.
Among on-the-job trainees, over a third were placed in the same broad
occupational categories in which they had previously worked, while over a
fifth were assigned to training positions at a lower occupational level.
Comparing the occupational distribution before and after training, the pro
portion working as laborers, transportation operatives, garage workers,
farm laborers and private household workers actually rose from 13 percent
to 15 percent.
A third of Job Corps entrants have had no regular work experience and
the remainder have largely worked in menial "youth" jobs. Job Corps
training helps them secure entry level "adult" jobs although only one in
seven participants ends up as a completer with training-related employment.
Post-program employment is concentrated in manual, entry clerical and entry
health jobs secured by the participants mainly through their own initia
tive.
Little is known about the "best bets" for training. Most female
classroom trainees are in clerical and service occupations (usually
health). While 17 percent of all 1976 classroom trainees with a job before
entry worked in female clerical occupations, 35 percent of trainees were in
female clerical occupations and 25 percent of trainees with a job after
training remained in these occupations. Three-fifths of participants
trained in clerical work who subsequently got jobs ended up in trainingrelated work, as did two-thirds of those trained in service jobs. The
rates of training-related employment were much lower for trainees in other
occupations. Nonconstruction crafts were standard training fare for males,
but the batting average of this training was low in terms of subsequent
training-related employment. While OJT participants were more likely to
find employment in the occupation of assignment, those "trained" as service
workers, laborers, garage workers, farm workers and transportation
operatives were less likely than other on-the-job trainees to stay in the
same occupation, probably because they were able to find something better
on their own. Job Corps training that looks good in the short-run does not
look as beneficial over the long-term. Based on experience of 1977
participants, the best bets for completion, placement and higher wages were
manual occupations—forestry, gardening, construction and industrial
production—for males and forestry, gardening, construction and health for
females. Over the longer run (12-18 months post-termination), however,
persons trained in these occupations were less likely to register gains
relative to controls than those trained in some other occupations including
transportation and service for males and the clerical field for females.
The impact of training is determined by the duration of stay. The
estimated annual earnings gains of 1976 classroom trainees staying one to
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20 weeks were only one-sixth those of participants staying 40 or more
weeks. Job Corps males who stayed less than 90 days, and those who did not
continue to completion, were earning the same as controls during the period
12 to 18 months after termination; in contrast, those completing a
vocational program earned $1,250 more on an annualized basis. Early female
dropouts gained $300 on an annualized basis, partial completers $750, and
full completers $1,500.
Placement is a second key factor. All of the post-program earnings
gains for 1976 classroom trainees were accounted for by the group entering
employment on terminating the program. While it is not surprising that
those immediately employed had higher near-term earnings relative to
controls or relative to other participants not placed, it is significant
that the differentials remained substantial two years later.
Trainees staying longer are more likely to be placed. The more
employable participants tend to stay longer and are more likely to
complete. Such in-program sorting is greater in Job Corps—where only
three of ten participants are full completers--than in local classroom
training where three in four complete the usually shorter duration
assignments. Yet for both Job Corps and local classroom training, the
effects of duration of stay and placement remain significant after
adjustment for the measurable differences between dropouts and completers.
Moreover, the dropouts and short-stayers earn much the same as their
controls over the long-run, so that sorting of the "winners" and "losers"
is not an explanation of the substantial gains of those who stay.
Completion itself appears to be a substantial factor. Those completing
local classroom training have a high probability of being placed whatever
their duration of stay. Those who complete Job Corps training gain
substantially more and are more likely to be placed than participants who
stay as long but do not complete. Corpsmembers who secure a GED earn more
than matched individuals who do not. Finally, the effect of duration of
stay is strong even when placement is used as an additional control
variable in regression equations predicting earnings gains. All this
supports the conclusion that training increases human resource endowments
and employability, and that those trained longer are more likely to obtain
certification which in turn improves their chances of finding employment or
being placed upon termination, but also their chances of staying and
progressing in the initial jobs or being able to move on to better ones.
Remedial instruction, basic life skills training and attitudinal or
motivational improvement activities are important components of training.
Certainly they are a major factor behind the Job Corps' success. Par
ticipants who stay over 90 days gain significantly in maturity and social
attitudes. Job Corps treatment reduces crime (arrest rates the first year
out were 10.9 per hundred for 1977 participants, compared to 16.7 per
hundred for controls), reduces childbearing and illegitimacy, increases
mobility, and increases matriculation in college and post-second training.
However, Job Corps achieves these changes by creating a 24-hour-a-day
structured environment away from other influences. The supported work
program that provided well-organized and well-run full-time employment
opportunities for dropout youth, but did not remove them from home en
vironments and did not include counseling, recreation, motivation, student
government and the like, did not produce positive changes in criminal
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behavior or drug abuse, nor did it significantly increase post-program
employment constancy.
School-based programs aiming to improve "employability skills" through
instruction and activities designed to expose youth to work settings and
requirements are able to change tested vocational attitudes, job knowledge,
job holding skills, work relevant attitudes, job seeking skills, and sex
stereotyping in career goals. However, these attitudinal and skill gains
do not markedly alter post-program labor market success except when
combined with substantial job development activities so that employers
recognize that the changes have occurred, and unless the activities are
targeted to youth who plan to immediately enter the full-time labor market
after graduation rather than continuing their education. Moreover,
measurable attitudinal and skill gains are not realized in summer programs
which have about half the treatment hours, suggesting that intensity and
continuity are necessary to affect these dimensions noticeably. On the
other hand, short-term interventions that provide a helping hand at the
point of job search can substantially increase the immediate chances of
employment with little or no effect on measured employability skills or
attitudes.
There is clear evidence that a variety of alternative methods can
substantially improve the academic competencies of even the most education
ally disadvantaged; indeed, learning rates can be attained which not only
exceed the prior learning rates of such individuals, but overall school
norms as well. Participants in Job Corps, who have a sixth grade average
reading level at entry, gain 1.5 years in 90 hours of instruction and 2.2
years in 150 hours. The key is a self-paced, individualized educational
approach with the flexibility to be delivered a few hours daily in
combination with other activities. Computers simplify delivery of these
self-paced, individualized materials, increasing the gain rates, helping to
standardize curricula, reducing paperwork, and facilitating delivery in a
variety of settings.
Work as Training
Work, alone, apparently does not increase employability or employment
chances. The post-program earnings of 1976 adult work experience par
ticipants were no higher than those of matched nonparticipants, while
participants in public service employment gained between $250 and $750 in
1977. The greater PSE impact was due to more frequent transition into
unsubsidized public sector jobs. Almost all of the increase in employment
from pre-entry to the first year post-termination experienced by 1976 PSE
participants reflected increased unsubsidized public sector work.
The supported work experiment carefully tested the impacts of welloperated work experience projects structured to provide increasing re
sponsibility, close supervision and peer support. It found little or no
post-program earnings effects for dropout youth, drug addicts or exoffenders, but a statistically significant impact for long-term AFDC
recipients. Increased post-program employment in the public sector was the
primary source of the earnings gains for the welfare cohort.
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Where worksites have been used as classrooms for training in con
struction trades, with journeymen instructors, linkages to unions, and
structured skill progressions, the placement rates in construction, in
unions, and in high wage jobs far exceeded those in comparable work
projects which did not emphasize training or linkages, even though there
were very modest differences in positive termination and employment rates.
Where participants received work and training sequences—and only one in
twenty CETA participants in 1976 participated in multiple activities—they
appeared to benefit more than from work experience alone but less than from
classroom training or OJT. One reading of the runes is that when work and
training are combined, the post-program earnings effects will be largely
determined by the amount of training provided unless unsubsidized public
sector jobs are secured. For dropout youth in an experiment testing
alternative services, training activities had more impact on post-program
employment chances than work and training activities, which in turn had
more impact than work alone. Summer employment for disadvantaged teenagers
modestly increases the likelihood of returning to school and the proba
bility of part-time employment in school. The employment effects are
strongest among those who are least likely to secure employment in the
absence of the program. On the other hand, there are no measurable gains
over the summer in job knowledge, vocational attitudes, job seeking or job
holding skills, relative to control groups. Apparently, a first work
experience provides a "taste for earnings" or helps to overcome fears about
work without markedly altering attitudes or employability skills.
In summary, work experience can be useful for young people in ad
vancing workforce entry. It can be combined with training activities in a
sequence, with benefits roughly proportional to the degree of training. A
worksite may be structured as a training site and can yield some of the
benefits of classroom and on-the-job training while producing useful
output, but this model is the exception rather than the rule in local work
experience programs. In most other circumstances, the subsidized work will
only have post-program impacts if it serves as a tryout or on-the-job
training mechanism for existing unsubsidized jobs in the public or non
profit sector.
This does not mean that work experience and public
service employment are bad investments. If $1.00 in output is produced for
every $1.00 in cost, then any post-program earnings increases or in-program
benefits (such as reductions in crime) represent a positive return on the
outlay. However, if the aim is to alter future employment prospects, work
is only effective when properly targeted, designed or linked to unsub
sidized employment.
An Interpretation of the Evidence
When all persons available and looking for work are ranked into cate
gories based on prior experience, education, previous training and other
measurable characteristics used by most employers in setting job require
ments and in ranking applicants, CETA enrol lees are concentrated at the low
end of the distribution. The same standards used to establish eligibility
for CETA, and the same problems which lead applicants to choose this
option, are among those used by employers to rate individuals as high
risks. Nevertheless, there is very significant diversity in employability
among CETA participants. At one extreme, CETA may serve a single mother
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with a college degree reentering the labor force or a machinist displaced
from a job in a one-industry town; at the other extreme, the participant
may be a mentally retarded young person who has never held a job, or a
school dropout who has spent the last five years in prison. Each set of
characteristics can be assigned "batting averages" which are statistically
valid predictors of outcomes in most settings. The mother and the ma
chinist are good bets for training and for subsequent placement. The
dropout or the handicapped youth are poor bets. Yet there is also much
unexplained variance reflecting chance but also the wide range in potential
among individuals sharing any set of characteristics. Some dropouts may be
both motivated and intelligent, having left school because of family
responsibilities. Others may have dropped out because school was too slow
and regimented, although they have now matured. Some may have very serious
behavioral problems which are not recorded. Most failed in school because
they simply were not as good in academic areas as those who passed. Five
years in the future, these subgroups among the dropout population are
likely to have quite different average success rates in the labor market.
But it is impossible, or certainly difficult, to identify a priori the
differences in potential which will produce these differences in outcome.
Employers must make hiring decisions based on characteristics they can
measure and on the "batting averages" for persons with these character
istics. Available jobs at any point can be ranked according to their
hiring requirements, i.e., how much prior experience, education, previous
training and other skills the employers require. The distribution on the
supply side of the labor market ranking the available work force in terms
of employability, is paralleled on the demand side by the distribution of
available jobs according to the minimum employability they require in
applicants. There are always some jobs available for even the most
unskilled, and the most disadvantaged individual can usually get a job if
he or she really tried, even though the meager payoff may not justify the
effort. But usually, there are more available workers in the low em
ployability categories than there are jobs willing to employ such workers
and all such individuals could not find employment if they looked at the
same time.
Among jobs with equal hiring requirements, there is wide diversity in
career potential. Some entry jobs are dead-ends while others can be first
steps on career ladders. For the available worker entering the hiring door
or reading the want ads, it is in many cases impossible to distinguish
between jobs with career potential and those which lead nowhere.
The labor market functions by iterative matching of workers and jobs.
An individual with low potential hired into a job may soon be fired or
quit, or will accept the most menial work as his or her lot. One with high
potential will either retain the job and move up or will look for another
that provides more career opportunity. Eventually, he or she will find a
job with career potential and will advance, or will acquire a college
credential or apprenticeship which documents to employers a set of skills
or characteristics they desire. This individual will, then, move up the
queue to the next level of documented employability. Whether bouncing from
job to job or remaining in dead-end employment, the available worker with
less potential will become identifiable as a "loser," moving down the queue
in the eyes of employers to a lower level of documented employability.
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Classroom training targeted to individuals with limited employability
can impact on employment chances in several distinct ways: First, the
training can serve as an experiential sorting mechanism, not improving
skills or credentials, but rather identifying those participants with more
potential and motivation. Employers will want to hire them instead of
others with the same external characteristics because they know them to be
better risks. Second, the training activity may serve as a way of gaining
access to jobs without necessarily improving skills or credentials. This
may occur through the institutional leverage of the delivery agent or by
aiding participants in job search. Third, the training may be able to sort
both individuals and jobs, matching persons who have been identified as
having greater potential with entry jobs identified as more promising.
Fourth, the training may improve potential by increasing motivation,
employability skills or academic competencies, without providing cre
dentials that employers will accept in the labor market. Fifth, the train
ing may provide a demonstrable skill or a certification which is accepted
in the labor market and leads to a better paying and more stable job.
The distinction between these effects is of more than academic
interest. For instance, the second impact process may produce measured
gains in earnings relative to nonparticipants, but will do so largely by
reducing the chances of the nonparticipants. The process will have no
impact on skill shortages and the participants will benefit only to the
extent their job search is shortened. The fourth process increases
performance in a job once secured, but does not increase either the chances
of employment or the quality of the first job. Only the fifth process
meets skill needs and improves documented employability so that the
completer will be more attractive to employers.
There is evidence that CETA local classroom training functions in all
these ways. In general, however, the training is not of long enough
duration to increase competencies to the point where they can be certified
and documented. Only a small proportion of participants get a GED,
sheepskin, or certificate indicating the completion of apprenticeship.
There are very few occupations where skills can be taught in short order
than can be certified or tested at the hiring door, and where a large
number of jobs are available. Clerical training is one of these occupa
tions, and it tends to work best where those who are trained are mature and
have adequate academic competencies. Judging from the concentration of
earnings gains among 30-44 year-old classroom trainees, women, and those
previously out of the labor force--i.e., the groups most likely to be
assigned to clerical training—there is little doubt that this occupation
accounts for a substantial portion of the total gains from training. Basic
skills can be taught quickly in some occupations such as welding, but
training less frequently leads to jobs. For most occupations, long-term
training is needed to gain useful skills or certifications that are
recognized and demanded. Only the few classroom trainees who stay longterm gain these skills and certifications. Those who fall sort need the
placement leverage of prime sponsors in order to realize gains from
training. Likewise, less than a third of Job Corps participants graduate
from training or get a GED certificate. Placement assistance is con
centrated on this minority, with little help provided to noncompleters.
The overall gains produced by the program are largely the result of im
proved "potential" as manifested in greater stability of labor force attach-
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ment and employment. The jobs which are secured by Corpsmembers, most
often by their own initiative, do not pay more and are not much different
than those which could be secured without participation.
The most employable trainees are likely to stay longer and complete.
Those who are placed among those who stay longer or complete are even more
employable. In local classroom training sorting probably occurs more
through the placement process than the enforcement of completion standards.
Those placed are the "best" both because they include individuals with
initiative to get a job and those who are helped by the delivery agent.
The fact that the impact of placement continues over time suggests that
those individuals who are placed at termination are indeed "better" after
controlling for measurable differences and that jobs accessed for them are
"better" in terms of stability and career potential. The gains registered
by those classroom trainees who are placed despite short-duration training
and despite the lack of certifying credentials are probably a combination
of these two factors. The converse of this observation is that sorting
does not occur in classroom training that will be accepted by the labor
market in the absence of CETA leverage, i.e., the distinction between completers and noncompleters is not very specific in local classroom training,
and only a minority of participants even know if they complete. An
employer is not likely to give much credit to participation alone without
knowing the standards for completion and whether these standards were en
forced.
Job Corps sorting is much more significant because completion stand
ards are competency-based, the educational and vocational achievements are
documented and the residential experience itself tends to separate the
mature from the immature. Those employers—such as the military—who
regularly hire from Job Corps know the difference. Some employers use the
achievement records. But the completion standards and the competency
measures are not recognized by most local employers unfamiliar with the
program, so that if a youth does not get a job through the program, he or
she is unlikely to get credit and must prove himself or herself once hired.
Sorting is much more predominant in on-the-job training. The CETA
decisionmaker can and does screen more candidates than a typical employer
interviewing for a job, since all CETA applicants are assessed and usually
the most employable are assigned to OJT. Because OJT is rarely a "piggy
back" on other treatments, the sorting must occur basically on measurable
employability characteristics rather than potential as demonstrated during
prior participation. Judging from the wage and occupational change
patterns, it does not appear that there are wide gaps between experience
and job requirements in the OJT match-ups of workers and jobs, or that
extensive training is necessary. Nevertheless, trainees may still be less
employable or at least more risky than the usual hires. The try-out which
occurs for all entry hires also occurs under OJT. The training period
offers an opportunity to determine whether the somewhat higher risk
trainees, particularly those who have been outside the labor force and
those who have lost their last employment and therefore may be of uncertain
quality, will adjust to the job and respond to normal entry instruction.
OJT, thus, provides a try-out for more stable and better paying jobs for
those whose careers have been disrupted, as well as an opportunity for
entrants and reentrants into the work force--albeit those with more edu-
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Immediate
cation credentials--to get a chance to prove themselves.
employment is particularly important to reentrants or entrants who are more
likely to remain in the labor force when they get work right away. From
this perspective, OJT is more of a screening device than a training ground.
The roughly one of three participants who are not hired permanently are
those who fail their try-out or find that the assignment does not meet
their expectations. The decline in the earnings gains from the first to
the second year after termination, in contrast to the increase for
classroom trainees, suggests that some of the OJT participants lose their
jobs and the "training" is not transferrable, while equally employable
nonparticipants are eventually able to catch up somewhat.
There are several implications of these notions of sorting, certi
fying, job access and try-out. First, they suggest why OJT is so hard to
market to employers. Candidates are referred and the employer must choose
among them on the basis of documented employability dimensions, but they
are all risky to the extent that, on average, they have characteristics
which would usually rank them below normal entry employees or their
potential is uncertain because they do not follow the normal entry routes,
for instance, being recommended by other employees. Because hiring is
first and training later, the employer assumes the risk that the individual
cannot pick up the job as easily as normal hires, and the subsidy must
cover this risk. To the degree the job requires substantial training as
opposed to mere orientation, the employer assumes an even greater risk. To
overcome the employers' reservations, the delivery agent is inclined to
screen participants as much as possible so that they meet usual employa
bility requirements. Unless the best of the referrals is within the "risk
range" covered by the OJT subsidy, the employer will not even participate.
But given the difficulties of finding OJT slots and the clear evidence that
they help participants, the delivery agent may not want to jeopardize
future placements and may provide referrals well within the risk rangeproviding windfalls to the employer—in order to assure future cooperation
and to get immediate results for participants.
If the public accepted the initial risk by payrolling the participant
during a limited tryout period, the employer would have to be subsidized
only for extra training costs rather than the hiring risk. The extra
training costs for the individual could be better determined after the
try-out because there could be evidence of performance of each participant
in each assignment. It would be possible for the employer to take greater
risks. If there were such a try-out, experiential sorting in work or
classroom training programs could be used to identify and place in OJT the
measurably disadvantaged who demonstrated greater potential; the delivery
agent would not have to convince the employer that prior sorting had
occurred, but rather could could let him see for himself.
Second, placement is a key factor in realizing the payoffs of
training, but there are different implications in different settings. If
classroom training does not lead to credentials or measurable skills, like
typing speed, that can be tested by employers prior to hiring, improved
employment chances depend on placement leverage as well as the training
institution's reputation, which in the short-run may be affected by
publicity and linkage efforts, but over the long-run reflects the job
performance of trainees. If there is no sorting of completers and non-
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completers based on demonstrated acquisition of specific skills, then over
the long run the placement leverage and reputation will erode and in
dividual participants who perform most effectively in training will not be
able to translate their hard work and ability into commensurately better
jobs. Improving potential but not documented employability will help when
and if the participant gets a job, but pays off more certainly when there
is placement, particularly when this accesses jobs with career potential
where the individual's abilities and newly acquired skills can be fully
utilized. Placement is less crucial where training provides accepted
credentials or measurable skills; however, these are likely to be dis
counted unless the individual shares the characteristics and experiences
usually associated with these credentials and skills, or if the trainee has
other impediments to employment. This will be particularly true where an
individual makes a "quantum leap." In such cases it may be necessary even
if there has been substantial sorting, training and certification, to
provide for a try-out or to exert a special effort to secure placement so
that the skills and credentials are accepted at face value.
Third, the attainment of credentials requires longer training than is
usually provided, and more sorting as well. In order to avoid hurting
those who lack the potential for a major advance, the obvious solution is
to use a base-level training activity to provide worthwhile aid to large
numbers while identifying participants with the greatest potential for long
training in a second tier of activities. For the majority not moving on to
the second tier, placement after first tier participation would continue,
as now, to find "better" jobs for those who are "better" but not good
enough for advanced training, while helping the remainder to simply find
employment more quickly. In the second tier, where the number of entrants
and completers would be much smaller than in the first tier, substantial
placement efforts would and could be exerted to secure employment in
training-related jobs in order to assure that the intensive investments
paid off.
Fourth, improved skills mean little if not recognized and utilized by
employers. Recognition depends on identification of competencies acquired,
documentation of the quality of the inputs which went into the preparatory
experience, proof that standards were maintained, and recognition that the
skills and competencies needed for specific jobs were, in fact, provided.
If there are no graduation standards, if the certification is nothing more
than a claim that some training occurred, if the quality of the training is
suspect, or if the competencies taught bear little relation to what
employers really want, the payoffs of training will be reduced, par
ticularly over the longer-run when jobs will depend on acceptance of the
credentials rather than the immediate leverage of the CETA hiring subsidies
and placement efforts.
Fifth, the future implications of these interpretations are even more
significant. The size of the available workforce at any point in time, and
especially the numbers at the lower end of the employability distribution,
is largely determined by the number of entrants and reentrants into the
labor force. This number will decline dramatically relative to total
employment as the post-war babies age into the prime working years and the
participation rate of women levels off. The annual rate of growth of the
civilian labor force age 20 to 24 is projected to fall from the 2.7 percent
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annual growth rate for males in the 1975-1979 period to -.1 percent
annually between 1979 and 1985, and to then decline by 2.9 percent annually
in the 1985 to 1990 period. For all women, the rate of increase in the
labor force will decline from 4.1 percent to 2.9 percent and then to 1.9
percent. Employment grew 2.7 percent annually over the second half of the
1970s, and 2.1 percent over the entire decade. Anything close to this job
growth would drastically exceed the 1.9 percent total labor force growth
projected for 1979 to 1985 and the 1.3 percent rate for 1985 to 1990. \J
The impacts will be greatest at the entry level. While there may be
large numbers of relatively well-educated prime age males and females
competing for mid-career advancement, the pressures at the career entry
door will be reduced, as well as the competition for menial and casual
jobs. Illegal or legal immigrants may fill the latter need, but they are
unlikely to be allowed full access to career entry opportunities. In
response, many employers whose hiring policies are now structured to take
advantage of the excess supply of entry applicants are likely to lower
their usual entry standards, regularize the career ladders so that the
promise of a future can be used to attract entry workers, initiate their
own intensive preparatory programs, work more closely with public insti
tutions, recruit from areas with excess workers, increase the pirating of
trained employees and further protect their own workers by compensation
provisions and advancement opportunities tying them to the firm.
Where firms increasingly provide their own training and must draw from
a high-risk pool, they will be much more responsive to preparatory ac
tivities by public institutions that screen and improve basic skills. More
firms will be willing to specify their requirements and work with insti
tutions to develop training adapted specifically to their needs. Since
they will have to take more chances in hiring, they will be more receptive
to a try-out approach which protects them from some of the risk. Persons
who are trained and credentialed are more likely to find jobs at higher
levels and have their credentials accepted even if they lack some of the
other characteristics now expected in applicants for these better jobs. As
more firms train, there will be an increased concern about other firms
stealing their employees, and a desire to limit this if possible by
expanding the supply of entry skilled workers and equalizing employer
training costs.
The magnitude of these developments will be affected by immigration
policies, military manpower needs, technological change, foreign competi
tion, national and world economic conditions. There is no crystal ball
which can accurately predict these factors. But all else being equal, the
labor supply changes which can be projected with some certainty are
massive. Employers will not alter their behavior overnight, and the degree
of change will vary by industry, region and type of firm. But the market
is enormously adaptable and the directions of change should work in favor
of training which sorts and improves potential as well as more ambitious
efforts to provide quantum leaps in documented skills. On the other hand,
training that simply accesses low-level, menial jobs will be relatively
less necessary or useful.
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SECTION 3.
MANAGEMENT, DECISIONMAKING AND DELIVERY—
A SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS

Diversity in Local Programming
The local delivery system which accounts for nine-tenths of trainees
and more than seven-tenths of training expenditures under CETA is charac
terized by enormous diversity. There were 484 state and local juris
dictions designated as "prime sponsors" for CETA in fiscal 1980, that is,
receiving funds by allocation, planning for the use of these funds,
contracting and managing activities, monitoring compliance, and reporting
to the federal government. Under the "comprehensive" component of CETA
(Title IIBC) which finances most local OJT and classroom training, prime
sponsors have broad discretion to choose the types of participants and the
types of services. They vary substantially in how they exercise this
discretion—particularly in choosing between job creation and training—as
well as in the results they achieve. In 1980, a fifth enrolled less than
30 percent of participants in classroom training while another fifth
enrolled over 70 percent. Over half of prime sponsors provided OJT
opportunities for less than a tenth of participants, but one in ten prime
sponsors provided opportunities for 30 percent or more. The cost of
classroom training per participant averaged under $1000 in a fourth of
prime sponsors, but over $1750 for another fourth. The placement rate upon
termination averaged over 50 percent, and the cost per placement below
$4000, for a fourth of primes; but the placement rate was below 30 percent
and the cost per placement above $8000 for another fourth. Under the youth
and structural public service employment titles of CETA, where the prime
sponsors also had a great deal of discretion in choosing between training
and other treatments, even greater variation occurred in the emphasis on
training.
The varying emphasis on training was not related to the variability in
local economic conditions nor in the participants who were served. The
unemployment rate might be expected to affect the availability of OJT
assignments, the opportunities which can be opened through classroom
training, and the relative attractions of and need for job creation, while
the youth share among participants might influence the service mix since
youth are usually offered short-term subsidized jobs and are underrepresented in local classroom training and, even more so, in OJT. According to
regression equations measuring the relationships between the emphasis prime
sponsors placed on classroom training in fiscal 1980 and their unemployment
rates and youth shares, primes with significantly above average unem
ployment rates or significantly above average youth shares gave marginally
lower priority to classroom training, but these two factors alone, ex
plained little of the variability in classroom training emphases. Neither
did they have much relationship to, nor explain much of the variability in,
relative OJT emphases or the priorities placed on classroom training and
on-the-job vs. work experience. To the degree a relationship existed,
prime sponsors with higher unemployment rates tended to undertake more OJT
and more total training (hence less work experience) than those with lower
unemployment. By the same token, the unit costs of OJT and classroom
training were only marginally related to unemployment rates or youth
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shares. Prime sponsors with high unemployment rates did not have to pay
substantially more to access jobs through OJT, and the duration or in
tensity of classroom training as reflected in the cost per participant, was
not substantially greater in high unemployment areas nor substantially
lower when more youth were served.
The type of governmental unit making the local decision, its size and
regional location affected service mix and outcome patterns. Smaller prime
sponsors with a labor force of less than 200,000 and state government
sponsors were more likely to emphasize OJT, controlling for their differing
unemployment rates and youth shares. Smaller primes (100,000 or less labor
force) and the large cities (500,000 or more labor force) were more likely
to emphasize classroom training, while states were less likely to use this
approach. The training shares of Title IIBC expenditures were lowest for
prime sponsors in the South and Northwest. The costs per participant in
classroom training were highest in large cities, counties and consortia,
reflecting cost-of-living differences probably as much as intensity
differences. OJT costs were lowest for the smallest prime sponsors and for
states. Prime sponsors which placed a heavy emphasis on training under
Title IIBC also emphasized training under their structural public service
employment and youth programs.
Differences in participant mix and in economic conditions were much
more powerful in explaining the variability in outcomes than the vari
ability in training emphases and costs. Differences in participant mix
(age distribution, race, sex, and welfare recipient shares), differences in
area conditions (unemployment rates, economic growth rates and quit rates)
and differences in activities (on-the-job and classroom training shares,
average lengths of stay and costs per enrol lee), explained almost twofifths of the variance in fiscal 1980 placement rates of prime sponsors.
Among these factors, the activities dimensions had the least impact. A
larger OJT share contributed to higher placement rates but a standard
deviation increase in the OJT share was associated with less than a fifth
of a standard deviation increase in the placement rate. In contrast, a
standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate was related to a
standard deviation decrease in the placement rate. Yet the fact remains
that the placement success of a prime sponsor was not foreordained by
participant characteristics, economic conditions or service patterns.
Three-fifths of the variance in placement rates was not explained even by
the most detailed regression equations, suggesting that management of and
priority on placement at the local level had much to do with prime
sponsors' relative placement success.
The Worm's Eye View
From the prime sponsor's perspective, the benefits of classroom
training vs. work experience are not as apparent as the national impact
studies would suggest. Prime sponsors do not undertake long-term followup, nor do they attempt to secure comparison groups in order to measure net
impacts. They focus, instead, on short-term outcomes and participant gains
from entry to exit. Immediately at exit from CETA, the employment rates
for 1976 work experience participants were higher than for classroom
trainees (52 compared with 29 percent). At the three-month follow-up, the
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differential was still in favor of work experience (52 to 46 percent).
Even though the work experience group was more likely to be employed a
month before entry, its gains from entry to exit were significantly greater
than for classroom trainees, and from entry to three-month post-termination
they were about the same. Work experience is also shorter and less costly
per person year, so that within a given local allocation more people can be
served by the work approach. At the same time, the local public gets back
a useful social product and locally-financed transfer payments may be
reduced during the period of participation, since wages offset welfare
benefits while allowances do not. In other words, the benefit-cost
calculus is different at the local level, and emphasis on work experience
is understandable even if it does not maximize the net post-program
earnings impacts from employment and training investments.
Likewise, the case for long-duration training is not as compelling
from the local perspective. In the first quarter after termination, the
percent of time employed for second half fiscal 1975 classroom trainees who
stayed between half a year and a year was 46 percent, compared to 43
percent for those staying 30 to 90 days. The differential was 57 vs. 47
percent over the entire post termination year and 66 vs. 54 percent in the
second post-termination year. In other words, a 90 day follow-up--the
longest which prime sponsors usually undertake—would not show the greater
relative gains made by the longer-term trainees. Based on prime sponsor
placement rates for trainees of varying lengths of stay, and assuming costs
proportional to length of stay, the cost per placement recorded by the
prime sponsor for the one to two month training would be three-tenths that
of training activities of over half a year's duration. It is not sur
prising that shorter training is emphasized.
Local decisions are based, to a large extent, on management in
formation gathered and processed according to a uniform system of
definitions and reports required by the Department of Labor. This
management information system has serious deficiencies. The descriptors of
employment and training activities are too broad. The intensity and cost
of treatments for specific participants and participant groups cannot be
determined. Only CETA costs are tracked; offsets from income maintenance
programs or other funding sources cannot be identified, so that the public
expenditure for treatment may exceed the CETA expenditure. The laundry
list of participant characteristics which are gathered, once aggregated,
provide little sense of the employability of participants. Outcomes are
difficult to interpret since positive termination is defined inclusively
and placements are not considered relative to the types of training
provided. Like all accounting systems, there are also loopholes; official
termination may not occur for three months or more after the receipt of
The information produced is not just
really substantive services.
inaccurate; it is misleading. Because the MIS leaves substantial latitude
for creaming, and because service intensity is not measured, low cost,
limited instensity services which are targeted for the most employable
among participants and which will maximize immediate outcomes, are en
couraged whenever budgets are tight or placement emphasized. Multi-step,
intensive investments for persons most in need are discouraged.
Even if prime sponsors could measure net impacts and the benefits and
costs of alternate local interventions for different participant groups,
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and even if management information accurately described and did not bias
their actions and outcomes, rational decisionmaking at the local level
would be almost impossible because of the instability and uncertainty in
federal budgeting and policymaking.
CETA has experienced dramatic
fluctuations in overall funding, but these shifts have been exacerbated at
the local level by an allocation formula which alters the relative shares
among prime sponsors from year to year. Congress almost never appropriates
the money on time. Every year there is a new program or new emphasis from
the federal level. The best talent in the private sector could not plan
and manage effectively under similar circumstances. Prime sponsors respond
as best they can by emphasizing the simplest short-term interventions which
can be phased up or down rapidly. Most focus on the short-run and on
crisis management rather than long-term institution building and system
development. Uncertainty and volatility are, without question, the primary
causes of CETA's management and delivery problems.
The Federal Presence
The prime sponsors operate within the framework of federal regulations
and federal oversight. The "feds" review and approve the activity plans
prepared each year by prime sponsors, monitor performance indicators each
quarter, and conduct a top-to-bottom review at the end of the year.
While the feds seek to achieve year-to-year improvements in placement
rates and unit costs in negotiating plans, prime sponsors may justify
exceptions in the plan or may seek modifications during the year.
Apparently, there is not too much torque in this review process. The
planned Title IIBC placement rate approved for fiscal 1980, after the
modification process had occurred, was below the level in fiscal 1979 and
only 1 percentage point above the level in fiscal 1978. The variances in
planned placement rates, training shares, and projected costs were almost
the same as the variances in the rates, shares, and costs realized in
fiscal 1980.
The end-of-the year performance review is a ritual paper exercise with
minimal consequences. Prime sponsors are rated as either eligible for
immediate funding, as needing corrective actions over the next year, or as
having serious problems that must be solved before funding. But denial of
funds almost never occurs, since it would mean termination for active
participants. Instead, the feds negotiate corrective actions and give
conditional approvals, which frequently continue for year after year. Even
if the "stick" were a meaningful threat, the quality of training is given
minimal weight in the assessment and no prime sponsor in 1980 received a
serious problem rating under IIBC because of deficient training. Process
issues such as equal opportunity enforcement and monitoring procedures have
received greater priority than measured performance. Even though outcomes
will be increasingly stressed in future reviews, the shortcomings of the
management information system will never permit accurate judgments about
local performance which would justify stern penalties. To date, however,
the annual reviews have had little or no effect on the amount of CETA local
training or its quality.
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The federal regulations do not preclude long-term training. The
guidelines concerning the appropriate length of training suggest that six
months is the minimum necessary training period for almost any occupation
in which classroom or on-the-job training occurs under CETA, and even in
these cases there is a presupposition of basic competencies which are
frequently lacking among CETA participants and which would require extra
time in addition to the vocational preparation. The two and one-half year
limit on classroom training cannot be considered much of an impediment
since less than one percent of fiscal 1977 classroom training entrants
stayed in CETA for more than 450 days.
The regulations do limit on-the-job training. Quite simply, the
payments to the employers do not compensate for the risk in hiring someone
of less certain qualifications and the paperwork involved. While prime
sponsors have varying success in securing employer cooperation, even the
most successful have marketing difficulties. If GOT shares under Title
IIBC were increased by a standard deviation, i.e., to a level now achieved
by the best one-sixth of prime sponsors, opportunities would still be
available for less than a fifth of participants. Experiments with varying
subsidy levels and formats have demonstrated that employers are responsive
to the level of reimbursement, and that the response rate escalates when
the participant is payrolled from CETA for a try-out period rather than
hired first by the employer. This is the only way most will give a chance
to the more disadvantaged among CETA participants. In sites where the
try-out approach was utilized for dropout youth and for disadvantaged
students, OJT opportunities for even these hardest-to-employ groups
expanded manyfold.
The federal measures which most affect the level and duration of
classroom training are the supplemental vocational education set-aside (6
percent of Title IIBC funds), the legislatively mandated training re
quirement under public service employment (15 percent of Title I ID PSE
expenditures in fiscal 1980), and special-purpose initiatives such as the
Skills Training Improvement Program (STIP) and HIRE, which provided funds
for classroom training and on-the-job training respectively, but only to
those prime sponsors who could use the money and meet requirements. The
increase in the vocational education set-aside from 5 to 6 percent in the
1978 amendments, the phase-up of the STIP program, and the PSE training
requirements, accounted for most of the increase in local classroom
training activity between fiscal 1977 and fiscal 1979. The Private Sector
Initiative Program which established local Private Industry Councils (PICs)
and set aside funds for private-sector oriented activities also increased
the share of funds going to training, simply because work experience was
intended as a last resort for the funds allocated for PICs. PICs have not
had an easier time marketing OJT than prime sponsors, and, hence, have
turned to classroom training and transition services. The expectations
that business participation in decisionmaking and the intermediation of a
business-oriented local group in the delivery process would make OJT more
attractive, placement easier and employer cooperation much more likely,
were unquestionably exaggerated. PICs may do marginally better than prime
sponsors, and the increment may be worth the cost, but more fundamental
changes in policies and practices will be necessary to improve the
effectiveness of local programs in private sector placement.
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An Alternative Approach—The Lessons from Job Corps
The Job Corps, operating under national direction and drawing par
ticipants from all areas of the country, offers several important lessons
for the design and management of training activities:
First, Job Corps is the only CETA activity which invests substantially
in the "hardest of the hard-core." The demography of Job Corps par
ticipants has changed hardly at all over the years and the legislative
stipulation of services has thwarted the attempts by budget cutters and
critics of intensive investments to trim the sinew and bone, rather than
the fat, from the program. To achieve similar targeting and intensive
investments under local pograms, it is probably necessary to specify both
service mix and the eligibility focus in the law and regulations, and to
shift more responsibility to the national or perhaps state level rather
than locally, where there are so many pressures to both dilute service
intensity or to "cream" whenever significant opportunities are provided.
Second, the residential dimension of Job Corps is a critical element.
The program draws individuals from areas of greatest need—usually where
institutions are overburdened or nonexistant—and provides exposure to
alternatives and a developmental opportunity. The number of intercity
moves for job-related reasons are more than twice as high for Job Corps
participants as for controls in the first year and a half after termina
tion. Job Corps is the only CETA program which is not localized. Most
"national" programs funded under Title III of CETA provide extra service
and delivery options which augment local activities but involve neither
recruitment from multiple prime sponsors nor mobility of participants.
Third, the Job Corps management approach is unique. Three-fifths of
Job Corps centers are operated on a contract basis by private corporations
or nonprofit organizations.
Competition provides options. Where a
contractor performs poorly, another can be selected. In contrast, it is
extremely difficult to suspend decisionmaking and management authority of a
local government unit. It is particularly difficult to fire the local
bureaucracies directing the programs. And where the same government units
are responsible for both decisionmaking and management, they are likely to
choose the approaches which are easiest or safest to manage, rather than
what may be best for participants. Private sector management per se is not
necessarily more effective—at least this has not been the case in Job
Corps, where nonprofit and public managers of contract centers have done as
well as private corporations—but the competition provided by the contract
approach, the flexibility to hire and fire, the separation of policymaking
and program management, have all proved beneficial. Where private or
nonprofit contractors operate in multiple sites, there are economies of
scale and the potential for specialization of staff and standardization of
management approaches. The annual budgets are larger for some contractormanaged centers than for many prime sponsors, and the provision of
comprehensive services for the severely disadvantaged is much more
challenging. Contracting for the management of local programs is an option
which should certainly be considered where local public sector management
has proved deficient.
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Fourth, Job Corps offers a complete spectrum of opportunities ranging
from special aid to the learning disabled all the way to college options
for Corpsmembers who advance rapidly, from vocational training in jani
torial work for persons unable to perform any other jobs to multi-year
training as computer customer engineers. If individuals cannot be served
appropriately at one center, they can be moved to a component at another.
Instruction is individualized and self-paced. Achievements are recorded
and rewarded. The standardized educational programs are based around a
diagnostic, prescriptive and progress measurement system. Most available
public and private sector materials have been screened and cross-referenced
to this system, so that there are a number of options to suit the interests
and needs of each individual. Likewise, occupational training is struc
tured around competency-oriented skill and knowledge hierarchies for each
vocation, with recording of progress for each trainee. In all Job Corps
offerings, then, enrollees are placed according to ability or interest, can
advance as rapidly as possible, can be rewarded for measured accomplish
ments and can compete for advanced opportunities available within the
system based on performance within the system. This approach is in marked
contrast to local CETA programs which offer "one-shot" treatment in most
cases, with few incentives for performance, no uniform records of achieve
ment, and limited opportunities for "quantum leaps."
Fifth, all activities in Job Corps operate under detailed national
standards dictating minimum qualitative and quantitative inputs. On-site
reviews can, therefore, assure that input standards are met. The use of a
standardized competency assessment and progress systems for the vocational
and educational components allows comparison across centers. With the same
essential mix of services from center to center, enrol lee surveys can be
and are used to identify potential problems in components. Most criti
cally, with costs negotiated and itemized by detailed component, and with
components relatively standardized, outcomes relative to national norms can
be used to assess performance. The poor performing center operators have
few excuses, and hence low performers are subject to greater pressures and
are likely to improve over time. Because the service mix and intensity of
local CETA operations is so variable and because there are no qualitative
standards, it is difficult to get the same torque on prime sponsors with
the CETA performance measurement system.
Sixth, recruitment and placement are the weak links of nationallydirected programs such as Job Corps, and they require more attention. Job
Corps recruits through its own system of contractors, primarily the state
Employment Services. Few prime sponsors use Job Corps as a treatment
alternative on a regular basis. Some enrollees could be better served in
local programs, while many participants in local CETA activities should be
in Job Corps. Job Corps also has its own largely separate placement system
that works in getting completers into jobs, but does not help dropouts and
partial completers for the most part, in contrast to local classroom
training where placement is more often provided to participants whatever
their duration of stay. As a result, many Corpsmembers have depressed
earnings during the first month or so after termination even though they
eventually break even or surpass like nonparticipants. This transition
could be eased if local prime sponsors had the responsibility of placing
individuals sent off to Job Corps for training and subsequently returning
to the locality without a job, and if they were notified immediately or
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even before scheduled exit. In other words, local activities must be
better linked with nationally-operated programs. They must begin to
operate in tandem rather than in isolation.
An Assessment of Operational Experience
All the facts and figures on training and its impacts reduced to some
rather simple conclusions: CETA (or its successor) should put more
emphasis on training, the duration of classroom training should be longer,
and on-the-job training opportunities should be expanded. Placement
efforts should go hand-in-hand with training, with an emphasis on securing
training-related jobs. Competency attainment should be stressed and
performance standards maintained for participants.
Career-oriented
opportunities should be available for those who prove themselves in the
system.
The CETA system is not now designed nor managed to achieve these ends.
This is a statement of fact, not a critique. CETA's mission over the last
decade has been, first and foremost, to create jobs, which was probably
appropriate as the economy strained to absorb the ever-increasing numbers
of youth and female labor force participants. Evidence in support of new
missions and approaches has not been available until recently. The decline
in labor force entrants which will provide the imperative for change is
only beginning to occur. Yet if past patterns are justified, they also
offer clues concerning the changes in policy and practice most likely to
move the system along the paths which are, in light of new evidence and
emerging labor market trends, now more appropriate.
Decentralization and decategorization were initiated under CETA in the
belief that decisions about services, delivery agents and participants
could best be made at the local level in response to local conditions.
Diversity was both expected and desired. A planning system and procedural
rules were formalized to assure a fair and reasoned set of decisions,
placing primary reliance on an analysis of labor market conditions as a
guide to local decisions. It would be expected, then, that areas with
similar economic conditions or similar target groups would tend to adopt
similar choices among intervention alternatives. Recognizing the crudeness
of area data as well as participant, service mix and outcome measures, it
is surprising that the service patterns, which vary so markedly among prime
sponsors, bear little relation to either area unemployment rates—the
primary consideration in planning and allocation—or to the proportion of
youth served—the participant mix factor expected to have the largest
impact on the choice of local service strategies. The findings discount
the most common excuses of prime sponsors, i.e., that training does not
occur because the "feds" force too many youth to be served, that below
average OJT enrollments are necessitated by high unemployment, or that
placement rates cannot be improved because of the participant mix or area
conditions. Decisions are more determined by the structure of the
decisionmaking unit, its size, and the historical approaches prevailing in
different regions.
Because of the difficulty in pinning down activities, services, or
outcomes, much less their interrelationships, performance monitoring has
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been basically a ritual exercise. Where the diversity is so great because
of local flexibility and the lack of federal standards, it is difficult to
second-guess any local decision or to judge local outcomes. Unlike Job
Corps, where one center is very much like another, and the activities are
defined by a set of detailed requirements for each element, the descriptors
for local activities which are used in the federally-mandated management
information system are not very specific and the content standards for
activities are almost nonexistent. "Classroom training," even with a
single prime sponsor, may range from a few hours of motivational and
character development activities to full-time occupational training for
over a year. Within even the broad descriptor categories, there is no
identification of the types of participants or the outcomes. The outcome
measures are also so vague that they tell very little about performance; it
is doubtful whether a "positive termination" really means anything and
impossible to tell whether a "placement" is training related. Without the
ability to measure what activities are occuring, without standards about
what should, as a minimum, go into each of these activities, and without
outcome measures available by characteristic of participants and services
received, it is impossible to make judgments about whether the activities
are adequate or the outcomes appropriate. Hence, the federal oversight
system focuses neither on inputs and their quality, nor on outputs and
their meaningfulness, but rather on processes. Acceptable processes do not
guarantee (and in fact may not even promote) wise decisions or positive
results. For instance, the summer programs operated by prime sponsors were
accepted until the last few years as long as plans were filed and the
participants and expenditures counted. Yet inadequate worksite activities,
poor supervision, and slack worksite standards were found in recurring
assessments by the General Accounting Office. Beginning in 1978 the
Department of Labor began to specify standards about what was required in
worksites, provided models, demanded specification of activities in
worksite agreements, but more critically, used these standards and
agreements as the basis for massively expanded on-site monitoring. There
were substantial improvements in the quality of worksite activities as a
result. The improvements were documented by further site visits by the GAO
and the Department of Labor's Inspector General, but were no more visible
in the management information collected by the Department of Labor than
were the earlier shortcomings. In fact, unit costs rose noticeably as a
result of increased management and monitoring efforts and the enrichment of
worksite activities. 2J
In a system which focuses on aggregates, and emphasizes quantity over
quality, there is little incentive for the prime sponsor to develop high
quality, intensive components. Since such components would serve only a
small proportion of participants, their effectiveness would be completely
hidden in a mass of numbers under the current management information
system. Despite the cumbersome paperwork requirements on local systems,
the management information system does not collect and report the right
information needed to support local or federal management, or to promote
either long-term training or the progression of individuals in an orderly
way through local systems.
The boogeyman of the heavy-handed federal government squelching local
creativity and dictating decisions turns out to be a pussycat. There is no
evidence that the federal regulations or the federal oversight restrict the
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amount or duration of classroom training undertaken by prime sponsors. The
law clearly allows for long training courses and urges targeting to those
most in need in the eligible population. It is primarily local pressures,
habit and administrative expediency which result in the broadest dis
tribution of limited resources. Everyone wants more OJT, and federal
oversight is certainly not the reason many prime sponsors do so little. It
is simply too difficult to market to employers.
Yet if the federal presence is largely neutral concerning the exercise
of local discretion over activity mix, intensity and targeting, the
oversight is not benign. It focuses attention on ritual processes while
providing no direction as to what is important. If the feds cannot or do
not say what works or what the standards should be, nor do they review
quality, neither can the local decisionmakers when dealing with politically
connected local delivery agents. Why create new training institutions or
approaches when existing deliverers are clamoring for support and there are
no incentives and few performance or impact standards for justifying
alternatives? Why concentrate resources when low costs and services for
more participants are favored by both local politicians and accepted by
federal monitors as an indication of efficiency. It takes all the
ingenuity and resources available to the prime sponsor to avoid the process
pitfalls that will be scrutinized in federal review, and to generate the
plans and modifications required by the feds even though they have little
to do with operational realities.
The basic issue, however, is whether decisionmaking should be
localized. A rational local decisionmaker conscientiously assessing
placement rates, costs and three month follow-up results might rationally
decide to emphasize work experience, or to put ten participants through
4-week training rather than offer one participant 40 weeks of training.
From the local viewpoint, the effectiveness differentials do not square
with those estimated by the "ivory tower" national impact studies. Since
the most rational decision from a local perspective is also the most
expedient, all the better! If residents must be placed only in local jobs,
and if these are scarce, the training options or payoffs may be limited so
that job creation and short training for menial positions are the best al
ternatives. It is not a condemnation of the quality of local decisionmakers to suggest that they may not know best in their limited context, and
that it may not be best to limit the decisionmaking context to the local
area.
More classroom training can be accomplished by expanding the state
set-aside for vocational education, categorizing resources for training as
in PSIP, requiring training under work experience as in PSE, or overlaying
a competitively-funded program such as STIP. Longer training can be
accomplished by duration specifications for these earmarked and extra
dollars, by emphasis from the federal level, and by the use of management
information system descriptors that identify costs for specific types and
intensities of services so that false economies are not achieved by
shifting to less intensive activities within broad service categories.
Marginally more OJT can be accomplished by guidelines, set-asides or
competitive funding to areas able to move OJT dollars, but the real answer
is to change the formula to provide for a "try-out" period before a hiring
decision or training contract is signed with the employer.
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These actions would focus federal policy, but would not
reduction in local control, since there are already copious
categorical titles, minimum spending requirements and the like.
to align these requirements so that they achieve a coherent
provide clear guidance.

represent a
set-asides,
The key is
policy and

The real issue, then, is whether a consistent national policy can be
developed and sustained. Currently the local CETA system tries to respond
to ever-changing priorities, and make the most rational decisions based on
the evidence at hand, but the directions are not clear and the locus of
decisionmaking inappropriate. The answer is not a new program model, or
more vigorous performance monitoring, or redistribution of decisionmaking
authority, although all these steps may be required. The key is, instead,
to determine at the national level what we are trying to achieve with
employment and training efforts, to set long-range goals, and to choose the
next steps that will, with the least rupture to the present system, move it
in these directions.
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SECTION 4.
THE UNDERLYING ISSUES

The most basic issues underlying employment and training policies are
rarely broached, and some basic tenets have been accepted without question
since the emergence of manpower programs on a major scale in the mid-1960s.
Because of cumulative changes, substantially different prospects for the
future, and the current retrenchment and uncertainty, it is critical that
these issues and postulates be reexamned.
At the inception of manpower programs, our nation's income maintenance
system left much to be desired. Although many persons in need may still
fall through the "safety nets," there has been dramatic improvement in the
scale and scope of cash and in-kind aid. Where major gaps existed in the
past, particularly in aiding the working poor, these have been partially
bridged by food stamps, earned income tax credits, increased work in
centives under welfare, expanded coverage and benefit levels under un
employment insurance as well as boosts in the minimum wage. For instance,
among the 5.5 million full-year labor force participants in 1980 whose
earnings, combined with those of other family workers, were below the
poverty level, 2.5 million were lifted out of poverty by receipt of
transfers and other income, and the average poverty deficit was reduced by
an eighth for those remaining below poverty. 3/ Wage and allowance
policies under employment and training programs need to be reassessed in
light of these changes.
There has been a significant reduction since the 1960s in labor market
discrimination, making it possible for minorities with skills and cre
dentials to compete on much more even terms than in the past. There is
also less discrimination in mainstream institutions such as colleges,
post-secondary schools and the apprenticeship system. To the degree
minorities can reach these entry doors with the required abilities and cre
dentials, they have much more equal access. Since action has now become
less affirmative, deficits in preparation due to limited prior oppor
tunities must be ovecome if further progress is to be achieved. Tra
ditionally, employment and training programs have served as battering rams,
or else have offered separate training in separate institutions. More
emphasis may be needed on providing substantive skills and credentials so
that the less employable can take advantage of increased mainstream
opportunities.
When manpower programs emerged, the institutional infrastructure was
quite limited. There were few community- and neighborhood-based organi
zations representing those in need. Primary emphasis was placed on
building institutional capacity and diversity. Likewise, to the extent
mainstream institutions had previously ignored the disadvantaged and their
special needs, the programs had institutional change missions. Practicing
what was preached, primary emphasis was placed on equal opportunity
employment of women and minorities in the mangement and delivery jobs in
the manpower growth industry. Now, with a wealth of community institutions
established, much institutional change achieved, and employment and
training programs a declining industry, it is neither appropriate nor
possible to give these goals the same priority as in the past, although
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they should certainly not be abandoned. Likewise, when resources were
plentiful, a "live-and-let-live" attitude prevailed among different
institutions. Reductions in funding will necessarily increase friction as
each interest seeks to protect its own rice bowl. Unless there is a clear
sense of goals and objectives, institutional leverage and political power,
rather than the needs of those being served, will dictate the relative
burdens of retrenchment.
Though retrenchment exacerbates tensions and debate, it occurred
because the consensus in support of employment and training policy had
already ruptured. By the close of the 1970s, the notion of an active
manpower policy—with countercyclical job creation efforts built on a
stable base of structural employment and training activities—was
undermined by the evidence of serious operational difficulties but even
greater political liabilities related to large-scale job creation.
Continually changed policy thrusts and overreactions to each perceived
problem had produced a complex system, difficult to understand and almost
impossible to administer because of the intricate procedures implemented to
achieve contradictory objectives. The panaceas had all been tried with
little effect. For instance, CETA was initiated as a block grant approach,
promising that decentralization and decategorization would improve the
quality of services. Yet most of the flaws of CETA which were highlighted
in the late 1970s were problems of misuse of local control made possible by
the lack of effective federal oversight, not the problems of too much
central control. It is ironic that the strongest advocates of a block
grant approach are also the most vociferous critics of CETA's failings at
the local level. A variety of mechanisms have been tried in an attempt to
increase private sector involvement, from the efforts of the National
Alliance of Business under the JOBS program to the creation of local
Private Industry Councils. NAB worked for a while in the tight labor
markets of the 1960s but its leverage soon dissipated. Some PICs have
worked, most have not, but they certainly have not proved a savior of CETA.
Federally-directed efforts have been good in some cases and bad in others.
Some states have effectively utilized Governors' grants to link and improve
local activities; most have not. Metropolitan-wide activities have been
encouraged with modest incentives for consortia, but performance has been
disappointing to those who favor planning and delivery on a labor market
basis. In other words, there are few untried ideas and hence little faith
that organizational changes alone will make a major difference.
Turning to the future, two major developments are likely to sub
stantially alter the setting of employment and training activities. The
labor markets of the next two decades will differ sharply from the
preceding two. The leveling off in female labor force participation and
the aging of the post-war babies into their prime working years will reduce
the surfeit of menial workers while increasing competition for mid-career
jobs. Labor market changes should improve the potential effectiveness of
training for persons of limited employability, but they will require
changes in approach. The diversified post-secondary education and training
system that was developed in response to the post-war baby boom will face
severely declining enrollments as this demographic cohort ages. While the
mainstream system focused primarily on advantaged groups in the past,
justifying the creation of a separate track for the disadvantaged, the
system will no longer have the luxury of such creaming. There are, then,
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physical and human resources available that can be tapped to upgrade the
quality of training and to increase the training options for those at the
end of the labor queue.
These past, present and future developments necessitate a recon
sideration of some fundamental issues and assumptions—however painful this
process may be. First and foremost, it is necessary to decide on the basic
missions of employment and training programs. Second, it must be de
termined whether or to what extent to maintain a separate remedial system
varying in approach and assumptions from mainstream institutions. Third,
the income maintenance policies must be reexamined and perhaps reconsti
tuted to reflect changes which have occurred. Fourth, a determination must
be made whether to continue spreading resources broadly among clients or to
try to concentrate on fewer individuals in order to prepare them to compete
more equally for available employment and higher education opportunities.
Finally, there must be a recognition of the limits as well as potentials
for improvement in employment and training efforts.
Rethinking the Missions
Clear definition of purpose is the foundation of effective social
policy. A vast array of missions have been assigned to employment and
training activities. In some cases, these missions have been contra
dictory. In the absence of priorities, they have always competed for
scarce dollars and attention. In simplest terms, it is unresolved whether
manpower programs are addressing a cyclical rather than structural problem,
whether they are targeted for people or for places, and whether their aim
is to provide palliatives rather than cures. According to the legislative
statement of purpose, CETA is intended "to provide job training and
employment opportunities for economically disadvantaged, unemployed or
underemployed persons which will result in an increase in their earned
income, and to assure that training and other services lead to maximum
employment opportunities and enhance self-sufficiency." These are fine
words, but too vague for federal or local policy formulation. The un
employed, underemployed, or disadvantaged may be suffering from either
short-term or long-term problems; and different sections of the law define
eligibility in different ways to differentiate between the structurally
unemployed and the cyclically unemployed. Increases in earned income can
be achieved through temporary subsidized jobs, placement and job access
strategies, remedial band-aids, or significant enhancement in individual
skills and abilities. The gains may reflect increased labor force par
ticipation, stabler employment, better pay, occupational mobility, or a
combination of all of these. The gains may be temporary, durable or even
cumulative.
The relative emphasis on structural and countercyclical goals has
changed from year to year, reflected in the violent fluctuations in funding
levels for different activities. Between fiscal 1975 and 1976, the
increase in job creation expenditures (measured in constant dollars)
equalled 90 percent of the cumulative increase since the begining of the
War on Poverty. Between 1977 and 1978, the increase in a single year was
again equal to 90 percent of the cumulative increase in all preceding
years. The constant dollar declines in the next two years erased three-
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fourths of this growth even though the aggregate level of unemployment
hardly improved. At present, there is a general consensus that counter
cyclical job creation is wasteful, but public opinion changes rapidly, and
if there were a sudden increase in the unemployment rate, there would be a
temptation to reinstitute job creation alternatives.
Such staggering fluctuations in funding and activity mix have ruptured
the delivery system. Any private sector business doubling in size every
four years would have growth pains, but if the product mix were substan
tially altered each time without warning, while the organizational struc
ture and accounting procedures were constantly changing, there is no way it
could perform effectively. This is what has been asked of the employment
and training delivery system.
However, growth and change are not the only problems. There are parts
of the system that are designed and operated as if addressing short-term
problems, although structural problems are supposed to be their objective.
Resources are allocated according to relative unemployment rates and, as a
result, there are dramatic year-to-year fluctuations in local activities
even when the aggregate funding levels do not change, and even though
structural problems do not fluctuate significantly over the short-run in
either absolute or relative terms. Local prime sponsors are required to
plan, contract, and deliver services on a year-to-year basis. Unspent
resources at the end of the year are subject to reallocation.
This scenario affects all aspects of operations. It leads to programs
of the lowest common denominator—those with the least complexity that are
extensions of existing efforts and which can be expanded or reduced with
little problem. The interventions selected are short-term so that they can
be surged and can have an immediate impact. Such projects rarely consider
multi-year or longer-term sequences for individual participants. Sequences
could only be arranged by the prime sponsor by linking together separate
activities, but each of these has very uneven enrollment patterns dictated
by annual funding schedules. The staffing patterns are also affected.
Only certain types of persons are willing to live with the uncertainty or
can be found on a moment's notice. Usually, they are uncredentialed, ready
to leave for other jobs, undermining stability of program delivery.
Finally, the stop and go pattern, and the annual division of spoils among
competing claimants, almost foreordains the use of existing community
resources rather than the development over time of improved training
programs, since their continuity cannot be guaranteed.
This approach to local CETA programs is in marked contrast to that for
Job Corps. Each center is considered a federal investment with planned
capital improvements over a multi-year period. Corpsmembers constantly
upgrade the centers through work activities which teach vocational skills.
Job Corps operational contracts are for two years with the possibility of
extension for another year if performance is adequate. In the expansion of
Job Corps in 1977-1980, careful attention was given to balancing the
geographic distribution of centers, building up capacity for serving
special needs populations, and diversifying training by the establishment
of a range of advanced career training offerings. This was only possible
because of the long-term focus and stable direction of the program. The
best and most stable prime sponsors also have such a long-range institution
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building focus, but this is despite rather than because of the design of
the planning and funding system for local programs.
Perhaps even more basic is the fact that funds are distributed to
areas according to need. Jurisdictions with the fewest jobs and with the
largest shares of their populations in need get disproportionate funding.
These areas, faced with massive job deficits, are least able to invest in
the long-term because of the immediacy of problems and the burdens of
managing massive job creation activities; their developmental institutions
are usually overburdened and the payoff of training is most questionable
because there are few jobs for those trained. In some cases, such prime
sponsors have been unable to spend their resources, in which case the
dollars are reallocated to the better spenders, usually those whose
problems are less severe, or those whose activities are even less ambi
tious, and therefore easier to mount. Resources allocated to states have
generally been redistributed to subareas based on need. Suburban and urban
areas are offered mild encouragement to form consortia which will encompass
whole labor markets, but they are then permitted to design activities which
merely composite separate programs for separate residents rather than
providing training and jobs where the opportunities are greatest (usually
the suburban areas) for residents of the less affluent areas within the
labor markets (usually the core cities). Finally, national programs other
than Job Corps have generally been used to support community-based groups
and unions in the delivery of localized services, diversifying offerings or
increasing equity, but rarely aiding in mobility or providing anything
which could not be developed locally. In other words, allocation to places
has taken precedence over the most effective services to people. National
programs, consortia, state activities and reallocated funds should all be
used to encourage training and employment in areas where the opportunities
are greatest for residents from areas where the opportunities are most
limited. Instead of leaning against the wind, CETA has accepted, perhaps
exacerbated, the status quo by its strictly localized focus.
CETA or its successor should be addressed exclusively to structural
problems. It should be targeted to people not just places. It should aim
to provide long-term cures rather than short-term palliatives. Thus, the
legislative purpose of CETA or its successor should be reformulated (1) to
provide employment and employability development activities for youth which
will assure an equal opportunity to gain the basic competencies required in
the competitive labor market; and (2) to provide adults suffering from
persisting labor market-related hardship the training and other remedial
services of adequate intensity, quality and duration to assure, as a
minimum, the capacity for self-support, and to offer, as far as possible,
opportunities for substantial career advancement commensurate with in
dividual ability and commitment.
To achieve this purpose, several fundamental changes would be re
quired. It is not enough to merely abandon the job creation titles of CETA
and to continue with all the other requirements. Achievement of the
structural mission requires realignment of the entire system including
planning, management information, regulations, allocation formulae,
eligibility rules, and most critically, funding stability. Uniform eli
gibility and allocation formulae are needed which focus on economic hard
ship—the longer-term problems of individuals rather than just their cur-
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rent status, and the structural problems of areas, not just their transient
Employability plans for individuals would
unemployment difficulties.
emphasize long-term as well as short-term aims, i.e., indicating the
advanced opportunities for which they might compete and the performance
standards in the immediate offerings which would serve as the basis for
The sequencing of program components, based on per
this competition.
"Opportunity tracks" of
formance at each step, would be encouraged.
advanced training and career access opportunities would be developed over
time and maintained with links to the current short-term activities. All
resources not allocated to, or not spent by, local areas would be used to
provide opportunities for training and employment wherever these could most
effectively be provided but reserved for persons from areas where the
structural problems are most severe. Aggregate funding targets would be
established for the long-term, with two-year advanced funding facilitating
a two-year planning and contracting cycle.

Mainstreaming
Most of our nation's formal training is provided in post-secondary
schools and colleges. Public expenditures for secondary, vocational and
higher education were on the order of twenty times greater than the best
guess of private sector expenditures for formal training in 1980, and over
seventy times greater than CETA training outlays for the disadvantaged.
The mainstream system of preparation for work has several predominant
features. First, it is a system which maintains standards at each level
for the quantity and diversity as well as the quality of inputs. Second,
it also maintains standards for individual progression through the system,
with minimum requirements for graduation from any level, and more refined
measures of performance that can be used in assessing qualifications for
movement to the next level. Third, the system is self-contained, with
built-in ladders and pathways so that performance at one level determines
the probability and direction of transition to the next. The payoffs for
completing any given level and the promise of the opportunities at the next
provide motivation for individual performance. Fourth, the system sorts
individuals so that, on average, those who advance are better able to meet
the requirements of the next level than those who do not. Fifth, there are
a number of second chance options such as alternative schools, less
demanding colleges or two-year institutions, in order to allow for the fact
that the sorting does not work perfectly. Finally, the system provides
credentials which are recognized in the labor market, and these credentials
are supplemented by more detailed information about the institutions or the
individual's performance in them which provides a further basis for
assessing ability.
Most of the problems in this mainstream system are related to devia
tions from these principles—deficiently trained teachers, grade inflation
and automatic promotion, unequal chances of advancement for persons of like
ability, sorting on the basis of factors unrelated to performance, the lack
of adequate second chance options, and the resulting debasement of the
diploma as a credential for judging past and potential performance.
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The local training and remediation system for those failing in or
failed by these mainstream institutions operates by a completely different
set of principles. There are no system-wide specifications of course
content or personnel qualifications. Expectations and measures of par
ticipant performance are minimal, and, strict completion standards are the
exception rather than the rule. For most participants, the primary
activity is prescribed at entrance and is a single experience followed by
termination. Because there are no higher level opportunities within CETA
allocated on the basis of performance within the system, and because
allowances often equal or exceed the starting salaries in potential jobs,
there is little incentive for the more able to work harder and accelerate
learning. Sorting is discouraged. Although early leavers tend to be the
less employable among trainees, the allowance system encourages par
ticipants to remain in training even when they are not performing, and the
management information system penalizes projects with high termination.
Consequently, completion of a CETA training program does not mean much to
employers unless the training is secured from a mainstream institution with
its own reputation and standards, or achievements of participants are
referenced to some outside credential standard such as the GED.
There are several reasons why principles and practices of the remedial
system are so divergent from those of mainstream institutions. One is
ideology—the belief that individuals who have failed in or been failed by
the schools and the labor market need success not reinforcement of previous
failure. Sorting is resisted on the grounds that identification of
"winners" also requires identification of "losers." Manpower programs
emerged in the 1960s as a "piece of the action" for institutions and
individuals left out of the mainstream, so that different principles were
adopted as a rationale for a separate system. Remedial training activities
on a major scale are only two decades old, and delivery personnel have not
yet been professionalized and standards for local activities have not been
developed, as they were, over time, in the more stable and mature voca
tional education system. The uncertain financial support provided for
remedial training, and the emphasis on day-to-day operations and "body
counts," has discouraged the development of an institutional infra
structure.
Short-duration, "one-shot" courses are dictated by the
planning, contracting and funding cycles. Local systems could not mature
because of the frequent changes in policy, fluctuations in resources and
the harried pace of growth.
With its principles so at variance with those of mainstream insti
tutions, the local training and remediation system has difficulty in
establishing linkages.
Only a portion of its participants can meet entry
standards without remediation, but CETA's focus has traditionally been just
this first remedial step. Courses may be purchased from local insti
tutions, but these often amount to a special class for CETA enrollees,
frequently of shorter duration and with lower standards.
Job Corps is the exception. It was designed to parallel and link with
mainstream institutions. It has competency-based vocational and educa
tional programs that document individual achievement, with standards for
progress and completion. Job Corps "sorts" in that less than one of three
entrants meets completion standards. Advanced career training components
provide multiple options all the way up to enrollment in two-year and
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four-year colleges, but only to Corpsmembers who prove themselves in the
system. Thus, when linkages with mainstream institutions are achieved,
success in Job Corps can be, and has been, rewarded. For instance, unions
have agreed to apply apprenticeship standards in many of the Job Corps
training courses which lead to qualification for skilled craft jobs and ac
ceptance by employers. Similarly, vocational schools, colleges and junior
colleges involved in advanced training have awarded credit for Job Corps
education and training. The problem is not one of design but of recog
nition. The Job Corps is relatively small and its centers are isolated, so
that employers and institutions may not be familiar with the Job Corps
approach.
There is no conclusive evidence but no real doubt that participants in
remedial programs are more likely to succeed in the labor market if they
can be trained in mainstream institutions and participate according to
mainstream principles. Almost any employer will credit completion of a
year's training at a local community college or a recognized proprietary
training institution higher than a year's training in a program established
by CETA. The CETA reference alone may have negative connotations, and a
participant supported by CETA to go to a local mainstream training insti
tution might do better by disguising this sponsorship.
Some doubt that CETA eligibles can effectively navigate in the main
stream, but the evidence suggests that they can, with a little help. In
May 1981, 1,800 of the 42,000 Job Corpsmembers were enrolled in postsecondary institutions. Over two-thirds of those who had been enrolled the
previous year returned—a rate equalling that of regular students in the
institutions. These youth would not have been in college without this
assistance. Less than half a percent of a comparison group for 1977 Job
Corps participants were in college in 1979. In a structured experiment to
test a GI-Bill voucher approach as an alternate treatment strategy for
CETA-eligible youth, only half of the control group attended college the
next year, compared to nine-tenths of those provided tuition and expenses,
as well as counseling and other assistance. Among the experimentals,
four-fifths of those who attended college were still enrolled through three
semesters compared with only half of the controls who originally matric
ulated. Those participants who were in the cohorts receiving educational
and personal counseling had better retention than those simply provided
financial support. 4/
Some argue that mainstream institutions will not serve the disadvantaged, but there is no question that opportunities will be increasing.
Unlike the 1970s when enrollment in two-year post-secondary institutions
almost doubled from 2.2 to 4.2 million while enrollment in four-year
institutions rose from 6.4 to 7.2 million, the enrollment in two-year
institutions will decline to 3.8 million by 1988 unless there are changes
in attendance patterns, while enrollments in four-year colleges will
decline to 5.7 million. 5/ Excess capacity will generate increased
interest from mainstream institutions. It is important to take advantage
of these resources.
Congress has encouraged the use of these institutions through an
emphasis in the law on cooperation and linkage. However, the real obstacle
is not the relational process, but the fundamental mismatch between the
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principles of the mainstream and remedial systems. In order to fully and
effectively utilize mainstream institutions, CETA will have to bring
individuals up to normal entry standards, which, in turn, will require a
two-tier approach, providing advanced offerings but only to those who
demonstrate the motivation and ability in the first tier and come up to
standards. The system now focuses primarily on preparation for and place
ment in low level jobs without providing the more substantial opportunities
which are possible and needed. The remedial system will be more acceptable
to the private sector, and the credentials it provides will yield more
payoff, if it operates like mainstream institutions.
Deemphasizing Income Maintenance
Employment and training programs began their rapid expansion as part
of the War on Poverty, and income maintenance has always been one of their
primary objectives, even though the rhetoric has emphasized future earnings
improvements. For classroom training, the transfers are clearly identi
fiable. Allowances represent over two-fifths of the cost of local train
ing, with trainees receiving the minimum wage for hours of participation
plus reimbursement for extra costs of participation. Unemployment in
surance recipients have their weekly benefit subtracted from this al
lowance. Welfare recipients receive $30 above their weekly welfare benefit
plus expenses, rather than an hourly allowance. The transfer is not so
identifiable but still substantial in other activities. For on-the-job
training, participants are usually paid the going wage for the entry job to
which they are assigned even though their productivity may be below
average. It is difficult to estimate the gap between the productivity and
learning rates of CETA trainees and other entry employees, although the
assumption, stated in regulations, is that the OJT payment, usually half of
the wage, covers this differential. In subsidized work programs, the dif
ference between the usual minimum wage paid and the productivity of
enrol lees represents income maintenance. For instance, for a variety of
youth programs it is estimated that the work activities return between $.30
and $.70 worth of value added for each dollar paid. 6/ The income transfer
is, thus, between 30 and 70 percent of the wage bill. In some programs
such as public service employment, where skilled but unemployed workers are
hired, the value added may actually be higher than the wage paid. On
average, though, when work experience is provided to persons of limited
employability, there is an element of transfer.
There are several justifications for these income maintenance
elements. Training and work are constructive activities, returning future
benefits in the first case and immediate benefits in the latter. From a
social perspective, income transfers through training and work are more
fruitful, less expensive, and therefore more politically acceptable, than
subsidization of idleness. Many trainees could not afford to participate
or would not be interested unless their income needs were met. For
classroom training, the use of the minimum wage as an hourly allowance
makes training as attractive as work (or even more attractive since al
lowances are not taxed). Also, minimum allowances and earning floors
protect against erosion of competitive wage levels.
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There are also several arguments against income maintenance, at least
as structured under current law and practice. More persons could receive
work or training if the income maintenance elements were reduced. The
allowances or wages are inherently inequitable, since opportunities are
available for a small minority of the poor who are then usually lifted far
above the poverty threshold by participation. Where the cash benefits of
training or work are more attractive than the options in the labor market,
participation may be encouraged even though training is not desired or the
experience is not needed. Likewise, the differential may produce an
incentive to remain in a program rather than to transition quickly into the
labor market. When a minority of trainees participate only to get the
income transfers, it can detract from the quality of the training for
others. Work experience requiring less than "a day's work for a day's pay"
may create unrealistic expectations and complicate adjustment to the
competitive labor market. Finally, a high allowance floor limits the
resources and range for incentive mechanisms.
The evidence provides some perspectives on these issues. Individuals
lacking the resources for minimal subsistence would surely find successful
participation difficult, and this absolute level of need is probably best
defined by the poverty standard. As a result of eligibility requirements,
almost all participants in classroom training have an annualized income
over the last six months which is below the poverty threshold or 70 percent
of the BLS lower living standard, or else they receive welfare. Their
average annual poverty deficit--i.e., the amount needed to bring their
income up to the poverty threshold (based on income recorded on CETA intake
records, estimates of welfare benefits which are not counted in determining
eligibility, family size at entry and the poverty levels associated with
these size categories) was between $2000 and $2500 in fiscal 1979. It
would be even less if account were taken of the food stamps received by a
fourth of participants (in fiscal 1979). ]_/ A minimum wage allowance in
1979 for 35 hours weekly of classroom training equalled an annualized $5300
in untaxed income, with up to another $1000 available for dependents. In
other words, the allowance would be between two-fifths and half as large if
the aim were merely to assure all participants a subsistence (poverty)
standard of living during participation.
Granted that no one gets rich by enrolling in a training course, the
issue remains whether the scarce resources have been husbanded sufficiently
or divided equitably. Some people have been denied training because their
income was barely above the poverty level; others a few dollars below the
threshold enrolled and received allowances which moved them substantially
above the poverty level. In the case of welfare recipients, however, it is
assumed that the public assistance benefits meet needs, even though these
benefits are substantially below poverty levels in most states. Recipients
are provided $30 per week in addition to their normal benefit as an
incentive to participate. Thus, a person from a family with exactly the
same income from sources other than public welfare would receive an
allowance three or four times as large as the stipend to recipients.
Does lesser income preclude the successful participation
recipients? Single parents who apply to CETA are more likely
to be assigned to classroom training (38 percent versus 30
1980), AFDC recipients stay longer in training (33 percent of

of welfare
than others
percent in
1977 class-
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room trainees who were recipients stayed 180 days or more compared to 31
percent of all participants), and have a dropout rate only slightly above
average (27 percent versus 24 percent for 1977 enrolles) despite the longer
duration of their scheduled training. jB/ In other words, it does not
appear that the lack of the full hourly allowance is an impediment to
participation, even for the group which has the greatest family responsi
bilities.
Job Corps takes another approach. Its total transfers were estimated
at approximately $3000 per Corpsmember year in fiscal 1977, but the monthly
allowance and readjustment benefit accounted for less than a third of this
total. The current allowance on entry is $40 per month, but this rises to
as high as $100 per month depending on length of stay, as does the re
adjustment allowance which is available upon termination. Job Corps has
been able to fill its centers, even though it provides less cash in the
pocket, because it offers a meaningful option to what is available locally.
The incentives are unquestionably one of the factors contributing to longer
stay.
If the allowance in local classroom training were reduced by half, it
would mean roughly a one-fifth reduction in per participant costs.
Training programs might also economize by registering participants for the
welfare benefits to which they are entitled. One-sixth of classroom
training entrants in fiscal 1980 were eligible but not receiving public
assistance at application, and many more were eligible for but not
receiving food stamps. 9/ The preferred payment might be through an al
lowance, but the source of the funding might better be the income main
tenance programs if the aim were to maximize the amount of training with
the scarce resources targeted for this purpose. Rational local decisionmakers would prefer to avoid registration since they share in local welfare
costs while the allowances are totally funded by the federal government.
Likewise, they would prefer to place recipients in work experience, since
the wages offset welfare payments while the allowances do not.
The level of allowances obviously affects the payoff of training from
a taxpayer's perspective. Under the most reasonable assumptions, the
taxpayer benefit-cost ratio for classroom training was estimated to be .73
for 1976 participants. If allowances were reduced by half, the ratio would
rise to .91. Under more liberal assumptions about the continuance of
post-program gains, the higher estimate of the taxpayer benefit-cost ratio
were near the breakeven point under the current allowance approach, but
would rise substantially above it if allowances were paid up to the poverty
level rather than on an hourly basis. Allowances are not counted as costs
in social benefit-cost calculations, since they are a transfer from
nonparticipants to participants, but the same public expenditure would
produce more social benefits if there were no allowance payment and more
individuals could be served.
The evidence that allowances attract and hold participants who have
little desire for training is circumstantial. There have been no careful
tests of alternative formulations, and the few unstipended activities have
usually been short-term and in competition with stipended approaches. 10/
However, the circumstantial evidence is compelling. Among fiscal 1976
classroom training entrants, only 37 percent were employed 12 months prior
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to entry and 20 percent one month before entry. With the allowance pro
viding a minimum wage income or an incentive supplement to welfare pay
ments, it is clear that at least four-fifths and probably more received a
higher income in-program than one month prior to entry, and at least
three-fifths received more than they had before any temporary problems were
encountered. Likewise, the post-program employment rates were 42 percent
one month after termination rising to 54 percent one year later, i.e.,
nearly three-fifths received more income during participation than they
could and would immediately afterward, while nearly half received more than
they would one year later, ll/ It would certainly be understandable if
persons lingered in training and if delivery agents were reluctant to
terminate participants with inadequate performance.
The effectiveness of allowances structured as incentives has not been
tested, but certainly the logic is compelling. If each trainee in fiscal
1976 were provided a $100 bonus for finding immediate employment in a
training related job, there would have been a "windfall" for the 42 percent
securing employment without the bonus, but the $4200 for every 100 par
ticipants would have been more than offset if just one more of the
remaining 58 per hundred got and kept a job for one year at the average
immediate post-program earnings of $6700. The economics are even greater
if self-placement can substitute for institutional placement. For in
stance, Employment Service costs per placement averaged $160 in fiscal
1980. The evidence of the success of low-cost job search assistance
suggests that this activity coupled with placement bonuses for classroom
trainees could probably make a substantial difference in placement rates
and placement costs. On the other hand, incentives for staying only make
sense if there are completion standards and the bonus is based on com
petency attainment, not just staying.
All incentives need not be
financial.
If career training opportunities were allocated based on
performance in short, basic-level training activities, a lower incentive
bonus might be used because the opportunity itself could provide moti
vation.
The savings to be realized by paying lower wages to participants in
work experience and OJT are potentially substantial, but there are several
issues which must be addressed. If work experience were targeted to those
with no recent employment and with extremely limited skills, the principle
of a learner's differential—which is already contained in the Fair Labor
Standards Act—would certainly make sense. If the work experience were
structured as training, then part of the payment (up to the level of output
of the participant) might be charged to wages and the remainder to
allowances structured as incentives for performance and self-placement
rather than paid for hours of participation. The mechanism for lower wages
in OJT would be a "try-out" period in which the individual would be
stipended by CETA as a training participant, receiving allowances rather
than wages. The individual would not be an employee of the company and
would not undercut wages. A reduction in wages for subsidized work which
offers no training or employs those who could do the same work without
training is certainly not reasonable. A requirement for remediation as
part of all work experience, the use of work experience to identify
training candidates, and a time limit on the allowance element in work
experience would help to protect against abuse. On-the-job training at
lower wages is inequitable if, as is usually the case now, the individuals
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placed are very closely matched in experience to the requirements of their
But the try-out approach should permit the assignment of more
jobs.
disadvantaged participants since the uncertainty and risk are reduced for
the employer. These safety features must be implemented as part of any
Moreover, any reduction in
changes in income maintenance approaches.
allowances or wages will reduce the benefits to participants, and even if
reductions are warranted from the taxpayer's perspective, they are only
justified from a social welfare perspective if the savings are used to
serve more individuals, to provide incentives for performance or to assure
expanded training opportunities.
Penny Wise, Pound Foolish
A major policy issue is whether to invest intensively in a few in
Because of scarce re
dividuals or less intensively in larger number.
sources, this rationing decision is unavoidable. The national impact data
suggest that there are very substantial payoffs to longer term classroom
training. The income gains relative to controls for 1976 participants were
nearly four times as great for those staying 21-40 weeks as they were for
those staying 11-20 weeks, and more than six times as great for those
staying over 40 weeks. The evidence suggests that participants who are
less employable and, in particular, black males, gain more from OJT than
from any other intervention, so that this approach may make the most sense
for persons most likely to be excluded from primary labor market jobs.
Even with OJT subsidies, however, it will be difficult to market such
individuals to employers unless their employability is first enhanced. Is
longer-term classroom training, then, the answer? Can OJT be arranged so
that less employable or higher risk persons can be placed after remedia
There are several factual and normative issues that must be
tion?
addressed before reaching judgments on these questions.
While the comparison of average individual gains of long stayers
versus short stayers strongly argues in favor of long-duration classroom
training, a more appropriate perspective may be the total gains of trainees
Several persons can be
from different duration-of-stay combinations.
trained short-term for every one trained long-term, and while the in
dividual gains may be less for the short-timers, their combined gains might
If it is assumed that the cost of training is directly pro
be greater.
portional to the weeks of training, then for every 100 persons receiving
over 40 weeks of training (with an assumed average of 50 weeks), 167 could
be served in the 21-40 week category (with an average of 30 weeks) and 333
in the 11-20 week range (with an average of 15 weeks). Based on the gain
estimates for fiscal 1976 classroom training enrol lees (leaving by the end
of calendar 1976), the differential in total gains is less than the
Significantly, however, the payoff of
differential in average gains.
longer-term training remains substantial: 12/
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To the extent longer training pays off, it is important to determine
whether participants will stay long enough to complete. The evidence
suggests that the limited duration of CETA classroom training has not
resulted primarily from high dropout rates. Among fiscal 1977 classroom
trainees, just a fourth of those who reported on completion status con
sidered themselves to have been dropouts. A third of these self-described
completers participated for more than six months and 15 percent for over 9
months, which was little different from the 27 percent and 13 percent
respectively among all participants. Conversely, 34 percent of selfreported completers stayed less than 90 days, only slightly below the 38
percent of all trainees. In other words, the distribution of actual
training duration was not markedly different from the distribution of
planned training duration. Significantly, most dropping out occurred
early. Forty percent of self-described dropouts left the program within
two months; past that point the dropout rate was relatively constant. Put
another way, if a participant stayed more than two months the chances of
completing were four in five. 13/ This suggests the possibility of
two-stage training, where the initial two or three months are used to
identify those seeking and likely to succeed in longer-duration training.

Length of stay

Dropouts as share of classroom
trainees reporting on completion
status (fiscal 1977 entrants
into classroom training)____

days
than
than
than
than
than

41
19
19
17
17
15

0-60
More
More
More
More
More

60
90
120
180
270

Factoring these dropout patterns into the simple model would increase
the relative benefits of longer training. Each time an 11-20 week slot is
refilled, the high probability of early leaving is faced again. The
extension of the 11-20 week slot to a 40 week slot will mean fewer new
entrants and a lesser percentage of early leavers. If those who drop out
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from longer training, say, during the 21-40 week period of a 50 week
training program, experience the same gains as persons scheduled for 21-40
weeks of training, then a longer scheduled period of training would almost
always pay off. Multiple stages of training would help to assure this
result.
The experience in Job Corps provides confirming evidence. The chances
of completing a vocational program are 30 percent among all entrants, but
among those staying more than 90 days, the chances increase to 50 percent.
For all enrollees the average duration of stay is 6.0 months. For those
who stay more than 90 days, the average is .9 years. Where advanced pro
grams are offered which represent significantly better opportunities, and
where individuals compete for and must prove themselves to get into these
components, the dropout rate is extremely low. For instance, in the Job
Corps advanced career training for computer customer engineers and
operators—an eighteen month combination of work and training with guar
anteed high salary jobs for completers--nearly nine of ten finished the
training. In the advanced program in junior and community colleges, the
length of stay of enrol lees was substantially longer than that of other Job
Corps enrol lees staying more than 90 days while the retention rate in
college equalled that for students in the schools in which they were
enrolled. 14/ These advanced components required at least 90 days par
ticipation in Job Corps, so that the early leavers were screened out. It
appears, then, that the two stage approach does work.
Even if the extra immediate post-program earnings for short-term
trainees cumulated to those of the long-term trainees, there are several
reasons why the "quantum leaps" for fewer individuals might be preferred.
For instance, 167 persons might be trained for an average of 15 weeks with
two-thirds of those completing training and gaining $100 each in earnings.
On the other hand, 50 persons might be trained for an average of 100 weeks,
of whom only a third would complete but with gains of $770 each. Nomi
nally, the benefits and costs would be the same. But society would have 83
more welders and entry clerical workers in the first case while the second
case would mean that it had 17 machinists or executive secretaries. The
economy would probably be better off in the latter case if this meant
filling skill shortages and helping to ease bottlenecks. Put another way,
there is a fair chance that the short-term trainee is displacing a like
person who would otherwise be getting the entry job, while there is less
chance that the longer-term trainee would be displacing anyone, much less a
peer, from a more skilled opportunity. In theory, it is also more likely
that the longer training, if it provides a credential or a chance to enter
and compete equally in a career track, would have greater continuity of
benefits. The preliminary evidence offers only partial confirmation.
Benefits increase between the first and second post-program years for 21-40
week participants in contrast to those with shorter training, but they fade
out somewhat for persons with 40 weeks or more of training. For women,
however, the gain from longer training apparently increases over the
post-program period. 15/
Another reason for longer training aimed to produce substantial career
advancement is that it can be used as an incentive for performance in
shorter training, just as the chance to get into a prestigious college is
an incentive to maintain grades in high school. There is no reason to
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believe that the disadvantaged will respond to opportunities any
differently, and the limited evidence supports this view. In Job Corps,
for instance, the attendance and completion in on-center GED programs
increased when the advanced program in colleges and junior colleges was
introduced with the requirement of a diploma or GED before entry.
Likewise, enrollees in Job Corps centers with more input into the college
program indicated that they planned to stay longer in order to get into the
advanced program. 16/ This incentive effect will only occur if there are
enough advanced options, if they are attractive, if assignments into them
are hinged on performance, and if the options and performance requirements
are made known to enrol lees. If more advantaged participants are simply
assigned at entry to the advanced courses, there is no incentive effect.
Thus, it is necessary to integrate second tier with first tier oppor
tunities if there is to be a synergy.
For OJT, the duration of stay is not the issue, but rather the
differential between the experience and credentials of the participant and
the minimal requirements of the job to which he or she is referred. The
best approach would appear to be a combination of work experience and OJT,
or classroom training and OJT, i.e., where the performance in a primary
component would be used to identify potential as well as to improve skills
up to the level required for entry and success in the on-the-job training.
Unfortunately, this coupling of activities is rarely used. Only 2 percent
of 1976 participants were enrolled in a combination of classroom training
or work experience and OJT. 17/ Another approach would be to let the
employer try out the participant before making the hiring decision. In
either case, it would then be possible to increase the differential between
measurable characteristics of the participant and the normal entry re
quirements of the job without increasing the risks for the employer.
A Focus on Competencies
Competency-based approaches for education, vocational education, and
employability development, seek to identify knowledge or skill "building
blocks" and to arrange them hierarchically according to importance,
difficulty, and pedagogical sequence. Learning and experiential activities
are organized into units paralleling these competency clusters and
hierarchies. Measurement information systems are formalized to assess
skill or knowledge attainment and to track mastery of the building blocks.
Step-off levels are identified where meaningful certification can be
provided for mastery of the subsumed competencies for those not advancing
further.
Most remedial and special education curricula are competency-based.
In mathematics, they usually begin with addition and subtraction of whole
numbers, multiplication, then division, fractions, decimals, and so forth.
Addition is necessary before multiplication is possible, and multiplication
is necessary before long division can be accomplished. To teach addition,
as well as each of the subsequent competencies, there are tutorial
materials, as well as sets of drill and practice exercises. Mastery of
addition is tested by the ability to correctly answer a variety of
problems, and progress to subtraction does not occur until addition skills
are mastered. Likewise, remedial reading and language arts systems usually
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define clusters of skills or "strands" such as vocabulary, antonyms and
synonyms, word usage, interpretation, and the like. Each strand has its
own building blocks of lessons and tests. The building blocks in each
strand are scheduled so that advancement along each strand provides the
competencies needed to master competencies at the same levels in other
strands. The levels can be set so as to parallel grade-level norms in the
schools. GED instruction is based on a clustering of high school com
petencies into five functional areas. A uniform national test, with five
subparts, is used to measure initial skills in each category and lessons
are structured to overcome test-measured deficiencies in any of these
areas. There are a set of practive tests which can then be used to assess
progress with the lessons, and when they are passed, the full GED test may
be taken.
Each state will grant a diploma to nongraduates who achieve
adequate scores on each of the subtests, and an average for the total
tests, as determined by varying state standards.
Competency-based vocational training curricula have been developed in
almost every occupation. As an example, competency-based courses in
carpentry usually begin with lessons concerning safety, terminology, tool
usage and care, and the understanding of sketches. The next cluster may
include laying-out and grading foundations, and might then advance to
clusters of lessons concerning framing, roofing, exterior work, interior
finishing, and finally remodeling. There may be several building blocks in
each of these clusters. An entry carpenter might need basic knowledge in
each of these clusters. An advanced carpenter might need a higher level of
skills in each cluster. Skills are usually assessed by knowledge tests,
but also by the successful completion of designated tasks.
There are also some competency-based approaches for basic life skills
training and employability development. For instance, some curricula
subdivide basic life skills into areas such as consumer skills, citizen's
rights, job application and job search techniques, career knowledge, and
the like, with lessons designed to achieve each of these clusters of skills
and with written tests to measure skill or knowledge mastery.
The various alternative competency-based education, vocational
training and employabilty skills systems differ in the specificity and
clustering of their building blocks, the design of the knowledge/skills
hierarchies, the segment of the hierarchy to which they are directed, as
well as the number and types of tests or tasks to demonstrate competency
attainment. They also differ in the lessons and activities which are
developed to provide each identified competency.
The setting in which they are applied also varies. At the extreme is
the Job Corps education approach. All Corpsmembers operate within a
uniform system, all materials in Job Corps are referenced to the same
standards, all individual options within Job Corps depend on progress
within this system, and individual teachers and centers can be judged
relative to their ability to move students forward in this system. In most
other settings, the competency-based approach is less comprehensive. One
in five high schools in the nation requires seniors to pass an individual
competency test. Some states and some local school systems have adopted
competency systems for the kindergarten through 12th grade levels which
dictate the skills required to move from each grade to the next and they
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have restructured curricula to focus specifically on these competencies.
Most employ a single competency test which seniors must pass to graduate.
Two of three schools with competency tests for graduation have at least
some special remedial courses developed to overcome specific deficiencies
as measured by these tests. In many other cases where there are no
competency standards overall, a competency-based system may operate
alongside regular classroom instruction. For instance, students may spend
some of their day in self-paced computer-assisted instruction systems based
on competency hierarchies, but participate the rest of the day in a regular
classroom where progress is graded relative to class norms. For vocational
training, there are a few occupations such as radiology or nursing where
licensure requirements serve as the reference points for the competency
standards. Apprenticeship involves the specification of the skills which
must be mastered and provides the framework for competency-based in
struction in apprenticeable occupations. The apprenticeship standards and
training requirements for each occupation vary from state to state, but the
systems for any given occupation have a great deal of similarity. In most
applications, however, competency-based vocational training systems are
restricted to a single delivery institution or set of institutions. Some
public and many private for-profit institutions structure their training to
"meet the needs of industry," i.e., they determine their competency
hierarchies and the step-off levels in conjunction with representatives of
the private sector. However, such efforts are usually ad hoc.
Competency-based systems have several inherent advantages: First,
they usually involve individualized, self-paced learning. This has
pedagogical as well as operational attractions. Individualized systems
make sense for those who can progress faster or cannot progress as fast as
norms. Where individualized systems are in place, it is not necessary to
segregate the slow or fast learners in special classes in order to meet
their needs. Many students learn more easily when lessons are organized in
"bite-sized" chunks which provide positive reinforcement each time one is
mastered. Some individuals can do better when compared with their own
abilities rather than classroom norms which compound their inadequacies.
Such systems help to identify when skills are not mastered so that remedial
attention can be concentrated when and where it is most needed. In a
regular classroom a student may sit quietly for a semester and never learn
anything without this being noted; a unit approach provides continuing
indication of effort and accomplishment.
Second, in any system which serves those who have severe income and
earnings problems in need of immediate attention, participation cannot be
scheduled on a semester basis. Instruction needs to be open-entry and
exit. Participants will vary widely in capacity, so that any remedial
system of instruction must allow entry at the level of ability. Remedial
treatments are voluntary rather than legally enforced like school
attendance, and the disadvantaged may have many problems that interrupt
their courses mid-stream. A competency-based system is ideal since they
can return later without repeating all previously learned segments.
Third, the formalization of a single hierarchy of competencies
requires consensus on learning processes and on the skills that are needed
for certain tasks or outcomes. This consensus can help to provide
legitimacy to the education and training which is provided. There is,
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then, some assurance that the individuals who are credentialed or have
completed will know certain information and be able to perform certain
skills, and that the skills and knowledge are appropriate.
Fourth, where a hierarchical system of building blocks has been
established, it is possible to cross-reference materials to the level,
strand, or unit to which they are directed, and then to assess their
relative effectiveness in helping individuals to master each competency.
For instance, in Job Corps where there is one uniform system of strands,
levels, and units structuring education efforts, almost all available
commercial and publicly-developed materials have been screened for
applicability and cross-referenced to this grid. Available for each center
and instructor are a range of pre-screened written materials from different
publishers, Job Corps-developed lessons, as well as computer-assisted drill
and practice and tutorial lessons. The teacher may choose from these
options or may develop his or her own. Gradually, experience has been
gained about how well each of these different materials works. This
information has been used to add to and subtract from the options systemwide, and to communicate insights between teachers and across centers. If
each center had its own hierarchy of competencies and competency tests,
each would have had to screen and cross-reference materials, and there
would be limited transferability of the lessons because the systems would
be so different. A standardized reference system is particularly important
given the rapid expansion of computer-assisted instruction lessons. In a
prime sponsor with numerous delivery agents offering remedial education, it
would be impossible to utilize a minicomputer and terminal system unless
the reference framework were standardized.
Fifth, the use of a single competency-based system permits better
performance assessment and evaluation. Where there is a uniform framework,
the entry competencies are known for all individuals, i.e., they are
measured against the same standards so that differences in the individuals
served by different agents can be more exactly determined in making com
parisons. The gains resulting from participation can also be assessed by
the same standards, and then weighted in light of the time and cost to
achieve these gains. The subdivision into building blocks permits a more
refined estimate of impacts than when the only success measure is com
pletion of a benchmark such as a GED--i.e., a ruler which measures in
inches will give a better indication of height and its consequences than
one which measures only yards, particularly when many of the distances
covered are less than a yard.
Standardized and refined measures of in-program changes are par
ticularly important where there are differing service mixes and approaches
that produce the outcomes. Marginal increases in educational competencies
bear only a modest relationship to immediate employment chances, so that
assessing the success of an education component by the placement rate of
participants is not very exact. Different agents may be responsible for
placement and education. If the former is effective, the latter might
appear effective whatever the quality of its instruction and vice versa.
Where an agent handles both remedial education and placement, the per
formance in either component may obscure the performance in the other.
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Sixth, the use of a standardized, competency-based framework can
simplify the teaching task, permitting teachers to concentrate on meeting
rather than diagnosing specific needs, and more on utilizing rather than
selecting or developing lessons. This is particularly important where the
vocational instruction or education is delivered by staffs which are not
well-trained to make such decisions. School and vocational education
systems try to assure quality by dictating the necessary preparation of
teachers and specifying at least the core materials which will be used.
CETA at the local level usually contracts with a multitude of delivery
agents, which vary in standards for teachers and materials.
There are several possible drawbacks to competency-based approaches:
First, any system of building blocks and skills hierarchies may not be
optimal for all purposes and all persons. As noted, there are several
different remedial competency-based systems, each with its own hierarchy,
learning strands, and levels. Presumably it could be determined which of
these works more effectively, on average, from a pedagogical and opera
tional viewpoint, but none will be optimal in all circumstances. For
instance, a competency might not be equally important in different
settings. Auto mechanics training in the Southwest would have to give more
priority to air conditioner maintenance than a course taught in the
Northeast. The educational steps by which most remedial students learn
best might not be appropriate for those with learning disabilities. The
basic issue is whether the exceptions are rare enough or the basic frame
works flexible enough to allow for specialized subsystems to be crossreferenced or additional measures and treatments added.
Second, any competency-based system requires tests or demonstrations
of ability through task performance. There are problems in the accuracy
and application of any tests. These are reduced where the tests and the
curricula are closely interconnected as in competency-based systems where
each unit contains its own test, the accomplishment of a set of units is
documented by questions drawn from all of these separate tests, so that
trainees become accustomed to test-taking. Yet where curricula provides
learning which is not closely related to what is tested, the benefits may
not be measured, so that over time emphasis will be placed on approaches
focusing narrowly on the tested competencies. Mastery of some competencies
cannot be tested but must be demonstrated, which introduces a judgemental
element even when there is very clear specification of the tasks and
performance standards. If delivery agents are judged by the accomplish
ments of students, they are likely to generously interpret any standards
and an outside checking system may be needed to assure accurate assess
ments.
Third, competency-based systems usually increase paperwork. Each unit
or building block ends in a series of tests or skill demonstrations which
must be graded by students or teachers. Level tests must be applied after
completion of a set of building blocks. There needs to be a tracking of
individual progress through the system. In contrast, there may be only
four or five tests a semester that must be graded and recorded in a regular
classroom. The real problem comes when competency-based systems supplement
traditional approaches, so that the tracking needed for the individualized
system is in addition to, rather than an integral part of, the regular
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grading and assessment system. The benefits of the competency-based
approach increase when it is used consistently, i.e., the curricula is
adapted to this framework, and students, teachers, and delivery agents are
judged according to performance within this framework. In Job Corps, there
is this consistency. In many other systems, however, there are disjunctures. Individualized education plans (lEPs) are required for special
populations in the schools, and usually these include competency-based
prescriptions. But special education classes most often supplement regular
activities, so that students are graded by what they do in regular
classrooms, while the individualized approach is a separate, overlaid
system. The plans, formats and methods of tracking progress towards
achievement of IEP goals are rarely standardized even within school
districts so that instructors are not judged according to the relative
progress of their students in relation to these plans. Thousands of filing
cabinets are full of lEPs (and CETA employability plans) which have little
relationship to treatments and for which there is no tracking of outcomes
relative to plans or of the steps which led to these outcomes.
Fourth, competency-based systems can be a challenge to traditional
approaches and personnel. Much of the training received by teachers and
vocational instructors—learning to prepare lesson plans, to survey and
select materials, to make meaningful presentations to classes, and to
diagnose individual problems—is of reduced importance in individualized,
competency-based systems. Teachers used to exerting control over students
through class norms and peer pressures may be uneasy in educational
settings where students can progress at their own rate and are judged
relative to objective standards. The same teachers may not be prepared for
nor inclined towards the individual interaction which is a part of com
petency-based instruction. It is easier to use student aides and paraprofessionals in a competency-based system, and this may threaten the
professionalism of teachers as well as their job security. Finally, the
tracking of students' performance by a uniform and objective system
facilitates better comparisons of the effectiveness of teachers. No one
likes to be under the gun constantly to produce results.
Turf issues are unavoidable where uniform standards and approaches are
involved. Everyone may agree with the concept of the individualized
competency-based approach, yet some believe that each school district or
prime sponsor should establish the framework, others believe that standardsetting should occur at the state level, while there are advocates for the
creation of uniform national standards. The issue of debate is whether
differences in students or teachers between areas and states require
different systems, and whether these differences must be determined
locally; but to a large extent, the core question is simply who gets to
call the shots.
With the exception of Job Corps, employment and training policy has
not addressed content issues such as appropriate standards for delivery
staffs and services, the types of materials which are utilized, the
competencies which are attained, or the frameworks by which education,
training, and employability development are structured and tracked. Each
prime sponsor is left on their own, with no stipulations in the regulations
nor in the federal plan and performance review process, and with almost no
technical assistance. Few prime sponsors have specialists in training,
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education, or basic life skills training, even though these are the major
human resource development components of CETA-funded local activities. As
a result, few set standards or try to track participants relative to these
standards. They usually contract with whatever institutions exist locally
and accept their standards, if any. It is impossible in such cases to
compare the effectiveness of like training activities within a prime
sponsor area, much less across prime sponsor areas, except by the postprogram results. Yet these are poor indicators of the quality of training
since they are dependent on the type of clients served (whose skills at
entry are not measured), as well as placement and job access effectiveness
(which may vary widely). Each delivery agent must screen all available
materials and choose a curriculum, which is a hit-or-miss process when
staff has not been trained to make such decisions. Many develop their own
lessons, hierarchies and skills building blocks without any test of whether
these are better or worse than ones already existing. Job developers and
placement personnel then try to market products which vary widely in
quality. Employers cannot know what tasks CETA trainees can perform or
what knowledge they have attained.
The picture is the same for CETA-funded remedial education offerings.
If a community-based work program for dropouts wants to add an educational
or employability skills component, the delivery agent must screen all
available materials. It will have to set up a system for assessing
progress in these materials and establish standards of completion. If the
delivery agent were instead provided the Job Corps system or another one
like it, it would simply have to test the students to determine their
beginning level and try-out the various lessons that have already been
pre-screened for each level. Technical assistance materials would already
be available on how to use these materials. The uniform competency testing
framework in Job Corps is already cross-referenced to SAT, CAT, GED tests,
and grade level norms, so that the deliverer would not have to validate
separately the quality of its educational activities.
CETA employability skills training, which is usually focused on youth,
includes a potpourri of activities. No one knows what an individual has
accomplished or learned, and hence the "graduate" is little better off in
competing for jobs than the nongraduate. Each pre-employment activity uses
its own system of assessing employability skills, so the assessment must be
repeated each time the individual participates in another activity.
These shortcomings could be overcome by the adoption of standardized
systems for measuring, tracking, and certifying competencies and for
structuring CETA education, vocational training and employability skills
For each major occupation of training, the
development activities.
Department of Labor, in conjunction with apprenticeship and vocational
education experts, could screen the various competency-based systems and
agree on a competency hierarchy spanning from the entry level to the most
advanced training level. These would be much like, but improvements on,
the Training Achievement Records used in Job Corps. Short tests and
required skills demonstrations would be specified. The vast array of
existing competency-based curricula in CETA, Job Corps, and vocational
education which aim at different levels in this hierarchy and seek to move
trainees different distances could, then, be screened for adequacy and
cross-referenced so that anyone developing a training program at any level
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would be provided the best of the available options. An entering par
ticipant in CETA would be given a standardized test of vocational aptitudes
and abilities (and the score would be recorded on the MIS intake form). He
or she would be assigned a training cluster and would enter at a level
based upon already acquired skills and competencies which would be noted as
the beginning point on the training record. Training would be offered to
provide each of the competencies in the hierarchy, whether through one of
the nationally-identified curricula options or a locally-developed one.
Presumably, the locally-developed curricula could be divided into modules
to parallel the hierarchy, but an alternative would simply be to apply the
knowledge tests and performance demonstrations to document achievements in
a standardized way, however these were taught. Other skills and spe
cialities could be documented to supplement the training record if the
delivery agent were providing more than the minimum training. Thus, all
trainees in carpentry in various courses in a prime sponsorship or in the
nation could be pegged according to where trainees started and how far they
advanced. As part of the monitoring process, the prime sponsor could spot
check whether trainees could indeed perform as indicated by the training
record, thus assuring that competency standards were maintained. Each
prime sponsor or perhaps each state, in conjunction with employers, could
determine the levels or step-off points which would be certified. Some
might choose to put greater emphasis on a particular competency by adding
more detailed standards to supplement the national framework. The national
system would presumably be consistent with the usual apprenticeship and
licensing requirements, so that at the state level, it could be determined
which of the skills and activities had to be acquired to achieve an
apprenticeable level, and any additional requirements that would have to be
added to meet special state expectations.
In basic reading, mathematics and language arts, up through the GED
level, a uniform competency framework would be much like, but an improve
ment upon, the Job Corps educational system. Each participant in CETA
would be given a short, standardized reading and mathematics test at entry.
The scores would be part of the record, along with other demographic
information, since educational competence is a major determinant of
employability. Participants in need of remediation would then be placed
within an educational component at the level of demonstrated ability, and
their advancement though standardized competency levels would be tracked.
The end point would be noted on the management information system as an
outcome. Experts could (as they have done to date for Job Corps) screen
and cross-reference the vast array of available competency-based commercial
and public curricula (including CAI lessons), providing options for each of
the standardized building blocks (and, perhaps, purchasing in large
quantities certain of the best materials which could be provided as a core
program if prime sponsors chose to utilize it). In such a system, each
state would determine the step-off points, just as they do now on the GEO
test by setting the average and individual score requirements for the five
GED subtests. In fact, the GED categories, practice tests, and related
instructional materials would be integrated as the cap in the national
system, since they have already been adopted by all states and are used in
Job Corps. But it might also be possible to identify a "basic skills"
step-off point lower than the high school diploma level which would
recognize acqusition of some of the basic academic abilities expected by
employers even for entry jobs. This makes sense since many of the dropouts
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who participate in CETA cannot be brought up to the GED level, but can at
least master these elementary skills.
A competency-based employability skills framework would define and
cluster the knowledge and skills needed to enter the world-of-work. One of
these clusters could be the "basic skills" certification just mentioned.
Others might include consumer skills, citizen's rights and responsi
bilities, job search skills, and occupational decisions. Acquisition of
competencies in each of these areas might be tested but would also
necessarily include the successful completion of certain tasks such as
opening a bank account and applying for a certain number of jobs. There
has been some progress in specifying pre-employment skills and skills tests
under the Consolidated Youth Employment Program which adopted a competencybased approach, and a comprehensive system has been developed for Job
Corps. 18/ The vast array of materials which have been developed in recent
years would be screened and cross-referenced, with perhaps a core package
provided to prime sponsors. There would be a standardized fonn for
tracking individual participants, and documenting mastery of each
knowledge/skill cluster. Again, the management information system would
count the number of participants achieving these basic competencies.
In the CETA context, the "pros" of such competency-based approaches
would outweigh the "cons" for several reasons:
First, since CETA is 100 percent federally financed, it would be much
easier and more justified to establish a uniform framework than would be
possible for education or vocational education, where there is a long
history of local control and most of the funding comes from state and local
sources. CETA deals mostly with the individuals who have left or are
excluded from these basic education and vocational systems. The disadvantaged are more likely to have interrupted participation, the inter
ventions are usually short-term, and it makes sense in these contexts (as
it does in the case of the GED) to have a single measurement and tracking
framework so that progress can be cumulated over several periods of par
ticipation.
Within CETA, the roles of the various players would not be markedly
altered. State and local governments would still have the authority to
choose clients, to adapt to local conditions, and to choose curricula.
Paralleling the GED approach, states could still establish their own
requirements along a standardized competency hierarchy. Likewise, prime
sponsors could choose, in conjunction with employers, the levels of
vocational skills needed for sets of jobs, or could determine each em
ployer's needs separately. The prime sponsor would still be free to choose
the level of entering participants (consistent with CETA eligibility) and
how far to try to move them. Curricula could be chosen from among the
screened alternatives, or the prime sponsor might use other curricula but
with tracking of progress according to the standardized competency
hierarchy. Extra requirements could, of course, be added to this hier
archy.
Second, because CETA participants are outside the mainstream systems,
the standards imposed would not challenge these other systems, on the
contrary, the development and adoption of competency frameworks might

330
provide a basis for the integration of CETA activities with vocational
education, apprenticeship, military training and education. Vocational
education has been moving rapidly towards a competency-based approach, and
there is a possibility of legislative consolidation of federally-supported
post-secondary vocational education and CETA training.
Certainly an
important step in this direction would be to adopt common nomenclature so
that there would be transferability between curricula, records and creden
tials in the two systems. Likewise, apprenticeship, itself, is a com
petency-based system specifying the skills and knowledge needed in par
ticular jobs and the ways in which these can be obtained. Standards differ
from state to state but usually cover the same building blocks. The
frameworks evolved under CETA could be made as consistent as possible with
those core state systems. In each state, the CETA framework could be
referenced relative to the apprenticeship requirements (or the requirements
could be altered to match the CETA framework) so that training could build
towards certified career tracks. Much work has been done to identify the
transferability of military training, i.e., to determine the competencies
provided which could be applied to civilian occupations. The adoption of
standardized skills/ knowledge hierarchies for each occupation would
provide a reference framework. In addition, CETA training might be used as
preparation for military careers and credited upon enlistment rather than
repeated afterwards.
The linkage with education systems is already
achieved to some extent through the GED system, but standardization of CETA
approaches below this level would enable states to specify and credential a
basic skills level lower than high school equivalency.
Third, it is likely that CETA will increasingly emphasize human
resource development, including mandatory combinations of training with
work. It is critical to be able to track the effectiveness of each of the
components in the service mix, and also to be able to mount quality
educational offerings which supplement other activities.
Since CETA
participants are disadvantaged and frequently minority group members who
may suffer from discrimination, it is all the more important to document
the competencies they attain and to do so by an objective system which is
recognized in the labor market and by all delivery institutions.
The competency-based approach will help to assure the quality of the
CETA materials and instruction without requiring the credential!ing of
staff at the delivery level. The pre-screening of materials by experts and
the use of an individualized self-paced system reduce the need for staff
who are highly trained in lesson planning, materials selection, and
education or training philosophy. It permits greater use of individuals
who are good at working with participants needing personal attention and
understanding. Because materials and offerings are so diverse in the CETA
system, and there is no common reference system, it is now almost impos
sible to offer technical assistance on the substantive education and
training offerings. A common reference system will facilitate technical
assistance.
Fourth, the imposition of such a system would not add significantly to
paperwork requirements since CETA already must prepare individual employability plans for each participant which include assessments, service
servi
plans and goals. Prime sponsors are charged with linking each traini ng
occupation to apprenticeship standards wherever appropriate. Records of
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GED attainment are already kept so that there is some tracking of in
dividuals relative to this goal. Much of the CETA-funded human resource
development activity at the local level is, by necessity, competency-based
and open-entry and exit, thus requiring recordkeeping at the delivery site
to track individual progress. A uniform framework would permit full
utilization of computer-managed instruction capabilities >as well as
computerization of many recordkeeping tasks. It is only when the frame
works are the same and nomenclature is standardized that economies of scale
can be achieved through computerization. The introduction of such al
ternative systems where tests are taken and scored on terminals, where
assignments are made by the terminals based on progress in lessons, where
computer-assisted lessons are shared on a wide scale, will dramatically
reduce paperwork. The technical feasibility of such systems has already
been demonstrated.
Fifth, the competency-based approach would provide the basis for
measuring the effectiveness of CETA components. All entrants in local
prime sponsor activities and from one prime sponsor to another would be
assessed using standardized educational, vocational, and employability
skills tests; this information would add significantly to the determination
and comparison of employability. Where a remedial component is combined
with another activity such as work experience, it will be possible to
directly measure whether the remediation is effective rather than trying to
infer from post-program outcomes which reflect the impact of the total
treatment. The need for improved performance assessment and management
leads in the same direction as the arguments for standardized competencybased frameworks.
Finally, these standardized competency-based approaches could be
implemented incrementally without rupture to the current CETA system. The
competency-based education approach of Job Corps has been well tested with
a disadvantaged population and could be adopted as an option for all prime
sponsors, supplemented by a requirement that all participants be tested at
entry and exit using Job Corps reading and mathematics tests, and that
their scores plus hours of treatment in educational components be recorded
in the CETA management information system, as they are in the Job Corps
MIS. A competency-based employability skills program is desperately needed
because of the diversity, disorganization, and uncertain quality of preemployment activities under youth programs. A standardized curricula might
be provided as an option, but the standards for "basic employability
skills" for each individual might be incorporated as an outcome measure on
the MIS. The occupational competency hierarchies could be developed and
implemented for one occupation at a time in a coordinated effort with the
apprenticeship and vocational education systems. Uork is already underway
to develop such competency frameworks in several occupational areas,
borrowing from the extensive developments in the vocational education
community.
Without question, there will be problems in implementing such frame
works and in forcing change in the traditional ways of doing business under
CETA. There will be justifiable complaints where the systems do not make
sense in local contexts, and these cases are sure to be exaggerated by
individuals and institutions adversely affected by the changes. Yet if
CETA is to increase its emphasis on human resource development, if it is to
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realize the potentials of computerization for management, technical
assistance and instruction, if the quality of substantive offerings is to
be improved, if performance is to be measured and if the activities and
participants are to be better marketed to the private sector, employment
and training policy must begin to address these controversial issues and
move towards the standardization of competency assessment and tracking
systems and instructional frameworks. Because CETA is a federal system,
because its clients need individualized, self-paced assistance offered in a
variety of settings, and because they critically need documentation of
their competencies so they can compete more successfully in the labor
market, it is crucial that CETA take the lead in developing and imple
menting competency-based systems.
Realistic Expectations
One of the most difficult issues of social policy is to agree what
constitutes success or failure of social interventions, to set realistic
expectations, and to then judge performance by these standards. Employment
and training programs have suffered in the past from overselling and then
failure to measure up to inflated expectations. For instance, President
Johnson claimed, in signing the Economic Opportunity Act, that each $1,000
invested in Job Corps would return $40,000 over a lifetime. From a social
benefit-cost perspective, the Job Corps investment is profitable, but the
"profit" is closer to $.40 rather than $40 on each dollar invested. The
present value of the earnings gains alone do not even amortize the
investment. If it were not for the program's substantial impacts on crime,
it might not be considered profitable. Moreover, the taxpayers' benefits
do not exceed costs under most assumptions. There is no doubt that the Job
Corps provides a unique opportunity which results in substantial gains for
those who complete. But participation does not assure self-sufficiency.
Even though the proportion of 1977 participants who were taxpayers in the
next two years was a fourth above the proportion among like nonparticipants, and even though the proportion who were welfare recipients declined
by half, a fourth of Corpsmembers were still outside the labor force two
years after termination and the average annualized earnings of those
employed was just $8,000, or only slightly above the poverty level for a
family of four or the earnings from full-time work at the minimum wage. 19/
For local classroom training, the earnings gains pay back the social
costs, yet self-sufficiency is not the result for very many participants.
Two years after termination, less than three of ten second-half 1975
trainees had annual earnings of over $6,000--or roughly the 1977 poverty
level of a nonfarm family of four—and two-fifths of these were persons who
had earnings above $4,000 in the year before entry. A fifth of trainees
had no earnings two years later. Although on-the-job training produces
more substantial earnings gains, it does not assure self-sufficiency
either. Two-fifths of second-half 1975 trainees had earnings below $6,000
in the second post-termination year, and a tenth had earnings below $1,000.
Over half of those with earnings above the $6,000 threshold were substan
tial earners (above $4,000) in the year before entry. 20/
Are these reasonable batting averages? The answer depends on the
perspective. For instance, the recent estimates of the rate of return on
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investments in college education range from 8 to 16 percent, while the rate
of return for two-year technical degrees is between 8 and 15 percent. The
rate of return has declined over the last decade although the amount of
deterioration is subject to debate. For white males, four years of college
is associated with between one-third and two-fifths higher earnings than
for high school graduates, and one to three years of college is associated
with between 5 and 10 percent higher earnings. For black males, the
returns to four years of college are almost double those for whites, when
they are compared to other blacks. 21/ The total cost of college in fiscal
1980 was $5,000 per student per year. Estimating foregone earnings at the
minimum wage level of $6000 annually, the cost of four years of college
would thus be $44,000. Next to these figures, the gains from five months
of OJT or classroom training or six months in Job Corps--18 percent, 10
percent and 8 percent, respectively, do not appear inconsequential.
Likewise, the estimated social rates of return—45 percent for Job Corps, a
minimum of 38 percent for classroom training, and a higher, though
uncertain, rate for OJT--are more than reasonable. Alternatively, the 350
hours of remediation averaged in classroom training might be compared with
the 15,000 hours averaged in the primary and secondary education system.
Should the expected benefits be proportional? The dropout rate in Job
Corps is high--perhaps excessive to some—but the one-third completion rate
does not look so bad when compared to the less than 50 percent completion
rate of two-year colleges. 22/
The schools and the labor market are not perfect sorting mechanisms,
but they do, on average, separate the "winners" from the "losers."
Failures and deficits may cumulate over time so that even though a person
has innate potential, there can be enormous impediments to its realization.
Thus, a low batting average is inherent in any program which seeks to
substantially alter the skills and behavior of individuals who are identi
fied on the basis of prior failures or employment handicaps. The more
ambitious a program, the smaller the proportion who can complete it, all
else being equal.
The chances of translating increased skills and credentials into
increased earnings are also constrained. Within the CETA population, many
Job Corps or classroom training completers achieve skills equal to those of
more advantaged individuals, but few enjoy the same earnings. The CETA
trainee and the post-secondary vocational school trainee may type at the
same speed, perhaps even read with the same ability, but if one is a
welfare mother and the other independent of childcare responsibilities,
employment is less likely to be interrupted and jobs easier to find for the
latter. Furthermore, employers are unlikely to give full credit to CETA
training. The private sector sees the system as one which screens in the
least employable, does not sort out the poor performers, and provides only
modest duration of training. If adequate numbers of entry workers can be
found through contacts with trusted employees or other reliable mechanisms
which reduce the risks, why should employers draw from CETA for anything
but menial jobs? The employer has to be convinced that the training is
real and that the trainees can perform; otherwise the employer will respond
only if bribed or coerced.
In light of these realities, the expectations concerning the payoffs
which will result from improvements in the system must be tempered. For
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instance, if the proportion of local classroom trainees staying over 40
weeks were doubled from the 7 percent level in fiscal 1976, with propor
tionate reductions in each of the shorter-stay categories, and if these
longer trainees benefited as much as those in 1976, the average impact of
classroom training would be increased by only a sixth. Moreover, the cost
per participant would rise by an eighth. Similarly, if enrollments in
advanced career training in Job Corps were expanded so that one-third of
the completers achieved post-program earnings gains double the average for
completers, this would increase the average gain for all Corpsmembers
(based on the 12-18 month post-termination estimates) by two-fifths, or
from 13 to 17 percent of control earnings. But the number who could be
served would be reduced by a fifth if each of the advanced trainees
remained an extra year. Total earnings gains from the same Job Corps ex
penditures, then, would rise by a tenth and the social benefit-cost ratio a
little over a twentieth.
These crude simulations merely suggest that longer training means
fewer will be served, and that the larger earnings gains of the few who
benefit more must be averaged over all other participants. If the proposed
changes occurred, they would not dramatically alter the overall performance
of the training system, although they would increase the rate of return on
the public and taxpayer's investment.
The degree of possible reorientation is also constrained by the
proportion of the CETA population that can benefit from advanced training,
as well as by the number of advanced opportunities that can be secured.
Less than a fourth of Job Corps participants, for instance, enters with or
secures a diploma or a GED. If half of these participated in college or
post-secondary programs, they would still represent only a third of
completers or an eighth of total participants. In local programs, which
serve a more varied and less disadvantaged population, a larger proportion
could benefit from "quantum leap" approaches. The constraint is really the
ability to organize such offerings and to link them to jobs. Training and
job links may be very difficult in depressed areas where the disadvantaged
are concentrated. Mobility arrangements to secure training and jobs
elsewhere are not going to be of interest to most participants. Even in
Job Corps, where participants have demonstrated their willingness to leave
home at least temporarily, the increased moves across cities (excluding Job
Corps relocation) are only 20 for every 100 participants in the first 18
months after termination. 23/ Moreover, there are serious problems in
mounting relocation efforts because of the political sensitivity of the
issue. A reasonable goal might be to serve between a tenth and a fifth of
all participants in CETA in mobility-oriented programs, which might be
expected to achieve an increase in suburban and intrastate mobility of a
few per hundred total trainees, and even less interstate mobility. However
beneficial at the margin, and however correct in the direction of emphasis,
this will have modest impacts on aggregate measured benefits even if the
mobile individuals gain significantly.
None of these changes will be achieved rapidly. The benefits of
advanced training options, for example, rest on the premise that indi
viduals will be sorted and developed in a first tier of activities and then
a select few will move to the second tier. Simply creaming at intake and
selecting the best individuals, or openly recruiting more able individuals
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for these opportunities, will result in more modest net benefits. The
advanced training options will take time to establish, but it will be even
longer before the feeder system is linked to these opportunities, and
participants move through both the first and second tiers. Even if the
earnings improvements of second tier participants were quite substantial,
it would be some years before the gains noticeably increased the payoff of
all CETA training. Likewise, realignment of the employment and training
system consistent with mainstream principles is a lengthy institutional
change process. The development and utilization of competency assessment
systems, input requirements, standardized curricula and graduation
standards takes time, and it will be even longer before the labor market's
perceptions of the system's effectiveness are altered and potential clients
are convinced that, in fact, real opportunities are being offered so that
they can get more from CETA than a weekly check.
Because massive impacts cannot be expected and any impacts will take
time does not argue against the directions of change, or their substantial
payoff at the margin. Since the current training activities are working,
since the changes involve a steady realignment rather than a revolution in
these procedures, and since the new system would be in place by the
late-1980s when the labor market effects of demographic changes will be
most strongly felt, there is nothing to be lost by carefully building a
second tier of advanced training activities, providing opportunities to
successful participants in the first tier, and gradually changing the
thought processes and operational procedures in the system that already
exists. Without expecting major or immediate improvements in overall per
formance, there is nevertheless good reason to move ahead.
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SECTION 5.
SHAPING THE FUTURE

The Quest
Since the first employment and training programs were implemented at
the beginning of the 1960s, there has been a continuing quest for a
"national manpower policy" and a "national manpower system." The "holy
grail" was a comprehensive and coordinated set of programs addressing both
structural and transitional labor market problems. The structural measures
would include basically preventative activities—youth jobs and preemployment services that would compensate for opportunity deficits of
minority and poor youth; programs that were basically corrective—including
intensive remedial assistance such as Job Corps, classroom and on-the-job
training, and comprehensive services for poverty areas; plus those that
were basically ameliorative—job creation for older workers and for welfare
recipients plus sheltered work for the handicapped. The measures addressed
to transitional problems would include countercyclical job creation to
absorb a significant share of the unemployed, pfus adjustment assistance to
aid the victims of mass layoffs, foreign competition ancl other dis
locations. Ideally, these elements of the manpower system would be co
ordinated with other governmental decisions and actions under a national
manpower policy. By linking with affirmative action efforts, the placement
performance of the training programs could be improved, while the availa
bility of hiring and training subsidies would provide a "carrot" to go
along with the affirmative action "stick." Training activities were
initiated as a means to provide the skilled manpower to attract firms to
depressed areas; conceptually if not operationally, they remained closely
interrelated with economic development activities. Employment and training
programs were intended as a mechansim to help public assistance recipients
achieve self-sufficiency, or at least to provide useful output to offset
the costs of income maintenance. Manpower policies were to be coordinated
with military and immigration policies to balance supply and demand in the
labor market.
The quest carried us far. Youth development activities increased
dramatically in the mid 1960s and in the late 1970s. Training efforts rose
through most of the two decades. Structural and countercyclical employment
measures expanded exponentially as part of the Carter administration's
economic stimulus package. Countercyclical job creation was established in
principle when the trigger formula was added to CETA in 1976, authorizing
funds adequate to create jobs for one-fifth of the excess unemployed above
4 percent. The Humphrey-Hawkins legislation provided a framework, pledging
the nation to combatting both structural and cyclical problems. There were
steps to link economic development activities initiated under the stimulus
package with expanding employment and training programs. Welfare reform
proposals and demonstrations were mounted, with the goal of transforming
countercyclical PSE jobs into opportunities for welfare recipients as
unemployment eased. A large-scale, experimental program was implemented,
guaranteeing part-time school-year and full-time summer jobs to al 1 poor
16- to 19- year-olds remaining in or returning to school. Expansion and
reorientation of youth programs was proposed and almost passed into law in
1980, with the aim of creating a stable and comprehensive employability
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development system. Tentative linkages were established between CETA and
the military to train for military entry and to utilize domestic military
facilities. The certification procedures of Trade Adjustment Assistance
were liberalized in the late 1970s, and adjustment programs were extended
to the lumber and airline industries, where conservation measures and
deregulation, respectively, caused dislocations. A "positive adjustment
assistance" demonstration was announced in the waning days of the Carter
administration in order to increase retraining and relocation under Trade
Adjustment Assistance.
Thus, the nation came very close to establishing a manpower system and
policy consistent with the ideals which had existed since the genesis of
employment and training programs. Yet, even as the policy measures were
being adopted and programs implemented, the consensus and resources began
to erode. Before the Reagan administration entered office with its pledge
to cut back the role of government, the Carter administration and Congress
had already reduced countercyclical public service employment, making a
sham of the trigger formula and burying any hopes of translating the
Humphrey-Hawkins full-employment bill into a meaningful commitment. The
favorable results of the youth Entitlement program were ignored, and the
brakes were applied to welfare reform. The Reagan administration quickly
finished the work, eliminating all public service employment, drastically
retrenching youth programs, wielding the meat-axe on trade adjustment
assistance, and proposing workfare rather than guaranteed jobs and training
as the direction for welfare reform. The underlying issue in the public
debate shifted from how quickly the nation could afford to implement the
remaining elements of a "national manpower policy" and a "national manpower
system," to whether we should even continue federally-funded employment and
training activities.
There are reasons for this dramatic reversal which had nothing to do
with the wisdom of the policies or programs. Employment and training
activities were one of the few controllable elements in the federal budget,
and hence, easiest to cut. Countercyclical programs were reasonably pop
ular while people were being hired, but there were few political benefits
once the opportunities were filled. The Congress which voted on appro
priations never received political credit, since the hiring decisions were
made locally, but always received the heat when local excesses were
discovered. Trade Adjustment Assistance was a promise made to buy off
opposition to tariff reductions; once these reductions had been imple
mented, the promise could be reneged. The structural portions of CETA were
concentrated in poverty areas, and increasingly targeted on the poor, and
the delivery system was isolated from the mainstream institutions, so that
the programs had limited constituencies. The conscience of the majority
was eased by the claim that a booming economy would result from reduced
government expenditures, soon creating jobs for those otherwise served in
public programs.
While these reasons largely explain the drastic retrenchment, the
shortcomings of employment and training policies and programs were also a
factor. To put it bluntly, the preventative elements did not have
demonstrable preventative impacts; many of the corrective measures were
diluted until they provided only short-term help; the countercyclical
components did fairly well in hiring during the build-up but poorly in
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transitioning and phase-down; adjustment assistance did more to compensate
for the pain associated with change than to facilitate adjustment.
Basically, all these measures became ameliorative in emphasis. This is not
to say that they had no impacts on transition, adjustment, preparation,
prevention, and career advancement, but they usually reduced to the lowest
denominator so that their long-term effects were subverted to maximize im
mediate, ameliorative impacts.
The basic lesson is that it is difficult to mix missions. When there
are dual roles, those which are most immediate and easiest to achieve will
overwhelm the others. Alleviation of symptoms is simpler than the achieve
ment of cures.
This is not to argue that symptoms should or can be ignored. Our
economy does not generate enough jobs for those at the end of the labor
queue. The shortfalls are severely felt by the young, minorities and
residents of poverty areas. It is a judgment whether job creation is
preferrable to income maintenance or to doing nothing. It is a fact,
however, that job creation efforts in the 1970s would have performed better
if not so rapidly expanded, and could have been designed and improved to
increase their transitional, preventative and preparatory impacts. But job
creation is basically an ameliorative approach. If problems are to be
cured rather than simply mitigated, it is necessary to pay much more
conscious attention to, and place more priority on, human resource develop
ment. The drastic retrenchment of job creation at this juncture makes this
shift in priorities a fait accompli. Most likely, job programs which are
now being retrenched will return to favor at some point. Yet if this
occurs, it does not mean that comprehensive manpower policies and systems
which combine job creation and human resource development missions are
appropriate. Training, education and career access activites for those at
the end of the labor queue have a different "gestalt" from job programs,
and though the measures should be closely integrated, they need separate
policies and approaches. Thus, an "active manpower policy"--the holy grail
of the last two decades for advocates of employment and training programsmust be redefined. There needs to be a new vision of what can be or should
be achieved in the future through human resource development, whatever
occurs on the job creation front.
While there are shortcomings in the design and implementation of our
human resource development efforts for persons of limited employability,
the setting in which they must operate is much to blame. The flaws in CETA
training that receive attention, and the improvements that can be made by
their correction, are minor in terms of the "big picture," even though the
larger and more critical dimensions are rarely examined and certainly not
blamed for the problems they cause: First, the distribution of public
resources violates principles of horizontal and vertical equity. Through
the secondary education level, the distribution is reasonably equitable.
There has been some progress in equalizing expenditures among the school
districts of rich and poor, minority and nonminority. Remedial activities
and those focused on special needs populations expanded rapidly (at least
until recently), helping to equalize opportunity. The major problem comes
when young people leave the secondary level. Higher education predomi
nantly serves persons of high socioeconomic status, and public expenditures
for human resource development beyond the secondary level are concentrated
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on higher education. The distribution of enrollees in two-year insti
tutions and post-secondary vocational institutions is more balanced than in
four year institutions, but the disadvantaged and less academically able
are underrepresented throughout. Public support for remedial training
efforts are meager in comparison, whether measured in aggregate dollars,
the proportion of those in need who are helped, or the intensity of
investment in any participant.
Human resource development efforts—both the mainstream components and
those targeted to the "leftovers"--must operate in a void, preparing
individuals for the labor market without specification of work require
ments, without established bridges into jobs, and without the involvement
or interest of the employer community. There are exceptions for pro
fessional occupations, such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers and
nurses, where job requirements are developed and maintained by the pro
fessional community or through licensure, but at the middle and lower
levels of the occupational structure, the requirements for jobs are rarely
specified. Employers have no incentive to work with the preparatory in
stitutions and/or to formalize entry routes unless they face shortages of
particular types of workers, but this usually occurs only at the upper ends
of the skill distribution. For most jobs, employers prefer to be left
alone with their own methods of recruiting and standards of selection. As
a result, training and education must be general rather than customized to
prepare individuals to meet specific requirements. Many who could be
trained to or already can meet the true requirements of a job are not
hired.
Because limited resources are devoted to remediation or ernployability
development for those who do not make it into higher education, these
dollars are targeted on persons by the only quantifiable and readily
available proxie of need—family income—and then spread as broadly as
possible among those who are eligible. This encourages the development of
a separate delivery system for the poor, one which has short-term objec
tives, and one which is isolated from the labor market and mainstream
institutions because it recruits high risk individuals and does not do
enough to substantially change or sort them. Within this separate system,
the major emphasis is on "dividing the pie," frequently creating separate
programs and institutions for each need group and each dimension of
employment problems. Even though the problems and groups overlap, it is
difficult to link the separate programs and institutions. There is no real
reason, for instance, other than institutional history and vested interest,
why the Employment Service and CETA should not be consolidated, or that the
WIN program for welfare recipients should be operated separately, or even
that post-secondary vocational training and CETA should not be under the
same decisionmaking framework even if operated by separate professional
systems.
Some very basic changes would be required to achieve greater equity in
public human resource development investments, to increase their payoff by
altering some of the grqundrules in the labor market, and to improve their
efficiency by eliminating institutional and vested interest barriers
between related efforts. These changes must be fundamental goals of any
human resource development policy. While there are a variety of ways to
realize these aims and almost infinite possibilities for a human resource
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development system, the following approaches are certainly among the
options which deserve consideration:
Preparing for Employment
The cornerstone of any human resource development policy is a primary
and secondary education system that, indeed, educates. While much at
tention has been devoted to the failures of education reflected in
declining reading and mathematics skills of students on standardized tests,
the reasons are relatively simple and the prospects for improvement not all
that gloomy. The crush of rapidly expanding enrollments, the breakdown of
standards for teachers and students, the proliferation of missions assigned
to the schools, and the lack of adequate alternative settings for youth not
performing well in regular classrooms, have been the major causes of
current problems. Enrollments are already declining, and there are more
teachers to choose from; the use of competency standards for students and
teachers are receiving increased emphasis; school systems are generally
returning back to the basics as resources become less plentiful; al
ternative schools operated within regular school systems or by communitybased organizations have expanded in recent years. These trends should be
accelerated so that achievement of basic competencies would be the primary
mission and focus of schools. Materials and teaching methods could and
should reflect the real world of work through career education concepts.
In recognition of the increasing propensity to combine part-time work and
education, there could be flexibility in the sequencing and scheduling of
school, including options such as shorter days, a quarter system, or more
entry and exit possibilities. Nevertheless, the "three Rs" would be
stressed during school hours so that it is assured that students who
advance and graduate have achieved the requisite competencies.
The development of "employability skills" and the provision of first
work experiences where there are no other alternatives, would be the
responsibility of a federally-supported, community-based system working
with and within the schools. This system, which would utilize as delivery
agents neighborhood based organizations, business groups, nonprofit
intermediaries, unions, vocational education agencies, the federal/state
Employment Service, and the schools themselves to provide career
counseling, occupational information, job search assistance, and placement
help to those who wanted and needed such aid. Transition services would be
guaranteed to all young people, and the progress of each youth in achieving
basic employability skills and experiences would then be tracked. Sub
sidized jobs and other developmental activities such as remedial education
and Job Corps entry training, would be targeted to young people with more
severe needs. First employment opportunities could be guaranteed to
persons from low-income families or those with severe employment handicaps
unable to find unsubsidized employment, but these jobs would be predicated
on school attendance and performance, and would be at least as demanding
as, and no more renumerative than, jobs in the private sector, so that
there would be incentives for transition. There would also be limitations
on the total hours of subsidized work. The aim would be to assure that
every youth wanting to work would have some job experience before leaving
school, along with the necessary career information, counseling and in
struction to enter the adult labor market.
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Career Investments
All persons permanently leaving the universal secondary education
system and the universal employability development system, whether grad
uating successfully or dropping out before attaining academic competencies
and employability skills, would be served by a career development (and
redevelopment) system. Each citizen would have a "career investment
account" which would provide support, as under the old GI Bill, for in
tensive remediation, career training or post-secondary education. Each
individual would receive an endowment, perhaps the equivalent of the
average tuition, room and board cost for two years of college. This endow
ment could be used to polish up the basics at the point of career entry,
for movement into a second career, or for retraining and relocation in the
case of dislocation. The endowment might be increased to reward military
service or volunteer work in VISTA, Peace Corps or a National Youth Service
program. It might also be increased for individuals adversely affected by
government decisions, such as tariff reductions and subsequently increasing
foreign trade.
The "endowment" could be used for higher education, post-secondary
vocational training in public institutions, training in certified private
sector institutions, or participation in public programs designed spe
cifically for the hard-to-employ. It could also be used to finance
mobility for career improvement. The "endowment" would be used on a
voucher basis. Each institution would charge the "full freight," would
maintain its entry and input standards, and the individual could, then,
choose among the various options. The voucher would not always involve
cash payments from the career investment account. For instance, tax
credits for college could simply be noted in the account. For guaranteed
loans the charge might be based on the default rate and administrative
costs or the subsidy costs for below-rnarket interest rates.
The single account approach would, thus, subsume a variety of separate
aid programs including college tax credits, Basic Equal Opportunity Grants,
much of the aid to post-secondary vocational education, readjustment
benefits, remedial training activites, and perhaps Gl-bill benefits (if
there is a return to the old Gl-bill approach for veterans). The net cost
of such a system for society is not the sum of the endowments which are
used, but rather the increased career training and education which would
occur for those who want to but are not now able to acquire training. The
account would equitably redistribute public expenditures among individuals
of different income levels. Some now receiving more than a fair share of
public funds would be capped at the endowment level. Any public aid beyond
the endowment period would be conditioned on later service contributions
such as doctors serving in the military or the Public Health Service, or
would be loans repayable at market rates, perhaps through the tax struc
ture. Rich and poor would, then, receive equal support from the same
system. Career training and preparation would be provided not on the basis
of a need determination, but as a right. The disadvantaged could use their
endowment in the same way and in the same institutions as the nondisadvantaged, if they could qualify, or else could use them to secure remedial
assistance.
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The career development system would serve a brokering function. Its
purposes would include outreaching to assure that those with special
problems utilized their endowments, helping individuals to make the right
career investment choices, monitoring to protect against misuse of
vouchers, providing mechanisms to facilitate mobility, certifying the
quality of education and training institutions, and developing institutions
to fill local needs where voids exist (although these would have to become
This brokering
self-supporting through the vouchers of participants).
system would be forged by the realignment of currently separate but very
much related activities—the federal/state Employment Service, CETA, WIN,
veterans retraining services, post-secondary vocational education, vo
cational rehabilitation, and the apprenticeship system. All the separate
delivery systems already have pyramidal decisionmaking structures, but the
decisionmaking levels and authorities vary widely so that coordination is
difficult. The systems would not necessarily be merged, but the decision
points and responsibilities would be made parallel. Federal funds for each
purpose, subject to whatever strings are attached, would be channeled to
states and then to area "Career Investment Brokering Agencies" (CIBAs)
which would have allocation, planning and oversight responsibilities within
each separate category, subject to state and federal review. The CIBAs
would be the same for all these activities. The CIBAs might be juris
dictions of a minimum size, consortia of jurisdictions, or substate
The minimum unit would probably have to be larger than the
districts.
existing cutoff for prime sponsors, since increasing administrative burdens
and declining funding levels have made this system uneconomical as well as
difficult to manage.
The realignment, alone, would solve some problems, but of more im
There could be a
portance, it would facilitate other needed changes.
single advisory council for career development and redevelopment activi
ties, perhaps with subcommittees for each specific focus area. Reporting
nomenclature, funding schedules and decisionmaking procedures could be
gradually standardized. The basic benefits for career investments would
all be noted in the same account system so that it would be possible to
keep track of the expenditures from different sources for each individual.
The lines of responsibility—which have become blurred in practice
under most federal grants in aid--could be clarified so that the federal
government would monitor the states and the states would monitor the local
agencies, and they, in turn, would have responsibility for monitoring any
subgrantees. Nationally-run programs would consist only of those involving
multi-state target populations, necessarily involving mobility and resi
dential support. Likewise, state managed programs would be those drawing
from several CIBAs, rather than simply augmenting local activities.
The ultimate aim of these realignments is a one-stop, comprehensive,
Any in
full-services approach for all career investment activities.
dividual needing help in preparing for career entry or reentry could turn
to a one-stop agency that would have access to all available institutions
and services. They would be provided by right as long as the individual
had a balance in his or her account. The full-services at the one-stop
center would include brokering of opportunities available outside the area
but allocated to its residents, both those developed by states and those
developed by national funding to promote interstate mobility. The military
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would be another option, and the one-stop agent could help the individual
to make his or her choice in light of a full range of options by providing
independent counsel and ombudsmanship relative to the military career.
Incentives for the Private Sector
This universal career investment approach would help to make human
resource development efforts more equitable. The use of voucher and
one-stop treatment approaches would help to integrate efforts for the disadvantaged and mainstream human resource development activities. Yet
ultimately, these measures would still be limited without steps to in
fluence the demand side of the equation--i.e., the labor market setting in
which this system and its participants must function. Traditionally,
emphasis has been restricted to the supply side. With the exception of
limited affirmative action efforts and tax credits for hiring the disadvantaged and welfare recipients, labor market processes and their results
have been accepted as a given, with public policy seeking to adapt in
dividuals and treatment strategies to these realities.
Competitive markets are best left alone unless there is a compelling
reason for intervention. One such reason is when the costs and benefits to
decisionmaking units in a market do not reflect the costs and benefits to
society. This is clearly the case in private sector decisions about
training investments. As long as the education system turns out an excess
supply of highly (perhaps overly) educated workers and the public picks up
the tab, firms will take advantage of this system and avoid their own
training. If each firm had to pay for the education of each college
graduate it hired, they would certainly cut back on the number of graduates
hired as well as the course requirements and costs. Likewise, investments
in worker training by individual firms may not be profitable because, with
our highly mobile workforce, the benefits may be captured by another
employer willing to pay a few dollars more to the employee. One way to
overcome these disincentives is an employer tax covering some of the costs
of preparatory activities now provided as "free goods," combined with an
offset where firms provide their own training or worker educational bene
fits. A "career investment tax" on the wage bill could be used to cover at
least part of the cost of career investment endowments. Employers with
their own training programs, or participating in cooperation with public
programs, could receive credit against the tax. Associations could pool
resources and establish training programs. Employers who did not train
would simply have to pay the tax. Penalties might also be invoked for
relocating firms not offering retraining and relocation benefits or ad
vanced warning to their previous employees; the individual accounts of
affected workers would then be credited so that they would have the means
for retraining and relocation. A training tax could be incorporated into
and managed by the Social Security system. In other words, employers and
employees would pay for some of the costs of career preparation and re
training in addition to unemployment, disability, illness and retirement.
The apprenticeship approach might be fostered by granting a lower
career investment tax rate or "experience rating" to firms willing to
register positions with a federal/state apprenticeship system. Partici
pating employers would articulate the competencies required for the jobs as

344

well as the training needed to achieve these competencies, would set the
standards and monitor the training for registered jobs, and would then
recognize the credential for completers of approved programs. The stand
ards would be utilized in training activities financed through the career
investment system. Trainees would, then, be provided skills specifically
required by employers rather than receiving extraneous training. The
requirements would be known by trainees and training institutions, so the
performance of both could be monitored. Most importantly, the certifica
tion of completion would be recognized in the labor market.
Ideals and Realities
In a period when budgets are being slashed for all social programs and
when taxes, particularly added payroll taxes, are anathema, it may appear
naive to even hint at the possibility of a comprehensive employability
development system, an individual entitlement to human resource invest
ments, a training tax on employers or an expanded apprenticeship system.
Yet there are several reasons to believe that these notions are not as
unlikely as they may appear today. Moreover, as long as these options are
not totally implausible, and as long as they provide the appropriate
guidance for incremental policy decisions, it is not necessary to believe
that they are probable long-term developments.
A comprehensive employability development system is realizable.
Schools have never devoted substantial resources to counseling, guidance,
or placement, and are now retrenching in this area, so that they would
welcome outside support. More and more, these activities have become the
domain of CETA-funded efforts. The Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot
Projects experiment has proved that part-time school-year and full-time
summer jobs could be guaranteed to all low income youth in school or
returning to school with a pricetag of less than $2 billion if the minimum
wage were paid for all hours of participation. 24/ If the wages were lower
and the total hours of participation were restricted to assure only first
employment experiences, it would be possible to reach a broader group of
youth, probably including most of those with below average family incomes.
Transition services could be implemented at a relatively low cost. A
developmental system which could reach into the schools and serve all
youth, utilizing an individualized competency assessment and achievement
measurement system, has already been tested in a variety of settings under
the Consolidated Youth Employment Program demonstration. In other words, a
comprehensive youth developmental system is completely feasible, its
elements well-tested and its pricetag not overwhelming if viewed as a goal
for a decade in the future when there will be fewer youths.
The concept of separate universal systems for education and employa
bility development, with schools concentrating on academic basics and
community-based and employer-linked local agencies concentrating on
employability skills, is certainly acceptable as an ideal. The two-year
review of youth employment problems by the Vice President's Task Force on
Youth Employment under the Carter administration, which included an ex
haustive effort to assess all empirical evidence but also to give fair
hearing to all perspectives and interests, reached the conclusion this was
the direction to move. The proposed Youth Act of 1980 which embodied this
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approach enjoyed bipartisan support although it was not enacted. 25/ The
Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects component of YEDPA, which tested
performance-conditioned job guarantees for poor students, emerged from the
Republican side of the aisle. Budget stringencies may have postponed the
implementation of these approaches and the realization of a comprehensive
employability development system, but there was broad consensus about the
directions of change even if resources were considered inadequate at the
beginning of the 1980s to move forward.
By the same token the entitlement to a minimum level of career
training and assistance does not necessarily mean a massive expansion of
governmental activity. To a large extent, the investment account would be
another way of paying for or simply keeping track of activities that occur
already through tax credits, subsidies to colleges, Basic Equal Opportunity
Grants and manpower programs. Not all of those who are eligible to receive
benefits will utilize them. By the time such a system is implemented, the
labor market at the entry level should be tighter, so that fewer would
choose a training alternative because of the dearth of work options. If
the long-term increase in the portion of the population enrolled in postsecondary activities continues, a larger share will already be partici
pating when the endowment is implemented so there will be less incremental
expansion. The endowment can be financed because the declining numbers of
career entrants should substantially offset the incremental proportion
provided education and training under this approach. Thus, the total
enrollments and expenditures for career training and education may not be
substantially larger as a percent of the work force or national income than
they are today.
Entitlement or endowment notions are hardly foreign. Each citizen has
an endowment for a primary and secondary education (and, in fact, is not
even free to choose whether to use it). Since longer education and
training are necessary to function in an increasingly complex society, it
would make sense to extend this approach to the post-secondary level, as
some states have essentially done with subsidized higher education. The
voucher and individual account approaches are certainly plausible. The GI
Bill—one of the most popular human resource investment programs in our
nation's history--has tracked a fairly large portion of the adult popu
lation under its entitlement system. Currently, service agencies collect
and retain detailed case files on individuals. For instance, CETA is
required to track services received over a five year period even if
individuals move from one jurisdiction to another. Social Security and
military registration are a fact of life, and sooner or later it is likely
that more foolproof citizenship and work certificates will be established.
An individual account, as opposed to numerous overlapping record systems,
would be no more of an infringement than social security retirement benefit
records, and equal protections could be built into the system.
The voucher and account notions force recognition that choice should
be maximized for all individuals. Institutional and vested interests are
intertwined with those of participants and, all too frequently, those being
served become captives of delivery institutions. A crucial question is
whether the individual, if provided the same resources and information
about the options, would make the same choices, and, in particular, whether
the disadvantaged would continue to use separate institutions or whether
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they would choose to enter the mainstream. The voucher approach forces the
question, and could be a useful supplement to, if not substitute for, the
service system which now exists for the poor.
Whether a human resource investment system is accepted, realignment of
separate programs and approaches makes sense. Attempts to force cooper
ation between CETA, the Employment Service, WIN and vocational education
through overlapping councils, reviews, sign-offs and set-asides have gone
about as far as they can where the decisionmaking structures are so much
out of alignment, and plans are evolved separately on the basis of distinct
thought patterns and nomenclatures. The ideals of comprehensive and co
ordinated administration, common terminology and one-stop, full services,
are important if they restrain fissiparous tendencies of separate programs
and provide direction and discipline for incremental movement towards their
integration. Likewise, the notion that federal, state, and local responsi
bilities should be reconstituted so that states provide options that
localities cannot, while the federal government provides opportunities for
residents of all states, can help to cut through the current confusion of
roles and responsibilities. Instead of providing options for mobility,
training and jobs which are not available locally, both the states and the
"feds" fund local activities in addition to but rarely coordinated with
those developed by local decisionmakers. Local decisionmakers are con
strained to planning for local labor markets and in light of available
local institutions. The dollars are channeled where the opportunities are
least. While Job Corps is a notable exception, providing for mobility and
for intensive training not offered locally, it is not integrated with the
local systems so that the youths who most need this type of assistance are
not always the ones who enroll. These problems need to be addressed
whether the career investment account approach is adopted.
The realignment of all the currently separate human resource invest
ment programs into a uniform and comprehensive system will be a nightmarish
process. Yet the Reagan administration is clearly in favor of the con
solidation of like programs and the provision of increased authorities to
states. There is likely to be some action on this front even if the career
endowment and employer tax notions are not accepted. The reauthorization
of vocational education and CETA at the same time, and the continuing
discussion of Employment Service reform, and the diminutive size of WIN,
offer immediate possibilities for such realignments. The restoration of GI
Bill benefits is under discussion and this might be easily integrated into
a comprehensive system. Finally, the trade adjustment problem will not
disappear because budget cutters have decided that benefits are no longer
owed to those affected by past policies. New trade issues will arise,
workers will again have to be "bought off," and the proposed account
system, coupled with extended unemployment insurance during the training or
relocation period, would be an expedient approach.
The one-stop, full-services approach is hardly a new concept. It
occurs today under vocational rehabilitation. The vocational rehabili
tation specialist is the broker for medical and training services which may
be arranged or purchased from an account for each individual. The
Veterans' Administration also provides help in some cases on a "fullservices" basis, particularly for disabled veterans; it arranges for the
various types of assistance for which the veteran is eligible by right.
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Some state and local prime sponsors have made progress in integrating
services under CETA, the federal/state Employment Service and vocational
rehabilitation. Given encouragement, this trend could easily accelerate.
Finally, the now "radical" notions of a career investment tax and a
substantially-expanded and legislatively-supported apprenticeship system
are not unforeseeable. The employer tax assumes that the economy will need
trained entry-level workers, both because of the reduced supply of entrants
and the increased skill requirements. If labor market conditons force
employers to do training anyway, and if those who invest find their workers
pirated away by other firms, they would have nothing to lose and something
to gain from such a tax. The tax need not and will not cover the full
costs of the career investments, because there are broader societal
benefits. Moreover, the scheme might be introduced as payroll taxes are
eased through general revenue tax financing of the redistributive aspects
of Social Security, or as unemployment declines so that unemployment
insurance taxes fall. To soften the blow, state unemployment insurance
debts to the federal trust fund might be forgiven, thus substituting
training taxes for the increases in unemployment insurance taxes needed to
pay back advances to states from the federal government. This is not to
argue that it will ever be easy to sell new taxes and a new approach, and
certainly not to suggest that it will be costless. The basic purpose of
the career investment account is to assure increased training investments
for persons who would otherwise be excluded. These extra resources could
be provided exclusively from general revenues. The reason to favor payroll
tax support for some of the costs is to provide incentives for the private
sector to do more training itself and to get more involved with public
efforts.
The idea of an expanded apprenticeship system, where employers
articulate job requirements and the training needed to meet these require
ments, thereby formalizing career entry ladders, has been much more widely
accepted in other industrialized nations, particularly when they faced a
shortage of entry workers as our nation will in the coming years. Our
nation's apprenticeship system, with under 300,000 registered apprentices,
covers a far smaller portion of total employment and far fewer occupations
than the systems in most of the European nations. There are now no
financial incentives for cooperation by employers. It is not unlikely,
therefore, that the emerging shortage of entry workers, combined with
financial incentives, will increase employer interest in the apprenticeship
approach.
Debate over a career investment tax and a national apprenticeship
system might be helpful as a way to demonstrate that supply side efforts,
no matter how well designed, are limited unless the demand side is also
leveraged. Training programs which concentrate on those who are least
employable will not succeed in more than marginal reordering of positions
at the end of the labor queue unless the unsubsidized sector—private,
public and nonprofit—feels that it is in its best interest to train to
meet needs rather than to hire already qualified or overly qualified
workers, and unless employers consider it in their best interests to work
with public institutions. The private sector must now be approached with
subsidy bribes and appeals to corporate conscience in an effort to convince
them that the workers provided through the employment and training system
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are as good as others even though they have "high risk" characteristics and
would normally be shunned. All too often, employers turn away from these
appeals by disparaging the training or the red tape that goes with the
bribes, simply because they do not believe they have a risk-taking or
training mission, and no need to accept one when there are plenty of
low-risk applicants available. The threat of a tax might, in itself,
generate more active efforts by the employer community. This was the case
in Germany when a training tax was legislated but never implemented because
employers voluntarily increased their involvement in the apprenticeship
system. At the very least, public debate and private sector opposition
would reveal the dearth of formal training in the private sector and would
dispel the claim that vaguely defined "private sector alternatives" can
replace public programs. If nothing else, it would force greater recogni
tion of the fact that the disadvantaged, and the institutions that serve
them, do not, alone, bear the blame for their problems.
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SECTION 6.
NEXT STEPS

The appropriate short-term goals are much more straightforward and far
less controversial. The weight of evidence documents the need for sig
nificant reorientations of our nation's manpower programs and policies for
persons of limited employability. Training deserves more emphasis, and
subsidized jobs should be combined with and lead into remediation, serving
as a mechanisn to identify those with potential for longer-term training.
On-the-job training rules need to be changed to make the approach more
marketable but also to facilitate OJT participation by the more disadvantaged. The duration of training should be increased through the
addition of a second tier of long-term training activities which provide
the opportunities for "quantum leaps" in employment status. These second
tier activities must be integrated with shorter-duration, first-tier work
and training efforts which are now the primary focus of CEfA. Performance
in these base level activities should be used to determine potential for
advanced training so that the advanced opportunities encourage better
performance. Placement must be emphasized, with greater concern for the
career potential and training-relatedness of the jobs, particularly where
more intensive investments are made in participants. Mechanisms must be
developed to facilitate the movement of individuals from geographic areas
of severe need to areas where employment and training opportunities are
more promising. Finally, the training system must be stabilized, with
increased focus on qualitative, rather than quantitative, dimensions, and
with greater use of competency-based education, vocational training and
employability skills development.
Such reorientations, while achievable with only modest legislative and
administrative changes, would have far-reaching implications. They would
make the employment and training system for the disadvantaged more like the
mainstream preparatory institutions, with increased emphasis on individual
performance standards and more sorting of the "winners" from the "losers."
Income maintenance objectives would be downplayed, and incentives initiated
to reward participant performance. More intensive assistance would mean
that fewer individuals could be served. Priority would have to shift from
the ameliorative, job creation oriented approach of current programs to a
stable and continuing focus on structural problems. The issues raised by
these changes cannot be resolved by facts and figures alone, but rest on
normative and political judgments. Resolution will require continuing
discussion. Yet the available evidence suggests the importance of main
stream precepts, the problems of current income maintenance approaches; and
the payoffs of greater resource concentration.
While decisions on next steps should certainly consider long-term
goals, no consensus exists today, and, indeed, the public discussion has
hardly begun. The only agreement seems to be on what not to do. The long
standing ideal of a national manpower policy which would include both
structural and countercyclical components has been undermined by the
evidence of severe operational and political problems in rapid job
creation, and, even more tellingly, by the evidence that job creation and
meaningful training rarely go hand-in-hand. But a new consensus has not
yet emerged, and options such as a comprehensive employability development
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system to assure basic skills for entrants into the adult work force, a
Gl-bill voucher approach to assure equitable and effective career in
vestments, a dramatic expansion of the apprenticeship system in order to
better identify the competencies and training necessary for career entry,
and tax incentives for the private sector to invest in training, have, to
date, received little attention or analysis. Whether one agrees with the
political feasibility of these notions or in the desirability of such
comprehensive reform in human resource development approaches, however,
these long-term proposals are reasonable navigational aids for next steps,
suggesting the need to more equally distribute public human resource
investments, to focus them more towards the end of the labor queue where
the payoff will increase in the next two decades, to move from a separate
needs-based delivery system to one integrated into the mainstream, to
improve the career entry process so that there is less waste and greater
equity, and to foster the involvement of the private sector.
The best means to achieve these ends are debatable. Judgments must be
based on what we know from abstract analysis of impact patterns, benefitcost computations and labor market theories, as well as from nuts and bolts
assessments of decisionrnaking and delivery patterns. The following recom
mendations, while necessarily judgmental, are strongly supported by both
the theoretical and applied analyses. These steps would achieve the
desired improvements in the current system, without major discontinuities
or drastically expanded resource requirements, by modifying the service
components, utilizing self-enforcing mechanisms and incentives to improve
performance, expanding second-tier, longer-duration training activities
locally, and gradually implementing an array of state and career training
activities providing mobility options.
An Emphasis on Training
Training should be a mandated element of work experience activities.
The 1978 requirement for training under Title IID public service employment
was straightforward and resulted in increased use of PSE as a training
vehicle. The regulations for work experience, career employment experience
under youth programs and summer youth employment activities call for
enrichment of work with education, training and transition services, but
they do not set any targets. Whether structural PSE is restored, its
set-aside approach for training should be adopted, and the training
activities under work programs should be tracked in the management
information system, as is now done in the case of PSE training. Hours of
unstipended paper and pencil as well as computer-assisted instruction might
be made a standard part of the workweek for in-school, summer, out-ofschool youth and adult work experience programs. Another approach is to
structure work projects as training. One tested model is the Ventures in
Community Improvement program, which mounted large-scale, carefully
organized restoration projects utilizing union supervisors, linkages to
apprenticeship, measurements of competency acquisition, graduated work
tasks, and performance requirements for participants so that work and
training were synonymous. Similar work projects might be structured to
provide training in other occupations.
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On-the-job training regulations should be modified to provide for a
"try-out" employment approach. Currently, an employer under OJT must hire
an individual without being able to discern whether the person can be
trained to meet requirements. In other words, the subsidy must cover the
training costs and lower productivity, but also the hiring risks. As a
result, employers are reluctant to participate in OJT unless provided
workers with previous experience in the same fields or those who are good
bets. An alternative would be to allow a three-month or six-month "tryout" period, during which the CETA prime sponsor would pay allowances to
the trainee placed in the private sector. At the end of this "try-out,"
the employer would make a hiring decision. Based on the participant's
remaining deficits at the end of the try-out, an "OJT-extended" contract
could be negotiated to cover any further training. Alternatively, the
employer might be eligible for the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit at this point
(assuming it remains in effect), after certification that such an incentive
would be warranted. This try-out approach would be attractive to employers
because they could size up the participant before a permanent hiring
decision. But it would also allow the prime sponsor to better judge the
ability of the individual to perform the specific job and to determine
training needs. Individuals participating in the "try-out" phase could be
offered remedial services and assistance. It would be possible to take
somewhat greater risks, i.e., matching more disadvantaged individuals with
any given job. Few really disadvantaged would be productive during a short
training period, so that there would not be a windfall to employers.
OJT is allowable but rarely used in the public and nonprofit sectors
because of the availability of PSE and work experience subsidies covering
the full costs of hiring. Given the evidence that PSE or work experience
increase post-program earnings primarily when they function as try-out
mechanisms in the public sector, it would be useful to formalize this
dimension, permitting try-out employment for unsubsidized jobs in the
public and nonprofit sectors under the same rules as in the private sector.
If a tax credit were provided for subsequent training to the private sector
employer, a similar payment might be made to the nonprofit or public agency
to encourage permanent hiring, or else an extended OJT contract could be
negotiated. As in the private sector, this would permit employers with
"real" jobs to take a risk on individuals more disadvantaged than those
usually hired. This approach could also be usefully linked to counter
cyclical revenue sharing rather than mounting a separate CETA job creation
effort when stimulus is next needed.
Adding Second-Tier Opportunities
New classifications for local training activities should be es
tablished in the federal regulations and the management information system
so that long-duration training can be identified, properly budgeted, and
emphasized. It is necessary to clearly define and accurately measure an
activity before it can be encouraged, and there is no recording of length
of training in local programs. A quite simple approach is to divide what
is now labeled as "classroom training" into more refined categories.
"Career Training" would be primarily occupational in focus, with a planned
duration of at least 1000 hours. "Career Preparation" would be primarily
educational in focus, and also planned to last over 1000 hours. "Entry
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Training" would be primarily occupational, and "Basic Skills" primarily
educational, with both planned to last less than 1000 hours. Expenditure,
outcome, and participant data would all be divided according to these cate
gories. Likewise, plans and goals would be identified separately for these
activities.
Minimum requirements could, then, be established for local Career
Training, Career Preparation, and On-the-Job (Try-out and Extended)
Training. In the review and approval process for local plans, there might
be targets for these activities developed either by regression analysis of
prime sponsor data in order to allow for participant mix and local economic
variation or by averaging the level for all prime sponsors and using this
as a guideline. Another approach would be to legislate a set-aside out of
the funds provided by formula so that this proportion could only be used
for these longer career training interventions. If the set-aside were not
spent locally, the resources would be part of the reallocations used for
state-level programs or nationally-directed Career Training and Career
Preparation activities.
State supplemental vocational education set-asides should be reserved
for Career Training and Preparation activities, i.e., long-term training
and remediation expected to significantly and permanently improve empi oyability. Prime sponsors would compete for these state funds to provide
training to local residents, perhaps matching from their formula allo
cations. The state could establish its own programs to serve residents of
balance-of-state areas and of local jurisdictions unable to mount ac
ceptable programs, or else it would buy slots from the prime sponsors with
exemplary programs and arrange for the mobility and residential support.
The result would be an in-state program, very much like STIP, but with
mobility features. The projects would be funded on a two-year cycle. Such
activities would have first priority in any reallocation of resources
provided by formula to prime sponsors within the state.
Advanced Career Training programs in Job Corps should be expanded and
diversified. For each general occupational area of training in Job Corps,
there should be at least one advanced training component which would draw
from centers throughout the nation those trainees who wanted to continue
their career preparation and had demonstrated the capacity and maturity.
These advanced courses would focus on expanding career areas in each
occupation. The Job Corps post-secondary and college program should also
be continued, and its opportunities more equitably distributed rather than
drawing disproportionately from a few centers. A reasonable target would
be to expand advanced training options to one-third of slots in Job Corps
which, because of their much longer duration of stay, would serve about
one-fifth of participants.
Corporate Career training programs of up to two years duration would
be implemented under national direction to provide intensive, fullysubsidized, classroom instruction and internships in programs operated or
directed by corporations and employer associations guaranteeing unsubsidized employment in jobs with career potential for all those completing
the training. The participants would be carefully screened from local CETA
programs to identify those who could make it with assistance but who would
have little chance without it. The opportunities would be restricted to
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persons from disadvantaged backgrounds (not just those eligible in the six
months before application) who had proved themselves in education and
training activities. The occupations of training would have a minimum
annual starting salary of half the mean earnings of year-round, full-time
male workers (the equivalent of roughly $10,000 in 1980). The jobs would
have to have documented career progressions beyond the entry level. The
institutional training would be in established corporate or association
facilities, or in programs established jointly with public institutions.
The internships would be provided by the sponsoring corporation or
association members, and would be carefully integrated with the classroom
instruction.
It is recognized that only a limited number of large corporations or
associations have established training centers or would be willing to
create such centers, and not all of these would be willing to guarantee
career entry jobs for disadvantaged participants even if they could assure
the quality of training and even if the costs would be fully covered. The
programs would have to be developed on a case-by-case basis with the aim of
building up gradually to and then maintaining a permanent capacity. The
goal would be to provide, on a continuing basis, roughly 10,000 career
entry opportunities annually.
Forging the Elements Into a System
Work experience is, according to present regulations, restricted to
persons with no previous experience, those reentering the labor force or
those in special need of a supportive work environment. A periodic review
of status is required in order to encourage the transfer of participants
into other activities or private sector employment as rapidly as possible.
This does not usually occur. Average stay in work experience was slightly
longer in 1980 than in 1976. 26/ The sequencing of activities, i.e., work
followed by OJT or classroom training, is all too infrequent. The most
straightforward approach would be to limit the work experience for any
individual to 500 hours, or roughly three months of full-time employment,
two years of summer employment, or one year of summer and part-time school
year employment. Job search assistance would be required for all par
ticipants at the end of this period. Successful completers of work
experience who had participated effectively in job search assistance, but
were unable to find unsubsidized employment, would be given priority in
local training activities.
Income maintenance and wage policies should be designed to encourage
entry into unsubsidized employment and successful performance in employment
and training activities. Particularly in the summer youth employment
program, compensation should be reduced. The aim should be to serve those
young people who have no other options and to provide them a first ex
perience so that they can find unsubsidized jobs. There is no doubt that
the program now serves a disadvantaged group, but it probably draws from
the front of the queue among those eligible and does not encourage tran
sition because the minimum wage is higher than what most could earn in the
private sector (three-fifths of 14- and 15-year-olds who worked in the
private sector earned less than the minimum wage in 1979, while partici
pants this age—representing 45 percent of summer enrollments--were all
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paid the minimum wage). 27'/ It is no wonder that teenagers are anxious to
come back one summer after another. Perhaps the easiest approach, as
suggested previously, is to require summer enrol lees to spend a day a week
or the equivalent in mandatory but unstipended instruction, and the re
mainder of time in minimum wage work. Incentive payments might be used for
those achieving milestones in the instructional program. This would avoid
confrontation over the subminimum wage issue by providing the minimum
during work hours but a lower hourly reimbursement for the full period of
participation. This same approach could be used for in-school work ex
perience.
The allowance under local training programs should be reconstituted
into three components providing for maintenance, participation expenses,
and performance incentives. The maintenance allowances would cover the
poverty deficits, i.e., the differences between family income (including
the cash value of food stamps) and the higher of the poverty level or 70
percent of the lower living standard, not to exceed the hours of partici
pation multiplied by the minimum wage. Participation expenses would be
determined on an individual basis to reimburse demonstrable expenses.
Performance incentives would be designed locally and might reward length of
stay, completion, and self-placement. These incentives would be limited to
one-fourth the hours of participation times the minimum wage. A best guess
is that the substitution of this allowance approach for current policies
would reduce the average costs of local classroom training by 10 to 15
percent.
OJT opportunities should be targeted primarily for successful par
ticipants in other components. First priority in assignment should be
given to successful completers of local Career Training and Career
Preparation to assure a payoff from this large investment. The assignments
should be commensurate with the vocational skills which have been learned
and the competencies which have been attained. Second priority in assign
ment would be given to successful participants in shorter-term training,
work experience, and other local activities.
Prime sponsors should be utilized as recruiting, referral, and place
ment agents for Job Corps. Each could be provided a quota of Job Corps
opportunities and could receive credit for referral into Job Corps, but
would also have the responsibility for placing residents upon their return.
Job Corps would have an advance warning system to notify prime sponsors
instantaneously in the case of early termination and prior to planned
graduation for completers. In case of relocation to another area, place
ment would be the responsibility of the recipient prime sponsor, with
reimbursement by Job Corps, unless Job Corps contracted with a union or
other placement agent. Job Corps would, thus, be integrated with the
comprehensive local systems even though managed at the federal level.
Advanced Career Training (ACT) in Job Corps, Corporate Career and
state-directed Career Training and Preparation programs must also be
integrated with first-tier activities. Each entrant into Job Corps is now
provided a catalogue of centers which includes a description of the entry
training available at each. When a full portfolio of ACT offerings are
developed, these should also be presented in a catalogue specifying the
entry requirements and probabilities for each offering and detailing the
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expected performance in and outcomes from training. Presentation of these
options should be a required element of entry orientation and of counseling
upon completion of basic reading and mathematics or entry vocational
training in local programs.
Each prime sponsor should be provided an allocation of opportunities
for state-directed advanced training programs and nationally-funded
Corporate Career slots. In each case, the entry and training requirements
would be specified in detail. The prime sponsors would, then, identify
local participants willing and able to leave to complete advanced training.
This catalogue approach and allocation of slots according to need would
assure all individuals an equal chance at "quantum leap" opportunities.
With the shrinking size of CETA, it makes sense to consolidate local
programs. The preferred approach is a bifurcated system with a set of
youth developmental activities preparing young people up to the point of
readiness for career training or entry, and an adult system which provides
the career training and career entry activities. This was the approach
recommended in the proposed Youth Act of 1980 and it makes a good deal of
sense. For most youth, teen problems do not presage permanent diffi
culties.
Teenagers gradually increase work activities, gaining the
experience and competencies for career entry, so that unemployment rates
fall rapidly by their early 20s. However, the teen problems would be
reduced, and the career chances improved, if transitional assistance were
available to better guide the process. The disadvantaged and minorities do
not have the same opportunities and their progress towards career entry
lags. They need first work experiences, a helping hand along the way, and
exposure to career options—in other words, short-term assistance sequenced
over these difficult years—if they are to enter the career job market
without handicaps. Intensive remediation or training in a single episode
is not appropriate until the youth has some maturity, commitment, and sense
of direction. Thus, the proposals for the Youth Act included a detailed
system for benchmarking competency development and maturation, and for
arranging a sequence of short-duration services over the teen years as
determined by individual needs and patterns of development. This youth
system would use experiences in summer and in-school work programs, among
other things, to make a determination of the readiness for career entry and
career training. The youth developmental system would, thus, serve as a
feeder into the adult, career-oriented system.
Limited services such as job search assistance, testing and guidance,
basic life skills training, and remedial education should be used to
identify those in need of more help, rather than operating in many cases as
separate treatments. These services, if unstipended, all have low costs
and might be expanded even with current budget stringencies. Inexpensive
minicomputer terminal networks or microcomputers can be used to deliver
short-duration
assessment, world-of-work
instruction,
occupational
information and remedial education to anyone who needs such services. The
networks and terminals are a way to link with all delivery agencies,
particularly the schools. Job search assistance, in-school employability
services delivered by specially-created nonprofit intermediaries, and
pre-employment services for out-of-school youth and adults, have proved
effective in diverting individuals from the use of intensive training that
is not needed or for which they are not ready. Significantly expanded and
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formalized transition services should be offered without eligibility
requirements other than the need for and interest in help, and should
identify those who need more assistance so that they can be channeled into
first-tier activities in either the youth or adult systems.
Increasing Placement Results
A crucial element of the "try-out" OJT approach would be a "ruleof-two"--n_o position could be refilled more than twice without a permanent
This would encourage placement and would be a self-enforcing
hire.
If individuals were assigned to menial jobs lacking oppor
mechanism.
tunity, they would be likely to terminate without placement and the
positions could not, then, be refilled. There would be iteration towards a
portfolio of try-out assignments attractive to participants. On the other
hand, the employers could not "try out" endless numbers of participants
Such a protective mechanism is
simply to secure subsidized employees.
particularly important if the try-out approach is used in the public and
nonprofit sectors, where work experience slots have often been used over
and over without a transition into permanent employment.
To further encourage placement, employers making a permanent hire
would be eligible for extended OJT negotiated at the end of the try-out
period based on an assessment of the individual's performance and remaining
deficits. It would also be useful to continue a variation of the Targeted
Jobs Tax Credit, but this should be restricted to employers hiring completers of Career Training, Career Preparation, Job Corps or Try-Out OJT,
and should be based on a determination by the prime sponsor that the
employer is taking an extra risk or will incur extra training costs in
hiring the participant.
Under the second-tier efforts—Corporate Career, Career Training and
Career Preparation activities, and Job Corps Advanced Career Trainingthere would be self-enforcing mechanisms to assure training-related place
ments for all completers. The Corporate Career program would involve a
guarantee from the sponsoring corporations or employer associations that
everyone successfully finishing the fully subsidized period of classroom
training and internship would be provided a training-related job by the
corporation or association at a guaranteed minimum salary level. For state
and local Career Training and Preparation, there would be a requirement for
the placement of three of four completers in jobs utilizing the acquired
skills or competencies before a new contract or new class could be
initiated. This requirement, combined with the priority under try-out OJT
given to completers of such long-term training and preparation, would
encourage placement efforts prior to the completion of training. In Job
Corps, the operators of Advanced Career Training would be responsible for
The placement of three in four completers in
placement activities.
training-related jobs would also be required. The tax credit and try-out
OJT approaches would be authorized also for these completers.
To assure placement from first-tier activities, the performance system
would emphasize unsubsidized placement above all other goals. Placements,
thus, need to be recorded by activity, with further designation as to
whether they are training- or work experience-related. The local allo-
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cation formula might be modified to provide 10 percent added funds to prime
sponsors exceeding their expected (based on regression analysis) placement
rate. Lowest performers would be precluded from competing for state Career
Training and Career Preparation grants (although residents would still be
served in programs operated by the state or in other jurisdictions funded
by the states, as well as in national advanced training programs).
For school-age teenagers, placement is not usually an appropriate
outcome. If youth who are not yet ready for the full-time labor market are
included in the data system, they will obscure the placement results and
reduce the possible leverage of performance monitoring efforts and in
centives. Alternatively, pressure for placement might result in fewer
teenagers being served. The bifurcation of local delivery systems into a
youth developmental system and an adult career entry and training system
would solve this problem. The "sticks and carrots" for placement would
primarily be applied to the career system, whereas the youth activities
would emphasize the development over time of the basic competencies needed
before entry into the full-time labor market. If the bifurcated approach
is not adopted, youth for whom placement is not an expected or desired
outcome should be designated in a special category so that they are not
included in the calculation of the placement rate.
Job search assistance should be an exit service in all components.
The evidence indicates that the employment rates of both youth and adults
can be increased by job-finding help. A strong argument can also be made
for bonus payments to participants who secure their own jobs and stay in
them for some period, say three months. The incentive component of the
reconstituted allowance formula could be used to provide such bonuses.
Mobility Options
The Career Training and Career Preparation activities funded with
state vocational education resources would provide for mobility. The
grants would be competitively distributed, but the opportunities for
participation would be allocated according to need. Thus, prime sponsors
without local Career Training and Preparation activities, as well as the
balance-of-state areas, would be allocated a number of slots in the
state-operated programs or in the state-funded activities of other prime
sponsors. The advanced programs would include funds for mobility and
residential support. The first priority for formula allocated resources
not spent by prime sponsors within a given state would be the expansion of
advanced opportunities so that individuals from these underspending areas
could be provided Career Training and Preparation elsewhere. Since these
advanced components would serve only a minority of all participants, and
since most jurisdictions would be able to mount at least some local ac
tivities, the mobility arrangements would be required for only a small
portion of total participants in the training system and should be
feasible.
For the nationally-directed Corporate Career program, Job Corps might
serve as the administrative mechanism, since its authorization provides the
needed flexibility, mobility, and national focus. The age limitation would
have to be waived for older participants, although the most appropriate
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target group may well be young adults. The training activities themselves
would be managed with minimum red-tape by each participating corporation or
association. A private sector Job Corps contractor(s) could serve as the
intermediary management agent for the program, i.e., working to identify
and screen local candidates for the opportunities, registering and keeping
track of them during participation, and arranging for mobility and
residential support. The contractor might also have responsibility for
identifying and developing Corporate Career opportunities. Thus, the
private sector would be dealing with a compatible intermediary rather than
a government bureaucracy.
The retrenchment of Trade Adjustment Assistance activities makes it
even more critical that relocation and retraining be integrated into
regular CETA activities. Yet a stable, structurally-oriented, localized
system cannot deal well with mass layoffs, particularly when there is no
advanced warning. Retraining and relocation, which are probably the best
options for those who do not have a good chance of recall, are rarely
utilized because local training facilities are focused on local jobs, there
is limited knowledge of opportunities available elsewhere, and no help in
arranging for mobility. Therefore, a national intermediary or several
intermediaries should be supported under the direction of the Department of
Labor to provide assistance to workers, firms and communities where mass
layoffs occur. The intermediary would, as early as possible after the
announcement of the layoff and upon the request of the local prime sponsor,
provide on-site employability and skills transferability assessments for
the laid-off workers. It would have pre-packaged job search assistance
materials as well as providing funds to initiate training. A full-time
unit of the intermediary would conduct job development in areas and in
dustries where transferability would be feasible, thus establishing a
relocation job bank. Based on individual assessments of workers, the unit
would make travel and job interview arrangements, would pre-screen for the
employer and would seek to move groups of employees and their families if
possible. If training were needed, this could be financed in the original
community or in the relocation destination. Prime sponsors in the source
and recipient areas would register the trainees, with reimbursement from
national discretionary funds or reallocated funds. Alternatively, the
resources currently authorized for Title 11C upgrading and retaining, which
have not been utilized by most prime sponsors, could be reserved for such
purposes rather than allocated by formula, so that resources could be
provided instantaneously where needed most.
There are several organizational alternatives for intermediaries.
Existing groups might be utilized, such as the Manpower Demonstration
Research Corporation or Public/Private Ventures which operated supported
work and VICI respectively. National community-based organizations could
coordinate such efforts through their local chapters. Private for-profits
could serve this function as they do under Job Corps management contracts.
Quality and Stability
These next steps constitute yet another restructuring of employment
and training activities. If they are to be achieved without rupturing the
current system—which is providing training that on average is effective,
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and in some cases is exemplary--there is a need to lighten the adminis
trative burdens and to remove many of the extraneous requirements. With
the use of self-enforcing mechanisms such as the rule-of-two under try-out
OJT, the 500-hour limitation for work experience, the three-in-four
placement requirement for long-term training approaches, priority for
training completers in try-out OJT, and set-asides for the advanced
components with automatic allocation to state and national mobility
programs in the case of underspending locally, there is less need for
detailed plans and process-oriented regulations. "Occam's Razor" should be
used to eliminate the ever increasing complexities of the legislation and
regulations. Perhaps a good place to start is in the planning requirements
for CETA, given the evidence that there is very little relationship between
types of participants, area conditions, treatment strategies or outcomes
despite the mandated planning process. Quarterly reporting and review by
the federal government is not necessary and should be ended, substituting
an end-of-the-year report that includes monthly enrollment, spending and
outcomes by major category of activity. Another useful change would be to
provide two year funding for CETA. At the very least, changes are needed
in administrative rules regarding real location so that two-year contracting
can be undertaken for Career Training and Career Preparation activities.
The allocation formula should be based on hardship factors rather than
unemployment, and the allocation share might be revised every two years
rather than annually.
The Department of Labor should adopt and require uniform, multi-level
competency standards for the major areas of academic, basic life skills,
and occupational training. After review of the best curricula and
materials, it should select those most appropriate for CETA client groups,
reference them to the competency standards, and provide them to local de
livery agents upon request. For instance, the Job Corps reading and
mathematics diagnostic and achievement measurement systems might be stand
ardized for all CETA reading and mathematics programs, and all the
materials which have been referenced to these systems could be catalogued,
purchased in quantity to save costs, and provided to prime sponsors to be
used by their subagents. Likewise, for each occupational area, there would
be a ladder of skills and knowledge. The achievement of each step could be
tested or judged by successful performance of specific tasks. The
competency ladder would be established in consultation with employers and
unions and in cooperation with the Bureau of Adult and Occupational
Education in the Department of Education and the Bureau of Apprenticeship
and Training in the Department of Labor. Once established, all available
curricula from private sources as well as those developed with public
support could be screened, and referenced to each of the competency di
mensions and levels. Those in the public domain could be provided for
local use, and the best of the private materials could be recommended and
purchased in quantity to be supplied on request. State and local prime
sponsors could, and would be encouraged to, develop their own curricula for
education, vocational training and basic life skills instruction, but would
have to reference them to the standardized diagnostic and achievement
measurement systems, and would provide them to the Department of Labor so
that they could be shared with other prime sponsors. States and localities
would establish completion standards for specific components and per
formance levels required for advanced opportunities; these standards would
be referenced to the standardized diagnostic and achievement measurement
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systems, just as states now set varying requirements for the GED by
reference to nationally-standardized competency tests. Thus, local
decisionmakers would have flexibility to choose among a comprehensive array
of materials, to set standards for each component at any level along the
skills measurement hierarchies, and to develop their own materials. Yet
they would have the advantage of less expensive acquisition, savings in
materials and screening costs, and greater transferability of model
curricula.
An institutional performance review and improvement plan should occur
every two years (just as colleges are reviewed for accreditation on a
regular basis). This top-to-bottom on-site assessment approach, combined
with an analysis of performance data, is used in Job Corps. Each center
also has formal improvement plans for the use of federal capital funds,
curriculum changes, and Corpsmember projects. The approach would simply be
extended to prime sponsors (and to the Corporate Career projects). Federal
teams or contractors could conduct assessments of each discrete activity
locally. They would identify where minimum standards were not met and
improvements could be made. Developmental plans prepared by each locality
would outline the steps to improve local training capacities. The time
saved by federal personnel in reviewing current quantitatively-oriented
plans, quarterly reports and grant modifications would be used in the field
to review local institutions. Local institutional assessments might also
be conducted by citizen's review teams,of employers, educators, vocational
educators and community representatives.
The propitious coincidence of the reauthorization of vocational
education and CETA might be used to realign the decisionmaking structures
from the state level down, particularly if federal contributions to
secondary vocational eduation are reduced, leaving primary emphasis on the
post-secondary level. The states could be given the authority to designate
area "Career Investment Broken'ng Agencies" or CIBAs subject to federal
guidelines, with the proviso that jurisdictions of more than 200,000
population would automatically qualify. These CIBAs would have planning
and decisionmaking authority for both federal vocational education and CETA
funds, subject, of course, to state and federal policies. Interagency
committees might be mandated at the federal and state levels to standardize
the management information and follow-up requirements for vocational
education and CETA, as well as to develop the standards for competency
assessment and curricula. If this step were taken, the federal/state
Employment Service and the WIN program should be consolidated into this
structure.
These legislative and administative actions, by themselves, will not
produce instant or dramatic improvements in employment and training ac
tivities. In fact, it is of utmost importance that they be implemented in
a measured fashion. As the Job Corps experience demonstrated so vividly in
the 1960s, intensive and complex training programs cannot be established
overnight. Even more critically, it will take time and a constant effort
to alter behavior and thought processes in the CETA system so that it is
reoriented to accept some unfamiliar concepts such as sorting, long-term
treatment, and a focus on careers rather than just jobs. A substantial
output of long-term trainees would not be expected until the last half of
the decade even if rapid implementation followed a 1982 reauthorization.
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Yet this is also when we can expect both improved economic conditions and
declining numbers of labor force entrants. What is needed is to set the
course properly and to proceed without the constant policy changes which
have characterized employment and training efforts of the last two decades.
The sagging productivity of the 1970s, and the decline of our economic
growth relative to other developed nations, taught us the dangers of
short-term perspectives, inadequate and erratic investment in capital and
equipment, and wasteful use of scarce natural resources. The lessons are
equally applicable to human resources. The future of the economy and the
social fabric depends in great measure on our willingness to initiate, and
to follow-through with consistency, policies which will develop the skills
of those who have traditionally been discarded and ignored, but who will be
needed more in the next decade.
At least on this one issue, the prescriptions to achieve equity and
efficiency are coincident. Those who preach the supply-side Gospel, as
well as those concerned with mitigating the inequalities which have proved
resistant to short-duration interventions, should be able to find common
ground in support of more intensive training investments for persons of
limited employability.
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